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ENERGY-RELATED CARBON EMISSIONS IN IRELAND: 
SCENARIOS TO 2020 
 
Abstract 
 
The consumption of energy and related carbon emissions are a development challenge 
requiring analysis and policy insights. Current analysis of future change in Ireland relies 
on quantitative point forecasts within which accuracy is difficult to achieve. A scenario 
analysis approach has often been applied with the longer term but is also useful on 
shorter time-scales. This research applied a combination of decomposition analysis and 
scenario analysis to identify and analyse the driving forces of change in Ireland 
historically from 1990-2007 and in the future to 2020. The historical decomposition 
used the LMDI I technique and was further quantified to 2020 using an integrated 
qualitative and quantitative scenario approach to explore plausible alternative 
developments. 
  
The historical analysis gives insights at macro and sectoral level to attribute change to a 
range of structural, scale and intensity effects. The macro decomposition was based on 
an extended Kaya identity while the sectoral offers deeper insights including a detailed 
representation of transport. Since 1990 energy intensity improved substantially in the 
macro decomposition, but the sectoral decomposition shows considerable heterogeneity. 
 
The four scenarios show divergence in emissions trajectories based on alternative 
development paths. This presents in absolute emission totals but also in sectoral 
contribution. Change arises not only in technological and economic drivers but also 
through drivers such as governance and society that underpin the evolution of the 
alternative scenarios.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
1.1 The energy and emissions challenge 
Climate change and energy have risen to the top of the global scientific and 
policy agendas. These issues have particular implications for national policy and 
processes of development in general. Through the Kyoto Protocol the EU 
committed to reduce GreenHouse Gases emissions (GHG’s) to -8% of 1990 
levels over the 2008-2012 period. Under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement1 the 
target agreed for Ireland was to limit the increase in GHG emissions to +13% of 
1990 levels by 2008-2012.2 This coincided with a period of rapid development in 
Ireland. Energy demand and emissions increased as the economy grew, 
infrastructure was developed and lifestyles changed. In 2007 total GHG 
emissions were 25.0% higher than the 1990 level, of which energy related 
emissions were 66.7% (McGhettigan et al., 2009). While GHG emissions 
reached a peak in 2001, a sustained increase in transport emissions has occurred.  
 
The island of Ireland is the third largest island in Europe.3 It is divided between 
the territories of the Republic of Ireland4 and Northern Ireland. The Republic of 
                                                 
1
 Council Decision 2002/358/EC. 
 
2
 Ireland’s subsequent “post-Kyoto” target under the EU climate and energy package, and the 
Effort Sharing Decision (406/2009/EC) was to reduce GHG emissions by -20% on 2005 levels by 
2020. This target applies to the “non-traded sector,” where the ETS covers the “traded sector”. 
There is potential for the target to be deepened in the event of an ambitious global climate 
agreement. 
 
3
 The islands of the mainland UK and Iceland are the largest. 
 
2 
 
Ireland is the subject of this research and for ease of reference is referred to 
throughout the thesis as ‘Ireland’. Ireland has a temperate maritime climate and a 
small dispersed population. It is highly dependent on imported energy, 
particularly oil. Gas has increased its fuel share in the energy profile and a small 
but growing base of renewables has potential for further growth5 (OECD/ IEA, 
2007: 12). 
 
Policy decisions6 with respect to energy and emissions can benefit from insights 
into the driving forces of change and how these may evolve into the future. The 
challenge to policy transcends energy and mitigation as an integrated issue of 
sustainable development across the social, environmental and economic spheres. 
In meeting the long term objective of the UNFCCC7 comparatively affluent 
countries such as Ireland will be required to significantly reduce emissions over 
the course of the century. Should emissions experience lock-in to a higher 
emissions trajectory this requirement may become unattainable. The long-term 
nature of the energy and emissions challenge is significantly influenced by near 
                                                                                                                                    
4
 The Republic of Ireland covers approximately five sixths of the island.  
 
5
 Ireland does not have significant additional hydro potential or nuclear energy in its fuel mix. 
But it does have the potential to further develop wind energy in particular but also other 
renewables such as wave, tidal, solar and biomass. 
 
6
 Political debates and policy decisions with respect to energy and emissions arise across a wide 
spectrum requiring insight into energy and emissions change. National planning and policy 
processes including; national development policy, sustainable development, environment, energy, 
climate and technology through to issues such as spatial development, economic development, 
societal well-being and public education are relevant. Many spheres require an enhancement of 
knowledge. 
 
7
 Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 2: the 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentations in the atmosphere. 
 
3 
 
term decisions.8 Scenarios can be used to track progress by establishing which 
emissions trajectory is evolving and aid the development of policy in response. 
 
1.2 Methodological issues in exploring future change 
Insight into future change in energy and emissions for both policy and reporting 
in Ireland is based on quantitative point forecasts.9,10 The use of either 
projections or forecasts in this context can be problematic. According to van‘t 
Klooster and Van Asselt (2006), performing studies of the future of a system is 
complex since many relationships “that may seem to have developed 
continuously in retrospect, often follow a non-linear pattern in the future”. The 
authors propose that it can be legitimate to hold different and often conflicting 
perspectives on how the future may unfold. Agnolucci et al. (2009: 1655) 
suggest that the past is not necessarily a good guide for the future in the context 
of energy and emissions.11 The predictability of energy and emissions and the 
accuracy of forecasts have been called into question even on shorter time-scales. 
                                                 
8
 Due to inertia in infrastructure, technology and even culture, near term decisions can have long 
term consequences. They can embed a long term development path that limits or prevents 
emissions reductions. 
 
9
 This includes research by the ESRI on economic forecasts. This is used to informed energy 
projections to 2020 by SEI. The SEI energy projections are used by the EPA to produce CO2 
projections. In addition the ESRI produce a forecast of emissions in the Isus model and DGTREN 
produce forecasts of energy and emissions for all member states of the EU. For further details see 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
 
10
 Energy scenarios were established to 2050 for Ireland by Douthwaite et al. (2007). These were 
based on the timing of oil peak and radical effects and responses to its occurrence. These appear 
more normative and less exploratory and would not constitute baseline scenarios. They appear to 
ascribe to the more extreme interpretations of oil and gas peak described by Smil (2003), and to 
run counter to the analysis of the IEA and the IPCC in terms of the availability of energy 
resources (see Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces). This type of strategic analysis suitable for 
contingency planning is in contrast to the “inquiry-driven” analysis intended in this research. 
 
11
 Armstrong (2001: 473) discusses two key sources of uncertainty in forecasting in general. 
These are overconfidence in forecasts due to uncertainty in the causal variables in an econometric 
model and assumptions about relationships that may not hold over the forecast horizon. 
 
4 
 
In addition, at the Dublin workshop for Annex I parties on the preparation of 
fourth national communications (UNFCCC, 2004) it was suggested that in some 
cases Annex I nations need to produce additional scenarios.12  
 
The ex-post evaluation of energy or emissions forecast accuracy has not often 
been conducted. In determining energy forecast errors in IEA member countries’ 
Linderoth (2002) described large forecast errors. These sometimes conceal the 
sum of considerable positive and negative forecast errors in the sectors, 
particularly with industry and transport. The authors noted that the underestimate 
of transport can have particular consequences for emissions reduction policy. In 
looking at forecast error for the US, Winebrake and Sakva (2005) found a low 
mean percentage error for total energy consumption concealing an average 5.9% 
overestimate for the industry sector and 4.5% underestimate for the transport 
sector. In general, errors occur not only in absolute totals and sectoral 
consumption, but in GDP growth rates, energy intensity improvement and in fuel 
mix (O’ Neill and Dessai, 2003). This reduces the potential accuracy of forecasts 
of GHG emissions and as they are an input into policy processes this has 
potential further consequences. Errors can occur even on short time-scales. 
Linderoth (2002: 61) concluded that large forecast error can occur even when the 
forecast year is close to the review year.  
 
In evaluating the Gothenburg Protocol, Kelly et al. (2010) proposed that the 
forecast used for Gothenburg in 1999 had underestimated Ireland’s energy use in 
                                                 
12
 These would be in addition to using a base case point forecast with policy scenarios as required 
by UNFCCC reporting guidelines. Further scenarios would reflect e.g. differences in GDP 
growth and some non-climate-related political choices with large impact on emission trends. 
Phasing out nuclear energy was given as an example. 
5 
 
2010 by 11%.13 The population, economy and mobility activity leading to this 
growth were all underestimated. The authors concluded that rates of 
technological and behavioural change would be important factors in future 
modelling. The “Energy 2000” study of the European Community in 1985 
underestimated Ireland’s consumption of oil and gas and overestimated solid 
fuels and renewable energy in 2000 (Pilvachi et al., 2008). Pilavachi et al. found 
substantial forecast error over the EU and outlined three areas of uncertainty; 
unanticipated “strong” political decisions,14 unanticipated energy requirements15 
and data definition and availability. On a long-time scale, Smil (2000) suggested 
the abandonment of quantitative point forecasts and the use of exploratory and 
normative scenario analysis.16 On the short to medium term time scale there is a 
clear benefit in using sectorally disaggregated scenarios. These can show 
variation in absolute totals of energy consumption and emissions. They can also 
illustrate potential divergent trends in for example sectoral contribution, 
economic growth rates and energy intensity change.  
 
In more general terms, de Jouvenel (2000) proposed that simulation models 
based on observations of the past are favoured by economists, econometrists, 
                                                 
13
 In this context, the potential significance of such underestimations is not just in environmental 
protection in meeting air quality targets but also in cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis of 
measures to meet targets.  
 
14
 These decisions included those from increasing concerns of climate change and the 
introduction of feed-in tariffs in Germany. 
 
15
 Including increased transport activity and the shift to gas. 
 
16
 “There is a fundamental difference between decisions that are good only if a particular 
prediction turns out to be correct—and the ones that are good for a range of alternative futures: 
scenarios, rather than point forecasts, are thus much more valuable, both from heuristic and from 
practical points of view” (Smil, 2000: 262). 
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statisticians and forecasters. Subject to the GIGO effect,17 the accuracy or 
scientific quality of forecasts is not guaranteed where results may be arbitrary 
and subjective. “This method has long been opposed to the scenario method, 
which is more developed and used by futurists for one simple reason: better a 
rough but fair estimate than a refined yet incorrect forecast” (de Jouvenel, 2000: 
45). In addition, technological and economic realities are implicitly embedded in 
energy modelling apparatus while results are often promoted as “objective” 
(Neilsen and Karlsson, 2007: 311). Midttun and Baumgartner (1986) termed this 
combination of modelling and politics as “the scientific negotiation of energy 
futures”. It increases the need for not only reproducible results and published 
models, but transparent assumptions and dynamics in energy and emissions 
modelling studies.  
 
Even on a short time-frame, uncertainty in GHG and CO2 projections can arise. 
This uncertainty is a challenge to probabilistic and predictive methodologies and 
suggests that scenarios have utility in bounding uncertainty. While forecasts are 
useful, they can also give an illusion of certainty. The continual revision of the 
CO2 and energy projections for Ireland since the advent of the recession (EPA, 
2009), illustrates some of the methodological difficulties encountered by 
forecasting. 
 
An additional methodological challenge for Ireland arises in response to the 
increase in emissions from transport since 1990. In the In-Depth Review (IDR) 
of Ireland’s third national communication to the UNFCCC, Rolle et al. (2005) 
                                                 
17
 Garbage In Garbage Out. 
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recommend that changes in GHG emissions be linked to changes in modal split 
and changes in passenger kilometres (p-km) for passenger transport and tonne 
kilometres (t-km) for freight transport. The review team specifically 
recommended explicit modelling of changes in modal split and distance. In the 
context of decomposition analysis, Ang and Zhang (2000: 1171) suggest the 
advancement of the methodology by the use of the LMDI I technique specifically 
to measure these indicators of the physical efficiency of transport.18 
 
1.3 Decomposing the driving forces of change 
There is a scientific consensus that humans have dramatically altered the global 
environment, but we have a limited knowledge of the driving forces of these 
impacts. The absence of a set of refined analytical tools is cited as a key 
limitation (York et al., 2003). Tools for analysis have evolved in the field of 
decomposition analysis, including the framework for sustainability known as 
IPAT of Commoner (1972) and Ehrlich and Holdren (1972), to the specific 
application with energy and CO2 in the Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990). The 
decomposition of changes in an aggregate environmental impact to its driving 
forces has become popular in disentangling the relationship of society and 
economy with the environment.  
 
Similar conceptual underpinnings can be found in the field of Index 
Decomposition Analysis (IDA). With the arrival of the world oil crisis in 1973 
and 1974 considerable attention was placed on industry energy use among 
                                                 
18
 Measuring physical efficiency of transport based on p-km and t-km. 
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policy-makers as industrial energy constituted the largest share of primary energy 
demand in most countries. Research began to focus on the mechanisms of change 
in industrial energy use. This new area of research emerged to quantify the 
impact of a structural shift in industrial production on total energy demand. 
These initial studies showed a significant impact of structural change on energy 
demand trends. The need to identify and quantify its impact became an 
imperative for policy-making. This line of research has since expanded 
substantially in terms of methodology and application, and “is now a widely 
accepted analytical tool for policymaking on national energy and environmental 
issues” (Ang, 2004: 1131). It is particularly useful given the analysis of the 
contributing factors such as structural change and energy intensity change. The 
decomposition of a pre-defined set of factors helps to understand the progression 
of driving forces, the impact of major processes occurring and policy dimensions 
tied to these processes (Steenhof et al., 2006).19 
 
The scope of application of IDA has expanded beyond industrial energy demand 
analysis to cross country and sectoral energy and environmental analysis. 
Measurements of energy efficiency are required by EU directive 2006/32/EC20 
and can be robustly achieved by tools such as the LMDI I technique of IDA 
(Ang, 2004). At the Dublin workshop of the UNFCCC (2004) participants noted 
particular interest in the decomposition analysis approach reported in the In-
                                                 
19
 The authors also proposed that this would allow a rationalisation for possible progression into 
the future. 
 
20
 The Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services Directive (2006/32/EC) seeks a 9% 
improvement in the energy efficiency to be achieved by each member state from 2008-2016. It 
defines energy efficiency as “a ratio between an output of performance, service, goods or energy, 
and an input of energy”. 
 
9 
 
Depth Review of Germany.21 In the context of national circumstances and 
emission inventories, indicators of key drivers of emissions could be established 
using this approach. 
 
 With the growing concern over the impacts of CO2 emissions on 
global climate change, many researchers have attempted to 
identify and quantify the underlying driving forces that affect 
changes of aggregate CO2 emissions in a country/region. 
Technically, this can be done by decomposing the change of 
aggregate emissions into some pre-defined factors using 
decomposition analysis. 
          (Zhou and Ang, 2008). 
 
The development of policy and the reporting and monitoring of progress22 is 
contingent on appropriate analytical tools for which purpose index 
decomposition analysis has been advanced. The need for policy insights from 
IDA has primarily focussed on historical analysis of driving forces. While 
decomposition techniques such as IPAT can be used to forecast future change in 
                                                 
21
 According to the workshop report (UNFCCC, 2004), using indicators from index 
decomposition analysis could explain problems and success stories and separate the effects of 
structural changes; “this method allowed assessment in quantitative terms and the separation of 
effects on emissions from improvements in energy efficiency, changes in the energy supply mix, 
and growth in population and the gross domestic product (GDP)”. Examples were given 
including; Hans- Ziesing, H.J., 2003: CO2 emissions in 2002 – only a slight reduction. Economic 
Bulletin of the German Institute for Economic Research 40 (4): 121–130. Schleich, J., 
Eichhammer, W., Boede, U., Gagelmann, F., Jochem, E., Schlomann, B., Ziesing, H.J., 2001: 
Greenhouse gas reductions in Germany – lucky strike or hard work? Climate Policy 1, 363–380. 
Kaivo-oja, J., Luukkanen, J., 2004: The European Union balancing between CO2 reduction 
commitments and growth policy: Decomposition analyses, Energy Policy 32, 1511–1530. 
 
22
 The reporting and monitoring of national and overall EU progress is required by the UNFCCC. 
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driving forces (Waggoner and Ausubel, 2002), IDA in particular is at the cusp of 
a new application in scenario analysis and forecasting. In establishing areas for 
further research in IDA, Ang and Zhang (2000: 1171) suggested its use in 
projecting future energy demand and emissions. Sun (2001) used a complete 
decomposition method to forecast GHG emissions of the EU 15 to 2010. Sorrell 
et al. (2009: 3128) recommended further research to use the decomposition 
framework for scenario development.23 Although both IDA of energy and 
emissions, and scenario analysis in the context of energy emissions are often 
based on the Kaya framework, the combination of these approaches has not often 
been applied. Four recent studies have combined these approaches; Agnolucci et 
al. (2009), Kwon (2005), Steenhof (2007) and Steenhof et al. (2006).  
 
Agnolucci et al. (2009) used a backcasting approach to scenarios and projected 
decomposition ratios24. This approach was used to generate a predefined outcome 
in 2050 to discuss how the ratios could be altered to reach future targets through 
public policy. Kwon (2005: 179) used scenario analysis to quantify future CO2 
emissions from car travel in the United Kingdom to 2030 using the IPAT 
framework. Kwon constructed a BAU scenario and alternatives by making 
assumptions on the development of each of the factors in the identity. Steenhof 
(2007) used the Laspeyre’s IDA approach to construct baselines for China’s 
electricity sector in 2020. Steenhof used a BAU, conservative and optimistic 
scenario, with time series analysis in the decomposition (every two years rather 
                                                 
23
 Sorrell et al. (2009) used the LMDI I method specifically in the context of decomposing road 
freight energy use in the UK. 
 
24
 Using the Kaya identity and not an IDA scheme. 
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than beginning and end year). Steenhof et al. (2006) also combines 
decomposition analysis25 and scenarios in projecting Canadian freight GHG’s in 
the short term to 2012. Decomposition analysis was conducted on the historical 
pattern to understand the drivers and scenario analysis provided the means to 
manipulate these drivers into the future. Once again BAU, optimistic and 
pessimistic scenarios were used.  
 
In the research detailed in this thesis on the energy related carbon emissions of 
Ireland the specific combination of the LMDI I technique of IDA with 
exploratory scenario analysis26 appears to be unique in the literature. The Kaya 
identity (Kaya, 1990) is the underlying framework that links the driving forces of 
change through both the decomposition analysis27 and the scenario analysis. 
 
1.4 Scenario analysis 
Scenario analysis has a rich history in an increasing number of sectors and 
disciplines (Van Notten et al., 2003: 423). It is a tool to deal with uncertainty 
employed by business, academia, organisations and governments (Nielsen and 
Karlsson, 2007: 303). Scenario analysis has been increasingly applied with 
                                                 
25
 To look at activity, structure and intensity using a decomposition approach that leaves a 
residual. 
 
26
 Exploratory scenario analysis explores plausible alternative scenarios without relying on the 
continuation of historical trends. This is contrast to the back-casting approach and the use of 
BAU and alternatives documented above. Borjeson et al. (2006: 727) define exploratory 
scenarios as responding to the question “what can happen?” This is in contrast to positing “what 
will happen?” through predictive forecast or projection of existing trends in Business As Usual, 
or “what should happen?” in normative scenarios or backcasting. 
 
27
 The LMDI I technique (Ang, 2004) for the analysis of energy and emission changes is often 
developed from the Kaya framework. LMDI I is the decomposition methodology employed in 
this thesis. 
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energy due to the difficulties in providing accurate forecasts (Silberglitt et al., 
2003), and the need for tools for imagining, discussing, and preparing for equally 
‘plausible’ futures. Specifically with environmental scenario analysis, including 
energy and emissions, these two streams could be respectively described as 
“inquiry-driven” and “strategy-driven” (Alcamo et al., 2008).28  Inquiry-driven 
scenario analysis is conducted to meet the needs of the scientific community 
through expanding knowledge and as an input into policy analysis. Strategy-
driven scenario analysis stems primarily from the business community for 
corporate planning. The scientific credibility of these scenarios is sometimes 
dismissed although these types of scenarios are not necessarily intending 
scientific credibility. 
 
Scenarios allow structured thinking on the future based on the evolution of 
aspects such as driving forces, trends, themes, events and cause-effect logics. 
With the scenario analysis approach the objective is not prediction, but to 
construct and articulate several different futures and the paths to them (Borjeson 
et al., 2006: 724). The advancement of the science of climate change has 
required insight into future climate changes and impacts. This is partially 
dependent on the evolution of human factors such as anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. Given the uncertainty of future development, scenarios were used in 
the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the appropriate tool for the exploration of 
the future evolution of global GHG emissions to 2100. As many biophysical and 
social systems are complex in evolution and poorly understood, the scenarios 
                                                 
28
 These threads seem to provide a concise typology but are described by Alcamo (2008: 5) as 
“only caricatures of scenario types”. 
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were neither predictions nor forecasts but were used to explore equally plausible 
images of future development (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 62). The scenarios were 
used as linking tools that integrate qualitative narratives or storylines and 
quantitative modelling.29 Scenarios are also used by intergovernmental bodies 
such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the European Environment 
Agency (EEA). 
 
Existing scenario exercises have tended to focus on the longer term in a world of 
great uncertainty (Nielsen and Karlsson, 2007: 303). Nevertheless, as outlined 
earlier, even on the short-to-medium term the application of the scenario analysis 
methodology has scientific credence and potential policy utility. The exploratory 
scenario analysis applied in this research allows the development of a set of 
plausible alternative scenarios of the evolution of energy CO2 in Ireland to 2020. 
These scenarios explore the evolution of driving forces both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. This bounds uncertainty in response to issues of forecast accuracy 
provides insights into driving forces of change and explores the potential 
contribution of the sectors to total change in emissions. 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
The application of scenario analysis in the short-to-medium term is intended to 
develop insights into plausible future change without additional policy as 
inquiry-driven scenario analysis. While the decomposition analysis gives insights 
                                                 
29
 Swart et al. (2004: 139) discussed how in ‘sustainability science’ the utility of scenario 
analysis is complimented by the imperative of the qualitative element; “to elevate non-
quantifiable cultural, institutional and value aspects of the integrated system is required to avoid 
limiting the analysis to quantifiable aspects which are not necessarily the most crucial”. 
14 
 
into historical change, the combination with scenario analysis in this study gives 
rise to the following research objectives: 
 
1. To identify and analyse the historical pattern of energy CO2 in 
Ireland by applying two levels of decomposition analysis at the 
macro and sectoral level. 
2. To broaden and deepen this analysis through the qualitative and 
quantitative discussion of the evolution and interaction of scenario 
driving forces of future change in Ireland similar to the SRES. 
3. To develop a set of integrated qualitative and quantitative baseline 
scenarios at both macro and sectoral level to explore plausible 
alternative development of energy CO2 to 2020 in Ireland. 
 
The originality and contribution to knowledge is found in a number of aspects of 
the research. Decomposition analysis has been applied to Ireland primarily in 
pan-European studies e.g. Kaivo-Oja and Luukkanen (2004), Diakoulaki and 
Mandaraka (2007) and Tapio et al. (2007). National application of related 
methods includes the ODEX methodology of Dennehy et al. (2009)30 and the 
environmental input-output approach of O’ Doherty and Tol (2007).31 
Specifically LMDI I, as the “preferred” IDA technique (Ang, 2004) has only 
been applied to Irish industry (Cahill and Ó Gallachoir, 2009). This study uses 
                                                 
30
 This gave a detailed representation of industry by sub-branch but an aggregated transport 
sector. It analysed separate services and residential sectors but with no characterisation of public 
services or agriculture. The ODEX methodology was developed under the ODYSSEE project 
<www.ODYSSEE-indicators.org/> but does not use the “preferred” DA approach LMDI I (Ang, 
2004). 
 
31
 This used an environmental input-output model for Ireland for the year 2000 and a projection 
to 2020. This model forecast emissions, waste and water use for the economic sectors with 
transport characterised as an economic sector and no representation of the residential sector. 
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exploratory scenarios in the short to medium term, in contrast to the traditional 
use of scenarios on a longer time-frame. Ang and Zhang (2000:1171) and Sorrell 
et al. (2009:3128), have suggested the use of decomposition analysis to project 
future energy and gas emissions and as a basis for scenario development 
respectively. This study combines decomposition analysis with scenario analysis 
which has not often been applied. This allowed the development of a set of 
integrated exploratory baseline emission scenarios for Ireland. The scenarios 
show considerable divergence in plausible trends, in contrast to the existing 
quantitative point forecast approach. The study offers potential longer-term 
insights through the exploration of scenario driving forces in Chapter 5, and also 
in the divergence in the development path that occurs in the scenarios. 
 
1.6 Preview of findings 
The following preview of findings focuses on results derived from the historical 
DA, the driving force exploration and the scenarios. From the macro historical 
DA results, as expected, scale growth in the economy was the most significant 
driving force acting to increase energy CO2 emissions. The energy intensity 
effect was the most significant effect acting to decrease emissions. The effect of 
population growth was comparatively minor but has been growing in importance 
in recent years. While the renewable energy penetration effect was minor it has 
also been growing in recent years and the fuel substitution effect contributed to 
limiting emissions growth throughout the historical period.  
 
The sectoral decomposition analysis shows considerable heterogeneity in the 
sectors and gives deeper insight into the processes underlying the energy 
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intensity improvement in the macro DA. Industry energy intensity improved 
significantly and is attributed to structural change. The other economic sectors 
showed an improvement in the energy intensity of services but an increase in 
intensity in the public services and agriculture sectors. The fuel substitution and 
renewable energy effects were minor across the final consumption sectors. The 
key issue for mitigation policy in Ireland, transport, increased in emissions due to 
two key processes; scale growth in total transport activity and increasing energy 
intensity. This is particularly notable in the road transport categories of private 
car, road freight and public passenger. The residential sector has been successful 
in limiting the increase in emissions primarily through improvement in energy 
intensity.  
 
In the period to 2020 population is expected to continue to grow in Ireland, 
whether due to economic growth or perceived income disparities encouraging 
immigration. Energy resources are deemed adequate in the near-term, while 
changes in the fuel mix in Ireland in the absence of policy change would still be 
expected to arise with increasing gas consumption. Economic growth is expected 
to return in the post-recession recovery period, but the timing, rate, nature and 
structure of this recovery is uncertain. Existing policies in Ireland have had a 
limited impact in reducing emissions. The economic development model has 
been relatively successful through energy extensive development, while spatial 
and transport development has acted to increase emissions. The evolution of 
future governance can manifest in stronger or weaker sustainability with distinct 
consequences for the sustainability concepts of immaterialisation, 
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dematerialisation and decarbonisation. This is characterised in the development 
path and manifests in the emissions trajectory. 
 
The heterogeneous trends evident in the historical analysis illustrate an important 
point in the analysis of energy emissions. It is not necessarily the actual rate of 
economic growth that is important, but the nature and structure of economic 
growth and wider societal development that is significant in determining 
emissions. The relationship of the economy and society to energy and emissions 
can be significantly altered by processes of immaterialisation, dematerialisation 
and decarbonisation.32  
 
In the context of the scenarios, emissions trajectories diverge based not just on 
alternative economic growth rates, but on the nature and structure of growth. The 
development pathway can be established in either higher or lower intensity forms 
of economic, transport and residential evolution. The manifestation of 
sustainability in the development path also influences societal choices towards 
the deployment of renewable energy and fuel switching on the demand-side but 
requires additional policy on the supply-side. The preferences of citizens can 
influence not only personal consumption but also the predilection of governance 
towards stronger or weaker conceptions of sustainability. In the scenarios those 
of stronger sustainability tend towards economic growth in services and mobility 
in less energy intensive forms. Those scenarios of weaker sustainability tend 
towards growth in industry, related road freight and the private car for personal 
mobility. The alternative development paths described in the scenarios manifest 
                                                 
32
 See Tapio et al. (2007). 
18 
 
in divergent emissions trajectories. The policy significance of these alternatives 
is in the potential to limit growth in emissions by following higher sustainability 
pathways in development in general. It also lies in the potential implementation 
of additional energy and mitigation policy to maximise emission reductions and 
the tracking of progress through the alignment of actual emission trends with the 
trajectories under each of the scenarios. The scientific significance of the results 
is in the divergent emission totals and the divergent sectoral patterns that lead to 
these totals even on the timescale to 2020. 
 
1.7 Overview of thesis chapters 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters and seven appendices. The following 
Chapter 2 discusses the technique of scenario analysis in more detail to give an 
overview of methodological considerations in applying the technique. This draws 
on examples of scenario analysis applied internationally in combining qualitative 
and quantitative methods in the development of integrated scenarios. An 
appropriate framework is required to identify and discuss the scenario driving 
forces which are structured through axes and logics in the development of the 
scenario narratives. In Chapter 3 the technique of decomposition analysis is 
further discussed. Decomposition analysis employs a range of techniques in 
quantifying historical change, the appropriate technique must be identified and a 
suitable identity must be constructed to measure the chosen effects at the macro 
and sectoral levels. The chapter also discusses data requirements and the 
quantification of the scenarios through the decomposition model. Chapter 4 
presents and discusses the results of the historical decomposition analysis at the 
macro and sectoral levels. The various data sources for the analysis are also 
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discussed, as well as the approach used in overcoming data gaps. In Chapter 5 
the scenario driving forces are discussed to explore their evolution and 
interaction. Various international literature was complimented by national 
literature where possible and appropriate, to place the discourse in an Irish 
context and includes various projections and forecasts. The integrated qualitative 
and quantitative scenarios of Irish energy CO2 to 2020 are presented and 
discussed in Chapter 6. These baseline scenarios illustrate alternative plausible 
developments based on the evolution of the development path and the divergent 
emissions trajectories that result. A synthesis of the sectoral results is detailed 
and although the scenarios are not predictions, they are compared with the results 
of existing national forecasts for plausibility. The narrative and quantification of 
the macro scenarios is also presented. In Chapter 7 conclusions are drawn from 
research findings and areas for further research and limitations are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2: SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Presented in this section is the scenario analysis methodology applied within the 
research. The generation of the scenarios includes both the qualitative scenario 
narrative or ‘storyline’ and the quantitative modelling process. This section 
documents the general characteristics of scenarios and scenario generation and 
specifics of developing qualitative narratives from the scenario driving forces. 
The quantitative modelling of the scenarios is described in more detail in Chapter 
3 Decomposition Analysis. 
 
2.2 Applying scenario analysis to energy emissions  
As discussed in Chapter 1 Introduction and Background, the primary function of 
national emission and energy scenarios in this research is to respond to 
uncertainty and potentially to develop strategic insights for policy. In the 
literature scenarios are used for a plethora of purposes. It is the objectives of the 
exercise that dictates the process used and the characteristics of the scenarios 
developed. The terminology used in describing possible future conditions in the 
context of emissions is often interchangeable in the literature. Holmes (2007: 13) 
clarifies some important distinctions. Whereas projections, project forward past 
trends and forecasts are predictive and seek to determine the most likely future, 
scenarios look at diverging trends and the potential unfolding of new dynamics. 
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Rather than prediction, scenarios seek to describe a ‘spectrum of possibility’. 
This is a bounded envelope of probability that covers the range of plausible 
outcomes. Environmental and emission scenarios are used in contexts where 
dynamic complex systems are subject to uncertainties. These uncertainties 
include inadequate scientific understanding, data gaps and the inherent 
uncertainties of future events (Nakicenovic, 2000: 149).  Often forecasts and 
projections are based on producing ‘Business As Usual’ (BAU) or central ‘best 
guess’ estimates and the high/ low or optimistic/ pessimistic variants of these.  
Alternatively formulating a range of emission scenarios is an appropriate 
technique to encompass uncertainties and deliver policy insights according to 
Nakicenovic. An issue that arises with the use of scenarios is the preoccupation 
of decision-makers with the quantitative point forecasts of single ‘most likely’ 
estimates. While this can reflect an ease of understanding of single estimates, or 
simply what decision-makers are accustomed to, these forecasts can also reflect a 
particular set of values or interests promoted as ‘objective’ information.33 This 
preoccupation with point forecasts may not be appropriate to either scientific 
inquiry34 or to strategic thinking in decision-making, but it is a practice issue for 
scenarios. The audience may have difficulty in grasping alternative dynamics and 
alternative futures in scenarios. This praxis issue is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
                                                 
33
 Nielsen and Karlsson (2007:311) discuss a science-policy nexus issue as technological and 
economic rationalities are implicitly embedded in models. This opens the question of the world-
view, values and philosophy underpinning supposedly ‘objective’ scientific information. This 
information can reflect specific futures that are profitable or preferable to certain interests or can 
be used to legitimise results rather than guide policy. Using scenarios offers an approach to make 
world views more explicit, through the description of underlying themes in narratives. They can 
also potentially be used to document assumptions used in modelling. 
 
34
 Smil (2003: 121) is severely critical of long-term quantitative point forecasts due to a “dismal” 
forecasting record and “false” insights that are potentially counterproductive. The author suggests 
exploratory forecasts of a range of plausible alternatives as a “sensible approach” but places 
particular emphasis on contingency and normative scenarios. 
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2.3 Qualitative and quantitative approaches 
The issue of “complex problems’’35 has a particular salience in the context of 
emission scenarios and suggests the use of ‘complex scenarios’ in analysis (van 
Notten et al., 2003:428). This involves combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods in the analysis of trends but also underlying themes. The evolution of 
complex non-linear processes can be explored by alternative dynamics beyond 
trend extrapolations and ‘dynamics as usual’.  
  
A dualism in emission scenarios has existed in two largely non-overlapping 
streams of inquiry through quantitative modelling and qualitative narratives 
(Fisher et al., 2007: 174). The main differences between model based and non-
model based scenarios is the technical and economic detail in the former and 
social, political and cultural developments in the latter (Neilsen and Karlsson, 
2007: 305). While these are seen as separate challenges, recent developments in 
scenario analysis seek to bridge this gap (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). The key 
characteristics of these two approaches have been outlined by Morita et al. 
(2001: 120);  
 
Qualitative scenarios are literary exercises aimed at 
holistic integrated sketches of the future […] have a 
greater power to posit system shifts, surprise and to 
include critical factors that defy quantification such as 
                                                 
35
 “Complex problems” are described by Van Asselt (2000) as a tangled web of problems (multi-
problem), the issues concerned transcend disciplines (multi-dimensional) and underlying 
processes interact at various scales (multi-scale). Although this may not always be prominent in 
scenario analysis with a narrow focus or short term perspective, it is a worthy consideration in 
emission scenarios given the breadth and depth of complexity and uncertainty evident. 
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values, cultural shifts and institutional features […] on 
the other hand qualitative scenarios may appear arbitrary, 
idiosyncratic and weakly supported […] quantitative 
formal models seek mathematical representation of key 
features of human and/or environmental systems in order 
to represent the evolution of the system under alternative 
assumptions […] are useful for examining futures that 
result from variations of quantitative driving variables, 
and they offer a systematic and replicable basis for 
analysis. 
 
The limits of deterministic modelling and descriptive analyses shown in the first 
decades of emission scenarios have seen the advancement in the literature of the 
synthesis of approaches as a way forward (Fisher et al., 2007:175). The 
combination of these two approaches can make scenarios more robust (van 
Notten et al., 2003:431) and give structural variance and methodological 
diversity to the approach (Morita et al., 2001: 121). Following this synthesis 
approach, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, scenarios are linking tools of qualitative 
narratives about the future and quantitative formulations based on modelling. 
These integrated scenarios consider the complex interplay and evolution of the 
system across and within alternatives. They also have a function in 
communication and aid mitigation analysis and policy-making, by explaining the 
‘all important’ social, political and technological context (Nakicenovic et al., 
2000: 70). The use of the narratives to structure thinking on the alternative 
development pathways not only makes scenarios more believable but can ensure 
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that they do not become an arbitrary numerical combination of quantitative 
variables. In parallel, the quantitative scenarios are complimentary to the 
qualitative narratives. They are used to check  consistency, to provide relevant 
numerical information, and to “enrich” the qualitative scenarios by showing 
trends and dynamics not anticipated by the storylines (Alcamo et al., 2005: 148). 
 
Figure 2-1 SRES schematic of alternative scenario formulations 
 
Source: Nakicenovic et al. (2000: 64) 
 
Each narrative scenario or storyline is a qualitative description of how key 
features diverge and are connected to each other (e.g. population growth, 
economic growth, technological development and policies). Depending on the 
logic of the scenario, certain developments are amplified or deemphasised. This 
non-probabilistic assessment does not present any of the scenarios as more or 
less likely. In “Session 3: Overview of scenario aspects; what types are most 
effective for what purposes?” of the IPCC’s Laxenburg expert meeting on 
emission scenarios (IPCC, 2005:8), Richard Moss  proposes two approaches to 
uncertainty in scenario analysis; i) using narratives, and ii) using probabilistic 
approaches. Using probabilistic assessment on scenarios can negate the benefit of 
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using the technique by focussing attention on a single ‘likely’ future. The JRC-
IPTS (2008) advises against using probabilities, while Schnarrs and Ziamou 
(2001: 29) state that most practitioners are against assigning probabilities as “the 
very essence of scenario analysis is to avoid such false exactness”. The European 
Environment Agency (2000: 10) discusses how the use of variations on a single 
scenario is less desirable than an approach that incorporates multiple perspectives 
through divergent scenarios. The authors also recommend that integration is 
crucial in viewing future developments and is based on interdiscipliniarity; 
 
A minimum condition to arrive at an integrated 
evaluation of the future is that the underlying scenario 
development process be interdisciplinary. 
Interdisciplinarity implies an original combination 
derived from the integration of multidisciplinary ideas or 
methods that permits explanation or assessment not 
achievable of non-integrated application of 
multidisciplinary ideas or tools. 
 
2.4 The evolution of dynamics 
The approaches to scenario analysis could be described as an inductive or 
bottom-up  trends approach where scenarios emerge step by step from the data, 
and a deductive top-down approach where the scenario narrative is constructed 
from the framework devised to begin with (JRC-IPTS, 2008). Scenario themes 
describe the nature of variables, dynamics and interconnections through 
approaches such as actors, factors and sectors (Rotmans et al., 2000). The 
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dynamics explored may have considerable impact on future emissions based on 
their evolution and interaction occurring as events and processes, and are 
discernable in the system today. The interactions could be described as 
synergistic or emergent behaviour36, where the complex combination of driving 
forces is greater than the sum of its parts. The use of ‘exploratory scenarios’ 
deliberately explores what might happen if the development of the scenario 
driving forces take a particular direction (Borjeson et al., 2006: 727). Exploratory 
scenarios look at structural uncertainty. A type of sensitivity analysis uses 
different combinations of input data in each of the scenarios (e.g. economic 
growth and sectoral shares) to explore data uncertainty. This potentially 
addresses an issue with optimising modelling used with energy and emissions, 
which risk producing thinking entrenched in current dynamics of “solutions, 
possibilities and limitations” (Borjeson et al., 2006). The editorial essay of 
Lempert et al. (2004) points to significant methodological issues in the climate 
change field, with implications for energy and emissions modelling. Due to deep 
uncertainty, the limitations of probability approaches and the multidimensional 
problem character, climate change “is not even theoretically optimizable”.  
 
In the development of exploratory scenarios van der Heijden (1996: 213) 
proposes linking historical and present events with hypothetical futures. Alcamo 
(2001: 7-8) describes this as ‘step-wise changes’ of driving forces, as the main 
factors that influence change. In the quantitative process, values for these driving 
forces must be assumed by modellers or taken from other studies. For the 
                                                 
36
 For discussion of complexity, unpredictability and emergent behaviour see for example; 
Funtowicz et al. (1998), Auyang  (1998) and Ormerod (2005), and for the implications of 
‘systems thinking’ Batty and Torrens (2005) and Hjorth and Bagheri (2006). 
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purposes of emission scenarios, scenario driving forces are defined by the Kaya 
identity (Kaya, 1990; Yamaji et al., 1991).37 
 
The “macro-bias” evident in many scenarios (Geels, 2002), occurs where 
scenarios excessively depend on macro-aspects (e.g. economic growth and oil 
price). The logics are top-down, and processes at meso and micro level are 
determined by dominant macro dynamics affecting the system. Schoonenboom 
& Van Latensteijn (1997) identified a related problem where the dynamic and 
outcome of scenarios are unsurprising and “somewhat tautological”. In 
discussing these problems (Elzen et al., 2002: 9) recommends incorporating 
sectoral dynamics for the inclusion of meso and micro dynamics, “where 
different actor groups (e.g. firms, users, public authorities, universities)” are 
involved in learning processes, social networks, lifestyles and worldviews.  
 
2.5 Scenario characteristics 
Given the diversity of fields now using scenarios, the processes, content and 
structure of scenarios developed vary significantly. Although scenario typologies 
are evolving (e.g. van Notten et al., 2003, Borjeson et al., 2005), there is no 
common theoretical and methodological framework for scenario analysis 
(Nielsen and Karlsson, 2007: 315). The characteristics of scenarios, the 
framework and process used and the form of the scenarios are determined by the 
goals of the exercise (Alcamo, 2001: 29). Given the multitude of variations in 
scenario exercises it may be useful to clarify some scenario characteristics.  
 
                                                 
37
 See section 2.6 for further discussion. 
34 
 
Various definitions of emission scenarios are present in the literature. The 
definition adopted for the purposes of this research is taken from the SRES 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 594); “A plausible description of how the future may 
develop based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions 
("scenario logic") about key relationships and driving forces”. The SRES also 
clarifies that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts. A number of 
characteristics of “good” scenarios have been proposed by (Alcamo, 2001: 24); 
 
i) firstly, that the scenarios fulfil the objectives of the exercise,  
ii) are transparent and sufficiently documented to be understood,  
iii) are plausible (or ‘not implausible’),  
iv) are internally consistent (can be shown by model),  
v) challenge beliefs or broaden the understanding of decision-
makers, and, 
vi) are ‘rich’ to convey diverse information and provide insights into 
non-linear or interrupted trends. 
 
The JRC-IPTS (2008) recommend five core criteria to guide the scenario 
process: 
1. Plausibility: The selected scenarios must be plausible, this means 
that they must fall within the limits of what might conceivably 
happen.  
2. Differentiation: they should be structurally different, meaning that 
they should not be so close to one another that they become 
simply variations of a base case.  
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3. Consistency: They must be internal consistent. The combination 
of logics in a scenario must not have any built-in inconsistency 
that would undermine the credibility of the scenario.  
4. Decision making utility: Each scenario, and all scenarios as a set, 
should contribute specific insights into the future that will allow 
on the decision focus that was selected.  
5. Challenge: the scenarios should challenge the organisation's 
conventional wisdom about the future. 
 
In contrast, Van der Heijden (1996: 187) offers a looser interpretation and 
proposes the following criteria; to be plausible, consistent and give a relevant 
new perspective. The author proposes that apart from these general rules the 
scenario planner has flexibility in deciding how to construct the scenarios and 
what organising principles to apply. While the guidance above implies key 
characteristics of robust scenarios, methodological issues remain. The nature of 
these issues is dependent on the objectives of the analysis. Within this research, 
the primary objective is to explore uncertainty and alternative plausible 
outcomes, as “inquiry-driven scenario analysis” (Alcamo, 2009). A secondary 
objective is to potentially offer policy insights.  Focussing purely on policy 
insights could be characterised as per Alcamo as “strategy-driven scenario 
analysis”.38  
 
                                                 
38
 Alcamo (2009: 5) refers to these two threads of environmental scenario analysis as 
“caricatures” of scenario types. 
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Internal consistency within scenarios is an organising principle frequently stated 
in the scenarios literature. Mander et al. (2008: 2759) argue against the use of 
internal consistency within scenarios, proposing that consistency is not “a 
consistent feature of society”. The methodological requirements of logical 
causality and consistency may be limiting factors in this respect, as paradoxical 
simultaneous trends and counter-trends may emerge (Postma and Liebl, 2005: 
167). A number of potential responses to this issue are offered by the authors39 
including using recombined trends and the quantitative approach of Lempert et 
al. (2003). In general, the search for consistency as an organising principle is 
more relevant to exploratory and/or quantitative scenarios, with the prime aim of 
establishing a plausible range. Establishing consistency helps to apply bounds to 
the stretching of the range, particularly where the extremes of the range are 
provided for by the scenario axes technique. If the higher priority of the study is 
to examine the complex interaction of driving forces, consistency becomes 
demoted as an organising principle. Examining inconsistency can be used to 
examine complex interaction of existing dynamics, or unfolding of potential new 
dynamics. New dynamics would widen scope towards lower plausibility 
outcomes. This interplay of consistency and plausibility, and the method to 
resolve depends on the goals of the exercise. A relevant consideration is that the 
structured process of exploratory scenarios seeks to analyse but not predict 
complexity and uncertainty. By this, it gives a picture of alternative plausible 
developments that may not occur, but should cover the plausible range. This 
amounts to an approach to engaging with uncertainty in scenario analysis, and 
given the conflicts, merits further research in the methodological literature. 
                                                 
39
 Inconsistency analysis and wildcards are also recommended see Postma and Liebl (2005). 
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Inconsistency or unfolding of paradoxical developments is explored by Postma 
and Liebl (2005) through “inconsistency analysis”. 
 
The issues of surprise, catastrophe and wildcards are important considerations 
that influence the range of “plausible” outcomes. Again the objectives of the 
scenario exercise dictate the approach. As prescribed in the SRES, the scenarios 
are not devised for contingency or emergency planning that includes wildcards or 
catastrophes. Plausibility is determined by the analysis of the historical and 
current situation, potential evolution of driving forces discerned from the 
literature and comparison with existing forecasts. Hence, wildcards and 
catastrophes and the strategic implications of these are outside of the scope of 
this research. This deliberate exclusion of low probability events and extremes 
places emphasis on mapping the range of “plausible futures”. Schnarrs and 
Ziamou (2001: 28) have advised against producing excessively wide spans for 
the scenarios, and therefore excluding extremes, as it is “too-safe” to look at 
wide spans. While it increases the likelihood that the true future state will not be 
missed, scenarios with very wide spans of estimates are “practically useless,” as 
the concerns of Smil (2003) reflect.  
 
A distinction must be made between future-forward “exploratory scenarios” and 
future-backward “backcasting” or “anticipatory” scenarios (Nielsen and 
Karlsson, 2007, Alcamo, 2001). In descriptive exploratory scenarios the goal is 
open-ended exploration of alternative evolutions and not pathways to utopias or 
dystopias or optimistic and pessimistic routes. This is the “neutral” objective of 
the scenarios. Developments within the scenarios may be viewed as either 
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positive or negative, depending on perspective. “Backcasting” scenarios are more 
normative and prescriptive by deliberately assigning a preferred or pre-destined 
future and working back to the present. A further distinction is made with 
baseline or non-intervention verses policy scenarios. Baseline scenarios explore 
evolution without additional energy and mitigation policies and measures 
(PAM’s). PAM’s may be tested using the baseline scenarios as part of mitigation 
analysis. The emerging complication is that even baseline emission scenarios 
must include at least some explicit energy and mitigation policies, particularly 
due to the Kyoto Protocol entering into force in 2005 (Fisher et al., 2007: 174). 
 
Time scale is a key consideration in bounding the scope of the scenario exercise 
as is the spatial scale. The difficulties experienced with forecasting accuracy as 
detailed in Chapter 1 Introduction and Background, suggests that it is useful to 
use exploratory scenarios even on short to medium-term time scales, particularly 
as short –term decisions may have long term consequences. The time and spatial 
scale of this research is straightforward. Due to both its policy relevance and 
emission reporting requirements it concerns the development of energy carbon 
emissions in Ireland to 2020. While this shorter time scale may reduce the 
possibility for analysing radical shifts, longer time scales can reduce policy 
relevance (European Environment Agency, 2000: 64). 
 
It has been recommended not to develop new scenarios unless it is necessary 
(Alcamo, 2001: 29). There is voluminous forecast and scenario data at the global 
and regional level from the SRES process. However, due to the homogenous and 
long term nature of global scenarios the utility of down-scaling this information 
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to Ireland could be questioned depending on the research objectives. Two 
national examples of downscaling include Trefers et al. (2005) and Kaivo-Oja et 
al. (2004), where both of these exercises specifically benefitted from using 
existing scenarios. The Dutch energy scenarios to 2050 (Trefers et al., 2005) 
were based around using just two of the SRES scenarios namely A1(B) and B2. 
This process was chosen on a longer time scale as they were back-casting 
scenarios. Kaivo-Oja et al. (2004) also used the SRES scenarios given their 
importance in the climate policy discourse of most countries. In that sense 
operationalising the IPCC scenarios yielded policy insights in its own right. 
Nevertheless, using existing scenarios can also act as “straitjacket,” both when 
downscaling and quantifying (Kok et al., 2006: 282). The divergent reality at the 
national level has been documented (Scheepers et al., 2006: 79) where different 
future scenarios for one member state may show quite diverging energy images. 
In the context of this research, the SRES scenarios were not directly applied. The 
processes used within the SRES, the scenario technique used and the discussion 
of the exploration of driving forces including literature informing the SRES 
proved an invaluable input. Aspects of processes used and the scenario technique 
applied within the SRES are discussed throughout this chapter. Aspects related to 
the discussion of driving forces and the literature used within the SRES, are 
discussed in Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces. 
 
2.6 Identifying and exploring scenario driving forces 
The European Environment Agency (2002: 17), illustrate how driving forces will 
be differently identified and discussed depending on the aims of the study. 
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Trajectories of future energy carbon emission are determined by complex 
dynamics (Fisher et al., 2007: 178) and can be expressed as driving forces 
including demographics, economics, resources, technology and non-climate 
policies (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 105). Within this research, the Kaya identity 
(Kaya, 1991) is applied as the basic system structure, both as the framework for 
exploration of drivers and for quantitative analysis.40  Although there is no 
common theoretical and methodological framework for scenario analysis 
(Nielsen and Karlsson, 2007), scenario techniques proposed in the literature are 
often structured on ordering and ranking systems for driving forces (OECD/ IEA, 
2003, Schwartz, 1991). The conception of the SRES (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) 
as the seminal literature in the field is based on the Kaya identity. Rather than 
using a ranking system, it explores the qualitative and quantitative evolution of 
the scenario driving forces through two modes. These involve the understanding 
of the historical and current situation and of existing quantitative scenarios and 
forecasts of the development of driving forces. This provides the framework to 
explore and discuss scenario driving forces, as the basic entities of scenario 
construction in both the qualitative narratives and their quantitative 
representation.  
 
A framework that is often used to describe changes in an environmental impact is 
the IPAT identity (Holdren, 2000; Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971). The IPAT 
identity relates impacts (I) to population (P) multiplied by affluence (A) and 
technology (T), (Impact = Population X Affluence X Technology). The IPAT 
identity has often been referred to as the ‘Kaya identity’ as a specific application 
                                                 
40
 See Chapter 3 Decomposition Analysis. 
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of IPAT used in emission scenarios. In function (1) it multiplies population 
growth, per capita value added, energy consumption per unit value added, and 
emissions per unit energy on one side of the identity, and total CO2 emissions on 
the other side (Kaya, 1990; Yamaji et al., 1991).  
 
CO2 Emissions = Population X (GDP/ Population) X (Energy/ GDP) X CO2/ 
Energy) 
                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
The Kaya multiplicative identity presents much utility as it can be further 
decomposed into other effects, but the Kaya identity does not suggest direct 
causality. Some important caveats to the use of the Kaya identity are noted by 
Nakicenovic et al. (2000: 105). The four terms on the right-hand side of equation 
should not be considered as fundamental driving forces in themselves, nor should 
they be considered as generally independent of each other. While the identity 
may imply a linear increase in emissions, e.g. with an increase in population, this 
depends on the interactions and relationships between driving forces.  
 
The SRES structured the exploration of scenarios driving forces and interactions, 
and consequently the literature review, using the following framework related to 
the Kaya identity; 
 
1. Population 
2. Economic and social development  
3. Energy resources and technology 
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4. Agriculture, forestry and land-use change 
5. Other sources of non-CO2 GHG’s 
6. Non-climate policies  
 
The framework for identification and discussion of driving forces applied within 
this study uses the following structure; 
 
1. Population 
2. Economic and social development  
3. Energy resources and technology 
4. Governance and policies 
 
The following two sections are omitted as they are not directly relevant to energy 
CO2 scenarios: Agriculture, forestry and land-use change as well as non-CO2 
GHG’s. Meanwhile, “policies” has been modified to “Governance, and policies” 
as an alternative categorisation. This is in keeping with the “six sector approach” 
of scenarios (de Jouvenel, 1986; Kelly, Sirr and Ratcliffe, 2004). This heading 
also reflects an evolving discourse with implications for the development path 
encompassing a variety of levels of governance and institutional aspects (Sathaye 
et al., 2007). “Policies” includes the mitigation and energy policies implemented 
and legislatively provided for up to the end of 2006 in Ireland. 
 
The following five categories of literature are introduced for this purpose. They 
cover both the open-literature of peer-reviewed academic journals, and non-peer 
reviewed or ‘grey literature’ such as official publications; 
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i) literature on driving forces and interactions, 
ii) discussions and analyses of historical performance in Ireland, 
iii) relevant global, regional and national energy and CO2 emission 
scenarios, projections and forecasts, 
iv) national economic and population projections and forecasts, and, 
v) policy literature, relevant to baseline scenarios. 
 
2.7 Scenario development  
The scenario axes technique is often recommended as a useful tool to construct 
images of the future (van der Heijden, 1996). It is an approach to structuring 
thinking on the future in the development of scenarios. This technique functions 
by the identification of the two most important driving forces by uncertainty and 
impact. Through the selection of two-dimensional axes which form the four 
scenario quadrants in Figure 2.2 these uncertainties characterise the main 
differences between alternative scenarios. Using the unifying structure of the 
scenario axes, the scenarios are developed as alternate stories of how the future 
may unfold. This development is reasoned from the position of the scenarios on 
the axes, the logic of internal consistency and based on a cause and effect logic 
(van’t Klooster and van Asselt (2006: 23). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2-2 Scenario axes leading to alternative scenarios
 
Source: van 't Klooster and van Asselt (
This approach can be
creative thinking (Mander 
structure thinking on the future. To 
implausible or illogical futures
development of other driving forces
development of other driving forces can be arrived at through the structu
analysis based on the Kaya i
each scenario can 
multidimensional conception of the future
with caution as a structural tool, and not viewed as a rigid bluep
“straitjacket” (van’t Klooster and van Asselt, 2006: 28). In responding to this 
challenge, examples of alternative applications of scenario axes include 
Resources Canada, (2000)
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SRES used a two dimensional framework that also illustrates the input of other 
driving forces in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2-3 Canada energy technology futures scenario schematic 
 
 
Source: Natural Resources Canada, (2000) 
 
Figure 2-4 SRES scenario schematic 
 
Source: Nakicenovic et al, (2000: 71) 
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While ‘macro’ or global and regional developments can have a considerable 
impact on Ireland, it is assumed within the research that these evolve in logical 
consistency with the driving forces in the national scenarios. These exclude 
further policy developments under the UNFCCC process or at the EU level. The 
ordering of driving forces through themes and trends within the scenarios is 
achieved using the logics provided by the axes and exploration of the other 
driving forces. This ordering is partially illustrated by a table of change in key 
variables which leads to the draft narratives that inform the quantitative 
modelling process. This multidimensionality is illustrated by the roots of the tree 
in Figure 2.4.  
 
The number of scenarios to be developed in the research is a key question in 
addressing the range of plausible futures. There has been a prevalence of three 
scenario exercises, while four and five scenario exercises have begun to replace 
this approach (Schnarrs and Ziamou 2001: 27). This helps to avoid best case, 
worst case and middle case assumptions which are contrary to exploratory 
scenarios, as they may or may not be equally likely. As proposed in Nakicenovic 
et al. (2000: 70) applying the principle of “Occam’s razor” led the SRES to use 
the minimum number of scenarios adequate for assessment, with four storylines 
avoiding the central or most likely impression. No one scenario can encompass 
the possibility envelope and reflect the uncertainty in development pathways. 
More than two scenarios are required to illustrate that the future depends on 
many different underlying dynamics. Avoiding three prevents the impression that 
there is a central or most likely future. Using four scenarios addresses these 
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concerns although it does raise communication issues (Alcamo et al., 2001: 12-
13). 
 
The narrative storylines in exploratory scenarios have two core functions; to aid 
exploration and communication. They are stylised narrative descriptions of 
alternative future developments relevant to the research question. The narratives 
can be from paragraphs to a few pages in length according to Schnarrs and 
Ziamou (2001: 28). In this research they are not designed to be event driven by 
elaborate plots, or have highly descriptive titles as this may appear more 
idiosyncratic and arbitrary. The primary objective of the process is inquiry 
driven, although they could be used to aid strategic processes. 
 
2.8 Process applied within research 
The process of “ideas generation” (Borjeson et al., 2006) within the research 
relies on two primary modes of enquiry in exploring the evolution and 
interaction of scenario driving forces;  
 
i) review of relevant emissions scenarios, projections and forecasts 
and discussions of relevant drivers available in the literature, and 
ii) empirical data on the historical change evident in the evolution of 
the Irish system evident through decomposition analysis (DA).  
 
Storyline narratives provide a supporting role to explore and communicate the 
logic of selecting the quantitative driving forces of emissions. Appropriate 
numerical estimates of the driving forces of future emissions are selected as part 
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of the quantitative process. This is achieved using the scenario logic provided by 
the narratives, the discussion of scenario driving forces and cognisant of existing 
forecasts and projections available in the literature. Using the guidance described 
above, a set of integrated qualitative and quantitative exploratory baseline 
scenarios were produced.  
 
As part of preliminary investigations, an expert workshop process was also used 
that led to an ordering and ranking of driving forces and identification of key 
uncertainties (see Appendix I). In scenario analysis this can form part of an 
iterative process between storyline, quantification and stakeholder feedback. Due 
to time and resource constraints this was not possible41 and workshops outcomes 
became part of preliminary and not substantive inquiry. A reliance on expert 
opinion may also constrain analysis with scenarios given the poorly understood 
issues often the subject of scenario exercises and the inability of participants to 
perceive their own assumptions (Peterson et al., 2003: 365). It may be desirable 
to use participation in scenarios, from both the scientific inquiry and democracy 
standpoints as both potentially benefit from inclusion of diverse perspectives. 
Nevertheless, it is ultimately the design, application and approach to the process 
that delivers diverse, robust scenarios. On this basis, the expert workshops made 
a preliminary contribution to informing thinking. As detailed in this chapter they 
were not developed as core to the actual methodology applied or indeed to 
research outputs. Despite the eventual peripheral nature of these elements to the 
core research these outputs were included in the appendix given potential 
additional and separate value to that of the main research outputs.  
                                                 
41
 This is similar to limitations experienced in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Alcamo et 
al., 2005: 150). 
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The scenario typology of Borjeson et al. (2006) describes a number of techniques 
that can be employed in the process of scenario development to contribute to the 
“generating phase” for generating and collecting ideas, knowledge and views 
regarding some part of the future. In exploratory scenarios these include 
workshops, survey and Delphi methods. Bell (1997) claimed that the Delphi 
technique was created and continues to be employed as it is a cheap and quick 
way of getting the information needed for making decisions. Stewart (1987) 
proposed that it is used when there is a shortage of data, inadequate models and 
lack of time or resources to make a thorough scientific study. The actual process 
used in this research was termed as an “internal scenario project” by Borjeson et 
al.  (2006) “where one researcher, a group of researchers or a scenario project 
team produce the scenarios back-office” as applied in related studies (Kwon, 
2005; Steenhof, 2007).  
 
The original decision not to use Delphi methods in favour of the expert workshop 
process follows the precedent of the SRES. The expert workshop process 
involved the identification of drivers, issues and trends and the ranking of these 
for impact and uncertainty. This allowed a graduation towards scenario logics 
including the key elements of “pivotal uncertainties” and “significant trends”. 
This qualitative process involved break-out groups and presentation and 
discussion of results at each stage in plenary. For further details on process and 
outputs of the expert workshops see Appendix I. 
 
50 
 
The process applied for scenario development could be summarised in the 
following broad stages; 
 
1. Identify research question. 
2. Identify data requirements and collection. 
3. Conduct quantitative historical analysis.  
4. Identify scenario driving forces. 
5. Explore the development of driving forces and interactions. 
6. Select scenario axes and logics of multiple driving forces. 
7. Construct draft qualitative scenario narratives.  
8. Select rates of change in model variables. 
9. Apply evolution from quantitative model base year to horizon 
year. 
10. Graph and present quantitative estimates of emissions. 
11. Explore plausibility and internal consistency. 
12. Finalise integrated qualitative and quantitative scenarios. 
 
Stage 1 dictates the scope of the scenario exercise. Stages 2-5 discern the 
historical and current situation and explore the evolution and interaction of 
driving forces affecting its plausible future development. Stages 6-10 lead to the 
construction of qualitative narratives of scenario evolution and a quantitative 
mathematical representation. Stages 11-12 are the stages of checking and 
integration of the final draft scenarios. For further details on the scenario process 
and its link to quantification please see flow diagram in Figure 3.4. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
There is no common framework for scenario analysis in the literature. This is 
developed based on research objectives and uses a range of scenario 
characteristics for guidance. The generation of baseline exploratory scenarios of 
plausible alternative developments uses both a qualitative and quantitative 
process. The scenario driving forces are structured using a framework of axes 
and logics within scenario narratives which also aid communication. They 
provide input to the selection and checking of appropriate numerical estimates of 
driving force change in the quantitative process.  
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CHAPTER 3: DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter presents and discusses the decomposition analysis (DA) 
methodology applied within the research. This section documents the choice of 
technique, the mathematical methodology applied and the construction of an 
appropriate identity to measure change. Change is measured at both macro and 
disaggregated sectoral levels. Specific aspects related to the application of DA 
both historically and in producing quantitative scenarios are discussed. The 
identification of data requirements is also documented. 
 
3.2 Decomposition Analysis, a panoply of approaches 
Decomposition analysis (DA) is widely applied in understanding changes in 
economic, environmental, employment and other socio-economic indicators 
(Hoekstra and van den Bergh, 2003). Several methodologies have been 
developed specifically for the purposes of energy and emissions DA. Two main 
streams of inquiry have evolved under the umbrella of DA; Index Decomposition 
Analysis (IDA) and Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA). Techniques 
under these headings have been used for both temporal and cross country/region 
analysis. IDA is formulated using concepts similar to index numbers in 
economics and statistics and is more popular in the literature than SDA which is 
based on an input-output model (Ang, 2004a: 761).  
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In distinguishing between these two approaches, the advantages of IDA over 
SDA include the requirement for less data, the utilisation of three indicator forms 
and in time series analysis (Hatzigeorgiou et al., 2008:492-493). In IDA 
absolute, structural and elasticity indicators have been analysed in contrast to 
SDA which has generally been restricted to absolute indicators. Input-output 
tables are not constructed annually in many countries, Ireland included. This 
restricts analysis to periods rather than an annual time series. IDA also permits 
the exploration of a share effect in industry or transport, and has a greater 
development of methodology and application studies in the literature. In contrast, 
SDA can distinguish between technological and demand effects that are not 
possible in IDA. Zhou and Ang, (2008: 1055) propose that while IDA is more 
flexible it is more aggregate in application.  
 
The relative abundance of data is attributed as the reason IDA is more popular 
(Hoekstra and van den Bergh, 2003) and can also be applied to more detailed 
time and country studies. The requirement for less data and the use of three 
indicator forms have been cited as the comparative advantages by Hatzigeorgiou 
(2008: 493), while Ang (2004a) proposed its simplicity and flexibility. 
 
Methods in IDA have undergone substantial changes in scope of application 
since the late 1970’s expanding from applications in industry to energy demand 
and emissions analysis across various sectors. Key to the application of IDA is 
the decomposition of change in an indicator, using a governing function to a 
number of pre-defined factors of interest to the analysis. This can be used to 
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achieve insight into driving forces42 or determinants that underlie changes. IDA 
is now a widely accepted analytical tool for energy and carbon emissions 
analysis (Ang, 2004b: 1131). The technique has direct policy implications as it 
can be used to accurately quantify effects including evaluation of energy 
conservation programs,43,44 and results may provide a basis for forecasting (Ang, 
2004a: 762).  
 
A range of techniques have been established within IDA (see Figure 3-1). While 
the Log Mean Divisia Index I (LMDI I)45 has increasingly become the preferred 
approach (Ang, 2004b), a choice must be made as to the appropriate technique to 
be adopted in the context of the proposed study. In the case of IDA, the 
mathematical properties of each technique aid this choice. 
 
3.3 Choice of IDA Method 
In advancing through the process of technique selection, the IDA begins with the 
definition of a governing function (Ang, 2004b: 1131). Following this, it 
progresses through stages of data definition, disaggregation level, selection of 
                                                 
42
 The driving forces in DA are determined by the governing function designed and are 
quantitative. In scenario analysis, driving forces can potentially overlap with those described by 
the DA, but they also encompass qualitative aspects that cannot be captured by modelling. 
 
43
 In monitoring national energy efficiency trends the Divisia index has been adopted by many 
prominent organisations including; the New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Authority (EECA), US Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (OEERE), the 
European SAVE project (ODYSSEE) and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), see 
also Ang, (2004b) and  Ang and Liu (2007b). 
 
44
 The ODEX is used to measure energy efficiency in Ireland. However Cahill and O’ Gallachoir 
(2009) applied the Divisia index to Irish industry and recommended it as a more robust and 
reliable measure. 
 
45
 For details of the multiplicative version see Ang and Liu (2001), and the additive version Ang 
et al. (1998). 
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DA method, application of DA method, period-wise or time series analysis and 
analysis of the results (Hatzigeorgiou, 2008: 494). The basic governing function 
for this study is the Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990). Choosing the appropriate or 
“preferred” decomposition technique has been explored in the methodological 
literature (Ang, 2004b).46 The author recommended a number of techniques 
documented in Figure 3-1 to be examined during selection.  
 
Figure 3-1 Recommended methods for energy decomposition analysis 
 
 
Source: Ang (2004b:1134) 
 
Technique selection has usually been on an ad-hoc basis Ang (2004b: 1134-5). 
The choice of method affects the contributions of the pre-defined factors so 
results are method dependent and consequently technique selection is a 
                                                 
46
 Two additional contributions to the techniques of decomposition analysis include; the Mean-
Rate-of-Change-Index (MRCI) of Chung and Rhee (2001), and the Production-theoretical 
Decomposition Analysis (PDA) approach of Zhou and Ang (2008). Lenzen, (2006) argues that 
the MRCI is not robust, while Zhou and Ang (2008) document some limitations of PDA but also 
suggest that it offers an alternative approach to CO2 emission decomposition. 
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methodological concern. The author recommends the following selection criteria, 
to establish the “preferred method” of decomposition; 
 
i) theoretical foundation,  
ii) adaptability,  
iii) ease of use, 
iv) ease of understanding and result interpretation.  
 
In reviewing the most robust decomposition techniques both in general and for 
energy related gas emissions analysis in particular, the Log Mean Divisia Index I 
(LMDI I) has come to prominence giving perfect decomposition (Ang, 2004b). 
Examining the selection criteria established above, the LMDI I technique has; 
 
i) a sound theoretical foundation and as it is related to index number 
theory it is appropriately robust e.g. through its properties in factor 
reversal tests, as it does not lead to an unexplained residual, 
ii) adaptability to a range of decomposition problems, including those 
with zero values in the data set, which commonly occur with 
energy related gas emission studies, 
iii) an attribute of “ease of use” as LMDI uses the same formula 
regardless of the number of factors in the problem, 
iv) an attribute of ease of understanding and result interpretation, 
through its perfect decomposition in results and the simple 
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relationship between the additive and multiplicative form (see 
below). 
 
On this basis (Ang, 2004b: 1137; Ang et al., 2003: 1565) recommends LMDI I 
due to a number of desirable properties, and particularly in the case of energy 
related gas emissions.  The Divisia index is “a weighted sum of logarithmic 
growth rates, where the weights are the components shares in total value given 
the form of a line of integral” (Ang, 2004b: 1133).  
 
LMDI I is also recommended above LMDI II (Ang and Choi, 1997), as it uses a 
simpler formula and results are very similar. Although the Arithmetic Mean 
Divisia Index (AMDI) may be used to replace LMDI I for simplicity, AMDI can 
not handle zero values and can leave a large residual. Therefore it is not 
appropriate in this case. Consistency in aggregation is an attribute of LMDI I that 
also highlights it for the purposes of this study according to Ang and Liu (2001);  
 
Consistency in aggregation allows aggregation of results for sub-groups 
to a higher level of aggregation in a consistent manner. The way sub-
grouping is defined has no influence on the results at the highest level. 
Sub-groups can therefore be formed in an appropriate way to serve the 
objectives of a study. 
(Ang and Liu, 2001:546) 
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Another perfect decomposition technique frequently reported in the literature is 
the Refined Laspeyres Method (RLM) of Sun (1998). The Office of Energy 
Efficiency of Natural Resources Canada had been using RLM since 1999 but 
found that residual terms were becoming more problematic as the analysis period 
stretched further from 1990. In response the Office of Energy Efficiency stopped 
using the RLM and moved to LMDI I in their 2006 energy efficiency trends 
report (NRCAN, 2006:1). Earlier, Greening et al., (1997) had conducted a 
comparison of six common decomposition techniques and concluded that the 
Divisia approach yielded the smallest residual. 
 
Given the continuance of empirical studies in both the RLM and LMDI I form 
Mu et al., (2009: 429) proposed that there is no consensus on the ‘best method’ 
despite the conclusions of Ang. Kim et al., (2009) found “little difference” 
between the results for decomposition of energy consumption in Korean 
manufacturing using LMDI I and Laspeyres among the techniques applied. The 
authors also proposed that during a time of economic shock or financial 
instability the imperfect decomposition methods may be advantageous as they do 
not attempt to distribute the residual and allow effects outside of production, 
structural and intensity indicators to explain a given change. Ang and Liu 
(2007a: 1431) suggested that the residual tends to be large where there are 
significant changes in structure or intensity variables. This hampers analysis as it 
is unexplained but it is difficult to know of its existence before conducting the 
DA. Cahill and Ó Gallachóir (2010) compared a number of decomposition 
techniques including Laspeyres and LMDI I on three European countries and 
again found a residual with Laspeyres and that it consistently overestimates 
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energy consumption. In the context of a model also required for future 
quantification in this study this is a concern. 
 
While the move in Canada towards LMDI I and away from RLM may mark a 
shift in the field of decomposition analysis it appears that there may be utility in 
producing more empirical studies on the “preferred” technique, particularly given 
the potential impact of different contexts. At a minimum, further application of 
techniques such as RLM could provide a check on results generated through 
LMDI I. Nevertheless, in summary, the mathematical properties of the LMDI I 
approach including its consistency in aggregation, perfect decomposition, and its 
flexibility, suggest its suitability as the DA approach in this study. This is in 
addition to its recommendation in the literature of Ang as the superior form of 
DA and also its frequent use in CO2 emissions analysis. 
 
3.3.1 Additional methodological issues 
On the basis of the Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990) and the extended Kaya identity 
used in other CO2 emission studies,47 decomposition analysis can be applied to 
an arbitrary number of factors in pursuit of insights on energy CO2. As the 
governing function generally involves four or five factors with energy CO2 
decomposition, for LMDI I the formula of a multi-factor problem is exactly the 
same as a two factor problem, which facilitates ease of use. This attribute permits 
the building of a governing identity to satisfy research objectives, the application 
of historical DA and the construction of quantitative scenarios for integration 
                                                 
47
 For example see Ma and Stern, (2008) or Agnolucci et al. (2009). 
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with the qualitative scenario process. In Ang (2004a: 766) four methodological 
issues relevant to the application of decomposition analysis are proposed; 
 
i) Method formulation as outlined above, towards perfect 
decomposition, for which LMDI has been used in this study in 
response. 
ii) Choice of multiplicative or additive decomposition, for which the 
preference of the analyst and ease of result interpretation are the 
key issues. This choice is irrelevant with the use of LMDI I as 
both approaches are linked by a simple formula. However the 
multiplicative method is seen as more suitable for chain linked 
time series analysis (this is discussed further below). 
iii) Disaggregation level of the data, where a fine level of sector 
disaggregation is normally preferred to avoid generalisation.  
iv) Decomposition on a chaining or non-chaining basis, where 
chaining (or time series decomposition) is preferred year by year 
above start and end year analysis (where sufficient data is 
available). Results on a chaining basis reduce the variation arising 
from technique selection. Within this study decomposition is on a 
chaining basis for more robust results. 
 
In addressing these issues LMDI I is employed in multiplicative form, chain-
linked year-by-year. The study applies both a macro aggregated and a sectoral 
disaggregated form of IDA. Insights into historical change are sought on both the 
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macro supply-side and the sectoral demand-side. In addition to historical analysis 
a quantification of future change through scenarios is also required. The macro-
supply side model offers insights into macro trends in “driving forces” or 
“effects” and offers a potential output for policy-makers, such as that provided 
by Ma and Stern (2008). The sectoral disaggregated model offers deeper insights, 
and is therefore theoretically more robust.48 
 
3.3.2 Basic mathematical formulae of LMDI I 
An IDA can be conducted in two forms either additive or multiplicative (Ang, 
2005). These two forms explore absolute or ratio of change respectively as 
described in Figure 3-3 using the basic formulae in Figure 3-2.  Examples of the 
additive form include Wang et al. (2005) and Lee and Wankeun (2006), while 
Wu et al. (2005) used the multiplicative. The choice of which form to use 
depends on a number of factors including the purposes of the study (absolute 
changes are analysed by the additive method, while relative changes are 
examined by the multiplicative form), the existence of negative changes in the 
data set, and ease of application. In LMDI I the two forms are linked through a 
simple mathematical relationship (Ang, 2005) and detailed in Figure 3-3. In the 
multiplicative form all terms are expressed as indices, while in the additive, all 
terms including the aggregate being decomposed are in the same unit of 
measurement. 
 
                                                 
48
 The results of the historical sectoral DA are akin to those provided by Wu et al. (2005) for 
historical change in China. The scenarios are akin to sectoral insights provided by Agnolucci et 
al. (2009) in scenarios for the UK. A key difference is in the back-casting in Agnolucci et al. as 
opposed to the future forward exploratory approach in this study of Ireland. 
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As discussed, in conducting an IDA such as LMDI I, the analysis begins by 
defining a governing function relating the aggregate to be decomposed to a 
number of predefined factors of interest. Gas emissions studies have more than 
two factors in the governing function and include factors such as fuel share 
change (change associated with the fuel mix), and gas emission coefficient 
(associated with the quality of the fuel). The following formulae taken from Ang 
(2004b), describe index decomposition and LMDI I. 
 
Figure 3-2 A summary of decomposition formulae 
 
Assume that V is an aggregate, there are n factors, V=∑ix1,ix2,i…xn,i and 
Vi=x1,ix2,i…xn,i, where subscript i denotes an attribute of the aggregate such as 
energy consuming sector or fuel type, etc. Further assume that from period 0 to 
period T the aggregate changes from 0
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where Drsd and ∆Vrsd are residual terms which may be excluded for methods that 
give perfect decomposition (LMDI I). The relevant formulae for the methods in 
Figure 3-2 are summarised below in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3 Log Mean Divisia Index (LMDI I) formulae 
 
The formulae of the effect of the kth factor are: 
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3.4 Macro decomposition model 
In order to analyse the historical pattern of change in energy CO2 from 1990 to 
2007 in Ireland through LMDI I (Ang, 2005), a suitable framework or governing 
identity must be established. This allows the identification and quantification of 
the “drivers” or “effects” leading to observed change in total CO2. As discussed 
in Chapter 2 Scenario Analysis, the Kaya identity has been used significantly in 
the literature to describe observed and future change in energy systems. It has 
particular salience in this study given its application in emission scenarios 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000) and is closely related to precedents set in the literature 
for LMDI I in historical analysis where it is developed as an “extended Kaya 
Identity” (Zhang and Ang, 2001; Wang et al., 2005; Hatzigeorgiou et al., 2008; 
Ma and Stern, 2008).49  The identity proposed by Zhang and Ang (2001: 181) is 
instructive to decompose changes in energy CO2 at the national level and used 
the following identity:  
 
E = Total Primary Energy Requirement (TPER) of all fuel types 
Ei = TPER of fuel type i 
C = Total CO2 emissions from all fuel types 
Ci = CO2 emissions from fuel type i 
Y = GDP 
P = Population 
The CO2 emissions using this approach can be written as the following extended 
Kaya identity; 
                                                 
49
 For a survey of IDA in energy and environmental studies see Ang and Zhang (2000). 
73 
 
C = ΣiCi = Σi(Ei/E)(Ci/Ei)(E/Y)(Y/P)P = ΣiSiFiIGP 
                                                                                                                             (1)                                                                                  
Within this scheme the following nomenclature is applied; 
 
Si = Ei/E is the TPER share of fuel type i 
Fi = Ci/Ei the CO2 emission coefficient for fuel type i 
I = E/Y the aggregate energy intensity 
G = Y/P the GDP per capita or income 
P = population 
 
The decomposition of an observed change in C associated with these factors are 
referred to as the fuel share effect (∆Cfsh), the emission coefficient effect (∆Cemc), 
the intensity effect (∆Cint), the income effect (∆Cypc) and the population effect 
(∆Cpop).  
 
However, function 1 does not represent the effect of change in CO2 resulting 
from the increased penetration of renewable energy. The identity decomposes 
CO2, and as emissions from renewables50 are theoretically zero51 the effect of 
renewables is not measured in this identity. In order to overcome this Ma and 
Stern (2008) and Wang et al. (2005) proposed an extended Kaya identity that 
also accounts for the change resulting from increased penetration of renewables 
                                                 
50
 Renewables; includes wind, solar, geothermal, hydro and biomass. 
 
51
 Theoretically the carbon emissions from these sources are zero as they are largely carbon 
neutral. Although some carbon is embedded in all fuel sources (e.g. with wind energy the life 
cycle carbon of wind turbine production and decommissioning), for the purposes of this analysis 
(which does not look at embedded or life-cycle carbon but looks at that which is relevant under 
UNFCCC reporting requirements) carbon emissions associated with renewables are assumed as 
zero. 
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as an energy structure effect. The term “negawatt” was coined by Lovins (1990) 
for avoided energy consumption due to energy efficiency. This similar term 
could be described as “negacarbon” or carbon emissions avoided through 
increasing the penetration of renewable energies into energy supply and 
replacement of fossil fuels. The following variables are described for Ireland, as 
an extended Kaya identity: 
 
E = Total Primary Energy Requirement (TPER) of all fuel types  
FFi = TPER of fossil fuel type i 
FF = TPER of all fossil fuels  
C = Total CO2 emissions from all fossil fuel types  
Ci = CO2 emissions from fossil fuel type i  
Y = GVA (sum of)52 
P = Population 
 
Within this scheme i denotes fuel type (coal, oil, peat, gas, renewables). The CO2 
emissions using this approach can be written as the following extended Kaya 
identity; 
C = ΣiCi = Σi(Ci/FFi)(FFi/FF)(FF/E)(E/Y)(Y/P)P = ΣiF1S1S2IGP 
                                                                                                                             (2)                                                                                          
Within this scheme the following nomenclature is applied; 
 
F1 = Ci/FFi the CO2 emission coefficient for fossil fuel type i 
                                                 
52
 Total GVA is used in place of GDP, for discussion see Chapter 4 Historical Decomposition 
Analysis. 
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S1 = FFi/FF is the share of fossil fuel type i, in total fossil fuels 
S2 = FF/E is the share of fossil fuels, in total fuels 
I = E/Y the aggregate energy intensity 
G = Y/P the GVA per capita or affluence 
P = population 
 
The decomposition of an observed change in C associated with these factors, are 
referred to as, the emission coefficient effect (∆Cemc), the fossil fuel substitution 
effect (∆Cffse), the renewable energy penetration effect (∆Crepe), the intensity 
effect (∆Cint), the affluence effect (∆Cypc) and the population effect (∆Cpop). The 
index of annual change in total CO2 emissions (Ctot) can be expressed in the 
multiplicative form as follows; 
 
Ctot = Ct/C0 = CemcCffseCrepeCintCypcCpopCrsd 
                                                                                                                             (3)                                                                                                      
Crsd is a residual term which does not exist if decomposition is perfect. The 
following LMDI I formulae apply to each of the effects; 
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Cint: 
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                                                                                                                             (4)                                
For guidance on how to handle zero values in the data set Ang (2005: 871) 
proposes substituting a small positive constant (e.g. between 10-10 and 10-20). 
Negative values do not arise in the data set used in this study.  
 
3.5 Sectoral decomposition  
3.5.1 Sectoral decomposition model 
 
The sectoral, or demand side IDA model of the energy system in Ireland, is 
designed to be comparative to the macro-model but offer deeper insights into the 
changes that occur. Following the macro decomposition model, the sectoral 
model also uses the LMDI I (Ang, 2004b; Ang, 2005) technique but establishes 
bottom-up analysis of the main energy consuming sectors. Consistency of 
aggregation allows sectors to be aggregated at the national level for two level 
decomposition and further comparison with the macro model. 
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As discussed by Wu et al. (2005: 323) previous studies usually address single 
sectors, mainly the industrial sector, or manufacturing sub-sectors.53 This study 
analyses multiple sectors including not only industry as one of the economic 
sectors, but also transport and residential sectors. The difficulty arising with DA 
at this level is that the definition of the different drivers of change varies by 
sector (see Agnolucci et al., 2009). However this is necessary to describe the 
drivers intrinsic to each sector. These are then aggregated through a 
generalisation, as proposed by Wu et al. (2005:323). 
 
Total CO2 emissions at the national level can be expressed mathematically in the 
following; 
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53
 Ipek Tunç et al. (2009) conducted a decomposition analysis of the Turkish economy using 
three sectors: agriculture, industry and services. 
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In this identity the following nomenclature is used; j indexes sector, j = 1,2,…,11 
agriculture sector, industry sector, commercial services sector, public services 
sector, private car transport, road passenger transport (bus and taxi), rail transport 
(passenger and freight), domestic aviation transport, unspecified (transport) and 
fuel tourism and the residential sector, i indexes fuel type, i = 1, 2…6 for coal, 
oil, peat, gas, renewables and electricity. As opposed to the macro model, 
renewables and electricity must be included as discrete fuel types as this is a 
demand side model, whereas the macro model is supply-side and uses aggregate 
energy requirements across the primary fuels. The meaning of each factor is 
described in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1 Meaning of each factor in Function 5 
Item Meaning Item Meaning 
Cij CO2 emissions fossil fuel i sector j Y Total economic output 
FFij Consumption fossil fuel i sector j TDj Passenger/ Freight distance sector j 
FFj Total consumption fossil fuels sector j TTD Total Transport Distance  
Ej Total energy consumption sector j HN Household Number 
Yj Economic output sector j   
 
 
Based on this identity, the following terms are defined CEij = Cij/ FFij the carbon 
emissions coefficient for fuel i in sector j, FSij = FFij/ FFj the ratio of fossil fuel 
type in total fossil fuels for fuel i in sector j, REij = FFj/ Ej the share of fossil 
fuels in total energy in sector j, EIEij = Ej/ Yj the energy intensity of economic 
sector j, for j = 1,2,3,4. EITj = Ej / TDj the energy intensity of each transport 
(mode) sector j, for j = 5,6,7,8,9,10. EIRj = Ej/ HNj the energy intensity of the 
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residential sector for j = 11, ESj = Yj/Y the share of economic output in sector j, 
for j = 1,2,3,4. ET = Y/Y the change in total economic output. TSj = TDj/ TTD 
the share of transport (mode) sector j in total transport, for j = 5,6,7,8,9,10. TT= 
TTD/ TTD the change in total transport, and HN= HN/ HN the change in the 
number of households. 
 
Function 5 can then be written as; 
C
 
=  ETESEIEREFSCE jjjijij
ij
∑∑
==
6
1
4
1
 
TTTSEITREFSCE jjjijij
ij
∑∑
==
+
6
1
6
5
 
HNEIRREFSCE jjijij
ij
∑∑
==
+
6
1
1
11
 
                                                                                                                             (6)                                                                  
 
Following the same formula as the macro equation, function 6 can be written as; 
 
Ctot=Ct/C0= CemcCffseCrepeCinteCinttCintrCesCetCtsCttChnCrsd 
                                                                                                                             (7)                                                        
 
In Table 3-2, the following determinant effects are defined in this framework 
described in function (7), and are further discussed in Chapter 4 Historical 
Decomposition Analysis. 
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Table 3-2 Definition of determinant effects from function 6 through to function 7 
Item f:(6) Item f:(7) Effect Effect type 
CEij Cemc
 
Carbon emissions coefficient effect Intensity 
FSij Cffse Fossil fuel substitution effect Structure 
REj Crepe Renewable energy penetration effect Structure 
EIEj Cinte Economic sector intensity effect Intensity 
ESj Ces Economic share effect Structure 
ET Cet Economic total effect Scale 
EITj Cintt Transport intensity effect Intensity 
TSj Cts Transport share effect Structure 
TT Ctt Transport total effect Scale 
EIRj Cintr Residential intensity effect Intensity 
HN Chn Household number effect Scale 
NA54
 
Crsd Residual Effect Test for perfect 
decomposition55 
 
3.5.2 Sectoral specification 
The final energy consumption sectors are identified by significant differences in 
the intrinsic nature of the energy services they use. This has implications for the 
drivers or effects that lead to change in CO2. In order to represent this, the 
framework for disaggregation of the sectors is discussed below. 
 
The sectoral diaggregation of the model is similar to that proposed in Wu et al. 
(2005) and Agnolucci et al. (2009). Full coverage of the main final consumption 
sectors in Ireland is achieved using two-dimensional data sources by sector and 
                                                 
54
 Not Applicable as not listed in function 6. 
 
55
 Should be zero in the case of perfect decomposition as in no residual. 
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fuel type. The consistency of aggregation of LMDI I enables the quantification of 
the effects at the sectoral level and their aggregation at the national level. As 
discussed in the previous section, the model accounts for four economic sectors 
(agriculture, industry, commercial services and public services), but not the 
construction sector as the energy/CO2 data is not disaggregated to describe the 
construction sector in Ireland.56 The model also accounts for six transport sectors 
or modes; private car transport, road freight, road passenger transport (bus and 
taxi), rail transport (passenger and freight), domestic aviation transport and the 
unspecified and fuel tourism sectors. The final sector in the analysis is the 
residential sector. In keeping with Ekins and Barker (2001) it is recognised that 
energy demand is more related to energy services (heat, light, power, mobility 
etc.) than for energy itself per se.57  This is difficult to accommodate given the 
huge variety of energy services required in each sector. In order to overcome 
this, energy services are suppressed in the economic and residential sectors, but 
represented in the transport sectors by activity measures of passenger and tonne-
kilometres. These are proximate units of energy services that are more commonly 
measured and understood following the approach of Agnolucci et al. (2009). 
 
In the economic sectors, agriculture and public services are given their own 
characterisation in the DA model. Agriculture is unique in its use of energy and 
public services are unique in the instruments necessary to reduce CO2 emissions 
by mitigation policy. The transport sector was given a detailed representation and 
                                                 
56
 Agnolucci et al. (2009) split industry into energy intensive and non-energy intensive branches. 
Data on GVA in Ireland is not disaggregated along these lines pre-1995. To facilitate a full 
analysis from 1990 through to 2007 consistent with the other sectors in the DA, industry is 
aggregated as one single sector. 
 
57
 This was also the interpretation of Agnolucci et al. (2009) in their energy emissions 
decomposition analysis and back-casting scenarios. 
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is split into six modes corresponding to the energy and CO2 data sources. This 
reflects the considerable differences in the provision of transport services 
depending on mode and the recommendation of Rolle et al. (2005). International 
aviation and international maritime passenger and freight transport, are excluded 
from the analysis. Both are included as memo items in national inventories but 
excluded from national totals and quantitative targets   (IPCC, 1999: 337).58 A 
similar limitation to Agnolucci et al. (2009) arose in the case of rail, as data on 
energy consumed by separate passenger and freight components was not readily 
available. Diakoulaki et al. (2006: 2642) aggregated total work performed by 
road even though it is not accurate from a strictly mathematical point of view. 
The authors proposed that it was an acceptable assumption for a consideration of 
total work performed by road if the ratio of passenger to tonne-kilometres does 
not change.  
 
In contrast to Diakoulaki et al. (2006) in the DA completed in this research on 
Ireland the ratio of rail p-km to rail freight t-km was not stable. Therefore results 
for aggregate rail intensity should be viewed with some caution.59 The road 
public passenger sector is also aggregated as energy data reported in the energy 
balance sheets that does not distinguish between bus and taxi. Nevertheless, this 
sector aggregates passenger activity and not passenger and freight activity. 
Analysis from a separate source allows conclusions on relative contributions to 
change arising from bus and taxi to be postulated (Howley et al., 2007). The 
unspecified and fuel tourism sectors do not have activity measures recorded or 
                                                 
58
 There is a difficulty in obtaining reliable data on passenger and freight kilometres for these 
sectors for Ireland. There is also a difficulty in attributing CO2 to departure and arrival nations the 
process of which is not formally agreed internationally. 
 
59
 See Chapter 4 Historical Decomposition Analysis for further discussion. 
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relevant respectively to the analysis of Ireland. These are aggregated and 
included as nominal sectors to complete the energy picture for Ireland based on 
final consumption. The residential sector is represented as a single consumption 
sector. 
 
The definition of the determinant effects for the residential sector uses a different 
structure to that proposed by Wu et al. (2005) for China. The authors explore 
residential energy intensity as energy consumed/total household income, a 
measure of change in energy consumption attributed to change in income. The 
development of the model here decomposes change in residential energy 
intensity as energy/ household (total final consumption/ total household number). 
This provides a measure of residential energy intensity related more directly to 
the physical characteristics of the housing stock. This measure is crucial to both 
energy efficiency objectives and to decarbonisation objectives in the residential 
sector. This decomposition approach measures one less effect for residential than 
the approach used for the economic and transport sectors. This is due to the 
singular nature of the residential sector. In the DA each economic and transport 
sector is measured for the share of change in the total economy and total 
transport while the residential sector stands alone.60 
 
The activity levels of the sectors are represented by both monetary and physical 
indicators. As discussed by Diakoulaki (2006: 2639), the use of physical 
indicators is considered more accurate but may only be relevant in particular 
                                                 
60
 Expanding the residential sector DA to seven plus effects would be an interesting and valuable 
study. The approach taken in this study of Ireland seeks to bound the scope of the analysis by 
limiting the number of effects to be measured. This is similar to the approach of Agnolucci et al. 
(2009) that used an occupancy effect of population/ household numbers but not a Crepe effect. 
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sectors.61 The problem of aggregation across sectors and sub-sectors of industry, 
and the less tangible outputs of the commercial and public services sectors is 
solved by the adoption of monetary indicators for the productive sectors as a 
common output specification. As illustrated in Table 3-3, activity is measured by 
Gross Value Added (GVA) for the productive sectors by household number for 
the residential sector and by total passenger and freight distance travelled for the 
transport sectors. For transport, this is achieved by passenger-kilometres (p-km) 
for passenger transport and by tonne-kilometres (t-km) for freight transport. 
Following the observation of Ekins and Barker (2001) transport activity is 
represented by mobility indicators rather than vehicle distance indicators. 
Mobility is the primary energy service sought in transport rather than vehicle 
travel distance. Permanent housing units are used as the activity measure in the 
residential sector as it gives a more accurate indication of residential change 
based on occupancy than total dwellings which may include nominal energy 
consumption in unoccupied dwellings. The decomposition models do not capture 
the effects of price, as per Agnolucci et al. (2009). Walking and cycling is 
excluded from the DA as data is unavailable. A full transport sustainability 
model would also include walking and cycling as transport modes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61Physical indicators are preferable but may not be available. Aggregation may cause problems 
across product lines of sectors and subsectors in manufacturing and as service sector output is 
less tangible. Problems with monetary outputs also exist including; multiple prices, price 
deflators etc. see Freeman et al. (1997). 
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Table 3-3 Sectoral disaggregation and activity measures 
Sector Activity Measure Unit 
Economic 
  
Agriculture Gross Value Added GVA (Million 2006 €) 
Industry Gross Value Added GVA (Million 2006 €) 
Commercial Services Gross Value added GVA (Million 2006 €) 
Public Services  Gross Value Added GVA (Million 2006 €) 
 
Transport 
  
Road Passenger Private 
(Car) 
Passenger distance 
travelled 
Million passenger-
kilometres (M-pkm) 
Road Freight Freight distance travelled Million tonne-kilometres (M-
tkm) 
Road Passenger Public 
(Bus and taxi) 
Passenger distance 
travelled 
Million passenger-
kilometres (M-pkm) 
Rail (passengers and 
freight) 
Passenger and freight 
distance travelled 
Million passenger-
kilometres + Million tonne-
kilometres (M-pkm + M-
tkm) 
Domestic aviation Passenger distance 
travelled 
Million passenger-
kilometres (M-pkm) 
Unspecified and fuel 
tourism62 
 
NA NA 
Residential Household number Private households in 
permanent housing units 
For sources see Chapter 4 Historical Decomposition Analysis. 
 
                                                 
62
 Activity measures for the unspecified sector are not reported. Activity measures for the fuel 
tourism sector are not relevant to this analysis. Fuels in this category are consumed on another 
territory and consequently while the emissions are attributable to Ireland under the Kyoto 
Protocol the activity itself is not attributable. 
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3.5.3 Model and data concordances 
The two models, macro and sectoral are employed separately to develop insights 
into the driving forces of change in Ireland and give a more complete picture by 
using supply-side and demand-side configurations. Theoretically, the higher the 
disaggregation level is, the higher the accuracy of results. In practice, both sets of 
results are useful as they allow different patterns to emerge and analysts can 
choose the appropriate level of results based on their own requirements. The 
models are separated by structure as they use different forms of extended Kaya 
identity as the governing function. They also employ data that establishes both a 
commonality and difference between the models. In order to establish supply-
side insights, energy and CO2 data is based on Total Primary Energy 
Requirement (TPER) in the macro model, while in the sectoral model Total Final 
Consumption (TFC) data is used. This establishes a statistical difference between 
the two models as TPER includes international aviation and stock changes, but 
also statistical differences in data compilation to TFC (Howley, 2009, personal 
communication). 
 
Although using the same energy and CO2 data sources would ensure direct 
comparability, it would not deliver supply and demand side insights. The models 
both use GVA data to establish a commonality between the results. Data sources 
are completed by population for the macro-model and by transport and 
residential activity data for the sectoral model. The macro model uses primary 
consumption of fuel types as it seeks supply-side insights, while the sectoral 
model uses electricity attributed as a fuel source to the sectors to develop 
demand-side insights. This leads to differences in the effects measured by the 
87 
 
models in terms of Cemc and Crepe. The increase in renewables in the electricity 
sector is attributed to Crepe in the macro model and to Cemc in the sectoral 
model. Based on this configuration a separate stand-alone model of the electricity 
sector would be required for specific insights into the electricity sector. With this 
separation in model frameworks, the macro model gives top-down Kaya insights 
(including population) while sectoral gives insights bottom-up from consumption 
sectors. The macro model compliments the sectoral insights and helps to validate 
the scenarios. The greater disaggregation of the sectoral level results allows 
deeper insight of what underlies change. Macro and sectoral results are compared 
in the historical and scenario quantification results to examine differences 
arising. 
 
3.6 Scenario quantification 
3.6.1 Qualitative and quantitative combination 
The quantification process of the scenarios allows the qualitative scenario 
narrative to be expressed in mathematical form. This translates the alternative 
qualitative scenarios into estimates of emissions that occur through the 
alternative development paths. It also involves a degree of sensitivity testing 
inherently in the scenarios as variations in model inputs are used. 
 
The quantification of scenarios is frequently necessary depending on the goals of 
the exercise.  Qualitative/quantitative “hybrids” can be used to relate the two 
approaches Borjeson et al. (2006: 733) describe this phase as using an 
“integrating” technique. The model structure ensures the different elements of 
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the system are consistently described and also facilitates systematic collection of 
data. In realising the research objectives, the LMDI I model provides quantitative 
interpretation of the narratives, integrates for consistency, and by the 
amalgamation of qualitative and quantitative approaches achieves 
methodological diversity in the approach used. 
 
Using this approach, the scenario driving forces are placed in a “logics” 
framework by the scenario narratives, to aid the process of assigning numerical 
estimates of input variables to the model.63 Cognisant of the historical pattern, 
and through the axes and logics established by the scenario narratives, model 
inputs are derived in keeping with the scenario criteria of plausibility and internal 
consistency.64 The quantified scenarios are also cognisant of existing projections 
and forecasts in the literature.65 These are used to check for plausibility at the end 
of the exercise. 
 
3.6.2 Scenario quantification process 
Decomposition analysis is a widely employed approach in the analysis of 
historical changes in energy and CO2 emissions, but has rarely been used in 
conjunction with scenarios or in forecasting energy demand and emissions. This 
                                                 
63
 In the Storyline and Simulation (SAS) approach to scenario quantification (Alcamo, 2001: 27) 
the scenario team assigns numerical values to the driving forces based on the best information 
available typically from previous studies. Driving force assumptions are then used by the 
modelling team or teams to compute the basic indicators of the scenarios. Finally the storylines 
are revised based on insights or inconsistencies presenting in the quantifications. 
 
64
 Recognising potential limitations of these criteria as discussed in Chapter 2 Scenario Analysis. 
 
65
 The aim is not to reproduce the results of existing forecasts and projections which could act as 
a straitjacket, but to use an exploratory scenario process of alternative plausible developments 
and to consider potential alternative dynamics and trend breaks. 
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has been recommended as a key area for future research (Ang and Zhang, 2000; 
Hatzigeorgiou et al., 2008; Sorrell et al., 2009).  Four recent published studies in 
the literature have combined scenario analysis and decomposition analysis 
(Agnolucci et al., 2009; Kwon, 2005; Steenhof et al., 2006; Steenhof, 2007). 
These involve various combinations of decomposition analysis and the scenario 
analysis technique.66 As described below, the sectoral scenarios are quantified on 
the basis of changes in activity levels and energy intensity trends and the fuel 
shares and final energy consumption associated with these activity levels under 
each scenario.   
 
In quantifying the exploratory scenarios using the logics of the scenario 
narratives, the quantification began by assigning numerical values to changes in 
activity levels in the sectoral model annually from the 2008-2020. To establish 
the relationship with energy consumption, numerical values were then assigned 
to changes in energy intensity and the consequent energy consumption and fuel 
shares that are consistent with the scenario logics and the activity levels.67 This 
process also included exploring both absolute changes (energy, activity and 
emissions) and changes in the effects in the model for plausibility and 
consistency. An iterative process occurs where final energy consumption via 
energy intensity was revised until it was consistent with scenario logics. In order 
                                                 
66
 For example, Agnolucci et al. (2009) used scenario back-casting and the Kaya identity. The 
following three papers used different decomposition techniques combined with scenario 
projections rather than an exploratory process. Kwon (2005) used the IPAT framework with 
BAU and alternatives. Steenhof (2007) used the Laspeyre’s decomposition approach with BAU 
and optimistic and pessimistic alternative scenarios. Steenhof et al. (2006) used a decomposition 
framework with residual and BAU with alternatives for the scenarios. 
 
67
 This includes reflection on policies relevant to baseline scenarios. 
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to arrive at associated CO2 emissions, the ratio of CO2 per unit of each fuel type 
was preserved at 2007 levels.68  
 
The emissions associated with electricity generation are quantified firstly by 
establishing growth rates of primary fuels used in generation (associated with 
electricity demand in the sectors) and then converting this to CO2.  This also 
follows the logics of the scenario in the evolution of fuel shares under each 
scenario (See Appendix II.). Carbon emissions are then reallocated back to the 
consuming sectors (as in the historical model) based on consumption share of 
electricity of the sector.  
 
This quantification was described by Agnolucci et al. (2009: 1653) as a process 
to: “construct scenarios by projecting the evolution of decomposition ratios into 
the future”. Similar to the SAS approach of Alcamo (2001) or the approach used 
in the SRES (Nakicenovic, 2000: 152), these were then compared against 
existing forecasts and projections in the literature to determine plausibility. This 
process is also cognisant of patterns in the historical decomposition, but allows 
variations in dynamics and trends consistent with the logics of particular 
scenarios.  
 
The steps in the scenario quantification process are presented below in Figure 
3.4. This details the overall scenario development process including the 
qualitative elements. It builds further on the stages of the scenario development 
                                                 
68
 Under this approach the emissions coefficient (or carbon intensity) of fuels doesn’t change as 
fuel quality is assumed not to vary. In the sectoral model the Cemc effect (emissions coefficient 
effect) does change but this is attributable to variations in the carbon intensity of electricity 
supply which is further explored under each scenario (see Appendix II). 
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process detailed in Chapter 2, section 2.8, in order to explain further the 
quantification process given the preceding discussion of the LMDI model in this 
Chapter. 
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Figure 3-4 Stages in the scenario development process including sectoral quantification 
 
 
1. Historical analysis (DA)
2. Literature review of scenario driving forces
3. Selection of scenario axes and logics
4. Development of qualitative scenario narratives 
5. Numerical values of future activity levels assigned
6. Numerical values of energy intensity changes assigned
7. Identification of future total energy consumption and fuel 
shares
8. Calculation and attribution of future electricity CO2 emissions
9. Draft integrated scenarios of future energy CO2
10. Iterative checking of scenarios
11 Amendment of qualitative and quantitative scenarios
12. Final integrated scenarios of energy CO2
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The flow diagram above in Figure 3.4 illustrates the process of scenario 
development characterised broadly on the right hand side through the phases of 
the scenario typology of Borjeson et al. (2006). Stages one and two involve the 
“generation of ideas,” towards the development of the scenarios. Stages three to 
nine involve the “integration” of qualitative and quantitative scenario 
components into a whole. Stages ten to twelve are the “checking” phase where 
logical causality, plausibility and consistency are considered leading to iterative 
amendments. The overall process is similar to that applied in Alcamo (2001) 
using SAS to deliver integrated qualitative and quantitative scenarios. 
 
Historical analysis through DA in stage one allows the identification and analysis 
of historical trends. The literature survey in stage two discusses the evolution and 
interaction of scenario driving forces both qualitatively and quantitatively and in 
combination with the historical analysis of stage one forms the generating phase 
of the scenario analysis. The integration of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques involves the key stages of quantification in stages five and six. At 
stage five plausible numerical values of future changes in activity levels and the 
shares of activity levels are assigned annually based on the logics of each 
qualitative scenario narrative. This includes cognisance of the historical patterns, 
their causation and the literature that informed the discussion of scenario driving 
forces that lead to the scenario logics. In order to arrive at total final energy 
consumption, and by that energy CO2, changes in energy intensity and fuel 
shares are then required.  
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In stage six plausible changes in the energy intensity of each sector are assigned 
based on the logics of each scenario. This stage also includes cognisance of the 
historical patterns, their causation and the literature that informed the discussion 
of scenario driving forces that lead to the scenario logics. Combining activity 
levels with associated energy intensity of these activity levels leads to the 
identification of the total final energy consumption of each sector at stage seven. 
The change in fuel shares that meet this total final energy consumption are 
determined based on the logics of the scenario including renewable energy. 
Assuming a constant emissions coefficient this leads to annual output values of 
energy CO2 in each sector of each scenario and also to total emissions once 
electricity has been included. At stage eight, electricity consumption is converted 
into CO2 and attributed to the sectors according to the methodology detailed in 
Appendix II. This stage involves assigning numerical values to the changes in 
fuel shares of electricity generation.  The conclusion of this phase leads to the 
draft integrated qualitative and quantitative scenarios in stage nine. 
 
The final phase of the scenario development process involves checking for 
consistency, logic and plausibility. Stage ten once more uses the historical 
quantitative analysis, the breadth of discussion of the scenario driving forces in 
chapter five and the logics of the scenarios developed including the scenario 
narratives. Change in activity levels and energy intensity are once more reviewed 
in tandem with the other input data of fuel shares and final energy consumption 
totals. At this stage the change in all of the effects measured by the DA model 
are checked for consistency with the logics of the scenario. Comparison with 
existing forecasts and projections of total energy CO2 is used at this juncture in 
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examining the plausibility of the scenarios. In stage eleven iterative amendments 
are made to both the qualitative and quantitative scenarios until they are regarded 
as consistent and plausible leading to the final integrated scenarios at stage 
twelve. 
 
The process of quantification within the macro decomposition model is based on 
the energy consumption described in the sectoral model, as it is theoretically 
more accurate. GVA was totalled from the sectoral model and used in the macro 
model as the economic data input. Population scenarios were produced 
separately and used in the macro quantification.69 The same process to derive 
CO2 emissions is used in the macro model. The challenge is in graduating from 
sectoral TFC to macro TPER energy data inputs to the macro model. The 
differences in energy data between the sectoral and macro models are threefold; 
i) transformation inputs are not included in sectoral energy data as it is a demand-
side model, ii) international aviation and stock changes are not included in the 
sectoral data, and iii) statistical differences in accounting practices between 
TPER and TFC. In order to overcome this and account for these differences; i) 
the Transformation Inputs (TI) determined in the electricity fuel share allocator70 
are added to TFC, and for ii) and iii) an assumption is made that the ratio of 
TPER to TFC + TI71 remains the same as in 2007. To quantify the macro 
scenario, the final consumption and transformation input for each fuel type in the 
                                                 
69
 See Appendix IV. 
 
70
 See Appendix II. 
 
71
 TFC + TI should equate to TPER but may have statistical differences in the energy balance 
sheets based on exchanges and transfers. 
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sectoral model, are multiplied by the ratio above, and as described below in 
function 8. 
 
TITFC
TPERTITFCTPER
ii
i
jijiji
2007,2007,
2007,
1,1,1,
)(
+
+=
+++
 
                                                                                                                             (8)                                
 
In function 8 TPER is defined as Total Primary Energy Requirement, TFC as 
Total Final Consumption, TI as Transformation Input, i is fuel type and j is year. 
 
The insights provided by the macro-model scenario quantification are more for 
illustrative purposes as the primary output are the sectoral results. Nevertheless, 
they do provide a further check on sectoral results and give insights from a macro 
perspective.  
 
3.6.3 Software requirements 
Commercially available spreadsheet software packages are sufficient to meet the 
computational needs of the analysis (Ang, 2005: 869-870). The key concerns 
being ease of use and presentation of the results in a graphical form. For the 
purposes of this analysis, Microsoft Excel 2007 was used as the software 
package as it has sufficient computational power, ease of use and appropriate 
graphical representation features. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Decomposition analysis is frequently applied in energy and CO2 emission 
studies. Choosing the appropriate technique is an important methodological 
concern. Within IDA, the LMDI I technique has been proposed as the “preferred 
approach” (Ang, 2004b; Ang, 2005) and presents with many attributes to deem it 
suitable in this study of CO2 emissions. It has been applied in both aggregated 
macro or supply-side form and disaggregated sectoral demand-side form. Further 
to the historical analysis achieved, it has been recommended to extend 
decomposition analysis to scenarios and forecasting. DA has not often been 
applied for this purpose. This study compliments the historical analysis by 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods of scenario analysis to produce 
integrated hybrid scenarios of Ireland’s CO2 emissions at both the macro and 
sectoral level aforementioned.   
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CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITION 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The following chapter discusses the data used in the macro and sectoral decomposition. 
Macro and sectoral decomposition results are presented and discussed and a synthesis 
of results is included to draw conclusions on historical change in energy CO2 in Ireland. 
Discussion of data includes a discussion on alternative metrics of development, 
reported data sources used and estimations made where data gaps exist. The macro and 
sectoral DA follow the methodology detailed in Chapter 3. This gives insights into 
change based on primary fuels and final consumption in the sectors respectively. The 
historical results are also relevant to scenario quantification in Chapter 6.  
 
4.2 Data 
For the purposes of both the macro and sectoral historical DA, data have been collected 
from a number of sources. These comprise annual observations over the period 1990-
2007 for energy, CO2 and activity measures and are discussed below. Analyst 
estimations have been made where data gaps exist in transport activity. A discussion on 
data quality and reliability is included.  
 
4.2.1 Energy data 
Energy data in Ireland is compiled by Sustainable Energy Ireland Energy Policy 
Statistical Support Unit (SEI EPSSU) for reporting to EUROSTAT and the 
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International Energy Agency (IEA) in annual energy balance sheets. This data includes 
Total Primary Energy Requirement (TPER) by fuel type and Total Final Consumption 
(TFC) by sector and fuel type for the macro and sectoral DA respectively. This data has 
been obtained along with the energy CO2 data by kind permission of Sustainable 
Energy Ireland (SEI, 2008) and updated for minor discrepancies72 (Dennehy, 2009, 
personal communication).  
 
The TPER data used by the macro-model establishes the supply-side picture through 
the macro DA. The data used consists of sub-fuel types aggregated as kilo tonnes of oil 
equivalent (ktoe) of coal, peat, oil, gas and renewables. The sectoral demand-side 
model has energy reported in ktoe for various sectors and subsectors in TFC by NACE 
code. The categories of interest to the sectoral analysis include twelve final consuming 
sectors. These are the economic sectors:  industry, commercial services, public services 
and agriculture, the transport sectors or modes: road private car, road freight, road 
public passenger,73 rail, domestic aviation, fuel tourism, unspecified and finally the 
residential sector. For rail data is not disaggregated by passenger and freight but is 
reported in aggregate form. Fuel tourism is a category that accounts for fuel purchased 
in the Republic of Ireland74 and consumed in another territory, including both petrol 
and diesel purchased by motorists and hauliers. This arises from a price differential 
between the two territories and presented in the energy balance from 1995 onwards.  
The unspecified category includes data errors and consumption by motorcycles, service 
vehicles, construction vehicles and domestic water activities. 
                                                 
72
 The data was updated to correct errors in the reporting of road freight gasoline in 2007, gas 
emission factors in 2006 and 2007 and CO2 incorrectly attributed to private car biofuels from 
2005-2007. 
 
73
 Road public passenger aggregates bus/coach and taxi/ hackney. 
 
74
 Emissions are consequently accounted for under Irish jurisdiction for reporting requirements. 
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The sectoral data accounts for various sub-fuel types is aggregated into the following 
categories for the purposes of this DA; oil, coal, peat, gas, renewables and electricity. 
This data is compiled using a bottom-up sectoral approach. The data as TFC excludes 
fuels used as an input to processes e.g. bitumen and lubricants. The sectoral DA uses a 
demand-side model and excludes transformation inputs. However, these are required 
for the calculation of CO2 in the scenario quantifications. As the analysis is concerned 
with that which is formally within the bounds of the Kyoto Protocol, international 
aviation and maritime activities are excluded. In the data set used for TFC energy 
electricity is allocated to the final consuming sectors based on consumption share to 
complete the energy profile of demand-side consumption. TFC data is presented in a 
form that can be readily applied to DA, as it is disaggregated both by sector and fuel 
type. Excluding international aviation and maritime activities not included in the 
analysis, other minor statistical differences arise between top-down accounting methods 
calculating TPER and bottom-up sectoral TFC data. These arise from statistical 
differences between the accounting techniques (Howley, 2010, personal 
communication).  
 
4.2.2 Calculation of CO2 emissions 
In calculating CO2 emissions for DA, a dataset where energy and CO2 data are robustly 
linked is required. The EPA publishes a National Inventory Report (NIR) of Irish 
Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emissions annually for reporting to the UNFCCC75 and the 
                                                 
75
 The NIR is submitted to UNFCCC secretariat under UNFCCC reporting requirements and 
guidelines on annual inventories from the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) 1999 and 2000. 
 
107 
 
EU.76 This covers the “basket of six” gases77 classified into six sectors: energy, 
industrial processes, solvent and other products, agriculture, land-use change and 
forestry and waste (Mcghettigan et al., 2009) 
 
The NIR uses the energy balance sheets of SEI to calculate energy CO2 and uses the 
IPCC sectoral methodology (IPCC, 1997) to calculate the emissions resulting from the 
combustion of the different fuel types. The EPA also use the IPCC reference approach 
to calculate emissions (IPCC, 1997). Known as the Common Reporting Format (CRF) 
the data transmitted by the EPA calculates CO2 in a top-down format and electricity 
using a bottom-up methodology established through the reporting of individual 
installations under the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Within this dataset, electricity 
is treated as a separate sector and is not allocated to the consuming sectors. Energy in 
the form of electricity from renewable sources is not included in the energy data and 
peat is included as a solid fuel that must be subtracted to obtain total coal. 
 
In order to overcome these limitations in the context of this study, the CO2 data 
calculated by SEI (2008) is used for the purposes of both macro and sectoral DA. The 
sectoral data also uses the “sectoral approach” in calculating emissions. It is constructed 
using the same national emission factors as used by the EPA and the same energy 
consumption data.78 The total CO2 data estimates produced by SEI show only a slight 
deviation from the official national emissions data. The EPA energy CO2 data based on 
the sectoral approach (McGhettigan et al., 2009) is 1.49% greater than SEI sectoral 
                                                 
76
 Emissions data is also submitted to the European Commission under decision 280/2004/EC. 
 
77
 These are the designated six GHG’s by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. 
 
78
 As discussed, the sectoral TFC data is not directly comparable to the TPER data. 
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approach data in 2007.79 This EPA data is 5.27% less in 2007 than the macro data of 
SEI based on TPER as they are not directly compatible.80 Using TPER based data 
reduces direct comparability with the sectoral model on the other hand it establishes a 
full supply-side configuration for Ireland. The approach in the macro DA yields 
separate and distinct insights to the sectoral model.  
 
Overall the SEI CO2 estimation data is compatible with the TPER, fuel type and 
sectoral TFC requirements of both the macro and sectoral DA. The electricity CO2 data 
is attributed to the consuming sectors following a similar approach to that used in the 
energy data for electricity. CO2 from power generation is fully attributed to the 
consuming sectors based on consumption share of electricity. Although partially 
outside of direct control of the consuming sector, to arrive at the demand–side 
configuration, the full carbon profile of electricity generation is attributed to the final 
consuming sectors. This includes CO2 attributable to downstream final consumption, 
but also upstream own-use within the power generation sector and transmission losses 
in the distribution network. There are no emissions attributed to renewable energies; 
wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, biomass, biogas or to electricity imports. Non-energy 
uses of fuels are not included.  
 
4.2.3 Activity data: Economy 
The national level of economic activity is commonly measured by Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Related to this measurement is the Gross Value Added (GVA) 
                                                 
79
 The difference is attributable to the EPA accounting for the power generation sector through 
bottom-up ETS data as opposed to SEI top-down method. 
 
80
 This is attributable not only to accounting differences, as the TPER energy data is calculated in 
a different way, but due to the inclusion of kerosene used in international aviation in TPER based 
data. TPER CO2 data is calculated using the same emissions factors as those used for the sectoral 
data. 
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indicator used in this research as in other precedents in DA, e.g. Lise (2006). This gives 
information on sectoral activity as opposed to the aggregate composite GDP indicator. 
The data set used has been obtained by kind permission of the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO, 2008a). It is measured in € million, calculated at constant factor cost, by sector 
of origin, chain-linked and referenced to 2006 giving real rather than nominal growth. 
Economic activity is measured in the following sectors: agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, industry (including building), distribution, transport and communication, public 
administration and defence and other services (including rent). For the purposes of the 
analysis these sectors are abridged and aggregated as Agriculture, Industry, 
Commercial Services (including distribution, transport and communication and other 
services) and Public services. Total economic activity for the macro model is the sum 
of total GVA. The data set consists of a series from 1990-2007. A recalculation occurs 
in the data set from 1995 onwards to account for FISIM (financial intermediation 
services indirectly measured). This is an estimated service charge in respect of non-
invoiced services in the case of banks and similar businesses, which was excluded prior 
to 1995.  
           
Debates around energy scenarios have frequently focussed on the use of purchasing 
power parities (PPP) or Market Exchange Rates (MER) to measure economic growth 
(Castles and Henderson, 2003; Nakicenovic et al., 2003). The discussion concerns 
measurement of relative per capita income levels across global regions and is therefore 
irrelevant to this research. Of more pertinence to the analysis is the form of 
measurement of economic activity. The measurement of economic activity using 
indicators such as GDP and GVA has many caveats attached. These measurements of 
human welfare are limited in scope and exclude social and environmental dimensions. 
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These indicators were not originally designed for the purposes of measuring human 
welfare or well-being (Kuznets, 1934) and are a gross tally of everything produced 
good and bad. They obscure equality and the disparity in income and welfare, the cost 
of pollution damage is calculated as positive, there is a failure to account for the lost 
value from depleted natural resources or the unpaid costs of environmental harm and 
the non-formal economy is not included. 
 
These critiques have led to the creation of alternative development indicators to reflect 
broader concerns of social and environmental welfare such as the Green GDP, Genuine 
Progress Indicator (GPI) and the standard global Human Development Index (HDI) of 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2004). Yet indicators such as 
HDI are not used in most energy models due to the ubiquity of GDP and GVA. This 
practice inertia leads to GDP or GVA remaining the dominant indicator of economic 
activity in DA and energy emission scenarios as universally accepted indicators of 
monetary activity (Nakicenovic et al., 2000; 115). For the purposes of the analysis, 
GVA is used as the economic indicator. Recognising its limitations, further research is 
merited on the incorporation of alternative indicators in energy and emissions analysis. 
 
Conventional wisdom holds that driving GDP higher is desirable and decision-makers 
seek to maximise this trajectory and avoid policies that could lead to reductions 
(Holmes, 2007: 75). Problems occur when the use of this indicator expands beyond its 
function in understanding income and production growth to measurement and 
perceptions of development progress. This is particularly salient in the case of Ireland. 
Even from an economic perspective, growth was unsustainable and the resultant 
housing bubble saw the future mortgaged for present gain. As John Holdren (2006) 
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said: “We’re not getting rich as fast as we think if GDP growth comes at the expense of 
the environmental underpinnings of well-being”. This could also be proposed for the 
social underpinnings of well-being and economic development, including social justice 
and equity, where a stable and equitable society supports economic growth. Through a 
myopic development focus on GDP, production and consumerism can be valued above 
human welfare or environmental quality, and perceptions of affluence can potentially 
be misguided as costs are offset to future generations.81 This could be reconciled by 
applying concepts and principles related to sustainable development as the decision-
making framework, or as a platform for the selection of a broader set of development 
indicators, rather than a limited focus on GDP growth (Halsnaes et al., 2007: 122-124). 
 
4.2.4 Activity data: Population 
The population data from 1990 to 2007 are published by the Central Statistics office 
(CSO, 2009a) and is used as an activity measure in the macro DA. The population data 
is estimated in thousands on an annual basis. 
 
4.2.5 Activity data: Transport 
4.2.5.1 Rail  
Rail data is represented by passenger kilometres (p-km) for passenger rail and tonne-
kilometres (t-km) for rail freight. This sector has been aggregated as million p-km and 
t-km as the energy data is not disaggregated and separate analysis is not possible. Data 
                                                 
81
 Halsnaes et al. (2007: 143-145) discuss the slow progress in moving from income indicators, as 
an economic measure, to development indicators as a measure of well-being. The pitfalls of 
utilitarian and rights-based approaches to social justice are reviewed and the “capability-based” 
approach (Sen, 1999) is offered as a solution. As an example, it is argued that in practice society 
is neither strictly utilitarian nor rights-based, and this points to problems in the use of CBA as a 
tool for selecting between options. 
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is published annually by the Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2008b) but without a full 
inclusion of passenger data on the Dublin light rail tram system LUAS. The data set has 
been completed using an analyst estimate for LUAS p-km since its commissioning in 
2004.  This was achieved using LUAS passenger data (CSO, 2008b: 109; RPA, 2005: 
3) verified by Farrell (2009, personal communication) and the average journey distance 
obtained from CSO (2008b: 109).  
 
Rail data compilation for the CSO is compiled from survey data from the Irish national 
rail company Iarnród Éireann. As this is survey data the CSO consider it robust 
although accuracy is technically difficult to deliver (Moore, 2010, personal 
communication). In exploring intensity change in the DA, caution must be used with 
respect to the aggregation of passenger and freight data. Given that the ratio of 
passenger to freight data is not constant, intensity in this category may measure both 
technical efficiency and change in the passenger to freight ratio as a type of structural 
change. 
 
4.2.5.2 Road Freight 
Road freight data measured in million t-km has been obtained (CSO, 2008b; CSO, 
2009b). The original road freight estimation from 1990-2007 (CSO, 2008b) was 
recalculated from 1998-2008 (CSO, 2009b). This used a new grossing methodology 
that is proposed to have led to an overall improvement in the quality of the data. As the 
data from 1990-1997 has not been recalculated, the data for these years from CSO 
(2008b) has been used. The data excludes light goods vehicles with an unladen weight 
less than 2000kg. The reliability of road freight data is expressed by a coefficient of 
variation of sampling error where relative precision is termed as twice this coefficient. 
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The coefficient is expressed as 2% across all of the weight categories included in the 
survey. 
 
4.2.5.3 Unspecified and fuel tourism  
Unspecified and fuel tourism activity has no relevant activity measure for Ireland. A 
full dataset is not available for unspecified as it includes some non-transport uses while 
fuel tourism is not relevant as the activity concerned occurs on another territory. The 
energy data can not be disaggregated to separate motorcycles. Motorcycles constitute a 
minor fraction of vehicle stock approximately 1.97% in 2007 (Department of Transport, 
2008: 3) or 0.17% of total vehicle kilometres (v-km) in 2008 (CSO, 2009c: 76). 
 
4.2.5.4 Private car 
Data on private car p-km is not compiled nationally. The first national v-km data series 
was published in 2009 detailing the period 2000-2008 (CSO, 2009c). In order to 
estimate p-km an assumption on changes in occupancy must be made. A data set of 
private car p-km has been estimated and revised by the European Commission 
(DGTREN, 2009). This data used average v-km, vehicle stock and an occupancy 
assumption from 1990-2007.  The average v-km data was taken from CSO (2008b) 
vehicle stock was taken from (Department of Transport, 2008) and the occupancy 
assumption was 1.4 in 1990 dropping to 1.25 in 2007.82 This estimate includes Small 
Public Service Vehicles (SPSV’s) or taxis and hackneys. These must be removed in 
order to estimate private cars only and ensure compatibility with the energy data.83 This 
                                                 
82
 According to Naegele (2009, personal communication,). 
 
83
 SPSV’s must be included with the road public passenger mode (including buses and coaches), 
for compatibility with the energy data. 
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estimate has been modified to remove p-km’s attributable to SPSV’s using stock data 
(Department of Transport, 2008) and validation with the European Commission 
(Naegele, 2009, personal communication).  
 
To test the reliability of this p-km data two alternative calculations were used; i) an 
analyst estimate based on the average private car v-km from 2000-200784 of CSO 
(2008b) combined with vehicle stock of Department of Transport (2008) and the same 
occupancy assumption as DGTREN (2009), and ii) using the private car total v-km 
estimation from 2000-2007 (CSO, 2009c) and the same occupancy assumption as 
DGTREN (2009). The maximum annual error for i) was -4.72% and for ii) was -8.62%. 
Theoretically, the vehicle kilometre data from the CSO is accurate. It is based on 
national data collection of odometer readings through the obligatory National Car Test 
(NCT).85 These reliability tests suggest a possible absolute error of over-estimation in 
the p-km data but this also relies on the occupancy assumption. Considering the 
apparently low assumption of private car occupancy it is likely that private car p-km 
data is therefore under-estimated.  
 
The occupancy rate of private cars in Ireland is uncertain due to the absence of national 
data.86  A drop in occupancy would be expected to at least follow and probably exceed 
                                                                                                                                    
 
84
 Assuming the same average vehicle distance from 2000 is constant from 1990-1999. 
 
85
 Some measurement error is possible, including difficulties with historical data pre-2007 in 
assigning measurement unit as kilometre or mile, and data on newer cars less than four years old 
(Moore, 2009). 
 
86
 Data on private car occupancy in Ireland is poorly reported. NRA (2008: 19) suggests a 
possible value of 1.13-1.92 for transport modelling based on flow group. These assumptions do 
not establish a temporal pattern. In the Urban Environment Project, Casey (2009) suggests an 
occupancy of 1.1 in 2006. This is limited the Greater Dublin Area and it is based around one trip 
type only through commuting data from the census (POWCAR data). The DTO estimated private 
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precedents in other EU Member States (European Environment Agency, 2003: 
European Environment Agency, 2005).87 In Ireland due to the rapid increase in private 
car ownership and consequent individualisation of transport, the occupancy drop 
probably lies in the range of 2.0 dropping to 1.5 from 1990 to 2007 and the assumption 
of DGTREN (2009) is conservative. This would suggest that the private car p-km data 
is under-estimated, particularly in the earlier years in the data set. Absolute accuracy in 
the estimation of private car p-km data can not be guaranteed and must be considered in 
the interpretation of results. Nevertheless, the conservative assumption of the drop in 
occupancy in the data used would suggest that is likely that the pattern in the DA 
results would be robust.88 The affect on the DA results would be to under-estimate 
increases in intensity of private car and also the shift in transport share to private car 
and away from the other modes.89 In the DA it is the direction of change (quality) rather 
than the magnitude of change (size) that is most important in positing conclusions in 
the results. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
car occupancy for all trip purposes of 1.37 in 2006 from survey data (McCabe, 2009, personal 
communication). Again this data is limited temporally and spatially to the GDA in 2006. 
 
87
 The European Environment Agency (2003) presents average occupancy for the UK, DE and 
NL which drops from 1.62 in 1990 to 1.46 in 2002, or 1.8-1.5 from 1990-1998 for the UK alone. 
This is not the same in absolute terms, but is similar in pattern to that adopted in the occupancy 
assumption for Ireland of DGTREN (2009).  
 
88
 By “pattern,” what is intended here is the growth in private car p-km’s concomitant to a drop in 
occupancy. 
 
89
 Given the significant increase in car ownership in Ireland over the period from a relatively low 
level, it can be posited that in the DGTREN (2009) estimate the occupancy assumptions are low, 
and the relative drop in occupancy is conservative. The effect of this on the activity data would 
be to; i) underestimate private car p-km’s and ii) underestimate aggregate total transport p-km’s 
and t-km’s. The effect on the sectoral DA results would i) underestimate any increase in energy 
intensity of private car, and ii) underestimate transport share effects towards a modal shift to 
private car and away from the other modes. 
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4.2.5.5 Road public passenger  
Road public passenger is a category that includes buses and coaches, but also taxis and 
hackneys (SPSV’s). Data on p-km is not available nationally. The first national v-km 
data series was published recently (CSO, 2009c), but only for the 2000-2008 period, 
and not on the basis of p-km’s. Bus and coach p-km’s have been estimated (DGTREN, 
2009) based on the evolution of the vehicle stock (Department of Transport, 2008). The 
energy data aggregates buses and coaches with SPSV’s. For compatibility, the activity 
data for buses, coaches, taxis and hackneys must also be aggregated. An analyst 
estimate for SPSV’s p-km has been added to the DGTREN (2009) estimate for buses 
and coaches. This analyst estimate combined data on vehicle stock, average v-km and a 
constant occupancy factor.90 Due to the absence of comparable estimates data in the bus 
and coach category is difficult to validate. In the SPSV category, the total v-km of 
(CSO, 2009c: 72) is on average 4.22% higher than the analyst estimate for v-km. 
Occupancy data is unavailable and can not be compared. 
 
4.2.5.6 Domestic aviation 
Domestic aviation p-km data is not available for Ireland. An analyst estimate has been 
produced for domestic aviation p-km combining data on the number of passenger 
journeys with average distance travelled.91 In estimating the number of passenger 
journeys, domestic aviation passenger statistics by “passengers handled” for Dublin, 
                                                 
90
 Using vehicle stock of SPSV’s (Department of Transport, 2008), average vehicle distance 
(CSO, 2009b) assumed constant from 1990-1999 and a constant occupancy factor of 2.4. 
Occupancy is derived from a UK proxy given the absence of national data, by using an 
intermediate value from the UK Department for Transport (Noble and O’ Hara, 2001). 
 
91
 An estimate could be derived from EUROCONTROL STATFOR data from 2005-2009. This 
data for the ten Irish airports (with 1 or more flights/day) is presented as flights and not passenger 
numbers. However, without an assumption on flight occupancy in addition to average distance, it 
is not possible to estimate p-km’s using this data. 
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Cork and Shannon airports were compiled. This involved data from 2004-2007 (DAA, 
2009: 88) supplemented with data compiled by the DAA for previous years from 1990-
2003. This was collated by the EPA to extend a completed series from 1990 to 2007 
(Duffy, 2009, personal communication).  
 
The data in DAA annual reports includes footfalls both to and from Dublin, Cork and 
Shannon airports. For each journey a passenger will register twice in the passengers 
handled statistics, in both the departing and arriving location. To arrive at the estimated 
number of passenger journeys and avoid double-counting, total passengers handled was 
divided by two. This data also includes journeys to or from the smaller airports in 
Ireland including Kerry, Knock and Galway.92 However, unlike Cork, Dublin and 
Shannon, journeys to or from these airports will register only once in the DAA data as 
data are recorded in Cork, Dublin and Shannon only. This approach gives a reliable 
estimate of passenger journeys between the larger airports, but underestimates journeys 
to or from the smaller airports.93  
 
In order to arrive at an estimate of p-km this data is extended by using the theoretical 
average distance of all domestic aviation journeys in Ireland at 125 nautical miles 
(231.5 kilometres), as used by the EPA in calculating emissions (McGettigan, 2009, 
personal communication). It is difficult to validate the domestic aviation data due to 
                                                 
92
 Data includes journeys to or from these airports but journeys between these smaller airports are 
assumed negligible (Moore, 2010, personal communication). Passenger numbers on routes 
operated by Aer Arann from the smaller airports of Donegal and Sligo to Dublin, and of 
Waterford to Galway are negligible when compared with the main airports listed (CSO, 2009b: 
97). Domestic air freight is also negligible. 
 
93
 To arrive at a metric of how much under-estimation occurs data on total passengers handled 
and recorded in all six airports for 2008 (CSO, 2009b: 100) was again divided by two to avoid 
double-counting. This illustrated that the three smaller airports of Kerry, Knock and Galway 
constituted 9.01% of total passenger handled in 2006 and 12.45% in 2008. This would suggest an 
underestimate of passenger journeys of 4.5% and 6.23% for 2006 and 2008 respectively in the 
analyst estimate. Further analysis of this under-estimation was hampered by data limitations. 
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lack of comparative data sets. Aside from the under-estimation of passenger journeys 
from Kerry, Knock and Shannon, the passenger journey data is theoretically accurate 
(Naegele, 2009, personal communication; Moore, 2010, personal communication).  
 
4.2.6 Activity data: Residential 
For the residential sector in the sectoral model, data on housing numbers within the 
state from 1990-2007 is used. Total household numbers can be estimated in many ways. 
The most appropriate for this DA is the number of private households in permanent 
housing units as measured in the census of population and interpolated for intercensal 
years (Cavanagh, 2009, personal communication).94 This metric is also used in 
residential energy analysis of O’Leary et al. (2008: 9) as the “most useful in terms of 
impact on energy usage changes”. The measure does not include temporary dwellings, 
holiday homes that are only occupied for part of the year and non-private households. 
 
4.2.7 Data Quality 
In order to characterise data quality, in keeping with Lyons et al. (2008), data on energy 
and CO2 emissions in Ireland can be assumed of high quality. In terms of activity data; 
data on the economy as measured by GVA, data on population and data on household 
numbers are assumed of high quality as data is well reported and well understood. Data 
for transport activity is of mixed quality given the requirement to combine reported data 
and estimates inferred from various sources to overcome data gaps. Data for rail (CSO, 
2008b) is reported from survey data compiled annually. Data for road freight (CSO, 
                                                 
94
 Data on the number of private households in census years is available on the CSO website 
<www.cso.ie>. Data on census years and interpolations for intercensal years have been obtained 
with kind permission of the CSO (Cavanagh, 2009, personal communication).  
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2008b; CSO, 2009b) is compiled annually by survey and measured for variability. 
Comparison of private car v-km data (DGTREN, 2009),95 and v-km reported (CSO, 
2009c) are similar. In extending this data on v-km to p-km it can not be guaranteed that 
absolute accuracy has been achieved. Occupancy assumptions are probably too low 
leading to an underestimate of private car p-km.  
 
The estimate of road public passenger data is difficult to validate given the absence of 
comparable data. Taxi and hackney p-km appears to be based on appropriate 
assumptions. Domestic aviation includes a small underestimation of p-km from the 
smaller airports of Kerry, Knock and Galway. Regarding the caveats above, the 
direction of energy intensity measurements within the DA are robustly quantified where 
there is a robust pattern. Share effects between modes and transport scale effects are 
subject to less accuracy where data precision has been reduced due to underestimation. 
Any underestimation appears relatively consistent throughout the time series. 
 
In general, it is more difficult to validate data from 1990-1999 due the absence of 
comparable data. More confidence can be expressed in estimated and reported data 
from 2000-2007.96 The pattern of v-km growth in each sector is consistently similar 
with (CSO, 2009c) in both absolute and relative growth, and this fits with the pattern 
emerging in earlier years in the time series suggesting a greater degree of confidence in 
data from 1990-1999. DA results for private car and road public passenger modes are 
supported by validation (Howley et al., 2009, Howley et al., 2007). The aggregation of 
                                                 
95
 Where p-km’s by SPSV’s have been removed. 
 
96
 Previous estimates for individual years for road transport v-km in Ireland such as Goodbody 
(2000) appear to be significant over-estimations, when seen in the context of CSO (2009b). TRL 
(2002) are in line with estimations. The CSO (2009b) v-km data is theoretically accurate as it is 
based on collated odometer readings from the national testing subject to minor limitations. 
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rail freight and rail passenger activity requires a degree of caution in the interpretation 
of the DA results. Walking and cycling are excluded from the analysis due to lack of 
data. There is a need for a full dataset of v-km and p-km for the various modes to be 
compiled and validated from 1990. This would aid analysis and thereby evidence-based 
policy-making in meeting the requirements of Rolle et al. (2005) and enable further 
DA. This has been advanced to some degree (CSO, 2009c) and is also the subject of the 
new departmental statistics strategy (Department of Transport, 2009). There is also a 
need to disaggregate rail freight and rail passenger and bus/coach and taxi/ hackney in 
energy and CO2 data. 
 
4.3 Macro historical decomposition analysis 
Results are reported as index change in effects annually and grouped by period in index 
change and percentage annual growth. Change is also reported as absolute changes by 
conversion back into CO2. 
 
4.3.1 Effects measured in the macro DA 
The affluence effect (Cypc) is a scale effect that measures a change in carbon emissions 
due to a change in the average GVA per capita (as an indicator of the abundance of 
wealth).  
 
Population effect (Cpop) is a scale effect that leads to change in carbon emissions
 
attributable to a change in the number of inhabitants. 
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The emissions coefficient effect (Cemc) is an intensity effect that measures change in 
the carbon content per unit of coal, peat, oil and gas (fuel quality). This also measures 
technological change (abatement technologies). 
 
The intensity effect (Cint) measures change in energy intensity due to technological 
choices, the structure and efficiency of the energy system and socio-economic 
behaviour (Paul and Bhattacharya, 2004: 586). If the increase in economic output 
exceeds the increase in energy input this effect measures a decrease in emissions.  
 
The renewable energy penetration effect (Crepe) is a structural effect that analyses the 
penetration of renewable energy (energy that is theoretically carbon-free such as hydro, 
wind, biomass, biofuel, solar, geothermal etc.) into the energy system to replace 
carbon-based energy (fossil fuels). 
 
The fossil fuel substitution effect (Cffse) is a structural effect that evaluates the 
substitution of fossil fuel types (coal, oil, peat and gas) in total fossil fuels. Also known 
as fuel switching this is a technological effect that can reduce carbon emissions by 
substituting a fuel type of lower carbon content (e.g. gas) for one of higher content (e.g. 
peat).  
 
Total change in carbon emissions (Ctot) measures the total change aggregating the 
determinant effects over the analysis period. 
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The residual effect (Crsd) is a residual from the attribution of change to the various 
determinant effects above. This LMDI I technique gives “perfect decomposition” 
dictating that the residual should be zero. 
 
4.3.2 Macro DA results 
Emissions increased substantially over the period from 1990-2007. This represents a 
period of profound change in Ireland, underpinned by rapid economic growth. A 
dynamic process of change occurred in the evolution of the driving forces of carbon 
emissions. This potentially has long-term consequences for future trends in energy 
carbon emissions and the ability to meet obligations for emissions reduction under 
UNFCCC.  The economy measured in GVA grew significantly by 177% in real terms 
or 6.18% per annum compound over the period, while population grew by 23.77% to 
4.339 million (see Table 4-4). The energy profile underlying this change also evolved 
considerably. The primary energy requirement increased substantially, and fuel shares 
in the energy mix changed (Fig. 4-1). These drivers led to a substantial increase in 
carbon emissions of 51.4%. The following DA quantifies the drivers underlying this 
change and enables analysis of the historical pattern, frames the context for future 
scenarios and illustrates potential policy levers available in Ireland to mitigate 
emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4-1 TPER energy profile for Ireland 1990
 
The complete time-series decomposition results for the macro LMDI are presented in 
Table 4-3 and Figure 4
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Figure 4-2 Macro decomposition analysis of Ireland's energy carbon emissions 1990-2007 
 
 
 
These results are summarised as follows: 
 
1. The scale effects (Cypc, 2.2375: Cpop, 1.2376) are the dominant drivers 
in Ireland. Population contributes to growth in emissions, but this is 
dwarfed by the affluence effect. 
2. The intensity effect (Cint, 0.6085) which reduces energy intensity, is the 
most significant factor in limiting growth in carbon emissions. 
3. The fossil fuel substitution effect (Cffse, 0.8966) and the renewable 
energy penetration effect (Crepe, 0.9883) both contribute to decreasing 
emissions but these effects combined are limited and are miniscule for 
(Crepe), the smallest of the effects measured. 
4. The accumulated effects reducing emissions are more than offset by 
drivers increasing emissions, leading to a significant increase in total 
energy CO2 emissions (Ctot, 1.5133). 
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5. The analysis illustrates three distinct periods in development trends 
(Table 4-1 and Table 4-2) a.) the pre-economic boom period 1990-1993 
with a small increase in total emissions (Ctot, 1.0203), b.) 1993-2001 
boom period of significant increase (Ctot, 1.4150), c.) 2001-2007 period 
of moderated growth (Ctot, 1.0482) where emissions continue to 
increase at a slower rate.  
 
Table 4-1 Macro decomposition analysis index of Ireland's energy CO2 1990-2007 
Year ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cypc ∆Cpop ∆Cemc 
 
       
1990-1993 1.0203 0.9760 1.0015 0.9681 1.0577 1.0195 0.9999 
 
       
1993-2001 1.4150 0.9465 1.0002 0.7931 1.7265 1.0764 1.0142 
 
       
2001-2007 1.0482 0.9707 0.9866 0.7926 1.2252 1.1278 0.9994 
 
       
 
 
Table 4-2 Macro decomposition analysis of Ireland's energy CO2 % growth rates 1990-2007 
Year ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cypc ∆Cpop ∆Cemc 
 
1990-1993 
 
0.67 
 
-0.81 
 
0.05 
 
-1.07 
 
1.89 
 
0.65 
 
0.00 
 
       
1993-2001 4.44 -0.69 0.00 -2.86 7.07 0.93 0.18 
 
       
2001-2007 0.79 -0.49 -0.23 -3.80 3.44 2.03 -0.01 
 
       
Growth rates calculated as compound annual growth rate rounded to two decimal places. 
Further analysis is facilitated by viewing time series and periodic analysis. The impact 
of the (Cypc) can be seen throughout the time series, particularly during the period from 
1993-2001 (1.7265). Rapid economic growth acted as a scale effect to increase the 
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energy requirement and carbon emissions by increasing activity and influencing 
production and consumption patterns across the economy and society. Ireland also 
experienced population growth, but the scale effect (Cpop) was not significant when 
seen in comparison with the (Cypc) effect (Figure 4-2). Not only was the (Cpop) effect 
less significant but it was linked to economic growth. Increases in population have been 
attributed to labour migration due to an economically defined immigration policy (see 
Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces). 
 
The (Cffse) effect measures the substitution of gas and oil for coal and peat in 
particular, as a graduation occurred to more convenient forms of energy through 
technological choices. The trend in (Cffse) steadily improved from 1990-2007 (0.8966). 
Technological change in the electricity generation and residential sectors substituted 
fuels. The (Crepe, 0.9883) effect failed to make notable progress in reducing national 
emissions over the analysis period. In proportion of total energy requirement, it began 
to penetrate through wind energy in electricity generation and biofuels in transport in 
the post boom period (Table 4-1). This slow progress arose due to insufficient policy 
support, the cost and fledgling nature of some technologies and physical limitations e.g. 
with the expansion of hydro (see Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces). While some 
technologies could be described as less mature in the 1990’s (e.g. solar), wind offered 
significant potential for expansion as a more mature technology.  
 
The improvement in the intensity effect (Cint, 0.6085) is potentially attributable to both 
technical efficiency and economic restructuring (see sectoral results). The improvement 
was facilitated by the increased affluence leading to investment in technological 
replacement and also societal preferences. The energy intensity effect is often recorded 
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as the most significant negative effect in DA studies. The (Cemc, 1.0135) effect has 
registered an increase over the period. Changes are attributable to fuel type quality and 
its associated emissions factor and sub-fuel types within each fuel type.97  
 
It is significant that in the 2001-2007 period energy intensity improvement is similar to 
scale growth from affluence. Growth in emissions is increasingly attributable to 
population growth in this period. This is a trend break from previous periods. The 
significance of this for this study is threefold: i) delinking of emissions growth 
increased and suggests a potential for the beginning of a bifurcation from a high 
emissions pathway in the future, ii) the potential interaction of effects, population 
growth in Ireland has been linked to economic growth and the development 
implications of this with respect to emissions, iii) methodologically, the macro Kaya 
identity used in this model yields deeper insights than an Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) which would not capture the effect of population. This highlights not only the 
limits of EKC but also the emergence of DA as a more appropriate method to 
disentangle the relationship between development and environment (Stern, 2004). 
 
The differences in effects evident over the period of analysis yield some interesting 
insights into the diversity of dynamics illustrated in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2. Period a.) 
from 1990-1993 before the economic boom was a period of low growth in total 
emissions with low scale growth (Cypc, 1.0577) and (Cpop, 1.0195) counteracted by 
intensity (Cint, 0.9681) and substitution (Cffse, 0.9760). In period b.) high scale growth 
due to (Cypc, 1.7265) was not sufficiently counteracted by (Cint, 0.7931) or (Cffse, 
0.9465) while (Crepe, 1.0002) did not penetrate further into energy demand and 
                                                 
97
 For example, change can arise in the shares of sub-fuel types of bituminous coal, anthracite and 
lignite within ‘coal’. 
128 
 
therefore total emissions grew significantly. In period c.) total growth has moderated 
but is still growing by 2007. The moderation in (Cypc, 1.2252) means it is now almost 
offset by the higher (Cint, 0.7926). The increase in the effect of (Cpop, 1.1278) exceeds 
the reductions achieved by (Cffse, 0.9707) and (Crepe, 0.9866). The importance of 
(Cpop) as a driver has increased as other positive pressures have declined. (Ctot, 
1.0482) is still rising as scale drivers are not accompanied by sufficient reductions in 
other structural and intensity effects.  
 
As observed in other DA studies, economic growth as represented by affluence is a key 
positive driver of emissions while energy intensity is a key negative driver. The quality 
or nature98 of this growth can have different implications for energy requirements and 
emissions. Periods of economic growth can also be used to invest in technological 
change to increase fuel substitution, renewable energy penetration and energy 
intensity99 progress. Growth in emissions is still occurring but has moderated. While 
there is a potential lock-in to a high emissions pathway there is also a potential 
bifurcation arising due to the moderation from 2001-2007. The progress made from 
2001-2007 may also be a short term trend. 
  
                                                 
98
 The term ‘qualitative economic growth’ has been used in the literature to characterise the type 
of growth. Tapio et al. (2007) described qualitative economic growth in the context of 
immaterialisation. In order to avoid confusion of quality with desirability or ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
‘quality’ the term ‘nature’ is used. 
 
99
 Including socio-economic behaviour and its cultural underpinnings (see Chapter 5 Scenario 
Driving Forces). 
129 
 
Figure 4-3 Accumulated decomposition of Ireland's energy carbon emissions 1990-2007 
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Table 4-3 Macro time series decomposition analysis of energy CO2 emissions in Ireland 1990-2007 
 
Year ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe   ∆Cint  ∆Cypc ∆Cpop ∆Cemc ∆C rsd 
 
1990-1991 
 
1.0166 
 
0.9920 
 
1.0003 
 
1.0012 
 
1.0131 
 
1.0057 
 
1.0043 
 
0.0000 
1991-1992 0.9980 0.9956 1.0006 0.9748 1.0206 1.0082 0.9988 0.0000 
1992-1993 1.0057 0.9882 1.0005 0.9919 1.0230 1.0055 0.9969 0.0000 
1993-1994 1.0384 0.9938 0.9994 0.9992 1.0429 1.0033 1.0000 0.0000 
1994-1995 1.0208 0.9950 1.0022 0.9474 1.0720 1.0043 1.0037 0.0000 
1995-1996 1.0503 0.9882 0.9996 0.9740 1.0792 1.0069 1.0046 0.0000 
1996-1997 1.0396 0.9929 0.9996 0.9407 1.0987 1.0105 1.0029 0.0000 
1997-1998 1.0620 0.9964 0.9970 0.9940 1.0683 1.0106 0.9962 0.0000 
1998-1999 1.0452 0.9837 1.0018 0.9715 1.0784 1.0104 1.0019 0.0000 
1999-2000 1.0328 0.9941 0.9996 0.9564 1.0713 1.0128 1.0015 0.0000 
2000-2001 1.0665 1.0011 1.0011 0.9900 1.0553 1.0152 1.0034 0.0000 
2001-2002 0.9985 0.9952 0.9983 0.9497 1.0418 1.0182 0.9977 0.0000 
2002-2003 0.9768 0.9914 1.0015 0.9473 1.0229 1.0160 0.9993 0.0000 
2003-2004 1.0290 0.9933 0.9974 0.9826 1.0356 1.0164 1.0043 0.0000 
2004-2005 1.0449 1.0111 0.9952 0.9816 1.0366 1.0219 0.9986 0.0000 
2005-2006 0.9908 0.9859 0.9967 0.9612 1.0247 1.0256 0.9982 0.0000 
2006-2007 1.0088 0.9936 0.9975 0.9503 1.0452 1.0234 1.0013 0.0000 
 
        
1990-2007 1.5133 0.8966 0.9883 0.6085 2.2375 1.2376 1.0135 0.0000 
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Table 4-4 Activity data for macro decomposition analysis 1990-2007  
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
GVA (2006, € million) 
 
60,305 
 
61,441 
 
63,219 
 
65,031 
 
68,046 
 
73,257 
 
79,606 
 
88,390 
 
95,428 
 
Population 3,505,800 3,525,700 3,554,500 3,574,100 3,585,900 3,601,300 3,626,100 3,664,300 3,703,100 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
GVA (2006, € million) 103,991 112,838 120,887 128,237 133,269 140,274 148,596 156,173 167,057 
         
Population 3,741,600 3,789,500 3,847,200 3,917,200 3,979,900 4,045,200 4,133,800 4,239,800 4,339,000 
Data sources: (CSO, 2008a; CSO, 2009a) 
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4.4 Sectoral historical decomposition analysis 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The evolution of the sectoral contribution of Ireland’s energy CO2 is presented in Figure 
4-4 and Table 4-5 below. Total emissions have increased significantly by 49.35%100. 
Concomitantly to the macro DA, a concentration of growth in the 1993-2001 period is 
evident in Figure 4-4. The significance of growth in emissions of an individual sector 
becomes clear given its relative contribution to total emissions. The overall period 
between 1990 and 2007 saw decline of the residential and industry sectors relative to the 
total. However, these are still the two largest sectors. Public services and agriculture 
now make a smaller relative contribution, while the service sector has increased. In 
transport, the private car and road freight sectors have recorded substantial relative 
increases. The fuel tourism and unspecified category has experienced significant growth 
predominantly due to increased fuel tourism. Rail has declined its relative contribution 
while public passenger has increased considerably but remains relatively small 
contributing 1.23% of total energy carbon emissions in 2007. The domestic aviation 
sector records a significant relative increase but also constitutes a small proportion of 
total CO2 emissions.101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100
 For an explanation of the difference between the metric of total emissions in the macro and sectoral 
DA see section 4.5 ‘Synthesis of results and comparison with macro DA’. 
101
 This does not measure the total CO2 equivalent of aviation. 
133 
 
Table 4-5 Sectoral contribution to total energy CO2 1990-2007 
Sector 1990 ktCO2 % 1990 2007 ktCO2 % 2007 Growth % Ave. ann. 
growth rate 
% 
 
      
Industry 7,928 26.80 10,175 23.03 28.35 1.48 
Commercial 
Services 
2,936 9.93 4,953 11.21 68.71 3.12 
Public 
Services 
1,900 6.42 2,381 5.39 25.35 1.34 
Agriculture 1,046 3.54 1,080 2.44 3.28 0.19 
Private Car 2,728 9.22 6,407 14.50 134.85 5.15 
Road 
Freight 
1,025 3.47 3,940 8.92 284.27 8.24 
Road Public 
Passenger 
160 0.54 545 1.23 240.03 7.48 
Rail 148 0.50 165 0.37 11.89 0.64 
Domestic 
Aviation 
62 0.21 160 0.36 159.36 5.74 
Fuel 
Tourism 
and 
Unspecified 
871 2.95 3,166 7.17 263.40 7.89 
Residential 10,777 36.43 11,205 25.36 3.96 0.57 
 
      
Total 29,581 100.00 44,178 100.00 49.35 2.39 
Data Source: (SEI, 2008), growth rates calculated as compound annual growth rate. 
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Figure 4-4 Evolution of sectoral composition of energy CO2 emissions 1990-2007 
 
 
The macro DA has explored drivers at the macro level using TPER based data for 
supply-side insights. The following sectoral analysis explores development of drivers 
within eleven sectors as a demand-side analysis from 1990-2007 to explore drivers in 
each of the sectors underlying the change in CO2 emissions. This historical perspective 
provides a deeper insight into the change in driving forces underlying the increase in 
Ireland’s CO2 emissions historically and potential trends into the future. 
 
The sectoral decomposition is presented in the following section. The contribution of 
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analysis is structured by the three sectoral groupings as follows; i) the economic sectors, 
ii) the transport sectors and iii) the residential sector. The separate groupings of 
economic sectors and transport modes facilitate the analysis of inter-sectoral shifts in 
the sectoral share of economic development and in transport mode share of transport 
activity. The analysis is presented in three sub-periods and over the entire time series 
from 1990-2007.  
 
The essence of DA, as applied to energy CO2 emissions, is to decompose the aggregate 
change in emissions into the relative contributions of the predefined effects. The 
significance of the results is defined by using index numbers and average annual growth 
rates. In multiplicative decomposition, the increasing or decreasing contribution of each 
effect is denoted by a number greater or less than one and is determined by the changing 
ratio of each effect from year to year in the chain linked series. The following sectors 
are discussed by effect and by time period as per macro decomposition. The changes in 
each time period are explored by both accumulated change to the index and average 
annual growth rate in per cent. Changes in each effect for each sector over the entire 
time series are presented in Appendix III.2. 
 
4.4.2 Sectoral DA effects 
The effects analysed in this decomposition are derived from the following function;  
 
Ctot=Ct/C0= CemcCffseCrepeCinteCinttCintrCesCetCtsCttChnCrsd 
                                                                                                                                         (1) 
This decomposes total change by fuel type, by sector and by year, where; 
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Ctot is the aggregated change of all of the determinant effects over the entire time series. 
Crsd is a residual error. It is the difference between the actual change observed and that 
determined by aggregating all of the determinant effects in the sectoral model. The 
divisia index gives perfect decomposition. Therefore this figure should be zero. 
 
The other effects can be categorised into three groups: 
 
The intensity effects: Cemc, Cinte, Cintt, Cintr  
The structure effects: Cffse, Crepe, Ces, Cts 
The scale effects: Cet, Ctt and Chn 
 
The Cemc is the ratio of CO2 per unit of energy for each fuel type in each sector. It 
evaluates fuel quality and the installation of abatement technologies. As electricity is 
included as a fuel type in each of the consuming sectors, it also shows change in the 
CO2 coefficient of the electricity sector due to fuel switching and renewable energy in 
electricity supply. 
 
The Cinte, Cintt, Cintr measure the intensity of energy use in each of the sectors and can 
represent the push and pull of both efficiency and affluence. In the economic sectors 
Cinte is the ratio of energy consumption per unit of economic output (GVA). Cintt shows 
the energy consumption per unit of travel (p-km and t-km), while Cintr measures the 
consumption per household unit. This can denote technical efficiency in energy use, or 
it can also denote intra-sectoral structural changes. This measure also subsumes energy 
prices, energy conservation and energy investments (Paul and Bhattacharya, 2004: 586). 
137 
 
The origins of change in this effect are the structure and efficiency of the energy system, 
technological choices and socio-economic behaviour. 
 
Cffse is a structural effect that represents the ratio of each fuel type in total fossil fuels. 
This effect measures the substitution of fossil fuel types within the sectors (but not in 
electricity as this is a demand side model). Crepe shows the penetration of renewable 
energy into total final energy (under demand side control and not in the electricity sector 
as electricity is allocated to consuming sectors). 
 
Ces measures change in the structure of the economy, the ratio of each sectors output in 
total aggregate output (GVA). Cts measures change in the structure of transport modes, 
the ratio of work performed by each transport mode with respect to total transport work 
performed (in the sum of p-km and t-km). These effects show the evolution of the 
structure of economic output and transport modes. 
 
The scale effects: Cet is a scale effect that measures change in the total economic output 
of the economic sectors. This is the change in CO2 emissions due to economic growth. 
Ctt is a scale effect that measures the change in carbon due to change in total transport 
work performed in the transport sector. Chn is a scale effect that measures the change in 
carbon due to the change in the total number of households in the residential sector. It 
stands alone as a single sector unlike the other sectors. 
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4.4.3 Economic sectors 
4.4.3.1 Industry 
The change in industry CO2 can be explained predominantly by economic growth (Cet 
2.7678) of the overall economy. This scale growth was the dominant positive effect and 
was significantly higher than any other effects leading to the increase. Ireland’s pursuit 
of economic growth in industrial development policy was a key factor in explaining the 
pattern. The increase in (Ces 1.3378) increased the structural share of industry in the 
economy. This economic scale and share growth is prominent during the boom period 
from 1993-2001. Economic growth moderates from 2001 onwards, while the industrial 
share stabilises.  
 
Energy intensity (Cinte) is the major factor in reducing emissions in all sub-periods as 
well as over the entire time series (0.4215). The improving energy intensity within the 
sector can be attributed to technical efficiency or to structural change within industry, as 
described by OECD/ IEA (2007: 64) “it does not necessarily mean that the actual 
processes used are more energy efficient”. The significant achievement in the energy 
intensity of Irish industry is more attributable to national industrial development policy 
and global economic influences rather than energy efficiency improvements (Dennehy 
et al., 2009: 24). Industrial development has concentrated more on high-value, energy 
extensive goods such as chemicals, petrochemicals and ICT. In addition, major changes 
to industrial structure included the cessation of steel production in 2001 and fertiliser 
production in late 2002 (Howley et al., 2008: 18). According to Diakoulaki and 
Mandaraka (2007: 646) the highest structural effects are accompanied by the highest 
output (scale) effects. This holds for Ireland having had the highest output effect in the 
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EU.102 It follows, that the energy intensity effect conceals intra-sectoral structural 
changes “especially in Ireland”. The authors consider Ireland as a pioneer “in 
integrating the sustainability concept into their development strategy”. 
 
Significant progress has been made at the level of development policy. At the level of 
technical energy efficiency of industrial activities, progress has been more limited. 
Dennehy et al. (2009: 25) propose that structural changes accounted for 63% of 
intensity change in industry from 1995-2007.103 Using a divisia index from 1993-2004, 
Lapillone et al. (2007: 36) proposed that structural changes accounted for all of the 
intensity improvement, without which intensity would actually have increased. Using a 
divisia index at constant structure across the branches of industry Cahill and Ó 
Gallachoir (2009: 1149) calculated an 11.3% improvement in energy intensity from 
1995-2005. 
 
In the final sub-period, emissions began to drop from this sector. The emissions 
coefficient effect (Cemc 0.8282) becomes important in this period as this trend break 
drives a reduction in overall emissions. This arises due to the decarbonisation of 
electricity supply, through fuel switching and renewables in electricity generation, and 
an increase in the ratio of electricity in the industrial fuel mix, see also; Howley et al. 
(2008: 64). Although progress in industry fuel substitution (Cffse 0.9938), renewable 
energy (Crepe 0.9879) and energy intensity (Cinte 0.7829) was made, a significant 
proportion of the achievement from 2001-2007 is upstream and outside of the direct 
control of the industrial sector.  
 
                                                 
102
 Using the Refined Laspeyres Method for manufacturing in fourteen EU countries from 1990-2003. 
 
103
 Using the methodology developed in the ODYSSEE project. 
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Table 4-6 Decomposition analysis of industry energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cinte ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 1.0423 1.0167 1.0032 0.9373 1.0321 1.0783 0.9797 
 (1.39) (0.55) (0.11) (-2.14) (1.06) (2.55) (-0.68) 
1993-2001 1.4161 1.0443 0.9881 0.5744 1.3111 1.8579 0.9809 
 (4.44) (0.54) (-0.15) (-6.70) (3.44) (8.05) (-0.24) 
2001-2007 0.8696 0.9938 0.9879 0.7829 0.9886 1.3816 0.8282 
 (-2.30) (-0.10) (-0.20) (-4.00) (-0.19) (5.54) (-3.09) 
1990-2007 1.2835 1.0552 0.9793 0.4215 1.3378 2.7678 0.7959 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
Figure 4-5 Industry decomposition by sub-period 
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As can be seen from Figure 4-6, the scale growth in the economy also dominated the 
increase in emissions from the services sector (Cet 2.7624). This resulted in a significant 
increase in total emissions over the period, predominantly in the 1993-2001 period (Ctot 
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effect (Cinte 0.7203) is attributed to scale growth in output through “rapid growth” in 
value-added (Howley et al., 2008: 87). Despite growth in output from the sector, the 
sectoral share of services slightly diminished over the entire period (Ces 0.9740).  
 
In this sense, a structural transition towards the services sector was not a source of 
emissions reductions. The fossil fuel share effect has increased notably (Cffse 1.2283), 
particularly since 1993. Despite a reduction in the effect of oil, there is an increase in 
the effect of electricity on carbon emissions within the sector. Absolute electricity 
consumption expanded, despite reductions in the emissions coefficient of electricity. 
This expansion in electricity is attributed to the increase in ICT and air-conditioning 
(Howley et al., 2008: 85). Little progress in reducing emissions was achieved through 
renewable energy in the fuel mix. This only begins to register from 2004-2005 onwards.  
 
The two effects acting to reduce emissions are the energy intensity and emissions 
coefficient effect. From 2001-2007, improvements in energy intensity (Cinte 0.8530) are 
exceeded by the achievement of improvements in the emissions coefficient (Cemc 
0.7603) attributable to the electricity sector. Again upstream, this was due to fuel 
switching and renewable energy in electricity generation. The final period from 2001 to 
2007 shows a stabilisation in emissions from the sector, as economic growth is 
accompanied by the reduction in energy intensity and the emissions coefficient during 
this period.  
 
It is more difficult to form conclusions about results in the services sector. Energy data 
is calculated as a residual (Howley et al., 2008: 88) and information on branches within 
the sector is unavailable. The sector is the most heterogenous in the economy depending 
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on sub-branch from high value added lower energy intensive offices research and 
development, to lower value added and higher energy intensive sectors such as 
restaurants, bars and catering. The share of fuel types is also heterogenous dependent on 
sub-branch. This ranges from sub-branches with a higher space heating requirement 
tending towards higher oil and gas consumption, to those favouring electricity 
correlated with office employees.  
 
There appears to be higher energy intensity for the services sector in Ireland, in 
comparison to the European examples according to analysis of SEI (O’ Leary et al., 
2005).104 However in their results from 1999-2002 there appears to be a structural shift 
towards higher economic output from the higher value less energy intensive sub-sectors 
such as offices, research and development and post and telecommunications. The 
residential, commercial services and public services sectors would tend to be the most 
climate dependent of the sectors under analysis. A higher proportion of the energy 
consumed would be for space heating purposes. Nevertheless, for commercial services 
climate correction had a negligible impact on energy consumption.105  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104
 The examples used were United Kingdom, France, Germany from 1990-2001. 
 
105
 According to Howley, Ó Gallachoir and Dennehy (2009: 77-78) climate corrected growth in final 
energy consumption for the aggregated commercial and public services sectors was 0.3% less than 
uncorrected data from 1990-2008. 2008 was anomalous as energy consumption increased by 6.9% but 
was just 1.9% on a climate corrected basis. 
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Table 4-7 Decomposition analysis of commercial services energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cinte ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
        
1990-1993 1.1230 1.0148 1.0000 1.0490 1.0021 1.0784 0.9762 
 (3.94) (0.49) (0.00) (1.61) (0.07) (2.55) (-0.80) 
1993-2001 1.4942 1.1018 1.0000 0.8050 0.9441 1.8587 0.9599 
 (5.15) (1.22) (0.00) (-2.67) (-0.72) (8.06) (-0.51) 
2001-2007 1.0053 1.0985 0.9947 0.8530 1.0294 1.3782 0.7603 
 (0.09) (1.58) (-0.09) (-2.62) (0.48) (5.49) (-4.46) 
1990-2007 1.6870 1.2283 0.9947 0.7203 0.9740 2.7624 0.7125 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
Figure 4-6 Commercial services decomposition by sub-period 
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by scale growth in the economy (Cet 2.7685). Despite a drop in economic share in the 
public services sector (Ces 0.4744), the scale growth in the economy is linked to growth 
in emissions in this sector particularly from 1993-2002 (Figure 4-7).  
 
The Cffse effect (1.2629) increases in the public service sector despite declines in oil and 
peat. Gas increased while electricity use increased significantly. Although renewable 
energy penetration begins to take effect in the 2001-2007 period (Crepe 0.9961) it has 
relatively little effect over the entire period (Crepe 0.9961). The Cint effect fluctuates on 
an annual basis and is relatively stable over the entire period leading to no improvement 
in intensity (Cinte 1.0013). Within public services the dominant negative effects are the 
loss in economic share occurring since 1990 and the reducing emissions coefficient 
attributed to electricity (Cemc 2.7624).  
 
Table 4-8 Decomposition analysis of public services energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cinte ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 0.9995 1.0245 1.0000 0.9812 0.9391 1.0783 0.9818 
 (-0.02) (0.81) (0.00) (-0.63) (-2.07) (2.55) (-0.61) 
1993-2001 1.2821 1.1122 1.0000 1.0452 0.6125 1.8581 0.9692 
 (3.16) (1.34) (0.00) (0.55) (-5.94) (8.05) (-0.39) 
2001-2007 0.9782 1.1084 0.9961 0.9763 0.8247 1.3818 0.7963 
 (-0.37) (1.73) (-0.07) (-0.40) (-3.16) (5.54) (-3.73) 
1990-2007 1.2535 1.2629 0.9961 1.0013 0.4744 2.7685 0.7578 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
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Figure 4-7 Public services decomposition by sub-period 
 
 
4.4.3.4 Agriculture 
In the agriculture sector, again Figure 4-8 illustrates the dominant factor in change in 
carbon emissions is economic growth (Cet 2.7696). Over the entire period the 
agriculture sector presents only a small increase (Ctot 1.0328). The industry and service 
sectors of the economy were the strategic economic development priorities. Increases 
experienced in the first two periods are countered by a reduction from 2001-2007 (Ctot 
0.8182). The structural effect of economic share declines in all sub-periods and over the 
entire period (Ces, 0.4105). The fuel switching (Cffse 1.0238) and renewable energy 
penetration (Crepe, 0.9995) effects are relatively static over the period. The two negative 
effects within the agriculture sector are energy intensity and the emissions coefficient. 
Energy intensity increases over the entire period (Cinte 1.0496), but does begin to reduce 
emissions from 2001-2007 (Cinte 0.8621). The emissions coefficient effect Cemc also 
reduces emissions in the agriculture sector but is relatively less important (Cemc 0.8458). 
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Electricity is a smaller component of the fuel mix in agriculture. The third period from 
2001-2007 appears to show a transition in the agriculture sector has occurred as 
intensity improvements begin. Agriculture energy CO2 analysis in Ireland receives little 
attention in the literature. 
 
 
Table 4-9 Decomposition analysis of agriculture energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cinte ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 1.0613 1.0105 1.0000 1.0897 0.9066 1.0784 0.9859 
 (2.00) (0.35) (0.00) (2.91) (-3.22) (2.55) (-0.47) 
1993-2001 1.1893 1.0132 1.0000 1.1173 0.5793 1.8586 0.9758 
 (2.19) (0.16) (0.00) (1.40) (-6.60) (8.06) (-0.31) 
2001-2007 0.8182 0.9999 0.9995 0.8621 0.7817 1.3819 0.8792 
 (-3.29) (0.00) (-0.01) (-2.44) (-4.02) (5.54) (-2.12) 
1990-2007 1.0328 1.0238 0.9995 1.0496 0.4105 2.7696 0.8458 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
Figure 4-8 Agriculture decomposition by sub-period 
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4.4.4 Transport modes 
The UNFCCC In-Depth Review (IDR) of Ireland’s third national communication (Rolle 
et al., 2005: 7) noted the high growth of transport emissions in Ireland. While the 
general reasons for emissions increases were known,106 the strengthening of the 
analyses of the driving forces underlying these increases was recommended. The 
following DA aids this response. The IDR recommended the linking of changes in 
emissions to changes in modal split by p-km and t-km and these in turn could be linked 
to policy measures. The DA results for the transport sector arise from considering the 
transport system as an integrated whole of different modes and change in the share of 
each transport mode. An innovation is applied to view transport as the provision of 
energy services through mobility by p-km and t-km rather than the movement of 
vehicles by vehicle kilometres (v-km). 
 
4.4.4.1 Private car 
The effects of scale of growth in the economy and affluence are further evident with 
private car. The increased car ownership arising over the analysis period flowed from 
enhanced personal incomes and manifested in mobility choices towards private car. This 
was also facilitated by cultural development towards individualisation and policy 
choices of government in infrastructural development towards roads.107 
 
Over the entire period and in all sub periods, private car presents a significant increase 
in emissions (Figure 4-9). It is of significant concern to climate policy in Ireland due to 
                                                 
106
 Reasons cited were rising car ownership from expanding personal incomes and rising freight transport 
from expanding GDP by Rolle et al. (2005). 
 
107
 This presents potential for technological, infrastructural and cultural lock-in to a higher emissions 
pathway. 
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its share of total emissions and the rate of increase since 1990. The results for private 
car illustrate that the dominant factor in change in carbon emissions is the scale effect of 
overall growth in transport (Ctt 2.2563). Although its share of total transport declines 
(Cts 0.8795) this may be misleading due to the considerable growth in total transport.  
 
The expected reduction effects for private car transport failed to materialise. The most 
instructive statistic for car transport over this period is the increase in energy intensity. 
Cintt for private cars has increased in all sub-periods and over the entire period (Cintt 
1.1879). This pattern may not be uncommon in other nations.108 In this DA intensity 
relates to energy consumption per unit of passenger transport.  
 
In spite of technological progress the increase in intensity can potentially be attributed 
to a number of factors. Primarily, the estimated occupancy of private cars dropped over 
the period and has particular implications for energy intensity measured as mobility by 
p-km. The rapid increase in car ownership and prosperity discussed by Howley et al. 
(2007: 22) would suggest that the trend to lower occupancy would be more pronounced 
in Ireland compared to other states in the EU-15. Total vehicle kilometres of private car 
increased. Energy consumption per vehicle kilometre tended theoretically to improve 
due to technical efficiency (Howley et al., 2008: 74). Concomitantly, the actual 
purchasing patterns arising from affluence and consumer decisions tended towards 
larger engine sizes that offset potential technical efficiency gains (Ó Gallachoir et al., 
2009). Similar patterns in engine size resulted with imported used cars. 
 
                                                 
108
 In the SRES, zero improvement in the fuel economy of new cars in the US was documented from 
1982-1992 (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 126). 
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The net effect led to an increase in Cint for private cars per p-km. Dennehy et al. (2009: 
38) proposed in improvement in energy intensity from 1995-2007 calculated per vehicle 
as 12%. This is measured in comparison to personal consumption of goods and services, 
which could be described as a more coarse measure. It incorporates other forms of 
consumption apart from transport. By analysing p-km109 transport is viewed as a system 
of mobility of passengers and indeed, freight rather than transport of the vehicle itself. 
Reductions in occupancy and purchase of larger engine sizes mean that private car 
transport was less defined as an efficient transport mode for passenger mobility and 
more as a lifestyle choice. Dispersed pattern settlement, urban sprawl and the 
prioritisation of private over public transport in policy and investment contributed both 
to the increasing requirement for the private car as a modal choice and increased vehicle 
distances travelled.110,111 In viewing a potential mitigating influence, the impact of 
biofuels on emissions through the renewable energy penetration effect presented a small 
reduction from 2004-2007 (Crepe 0.9902).  
 
While the DA for private car is contingent on the quality of the data used, confidence 
can be expressed in both the vehicle stock data from 1990-2007 and the average vehicle 
distance travelled data from 2000-2007. While the occupancy assumption is subject to 
uncertainty, confidence can be expressed in the conclusion that vehicle occupancy 
                                                 
109
 Measuring the energy intensity of v-km’s as opposed to p-km’s could be described as an inferior and 
less instructive measure when analysing the energy intensity of transport services. 
 
110
  A cascade can be posited here. Governance decisions, cultural identity and socio-economic behaviour 
combined with affluence to increase demand for mobility in general and private car in particular. This 
acted to encourage the modal choice of private car, increase travel distance, lower occupancy and increase 
engine sizes. The combined effect increased the scale of, and increased the intensity of each p-km. 
Consequently carbon emissions of private car transport expanded. The increase in population would also 
have acted as a scale pressure to increase vehicle stock and transport demand. 
 
111
 Evidence from Germany detailed in Hunecke et al. (2010) suggests that “mobility types” are a stronger 
predictive power than geographic or socio-demographic approaches. Mobility type denotes the attitudes 
to transport dividing people into five different categories; “public transport rejecters, car individualists, 
weather-resistant cyclists, eco-sensitised public transport users and self-determined mobile people”.  
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dropped. Given that increased engine size offset technical efficiency, any drop in 
occupancy would lead to an increase in intensity measured per p-km. It is very unlikely 
that the direction of the intensity measure will change regardless of plausible changes in 
assumed occupancy, leading to confidence in the measurement of increased intensity in 
the DA. 
 
Table 4-10 Decomposition analysis of private car energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cintt ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 1.1405 1.0000 1.0000 1.0629 1.0031 1.0675 1.0021 
 (4.48) (0.00) (0.00) (2.05) (0.10) (2.20) (0.07) 
1993-2001 1.6121 1.0000 1.0000 1.1037 0.9182 1.5894 1.0009 
 (6.15) (0.00) (0.00) (1.24) (-1.06) (5.96) (0.01) 
2001-2007 1.2773 1.0000 0.9902 1.0126 0.9549 1.3299 1.0031 
 (4.16) (0.00) (-0.16) (0.21) (-0.77) (4.87) (0.05) 
1990-2007 2.3485 1.0000 0.9902 1.1879 0.8795 2.2563 1.0062 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
Figure 4-9 Private car decomposition by sub-period 
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4.4.4.2 Road freight 
The road freight sector increased more than any other sector under analysis. Total 
transport grew due to economic growth. The nature of which acted to increase transport 
demand for freight and for passenger transport. This total scale effect acting to increase 
road freight carbon emissions (Ctt 2.2563) was accompanied by an increase in the 
structural share of road freight in total transport (Cts 1.6162). Increases in freight 
activity were handled by road rather than rail and in later years a modal shift also 
occurred away from rail to road. This pattern of road freight share growth was 
particularly high during the boom years of 1993-2001 (Cts 1.5178), but was still 
increasing from 2001-2007 (Cts 1.1445) and occurred despite increases in fuel price 
over the period.  
 
Of considerable importance to this pattern within the freight industry is the policy 
failure of an absence of any effective measure leading to a reduction effect. Neither the 
substitution effect (Cffse 1.0000) nor renewable energy effect (Crepe 1.0000) make any 
progress over the entire period. The energy intensity effect improves marginally from 
1993-2001 (Cintt 0.9842), but over the entire period (Cintt 1.0538) and in the most recent 
period from 2001-2007 (Cintt 1.0231) this indicator increases. Freight decisions appear 
to be prioritised for reasons other than efficiency of fuel consumption.  
 
While Dennehy et al. (2009: 37) record a marginal reduction in intensity of road 
freight,112 Howley et al. (2007: 21) proposed that increasing intensity could be 
attributed to the growth in heavy transport for construction. While this would explain 
                                                 
112
 The discrepancy may be attributed to a different analysis period (1995-2007) and/or due to the residual 
that is generated using the ODEX methodology. This does not present in the divisia index as it is perfect 
in decomposition. 
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the increase relative to economic activity, attributed to hauling relatively heavier low-
value ‘goods’ for the construction industry, it does not explain the increase with respect 
to t-km as heavier loads should theoretically improve intensity. Therefore, it is likely 
that the increase in intensity is due to other factors. Possible causes include load factor, 
empty running, engine-size and vehicle class and driver efficiency as noted for 
Germany (Leonardi and Baumgartner, 2004: 453). In discussing the increase in road 
freight intensity and emissions noted in five developed countries113 Kamakaté and 
Schipper (2009) proposed that the evolution of global supply chains and “just in time” 
logistics favour road freight for flexibility and speed.  While improving fuel economy of 
vehicles is “very important,” logistics and driving, higher load factors, and better 
matching of truck capacity to load can lead to improvements in intensity and emissions.  
 
Table 4-11 Decomposition analysis of road freight energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cintt ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 1.0394 1.0000 1.0000 1.0465 0.9304 1.0675 1.0000 
 (1.30) (0.00) (0.00) (1.53) (-2.38) (2.20) (0.00) 
1993-2001 2.3742 1.0000 1.0000 0.9842 1.5178 1.5894 1.0000 
 (11.41) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.20) (5.35) (5.96) (0.00) 
2001-2007 1.5572 1.0000 1.0000 1.0231 1.1445 1.3299 1.0000 
 (7.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (2.28) (4.87) (0.00) 
1990-2007 3.8427 1.0000 1.0000 1.0538 1.6162 2.2563 1.0000 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113
 In the USA, UK, Japan, France and Australia. 
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Figure 4-10 Road freight decomposition by sub-period 
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does not lead to reductions in the energy intensity of transport. In the DA results it is 
suggested that it increases intensity where it competes with bus and coach. The policy 
of liberalisation in Ireland lead to a significant increase in SPSV’s from 2001-2007114 
and a consequent increase in intensity of the overall road public passenger mode.  
 
The DA uses top-down data from the energy balance sheets which does not distinguish 
between bus and coach and SPSV’s. Bottom-up analysis of fuel consumption by 
Howley et al. (2007)115 shows that fuel consumption of SPSV’s increased significantly 
since 1990 and consumes more fuel than the bus and coach category by the later years 
in the analysis.116 Analysis of vehicle-km’s by (CSO, 2009c) also suggests dominance 
by SPSV’s and explains the intensity increase in this category. The supporting analysis 
described leads to confidence in the assertion that intensity has increased in this mode 
and also that this is attributed to increases in passenger transport by SPSV’s. Given the 
magnitude of the energy intensity increase it can be assumed that the results are robust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114
 The choice of passengers towards SPSV’s may reflect a similarity to tendencies with private car. 
Depending on affluence and culture and resultant preferences, passengers may move towards individualist 
forms over mass public transport see Hunecke et al. (2010). A lack of sufficient development of viable 
public transport alternatives and appropriate cycling and pedestrian facilities may also contribute to 
choices. 
 
115
 This bottom-up analysis used fuel consumption data from excise rebates from the Revenue 
Commissioners for bus and coach and based on NCT data for SPSV’s. 
 
116
 Fuel consumption by bus and coach increased from 40-77 ktoe from 1990-2007, while fuel 
consumption in the SPSV category increased from circa 17-118 ktoe from 1990-2007 (see Howley et al., 
2007; Howley et al., 2009). 
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Table 4-12 Decomposition analysis of road public passenger energy CO21990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cintt ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 1.1202 1.0000 1.0000 0.9603 1.0926 1.0666 1.0009 
 (3.86) (0.00) (0.00) (-1.34) (3.00) (2.17) (0.03) 
1993-2001 1.6482 1.0000 1.0000 1.1348 0.9188 1.5860 0.9967 
 (6.45) (0.00) (0.00) (1.59) (-1.05) (5.94) (-0.04) 
2001-2007 1.8417 1.0000 1.0000 1.4360 0.9679 1.3301 0.9962 
 (10.71) (0.00) (0.00) (6.22) (-0.54) (4.87) (-0.06) 
1990-2007 3.4003 1.0000 1.0000 1.4613 1.0377 2.2563 0.9938 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
 
Figure 4-11 Road public passenger decomposition by sub-period 
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benchmark of +13% on 1990.117 This sector was subject to considerable scale growth in 
all periods (Ctt 2.2051). However, despite absolute growth its structural share of total 
transport declined (Cts 0.7721). Upgrades to rail infrastructure occurred throughout the 
1990-2007 period. The structural share increased in the 2001-2007 period as rail 
passenger numbers increased and the LUAS tram scheme was commissioned in Dublin. 
The substitution effect acted to increase carbon emissions in all periods due to absolute 
increases in electricity consumption (Cffse 1.0980). In response to the scale growth of the 
sector considerable improvement in energy intensity of rail transport was achieved in 
the entire period (Cintt 0.6248) and in all sub-periods. Despite a modal shift of rail 
freight towards road (Howley et al., 2007: 41) significant passenger growth was 
recorded. The improvement in energy intensity increased in the 2001-2007 period (Cintt 
0.7513). 
 
 
Fuel consumption data does not distinguish between passenger and freight transport and 
this sector has been aggregated. Rail freight activity declined significantly.118 It is 
unclear how much of the intensity improvement is attributable to structural change or to 
technical efficiency. Diakoulaki et al. (2006: 2641) proposed that while it is not 
accurate from a strictly mathematically point of view to aggregate two different units in 
the form of p-km and t-km, it is an acceptable assumption for a comprehensive 
consideration of total work performed. According to the authors the caveat is a stable 
relationship between p-km and t-km in the activity data. In contrast to Diakoulaki et al. 
(2006), the ratio of rail p-km to t-km changed over the analysis period and cautions the 
                                                 
117
 The Kyoto Protocol target for Ireland is to limit the increase in GHG’s to +13% on 1990 by 2008-
2012. Assuming this metric is equally applied across all sectors for energy CO2 would suggest a +13% 
growth limit for rail which was not breached by 2007. 
 
118
 Rail freight declined as a proportion of total rail activity (t-km + p-km) from 32.44% in 1990 to 5.58% 
in 2007. 
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viewing of intensity improvement as a combination of the reduction in rail freight and 
technical efficiency. Nevertheless, in years where the ratio of p-km to t-km was stable 
(e.g. 1993-1996 see Appendix III), both decreases and increases in intensity have been 
observed. In these years intensity did not follow the expected decline that would arise 
from technical efficiency. The intensity measure may have been affected by issues such 
as capacity utilisation and logistics in rail or potentially by data accuracy. A minor 
improvement in the emissions coefficient is also measured (Cemc 0.9580), due to a 
reduction in emissions in electricity supply.  
 
Table 4-13 Decomposition analysis of rail energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cintt ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 0.9685 1.0116 1.0000 0.9251 0.9736 1.0675 0.9959 
 (-1.06) (0.39) (0.00) (-2.56) (-0.89) (2.20) (-0.14) 
1993-2001 1.0876 1.0259 1.0000 0.8989 0.7485 1.5893 0.9913 
 (1.06) (0.32) (0.00) (-1.32) (-3.56) (5.96) (-0.11) 
2001-2007 1.0622 1.0580 1.0000 0.7513 1.0594 1.2998 0.9704 
 (1.01) (0.94) (0.00) (-4.65) (0.97) (4.47) (-0.50) 
1990-2007 1.1189 1.0980 1.0000 0.6248 0.7721 2.2051 0.9580 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
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Figure 4-12 Rail decomposition by sub-period 
 
 
 
4.4.4.5 Domestic aviation 
Figure 4-13 illustrates considerable growth in CO2 from domestic aviation in Ireland. 
Scale growth over the entire period is predominantly responsible for this emissions 
increase (Ctt 2.2563). The domestic aviation sector experienced demand increases that 
were not met with energy intensity improvements (Cintt 1.3631). Intensity increase was 
considerable from 1990-1993 (Cintt 1.2745) and slowed to approach stasis in the 2001-
2007 period (Cintt 1.0044). It is unknown what factors underlie the increasing intensity 
as technical efficiency improvement would be expected. Logistical and capacity 
utilisation factors may have been substantial. Results are somewhat tentative for 
domestic aviation as the activity data used in the DA underestimates p-km 
marginally.119 Nevertheless, given the scale of intensity increase the conclusion that 
                                                 
119
 Data on passenger journeys is under-estimated. It is unknown how robust the average distance 
travelled assumption is for domestic aviation. See section on data in this chapter. 
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domestic aviation intensity has increased appears robust subject to validity of activity 
data. The DA has also excluded air freight activity which is included in energy data. 
The domestic aviation sector accounts for just 1.12% of transport CO2 in 2007120 but 
has a higher intensity per p-km and competes with other less energy intense modes.  
 
Table 4-14 Decomposition analysis of domestic aviation energy CO21990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cintt ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 1.0393 1.0000 1.0000 1.2745 0.7638 1.0675 1.0002 
 (1.29) (0.00) (0.00) (8.42) (-8.59) (2.20) (0.01) 
1993-2001 1.8942 1.0000 1.0000 1.0648 1.1192 1.5894 1.0000 
 (8.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.79) (1.42) (5.96) (0.00) 
2001-2007 1.3174 1.0000 1.0000 1.0044 0.9861 1.3299 1.0001 
 (4.70) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (-0.23) (4.87) (0.00) 
1990-2007 2.5936 1.0000 1.0000 1.3631 0.8430 2.2563 1.0004 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
Figure 4-13 Domestic aviation decomposition by sub-period 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
120
 Or 0.36% of total CO2 from all sectors. 
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4.4.4.6 Unspecified and fuel tourism 
The unspecified sector has no activity measure nor has fuel tourism. The unspecified 
categories involve a number of aggregated sub-categories for which data is unavailable. 
Fuel tourism involves activity that is not part of, and therefore not relevant to this 
analysis as it occurs on another territory. This category has been aggregated and 
included in the DA to complete sectoral coverage at the final consumption level. 
Absolute growth of these categories is considerable (Ctot 3.6342) (Figure 4-14) and it is 
in the context of their contribution to aggregate transport emissions that their 
significance becomes apparent. Fuel tourism rose as a price differential incentivised 
purchases of fuel by private motorists and hauliers for consumption outside the State. 
The fuel tourism category has expanded considerably with the price differential that 
arose with the UK from 1995 onwards in both petrol and even stronger in diesel 
(Howley et al., 2007:11-12). Fuel tourism is considerable in the overall transport energy 
profile (11.14% in 2007). The unspecified category also increased significantly from 
2005-2007 and was 7.21% of transport in 2007. The DA effect results under the fuel 
substitution category are largely irrelevant as change was attributed to fuel substitution 
(Cffse). 
 
Table 4-15 Decomposition analysis of unspecified and fuel tourism energy CO21990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cintt ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
 
 
      
1990-1993 1.2137 1.2111 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0021 
 (6.67) (6.59) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) 
1993-2001 2.6749 2.6590 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0060 
 (13.09) (13.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) 
2001-2007 1.1194 1.1187 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0006 
 (1.90) (1.89) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
1990-2007 3.6342 3.6026 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0088 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
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Figure 4-14 Unspecified and fuel tourism decomposition by sub-period 
 
 
4.4.5 Residential sector 
In the residential sector, progress has been made in limiting the increase of carbon 
emissions. Total emissions increased slightly over the entire period (Ctot 1.0396) but 
decreased from 1990-1993 (Ctot 0.9607) and from 2001-2007 (Ctot 0.9305) despite a 
significant increase in house numbers (Chn 1.4910).  The most significant factor in 
reducing emissions has been achievements in energy intensity (Cintr 0.8658). Energy is 
consumed in the residential sector for a diverse range of energy services from space and 
water heating to the use of appliances. Increased affluence in Ireland may have 
contributed to investment in the building stock to improve thermal performance Cint and 
also other forms of technological replacement (Cffse) and (Crepe), but has also enhanced 
energy demand for increased thermal comfort levels and use of appliances. 
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For the existing housing stock the period and type of dwelling affects energy demand 
and carbon emissions. Older houses tended to be of a lower thermal performance. The 
first thermal standards were introduced in 1979 and were successively improved. The 
type of dwelling also influences energy consumption, flats and apartments tending to 
the lower end of the scale, while detached houses tend towards the higher due to greater 
surface area. The trend towards detached houses in Ireland could be seen as an affluent 
trend. Average dwelling size by floor area is larger in Ireland than the UK and the EU 
15 (O’ Leary et al., 2008: 31).121 Some of the effect of affluence arising through 
increased average floor area was offset by a trend towards improved sustainability in 
construction design and performance of new house build, arising from legislative 
requirements122 (Howley et al., 2008: 82). 
 
The use of central heating has expanded considerably over the analysis period, which is 
theoretically more efficient than more traditional open-fires or back-boilers, but has also 
been offset by increased thermal comfort levels and larger floor areas. The residential 
sector along with the commercial services sectors has a higher relative space heating 
requirement, in comparison to the other sectors. It is therefore more climate dependent. 
According to O’ Leary et al. (2008: 27) climate correction has a negligible impact on 
residential energy and carbon emissions. When climate corrected from 1990-2006 
energy use per dwelling decreased 9.3% as opposed to 8.9% uncorrected (Howley et al., 
2008: 78). However, individual years show greater variation, 2007 presents a 5% 
increase in consumption when climate corrected. 
 
                                                 
121
 According to O’ Leary et al. (2008) the average dwelling size in Ireland by floor area is 27% above the 
average for the EU 15 and 30% above the average for the UK. 
 
122
 Revisions to the building regulations were introduced in 1992, 2002 and 2006 to improve energy 
intensity and legislate for more sustainable design requirements. 
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The emissions coefficient effect (Cemc 0.8153) has acted to reduce the carbon emissions 
of the residential sector in all periods attributable to upstream changes in electricity 
supply. The Cffse substitution effect (Cffse 0.9767) has acted to reduce residential 
emissions. Reductions in coal and peat have counteracted increases from oil, gas and 
electricity. Renewable energy was reduced as a share of the residential fuel mix over the 
entire period (Crepe 1.0113), but has begun to reduce emissions again from 2004 
onwards.  
 
The overall improvement in the residential sector in Ireland as typified by the 
improvement in energy intensity must be placed in context. Although it is a significant 
achievement, international comparison suggests that there is further potential to reduce 
both energy and carbon emissions. According to O’ Leary et al. (2008: 31-33) Irish 
residential energy carbon emissions in 2005 were 47% above the UK average and 104% 
more than the EU-27 average. Major improvements from 1990-2007 have placed the 
residential sector as one of Ireland’s best performing sectors. Despite this if Ireland’s 
relatively benign climate and current emissions are considered there may be significant 
mitigation potential in the future. Ireland’s residential electricity demand is also higher 
and can be attributed to increased appliance use (Howley et al., 2008: 80; Dennehy et 
al., 2009: 31).  
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Table 4-16 Decomposition analysis of residential energy CO2 1990-2007 
Period ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cintr ∆Chn ∆Cemc 
 
 
     
1990-1993 0.9607 1.0132 1.0045 0.9122 1.0481 0.9873 
 (-1.33) (0.44) (0.15) (-3.02) (1.58) (-0.43) 
1993-2001 1.1631 0.9575 1.0093 1.0445 1.1800 0.9765 
 (1.91) (-0.54) (0.12) (0.55) (2.09) (-0.30) 
2001-2007 0.9305 1.0067 0.9975 0.9088 1.2057 0.8457 
 (-1.19) (0.11) (-0.04) (-1.58) (3.17) (-2.76) 
1990-2007 1.0396 0.9767 1.0113 0.8658 1.4910 0.8153 
Figures in parentheses are the compound average annual growth rate. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-15 Residential decomposition by sub-period 
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4.5 Synthesis of results and comparison with macro DA 
For the economic sectors development has followed a lower emissions trajectory. This 
was achieved through development policy to restructure economic development towards 
less energy intensive forms coined as “the Irish way” by Kaivo-Oja and Luukkanen 
(2004: 1528).123 As noted in the macro analysis economic growth can act to increase 
emissions. It can also potentially act to reduce emissions by facilitating energy intensity 
improvement. In a broader sense it is the nature of economic growth that dictates 
emissions outcomes.  
 
In the context of sustainability, the economic and societal development that occurs with 
a growing economy can potentially be directed to “delinking” through 
immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation (Tapio et al., 2007: 435-
436)124. The economy and society relationship with energy and emissions is more 
complex than a simple linear interpretation can provide. This can be seen with the 
residential sector. Affluence led to demand increases for energy (e.g. appliance use 
increasing electricity consumption) but also facilitated technological change to reduce 
energy intensity125 and deliver fuel substitution and renewable energy penetration. 
 
                                                 
123
 Through economic development directed towards post-industrial information society. 
 
124
 Immaterialisation refers to the decoupling of both material production and consumption from 
economic growth and is also referred to as qualitative economic growth (Heitanen and Heinonen, 2002; 
Heinonen et al., 2005), post industrialism (Bell, 1974) or ecological structure change (Janicke, 1988)). 
Dematerialisation refers to the decoupling of the specified environmental harm from material production 
and is also known as eco-efficiency (Schmidt and Bleek, 2000) it may consist of technical development 
and/ or shifts within the sector observed e.g. transport modal split. Decarbonisation refers to delinking of 
CO2 emissions from total or sectoral carbon intensity, in the context of this research this can entail either 
fuel switching, renewables or change in the emissions coefficient. For further discussion see Tapio et al. 
(2007: 435-436). 
 
125
 This was achieved through legislative and policy change to deliver both improved thermal 
performance and sustainability. 
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The aggregated transport sector has also shown complex trends. Increases in GVA have 
driven higher freight demand and increasing personal affluence has driven higher 
personal mobility demand. Demand has evolved towards more energy intensive modes 
of transport and increased intensity within mode.126 This illustrates where governance 
and societal choices have evolved towards a weaker pattern of sustainability and 
resulted in poor delinking. The analysis of Tapio et al. (2007) showed Ireland to be an 
“outlier” in European terms.127 From 1970-2000, Ireland achieved immaterialisation of 
transport measured as p-km/ GDP and t-km/ GDP, while on measures of 
dematerialisation Ireland increased measured as gCO2/ p-km for passenger transport and 
gCO2/ t-km for freight. Ireland’s increase placed it above the EU 15 average for 
dematerialisation, particularly in freight. For decarbonisation Ireland’s transport CO2 
was similar to the EU average in 2000 measured as transport CO2/ GDP. 
Immaterialisation was related to Ireland’s high rate of economic growth while the 
dematerialisation results are consistent with the increase in energy intensity noted in this 
sectoral DA. The decarbonisation result must be seen in the context of Ireland’s 
anomalous GDP growth over the period. Further growth in transport volume and 
increasing intensity has also occurred since 2000. 
 
The aggregation of total transport activity allowed it to be considered as an integrated 
whole. While the aggregation of activity in Cts and Ctt may not be correct from a strictly 
mathematical point of view,128 it gives two potential advantages in the DA in the 
                                                 
126
 With the private car mode activity increased significantly and this activity became more energy 
intensive as occupancy reduced and engine sizes increased. 
 
127
 The “outliers” included Denmark and Luxembourg. 
 
128
 Due to the aggregation of two indicator forms p-km and t-km. 
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context of data constraints;129 i) using physical indicators in general gives potentially a 
more robust measure of intensity in individual modes130 and, ii) proximate insights into 
modal shifts can be identified that may not otherwise be possible.131 A similar constraint 
appears to have been encountered by Agnolucci et al. (2009: 1654) due to the 
aggregation of rail. The approach taken was to split the intensity term (energy/ GDP) 
into (energy/ p-km or t-km) * (p-km or t-km/ GDP) as another form of proximate 
insight into modal shift. In the transport sector growth in private car transport has been 
particularly problematic, with growth in SPSV’s in the road public passenger sector and 
growth in road freight.132 While domestic aviation forms a small proportion of total 
emissions, passenger journeys completed by domestic aviation are shifted to a higher 
intensity path.  
 
The various intensity results across the sectors illustrate the diversity of the dynamics in 
the sectors that can not be measured by the macro DA and potential pitfalls in macro 
intensity measurements using economic measures. The results of the sectoral DA are 
broadly consistent with the logic, and trend of the macro results. The intensity results 
are similar in pattern to those derived by Dennehy et al. (2009),133 but are not in 
                                                 
129
 As rail freight and rail passenger energy/ CO2 data is only reported in aggregate form. 
 
130
 As discussed by Diakoulaki et al. (2006: 2641), using physical rather than monetary indicators is 
preferable with disaggregated analysis. Monetary indicators have been used by e.g. Paul and Bhattacharya 
(2004). Using physical indicators allowed the DA to look at energy services provided by transport. This 
allows the DA to respond to the recommendations of Rolle et al. (2005). 
 
131
 The disaggregation of rail energy/CO2 data to passenger and freight would allow a DA to be 
completed separately on passenger and freight modes. This would give increased accuracy in the 
measurement of modal shifts and scale changes using physical indicators. 
 
132
 In the In Depth Review of Ireland’s third national communication to the UNFCCC, Rolle et al. (2005: 
13) noted the importance of limiting growth in emissions from transport in Ireland in the context of 
overall GHG’s and that “no single measure can address this problem sufficiently”. 
 
133
 Using the ODEX methodology. 
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agreement with the interpretation of results for road freight. The authors proposed an 
improvement which does not materialise in this sectoral DA.  
 
In Figure 4-16, aggregated changes in CO2 emissions for all sectors are presented. This 
allows sectoral effects to be seen in an overall context as per Wu et al. (2005). It also 
allows comparison against macro effects for validation and discussion of the dynamics 
underlying macro changes. The Cemc, Cffse and Crepe are aggregated across all sectors. 
The intensity effects (Cint) are aggregated across the economic and transport sectors as 
Cintec and Cintt respectively. Cintres presents the energy intensity of the residential sector 
separately. Differences between the macro and sectoral DA arise from statistical 
differences in the data used134 and the different decomposition framework applied to 
deliver macro and sectoral insights. The construction of the sectoral DA attributed 
electricity to the consuming sectors as a fuel type. This reversed the results of Cemc and 
Cffse with respect to the macro results. The macro results do not include electricity as a 
fuel type as transformation inputs in electricity generation are included in primary fuels. 
Fuel switching and renewables in electricity generation observed in the macro Cffse and 
Crepe are attributed to the declining emissions coefficient Cemc in the sectoral DA.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
134
 The macro DA is based on TPER energy and CO2 data which includes international aviation. This is 
not included in the sectoral DA. There are also statistical differences in the collection of data between 
macro TPER and sectoral TFC. 
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Figure 4-16  Radar of aggregated DA 1990-2007 
 
 
 
Due to differences in the DA framework the following aggregated effects are not 
directly comparable to the macro effects. The Cintec effect (0.6123) aggregated across 
the sectors reflects a substantial decrease in the energy intensity of the economic 
sectors.135 As discussed, this reflects changes in economic structure more than technical 
energy efficiency. The Cintt effect (1.3589) reflects the energy intensity increases of 
aggregated transport modes as a whole. The intensity effects are completed by the Cintres 
effect that shows the decrease in intensity of the residential sector (0.8658). The 
achievement of decreased intensity in the macro model using an economic measure of 
intensity, is comparable with that achieved in the economic sectors (Cintec) but is 
contrasted by the increase in transport intensity (Cintt). The decrease in the residential 
sector and the increase in transport are an illustration of the diversity of dynamics 
present in a complex system.  
                                                 
135
  This effect measures the intensity of economic activity, whereas Cint in the macro DA using total 
GVA to measure the intensity of all fuel consumption aggregated including transport and residential. 
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The scale effects Cet (2.7669), Ctt (2.2545) and Chn (1.4910) are reflective of not only 
the magnitude of the impact of economic growth and affluence on the system but of its 
nature. Production and consumption expanded to increase the size of the economy in 
Cet. With Ctt transport scale expanded to reflect increased economic demand for freight 
modes and increased demand of private citizens for passenger mobility. The increase in 
Chn is consistent with both the affluence and population effect of the macro model with 
increasing house numbers.  
 
The significance of economic growth and the affluence it entails is not just in immediate 
effects acting to increase carbon emissions, but in terms of potential infrastructural, 
technological, and cultural lock-in to a higher emissions trajectory in the future (Fisher 
et al., 2007: 176). This ‘weaker sustainability’136 is particularly evident with the 
transport sectors but concomitantly there is evidence of potential ‘stronger 
sustainability’137 in the residential and economic sectors. With the diverse performance 
noted in the sectors the growth in transport emissions in particular is of concern to 
policy. Given the requirement to reduce emissions through the Kyoto Protocol, and in 
the longer term, the political acceptability of a large increase in emissions becomes an 
important policy issue. It may lead to lock-in and may also necessitate even larger 
reductions from other sectors if targets are to be met. A clear policy/ legislative 
framework for overall medium to long term emissions reductions may be required. 
 
                                                 
136
 See Chapter 6 Scenarios. 
 
137
 See Chapter 6 Scenarios. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Data is reported in a number of categories relevant to the two-level DA. Alternative 
metrics of economic development may be valuable to analysis but have been slow in 
adoption and a traditional measure of GVA is used. Data gaps exist with transport 
activity and estimations have been made where necessary. This raises issues of data 
quality. The data has been explored to establish what caveats to the analysis must be 
applied and implications for result significance.  
 
The results of the macro DA illustrate that while carbon emissions increased 
significantly economic growth and energy intensity improvement are the most 
significant effects historically. Economic growth not only increases energy demand but 
can also deliver improved energy intensity by facilitating technological replacement. 
This can also occur through fuel substitution and renewable energy penetration. Growth 
in emissions has moderated from 2001-2007. Renewable energy has only begun to 
make notable progress in reducing emissions, while the substitution effect has reduced 
emissions through technological change since 1990. Despite population increases, the 
population effect was dwarfed by economic growth in acting to increase emissions. 
 
The sectoral results illustrate a diversity of dynamics in driving forces which can not be 
captured in the macro DA. Scale effects predominate in acting to increase emissions in 
the economic and transport sectors. Improvements in energy intensity are notable in the 
economic sectors and in the residential sector. The transport sector experienced 
significant growth in emissions due to increasing energy intensity in some modes, 
particularly private car and road freight but also the road public passenger category. 
Economic growth does not have a linear relationship with energy and emissions and it is 
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the nature of economic growth and development that is crucial. It defines the 
relationship of production and consumption to energy and emissions such as the pursuit 
of energy extensive economic development. The framework provided by Tapio et al. 
(2007) is useful particularly in DA to understand elements of sustainability in 
development as immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation. These 
processes can alter the relationship of economic and societal development to energy and 
emissions. Ireland may have significant challenges in overcoming potential lock-in 
particularly with transport. Progress has been noted in the economic sectors through 
development policy towards restructuring. The residential sector has improved the 
intensity measure considerably but may have significant additional potential to improve.  
 
The synthesis of results illustrates how the separate DA frameworks using different data 
sources yield results that give alternative insights into change. The results of the DA 
may be valuable in understanding historical driving forces of energy carbon emissions, 
issues for energy and climate policy and development issues in a broader sense. The 
results of the historical DA also facilitate consideration of potential alternative 
evolutions of driving forces into the future for scenario quantification. 
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CHAPTER 5: SCENARIO DRIVING FORCES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents a discussion of the driving forces affecting the potential future 
evolution of carbon emissions in Ireland. Based on a “Kaya” framework, driving forces 
are explored for evolution and interaction to inform the qualitative and quantitative 
process of scenario development in Chapter 6 Scenarios, by complimenting the 
historical decomposition analysis documented in Chapter 4.  
 
5.1.1 Framework for discussion 
The scenario driving forces discussed in this chapter provide for a more broad 
exploration of underlying driving forces than possible with the quantitative DA. This 
forms part of the qualitative approach of scenario analysis and facilitates the 
consideration of interactions among driving forces. Driving forces are not independent 
but are subject to dynamic and complex interaction and should not be considered as 
fundamental driving forces in themselves.138 This exploration informs the development 
of energy CO2 scenarios in Chapter 6 Scenarios by not only examining driving forces 
but by establishing quantitative ranges of driving force variables available in the 
literature. It broadens and deepens the discourse to consider underlying themes, 
                                                 
138
 The inter-dependence of driving forces and their abstract nature was noted by Nakicenovic et al. 
(2000: 105). An example of the abstract nature of driving forces could be posited with the case of 
population. Population is not necessarily a driving force itself as a relationship with energy and emissions 
must be established through some form of fuel consumption of the ‘population’. These are complex 
cause-effect relationships. 
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qualitative changes and aids the process of considering alternative dynamics.139 This 
discussion could also serve as a basis to inform longer-term scenarios. The chapter is 
structured according to the framework established in Chapter 2 Scenario Analysis: 
 
1. Population 
2. Economic and Social Development  
3. Energy resources and technology 
4. Governance and policies 
 
5.2 Population 
5.2.1 Population and demography 
The development of energy CO2 emissions, as described in the Kaya identity, is linked 
with demographic evolution. In the SRES, Nakicenovic et al. (2000) describe how 
population projections are amongst the most common of indicators of the future state of 
the world, and have a relatively high-accuracy in the near-to-medium term. Despite this 
observation a caveat exists “even so the future is unknowable and surprises are in store” 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 107). The influence of population on emissions is more 
intimately linked with demographic units “such as households and automobiles,” as it 
begins to contextualise and characterise the relationship of population with energy. The 
inclusion of the demographic unit such as household is recommended by Gaffin (1998: 
161) to specifically reflect a more insightful representation of demographics in 
emissions models and scenarios rather than simply ‘population’. Although the Kaya 
identity may suggest that CO2 emissions grow linearly with population increases, the 
                                                 
139
 This exploratory process in the scenarios is in contrast to BAU and optimistic/pessimistic alternatives 
or simple trend changes in scenarios. 
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actual development depends on interactions with e.g. economic growth, technology, 
economic structure and affluence.  
 
In advance of the SRES, Gaffin (1998) outlined a number of insights into the 
relationships of the Kaya variables to demographic developments. On the effect of 
population growth on economic growth the author proposed that aging can both increase 
and decrease savings patterns. This is dependent on whether the age structure of the 
population increases dependency ratios and reduces savings rates by a reduced fertility 
and mortality rate. In the case of a rapidly growing ‘younger’ population there may be a 
greater incentive to save for retirement. The author discusses how savings rates 
influence investment and therefore the stimulation of technological progress. The 
significance for Ireland on a shorter time-scale also includes the relationship with 
consumption of goods and services and by that energy. On the effect of economic 
growth on population growth the relationship is empirically less ambiguous. To 
economists and modellers demographics are frequently treated as an exogenous 
independent variable. An apparent axiom is relevant here; “the rich have fewer children 
than the poor” (Gaffin, 1998: 150). This demographic fertility transition is not uniform 
across nations and “some countries have failed to begin a fertility decline” (Nakicenovic 
et al., 2000: 112-114).  A stronger relationship is observed in the increase in life-
expectancy correlating with affluence. Both fertility and mortality rates are usually 
expected to decline with economic growth by the enhancement of living standards and 
cultural modernisation. The third major component of population growth in Ireland, net 
migration, is also influenced by economic growth. Despite increased national prosperity 
the fertility rate remains anomalously high. 
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On the subject of aging, Mackellar et al. (1995) discusses how an older population tends 
towards a higher household formation rate. This scale effect increases the number of 
smaller households which tend to be more energy intensive per person, but is also 
linked to social and cultural factors. Dalton et al. (2008) have offered an alternative 
perspective where aging significantly reduces long term emissions in the US due to 
changes in labour income and consumption patterns. Trends that affect demographic 
structure, from family structure and divorce rates, to the tendency to live alone, may 
have a substantial impact on energy use in industrialised countries (O’ Neill and Chen, 
2002: 83). This illustrates the input of social and cultural factors into the evolution of 
population as an emissions driving force. 
 
5.2.2 Spatial pattern and urban sprawl 
The phenomenon of urbanisation described by Gaffin (1998) describes the tendency for 
emissions to increase as transport and infrastructure demand expand through western 
style industrialisation in developing countries. In Ireland as a developed country the 
picture is complex. Urbanisation has already occurred. According to the 2006 census 
60.7% of the national population are in aggregate town areas (CSO, 2007: 19). This is 
still less than the European average of 75% (EEA, 2006: 5). The manifestation of spatial 
development patterns that increase emissions would tend to be associated with 
development in dispersed pattern or of lower density. The correlation in Ireland is 
different to the global urbanisation phenomenon. The National Spatial Strategy 
documented how Ireland’s population is dispersed in general, heavily dominated by 
Dublin in the east, with “strong evidence” that Dublin itself is becoming a “dispersed 
city” (DOEHLG, 2002: 20-22). The development pattern was directly attributed to 
investment decisions that influence where people work and live. The provision of 
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infrastructure and public transport is “expensive and difficult” in the context of lower 
density. 
 
The prevalence of urban sprawl involves increased travel distances for passengers, 
goods and services where the benefits of urban living are sought in rural locations. 
Urban sprawl is associated with higher motorisation of transport and greater use of the 
private car (Kahn Ribeiro et al, 2007: 366). Urban sprawl occurs in two broad patterns 
in Ireland; urban-rural migration to towns, villages and the open-countryside including 
“one-off housing”140 and low density suburbanisation of towns and cities. Low density 
planning in the Greater Dublin Area (GDA) is associated with a higher emissions 
profile. Recurrent emissions141 of new dwellings would have been reduced by 33% in 
2006 if development was in “city-centre”-type development as opposed to exurbs and 
commuter towns (Duffy, 2009).142 
 
Of particular salience for settlement pattern in Ireland, is the prevalence of “one-off 
housing,” constituting about one third of the building stock in 2002 (Watson and 
Williams, 2003: vi). This dispersed pattern of housing in the countryside tends to be 
detached house by design and would therefore be associated with higher energy 
consumption. As with the GDA, in the rest of the country the implications of the 
development pattern of new housing are towards higher transport and operational 
                                                 
140
 A term used in Ireland to describe the building of single dwellings in rural areas outside of towns and 
villages. 
 
141
 That are related to transport and the operation and maintenance of housing. 
 
142
 Duffy (2009) documented how much of the housing built in the GDA was low density and constituted 
34% of national housing construction from 1997-2006. In addition to low density, the tendency of 
development was towards larger floor area, detached or semi-detached by design with poor public 
transport links. All of these factors tend to increase overall “recurrent emissions”. 
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energy consumption and emissions.143,144,145 This is a significant issue given its 
acceptance in national development policy. This settlement pattern is sanctioned by 
national planning policy in Ireland (DOEHLG, 2005), and could be described as an 
affluent societal phenomenon running counter to mitigation policy objectives. In this 
context, potential infrastructural and cultural lock-in to higher emissions growth paths 
becomes relevant. Attributed to economic growth, Ireland has been identified in 
European terms as experiencing “urban sprawl” (EEA, 2006: 9), both in Dublin and 
nationally. National planning policy is identified as a key factor; 
 
This preference is realised in single-family houses in open countryside 
with the benefits of the proximity to the capital or other urban areas. The 
realisation of this ideal is greatly facilitated by the planning regime which 
imposes few constraints on the conversion of agricultural areas to low-
density housing areas.  
(EEA, 2006: 22). 
 
5.2.3 The evolution of demographics 
In keeping with the complex relationships between population and emissions outlined 
above, the global futures literature, as reviewed by (Morita and Robinson, 2001: 140-
                                                 
143
 Due to larger floor areas of housing, increased distances to access services and poorly developed 
public transport in rural areas in Ireland. The latter two factors can necessitate the use of the private car 
for transport.  
 
144
 Tol et al. (2009) developed an initial set of “regional environmental accounts for Ireland” that showed 
transport fuel use is highest in the commuter belts around Ireland’s towns and cities. Electricity 
consumption is also dominated by the commuter belts as is consumption of other energy but with a less 
strong correlation. 
 
145
 Moles et al. (2008) looked at “sustainability” in three clusters centred on Limerick, Sligo and Athlone/ 
Mullingar. They concluded that spatial planning of new housing in satellites and urban fringes was 
reducing Irish sustainability in relation to carbon emissions. Services and public transport are difficult to 
provide on this spatial pattern. 
188 
 
141), illustrated that scenarios with population growth can show both rising and falling 
emissions. Longer term, falling emissions tended to be associated with global 
population stabilisation at a low level. This would result from both lower levels of 
migration and cultural modernisation processes through increased prosperity, enhanced 
family planning and rights and opportunities for women.  
 
The evolution of demographics in both scale and structure can be estimated by 
calculating the natural change and net migration that shapes the development of the base 
population (Dignan, 2009: 5). Natural change consists of the addition of births and 
subtraction of deaths due to fertility and mortality rates respectively.146 Net migration is 
a function of the additions due to in-migration and subtractions due to out-migrations. 
Demographic development interacts with social and economic development in many 
ways. Fertility and mortality rates depend on factors such as education, income, social 
norms and health provisions. The change in net-migration is linked to issues such as 
perceived income disparities and equality across countries and is therefore linked to 
economic growth and policy decisions on migration and social justice within nations. 
Evidence suggests that in response to labour demand and skills shortages labour 
migration has dominated European migration for decades (Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 
2008: 2). With less restrictive immigration policies since 2004 post accession east-west 
migration in Europe has been most significant in Ireland and the UK. Immigration has 
been essential to the maintenance of labour supply in Ireland (Feld, 2005: 8). Feld also 
outlined the anomalous nature of Ireland relative to European demographics with a 
fertility rate largely outside of the range of other western European countries. 
 
                                                 
146
 This natural change is related to the cohort age structure of the population. 
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5.2.4 Population projections for Ireland  
The evolution of Irish population has experienced a relatively recent trend break when 
viewed in the longer term. The Great Famine of 1845-1849 and years of emigration 
afterwards saw population drop until the middle of the twentieth century when 
population started to grow again. This has left Ireland with a considerably smaller 
population than would be expected for a European country of its size. Emigration was 
common until the 1990’s when economic prosperity reversed the migration pattern to 
significant immigration. 
 
In establishing the pattern of demographic change in Ireland since 1990, two key factors 
become evident in population growth; fertility rates and immigration. Ireland’s 
population has grown consistently since 1990. With relatively high fertility rates and 
consistently high net migration due to favourable economic conditions population 
growth in Ireland is a statistical anomaly in international terms. Since the mid-1990’s  
migration has had the dominant impact on population change (CSO, 2008a:17). 
Increasing fertility rates have been consistently high and continue to be the one of the 
highest in Europe, exceeded only by Iceland and France (CSO, 2008a:11). The recent 
trends in fertility are “unlikely” to be maintained. Following international trends, 
fertility rates are likely to reduce due to negative pressure including educational 
attainment and labour force participation.  
 
The official national projections (CSO, 2008a) projected population on an annual basis 
to 2041. They involve two fertility assumptions; F1 remains at the 2006 level of 1.9 for 
the projection period while F2 decreases to 1.65 by 2016 and remains constant 
thereafter. Migration is the “most uncertain” determinant of population change in 
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Ireland (CSO, 2004:17, CSO, 2008a: 17). Although the labour market and economic 
growth are significant in determining outcomes, these were not explicitly factored into 
the definition of the CSO scenarios. Three assumptions of immigration are included in 
the projections. M1 evolves from high to low rates while M2 continues at a moderate 
level throughout the projection period. M0 is a zero net migration scenario. One 
mortality assumption is used within the projections with life expectancy continuing to 
increase as mortality is considered less uncertain. 
 
Alternative population projections have been produced for Ireland (UNESA, 2008; 
Lanzieri 2006; Connell and Pringle, 2004; Blackwell, 2001). These projections are at 
the lower end of the range projected by CSO (2008) and may be implausible. This may 
be attributable to the significant upward revision of migration assumptions in CSO 
(2008a) due to census results from 2006. The demographic assumptions contained in 
Capros et al. (2008) are also conservative. This is significant as these assumptions 
underpin energy projections for Ireland to 2030 of DGTREN. In the Medium Term 
review (MTR) Fitzgerald et al. (2008:47-49) use a similar fertility rate assumption to 
CSO (2008a) F1 while the migration rate is below CSO M2 and closer to M0.147 It is 
acknowledged that migration flows are uncertain, “migration flows tend to be quite 
volatile and are sensitive to economic conditions” (Fitzgerald et al, 2008: 48-49). 
Population projections can have an over-reliance on the recent past (Dignan, 2009). 
Trend breaks may be cyclical rather than permanent, and turning points are difficult to 
judge. The current projection method employed by the CSO, the “cohort component 
                                                 
147
 This may be significant as official national energy and emissions forecasts from SEI and the EPA 
respectively are based on the ESRI MTR and amendments. 
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method,” essentially relies on past trends148 and employs variant projections to manage 
uncertainty. 
 
The potential effect of the recession becomes important in demographic terms when the 
link between economic growth and population change is considered. The recession 
discourages immigration and encourages emigration. This has distinct ramifications for 
population projections given the significance of net migration in population change and 
changes to the base population. Although the natural increase of population in Ireland 
has arisen due to a higher fertility rate (CSO, 2009b), net migration has been estimated 
to have significantly dropped due to higher emigration and lower immigration (CSO, 
2008b and CSO, 2009a). The implications for population projections are a potential 
softened growth than that projected by CSO (2008a) through to 2020,149 but still tending 
to be higher than the alternative projections noted above. 
 
The construction of the population projections in CSO (2008a) are not directly in 
accordance with the logic of the scenarios developed for this research.150 The effect of 
the recession may also have a significant affect on population change particularly as 
emigration increases and immigration decreases. In the interests of a robust analysis, 
population scenarios were produced as part of this research in keeping with scenario 
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 Combined with consideration of expert judgement and user consultations in projections. 
 
149
 The CSO projections range in 2021 is from 4,686,000 in M0F2 to 5,688,000 in M1F1. M0F2 is a zero 
migration low fertility assumption while M1F1 is high migration, high fertility combination.  
 
150
 The CSO alternative projections were developed for a different purpose with different assumptions. 
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logics using a simple component method151. These are detailed in Appendix IV and are 
less than the upper range projected by CSO (2008a).152 
 
5.3 Economic and social development  
 
5.3.1 Background and evolution 
Ireland experienced unprecedented economic growth through the 1990’s. The nations’ 
position was reversed from one of the poorest to one of the richest Member States of the 
EU (DGECFIN, 2006: 256). The period of rapid economic growth was popularly coined 
“the Celtic Tiger”. Deep structural change occurred in the economy with growth driven 
by “rapid developments in Information and Communication Technologies, computer 
manufacturing, the pharmaceutical industry” (Rolle et al., 2005). Growth occurred in 
less energy intensive branches but expanded national prosperity and energy demand and 
had particular implications for energy emissions. The increase in economic output 
slowed in 2001, but continued at a more moderate rate until coming to an abrupt halt in 
the second quarter of 2008.153  
 
Many economic commentaries believed Ireland’s economy would come to a “soft-
landing” as predicted by (Bergin et al. 2003: vii). Rae and van den Noord (2006: 2) 
                                                 
151
 Estimates of immigration, emigration and natural increase were made according to the logic of the 
scenarios and include the potential effects of the recession. For an explanation see Appendix IV. 
 
152
 The CSO projections were produced before the impact of the recession in Ireland became apparent and 
consequently the upper range is probably too high. 
 
153
 Ireland could technically be described as in a recession after a second successive contraction in the 
economy. 
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predicted this was the most likely outcome, but cautioned that if a “disorderly 
correction” occurred there would be risks for macroeconomic and financial stability. In 
the 2005 Medium Term Review, Fitzgerald et al. (2005: vii) suggested that “the 
fundamental factors driving the Irish economy […] remain quite favourable”. While 
stating that although a soft landing remained a possibility, this MTR suggested a 
number of threats were present including in the building and construction sector and 
proposed that a correction in this sector was increasingly likely. Curiously, the most 
recent MTR from 2008 ceased any mention of a “soft landing,” the inflated building and 
construction sector or indeed the impending recession or financial crisis. It 
optimistically proposed that “the Irish economy is resilient in the face of adverse 
circumstances” and “this Review suggests that the fundamentals of the Irish economy 
are sound. Even if the immediate future may prove quite difficult” (Fitzgerald et al., 
2008: vii, xii). The MTR’s have repeatedly acknowledged the inherent uncertainty in 
their forecasts, the failure of the most recent MTR may be attributable to the 
methodology used.154 Economic commentator Jim O’ Leary suggested in the context of 
continual ESRI revision of short-term forecasts that; “it might be better to publish 
ranges rather than point forecasts. It might be better still to build different scenarios, 
corresponding to different assumptions about policy and the external environment” (O’ 
Leary, 2009). 
 
The coincidence of a sudden correction in over-valued house prices, rising 
unemployment and the consequent banking and public finance crisis in Ireland, with the 
                                                 
154
 The methodology used by the MTR, as a macroeconomic point forecast, may have limitations in both 
accuracy and strategic insights in the context of complex dynamics and uncertainty e.g. surprise and 
bifurcation from trend. Professor Terence McDonough has been critical, proposing mainstream 
economics as “broken” and disconnected from the real world, with “economists hiding behind massaged 
mathematical models that claimed to tell the future but failed to predict or prevent the current crisis” 
(Slattery, 2009). McDonough cited systemic problems of “glorified consumption” and policy mistakes 
such as the low-tax regime that lead to the fiscal crisis. 
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global recession, shocked the economy into rapid contraction (see Bergin et al., 2009). 
According to the IMF (2009: 6) the near term dynamics are tumultuous and uncertain. A 
significant trend break in the economic driving force has occurred. The interaction of 
slowing growth, financial sector stress, and the state of public finances, each threaten to 
pull the other down, while Ireland is susceptible to further external shocks. This is the 
most severe economic correction currently faced by any advanced economy, “and 
matches episodes of the most severe economic distress in post-World War II history” 
(IMF, 2009: 28). The openness of the Irish economy means that Ireland is intimately 
linked with world growth and the downturn that occurred globally in 2008.  
 
The original conditions leading to growth in Ireland’s economy are variously attributed. 
Credit has been primarily given to, state-driven economic development, social 
partnership arrangements, increased labour force participation of women, decades of 
investment in domestic higher education; targeting of foreign direct investment (FDI); a 
low corporation tax rate; an English-speaking workforce, and crucial EU membership 
which provided transfer payments and export access to the Single Market.155  
 
These favourable conditions for FDI attracted multinationals as Ireland became an open 
globalised economy (DGECFIN, 2006: 256). Ireland’s growth was concentrated in 
high-value added sectors of ICT and pharmaceuticals but has been added to by financial 
services and recently by indigenous construction (Fitzgerald et al., 2008: 9-19; CSO, 
2008c: 152). The structure of the economically productive sectors has evolved 
considerably away from the agrarian production of the past to manufacturing and 
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 For discussion see Čech and Macdonald (2004) or Fitzgerald et al. (2008:6). 
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towards services as an objective of national economic development (Fitzgerald et al., 
2005: 102).  
 
Subsequently, numerous policy failures inflated the construction sector to an 
excessively high proportion of the economy, and risks of a banking system collapse 
increased due to cavalier financing practices and light regulation (Bergin et al., 2009: 
5). Economic policy failures can be seen in the failure to regulate the banking sector 
sufficiently from high risk practices, and in the failure to control spiralling house prices 
or the development boom. They can also be seem in the failure to protect the public 
finances from over-reliance on short-term windfalls, such as stamp duty on houses of 
which the government had been warned (see IMF, 2009: 3). The OECD (2009a: 154-
156) attributes the “severe contraction” to the fall in housing investment and examines 
remaining risks from international financial instability and weak demand, but also 
proposes that the scale of adjustment to the imbalances could add strength to recovery. 
In examining the implications of such developments for the medium term to 2020, it is 
important to be aware of the trend break but not to get trapped in current dynamics that 
will evolve further. 
 
5.3.2 Social equity and poverty 
Throughout the period of economic growth the extent of progress on redistributing 
wealth may be questioned with implications for social equity and poverty. In 
comparison to other European states the lower national expenditure on social protection, 
health and education (CSO, 2008d: 40-42) can potentially be attributed to other factors 
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such as demographics.156 One measure of social equity, the risk of poverty rate, placed 
Ireland as one of the highest in the EU in 2006 (CSO, 2008d: 42). While Whelan and 
Layte (2006) found evidence of increased social mobility, contrary to ideas of increased 
marginalisation, Whelan et al. (2006: 112-113) acknowledge; i) there are substantial 
socio-economic disparities, ii) Ireland’s poor standing in relation to other EU countries 
and iii) also argue that polarisation may have increased in a narrower-range of socio-
economic groups. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the authors note progress in 
“dramatic reductions in levels of vulnerability and multiple deprivation across the socio-
economic spectrum”. Fahey et al. (2007: 10) give a largely positive tone to an overall 
assessment of progress “a fairly long list of social fundamentals that are stronger today”. 
However, the authors also confirm “social inequalities are slow to narrow, the 
indignities of poverty and hopelessness, though less widespread than before, are still all 
too common, some public services are poor”. The authors also gave a timely warning of 
“a niggling worry that the whole edifice of economic growth may come crashing down 
around our ears at some time in the future”.  
 
The Nobel Laureate economist, Joseph Stiglitz, proposes that “trickle down 
economics,” do not work (UNDP, 2003: 80). Sometimes the poor benefit and 
sometimes not, while the well-off can gain disproportionately at the expense of the 
poor. For Stiglitz, the key question concerns is if the strategies for growth, including 
liberalisation and globalisation, actually benefit those in poverty on such issues as 
access to education for the disadvantaged. Stiglitz concludes these are “not the kind of 
results that show up in typical econometric studies”. The significance of social equity in 
terms of energy and emissions lies potentially in both absolute and intensity of 
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 The relatively young population in Ireland may require less expenditure on these services than an older 
population. 
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consumption. In absolute terms the affluent may consume more than those in poverty 
(Roberts et al., 2007).157  Concomitantly, those in poverty may rely on more energy and 
carbon intensive energy services due to the absence of sufficient capital for 
technological replacement. 
 
5.3.3 The economy and development 
One of the main factors influencing GHG emissions is the “geographical distribution of 
activities” (Fisher et al., 2007: 177). This is one of the links between economic growth 
and emissions as a development pathway, and highlights the influence of human 
settlements and urban structures, on mobility needs and transportation requirements. As 
proposed by Sathaye et al. (2007: 701) the factors underlying the development pathway 
such as spatial patterns “are subject to human intervention,” and are under the agency of 
governance. Economic growth facilitated significant investment in infrastructure 
development in Ireland. Over the period from 1990-2007 this was scaled up 
considerably as Ireland sought to catch up in development and keep pace with economic 
growth.158 The development pattern that has been favoured in Ireland in-effect favoured 
dispersed urban sprawl and car-based transport (EEA, 2006). This has also potentially 
favoured an infrastructural and technological lock-in to high energy demand and high 
carbon emissions (Fisher et al., 2007: 176). These are the medium to long-term 
implications of recent short-term decision-making. Much of the housing and industrial 
                                                 
157
 Roberts et al. (2007) showed that the poorest tenth of the population in the UK are causing less than 
half of the carbon dioxide emissions generated by the richest tenth from energy use in their homes.  
However, the analysis also revealed a significant proportion of lower income households, as many as one 
in ten of all households, which have emissions as high as many richer households. 
 
158
 See Ireland’s National Development Planning <www.ndp.ie>. The OECD economic review of Ireland 
(2006) concluded that the stock of public capital was low but that the government had responded with a 
substantial infrastructure programme.  Public investment was expected to average 5% of national income 
for the next decade. 
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spatial pattern, and its related transport and energy systems have been decided and may 
be difficult to ameliorate or reverse. Tol (2007: 107-108) to some degree proposes that 
the reality of this lock-in is now here and that climate policy can only affect the 
demand-side to 2012. There are potential opportunities to modify the current pattern, or 
at least to ameliorate what is in place and plan for what is not. This would serve as a 
constructive starting point for mitigation policy. To a degree, baseline modifications are 
explored in the scenarios of this study.159 As discussed by Deutscher Bundestag (1994), 
to reach sustainability in transport beyond increases in efficiency requires changes in 
modal split and ultimately in urban planning. 
 
A failure to appropriately regulate development has equity, quality of life, 
environmental and economic implications (EEA, 2006: 28). Dispersed patterns of 
settlement increase the costs of infrastructure provision to public finances and 
potentially weaken competitiveness as costs are also increased. The economic and 
spatial development story of Ireland appears to be a case of failure to regulate or plan 
policy sustainability (economically, environmentally or indeed socially) and a market 
inflated by rising income “in some ways, Ireland has been a victim of its own success. 
Rising incomes and government policy failures pumped up a housing bubble that is now 
deflating fast” (Smith, 2008). It has been proposed that the rapid expansion in house-
building “was both sustainable and desirable,” and only post 2003 became 
unsustainable160 (Bergin et al., 2009: 4). This apparent financial view of sustainability 
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 Pertaining to various approaches to immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation (Tapio et 
al., 2007) in the various sectors see Chapter 6 Scenarios. 
 
160
 Various analyses have suggested an over-supply of housing and that upwards of three hundred 
thousand houses are vacant in Ireland depending on the accounting method (McArdle, 2010). It is 
unevenly distributed and could take up to ten years to be absorbed by demand in some parts of the state. 
Data on vacant residential houses in Ireland is not centrally collated and is estimated from sources such as 
ESB connections, the GeoDirectory and the 2006 census. 
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neglects from both an emissions perspective and in a broader development sense, the 
lack of sustainability of both spatial patterns of development and financial patterns of 
the construction and housing industries. These policy failures have economic, social and 
environmental implications and a more integrated view of sustainability is necessary. 
 
While in general the detailed processes and outcomes of Ireland’s economy are not the 
subject of this research, they have significance in the evolution of Ireland’s carbon 
emissions. The results of the DA have shown that economic growth and trends 
interconnected with affluence, e.g. private car p-km and the energy intensity of 
activities are intimately related with the economic patterns that the country has 
experienced (see Chapter 4 Historical Decomposition Analysis). Economic growth has 
been identified as the most significant driver of historical emissions in the macro DA. A 
relationship between current carbon emissions, the economic recession and the financial 
crisis can be posited. Light regulation and weak or absent policy on sustainability have 
integrated immediate and long term consequences (economically and environmentally) 
for Ireland as a systemic development issue.161 This led to both increasing emissions 
and economic risks. Ireland was once a “shining light” of European economic growth 
(Smith, 2008). It may now become a laboratory of how to resolve financial imprudence.  
 
Adam Smith, often cited as the father of modern economics famously wrote about the 
actions of self interest as an “invisible hand” promoting the interests of society (Smith, 
1776: Book IV Chapter II). Smiths’ statements were somewhat qualified in terms of 
how the theory of an invisible hand should be considered “nor is it always the worse” 
                                                 
161
 Issues of sustainability and climate change are gaining greater popular acceptance for inter-linkages 
with the economy, development and well-being in general. An example is the declaration in the ‘Stern 
Report’ of climate change as; ‘‘the greatest example of market failure we have ever seen’’ (Stern et al., 
2006: Part 1 page 1.). 
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and “frequently promotes”. The examples of climate change, the financial crisis and the 
recent development of Ireland’s built environment run directly counter to a rigid 
assertion of an infallible market, and more towards the Smith’s lesser cited assertions in 
the Wealth of Nations “Those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, 
which might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained 
by the laws of all governments” (Smith, 1776: Book II, Chapter II), and governments 
have; “the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the 
injustice or oppression of every other member of it” (Smith, 1776: Book IV, Chapter 
IX).  
 
When the economic system is left to market forces, the approach to development 
planning can come with large and avoidable social costs (Storm and Nastepad, 2007: 
1173). However, intervention is controversial and contested and government and market 
failure may be subjective judgements (Shafaeddin, 2004). Some arguments view 
intervention as undesirable. When choosing to intervene requires questions of when, 
how and how much? The key appears to be an appropriate balance. Cognisant of this, in 
the context of recent experiences in Ireland, the words of Sukhamoy Chakravarty may 
be instructive “the market is a bad master, but can be a good servant” (Chakravarty, 
1993). In the global futures scenarios, falling GHG’s are associated with higher 
government intervention, while rising GHG’s are associated with low government 
intervention (Morita and Robinson, 2001: 141).  
 
5.3.4 Relationships 
The driving force discussion of the SRES seeks to achieve an initial and tentative clarity 
on the complex philosophical aspects underpinning economic and social development. 
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This ‘driving force’ encompasses many different dimensions and linkages. Many 
different indicators have been devised to measure progress (see Chapter 4 Historical 
Decomposition Analysis). In defining development as the furthering of choices three 
essential choices are identified as; to have access to resources needed for a decent 
standard of living, to lead a long and healthy life and to acquire knowledge (UNDP, 
1997). A value is also placed on many other choices from political, economic and social 
freedom, to opportunities for being creative and productive, and to enjoy human rights. 
It can be argued that choices are only possible once basic human needs have been met 
such as food, shelter, health care, safety and education as described by Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) or the non-hierarchical “Human Scale 
Development” of Max-Neef (Max-Neef, 1991). Taking an economic definition, poverty 
becomes an absence of satisfactory economic development. The definition of 
development, involves social and cultural dimensions that cannot be resolved by 
scientific questions, as they become issues of values, preferences and policies 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000:114).162 As acknowledged in the SRES “income is not an end 
in itself” but a route to choices and “foreclose them” in the case of poverty. Income 
measures such as GDP may not reflect many multidimensional development issues but 
are practically the only development indicator used in emission scenarios. Recognising 
this limitation explains the context for the ensuing discussion and its primary focus on 
economic perspectives. 
 
Economic growth can be achieved by increasing factor inputs to production, such as 
capital or labour, or by increasing productivity. Without productivity growth, economic 
growth cannot be maintained with limited or depletable resource inputs (Nakicenovic et 
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 Therefore economic and development perspectives can not be considered as necessarily ‘objective’ or 
‘certain’ and they can not function as axioms as might arise from the physical sciences. 
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al., 2000: 119). The quality and composition of factor inputs are more important than 
quantitative growth in factor inputs. With deeper analysis, institutional and social 
factors, technology and knowledge and “non-market or under-priced natural resources” 
become important in explaining economic growth (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 120). The 
influence of demographics has been explored in the previous section, including the 
impact of aging. The influence of social and institutional change is synergistic, as 
changes in female labour force participation and issues such as education can have more 
important impacts on economic growth than labour force size. 
 
Access to justice, freedom from oppression and the rule of law are indicators of human 
development but are also necessary for the health of financial markets, where 
investment facilitates economic growth “The rule of law, sound contract enforcement 
and strong public regulatory institutions are important for making a market economy 
function” (UNDP, 2003: 148). Income inequality and attendant social tensions can also 
dampen economic growth. In general, it is difficult to analyse the role of social and 
institutional factors in economic and technological development. Much of these changes 
are qualitative and subjective in comparison to the relatively ‘objective’ quantitative 
measures of economic or technological developments. However the complexity and 
abstraction of social, cultural and institutional factors hides the power to direct driving 
forces such as economic growth (Rostow, 1990). Despite the difficulty in measuring 
processes, these factors should be taken into account in scenarios. It is here that the 
power of qualitative storylines to posit system shifts arises. Models cannot treat these 
variables deterministically (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 121) and an essential background 
may be excluded as a result without the consideration of these factors. 
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On the short term, social and cultural factors can dictate the direction of such aspects as 
behavioural and consumer decisions (Agnolucci et al., 2007: 1663). The social 
dimension has been acknowledged as the weakest pillar of sustainable development. 
While ecological economics has advanced the analysis of the environment-economy 
interface, tools for examining the links between the social and the other dimensions are 
under-developed (Lehtonen, 2004: 207). Theories of social capital may be the most 
commonly applied. Social capital may be defined as “networks of social relations 
characterised by norms of trust and reciprocity that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions”.163 It is recognised that social capital has 
economic benefits through social integration. The concept of social capital is contested 
along ideological lines. Supporters argue that it facilitates dialogue between social 
science disciplines, while critics propose that viewing “capital” reinforces negative 
structural dynamics (Lehtonen, 2004: 205). 
 
5.3.5 Trade and investment 
As previously discussed, the pursuit of export led trade and FDI has been a key 
component of economic growth in Ireland. FDI can trigger technology and knowledge 
transfer. This can increase economic growth through improving efficiency and 
increasing higher value-added exports (Buckley and Ruane, 2006: 1613). In Ireland, a 
highly selective policy was adopted to identify and encourage multinational investment, 
particularly in electronics and pharmaceuticals and also to allow Irish entrepreneurs to 
grow in the traditional sectors. An appropriate institutional and regulatory framework is 
                                                 
163Taken from Lehtonen (2004). The narrower framework of Putnam (1993) views social capital as a set 
of horizontal associations between people, social networks and associated norms that have an effect on 
the productivity of the community.  The broader framework of Woolcock (2001) views it as “the norms 
and networks that facilitate collective action”. 
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required to attract investment, secure the greatest benefits and offset risks (UNCTAD, 
2008). Irish development policy has facilitated export led growth of high-value added 
manufacturing and services with a lower energy intensity, and has been cited as a model 
of sustainable economic development (Kaivo-Oja and Luukannen 2004164; Diakoulaki 
and Mandaraka, 2007). This “specialisation” has economic benefits while reducing 
emissions nationally, but may not reduce emissions globally. This can export higher 
energy intensive industry to other countries and “only modifies the distribution of 
emissions across countries” (Sathaye et al., 2007: 707). It meets the letter if not 
necessarily the spirit of the UNFCCC.165 Given the potential to export national 
emissions, to reduce global GHG emissions would also depend on global trade balances 
that evolve and the geography of the life cycle impacts of goods and services. It has 
been widely acknowledged that FDI in Ireland has been significant in the pattern of 
economic growth but is recently in decline. This has occurred at a faster rate than the 
rest of the Eurozone attributed to Ireland recently becoming the most expensive location 
in the Eurozone apart from Luxembourg (IMF, 2009: 9). 
 
5.3.6 Consumption decisions, lifestyle and cultural identity  
The relationship between consumption decisions and emissions are intimately linked 
since the industrial revolution made energy and fossil fuels a part of daily life. The 
actual result of consumption decisions depends not only on productivity, income and 
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 Kaivo-Oja and Luukannen (2004) cited Ireland as a potential example of development to be followed 
by the Meditteranean countries. They also discussed that while Ireland improved energy efficiency to 
1998 it failed to decarbonise energy supply, and therefore did not follow a sustainable energy 
development path. 
 
165
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 2; seeks to achieve 
stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. This should allow for natural adaptation of 
ecosystems, protection of food production and economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
205 
 
investment/ savings decisions but on human cultural factors underlying these decisions 
expressed through identity, behaviour and lifestyle.  
 
In developing short-term scenarios, Mckibbin et al. (2004) discussed the use of a 
bottom-up approach in some scenarios. In contrast to top-down economic growth 
assumptions of long-term scenarios, assumptions about productivity growth and 
investment/savings decisions have been used as the main drivers of growth.166 In 
exploring this relationship, applying an ecological perspective to the “golden rule of 
capital accumulation” (Phelps, 1961) implies not only sustained consumption and 
savings for future generations but limits to consumption. These limits arise at least in its 
quality, in keeping with the objective of reducing emissions by modifying the 
development path (Harris, 2008:8). In shifting resources from consumption to 
investment the implication is a greater potential for consumption growth over time, but 
reducing investment can increase unemployment. Solving this conundrum can only be 
achieved by forms of investment which improve welfare but do not increase 
consumption of material goods and non-renewable energy. This is in line with the 
conclusion of (Mckibbin et al., 2004) stating that the type of growth is significant not 
necessarily the growth itself. Alternative investments include; in human capital, in 
natural capital, or in factors contributing to energy efficiency and carbon-free energy 
(Harris, 2008: 8). 
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 In expanding this discussion of how various complex factors have an influence on future carbon 
emissions, in the SRES (Nakcenovic et al., 2000) discusses how beyond demographic and economic 
factors, many other factors are involved. These include human resources, education, institutional 
frameworks, lifestyles, natural resource endowments, technologic change, and international trade. 
According to the SRES many of these important factors are not documented in the emission scenarios 
database, and sometimes not even in the respective scenario reports and publications. Some are neither 
quantified in the scenarios nor explicitly assumed in a narrative form. 
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Periods of economic growth that lead to increased personal income can increase the 
affluence of the population and can facilitate enhanced human choice. As discussed 
above, actual decisions of consumption, savings and investment can act to both increase 
and decrease emissions. Lifestyle and behaviour factors and consumer choice are 
significant across all sectors including buildings, transport and industry (IPCC, 2007: 
12) and include management practices. The importance of lifestyle is reflected in the 
large differences between energy per capita across nations. This can only partly be 
explained by weather and wealth and is attributed to different lifestyles, traditions and 
cultures (OECD/ IEA, 1997, EEA 2001). The development pathway and the choices this 
represents are also linked to the decisions of governance and the impact of governance 
on the factors listed above (Toth et al., 2001: 637).167 
 
Irish consumption patterns have been converging with those of other high-income 
OECD countries (Lyons et al., 2007a). This has occurred in both level and pattern by 
shares allocated to commodity groups, but the process has been slow. Selvanathan and 
Selvanathan (1993) showed that in most OECD countries, food, housing and medical 
care are necessities and clothing, durables, transport and recreation are luxuries. Kónya 
and Ohashi (2007) have shown that even between high income countries, consumption 
shares have substantial heterogeneity. This conclusion is supported by (Lyons et al., 
2007a). Irish consumers have tended towards high consumption expenditure. Combined 
with increased incomes this has lead to increased consumption across all categories and 
a greater expenditure on “luxury” goods (Lyons et al., 2007a: 9). Income effects rather 
than price favoured expenditures on transport, housing and miscellaneous at the expense 
of food and clothing. Irish consumption still resembles that of Greece and convergence 
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 See section on ‘Governance’ in this chapter. 
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is likely to continue towards that typical of high-income countries.168 The convergence 
pattern remains uncertain particularly in the context of recent income decline. A study 
of consumption patterns in Switzerland and the relationship with GHG emissions (Girod 
and de Haan, 2009) discussed how low household GHG emissions are characterised by 
less-spending on mobility but more on leisure and “quality oriented consumption”.169 If 
high-incomes are maintained into the future in Ireland, consumption of energy and 
energy-intensive products may remain high. This is dependent on the social and cultural 
factors underlying habit formation, and their potential change to alter the consumption 
level and pattern to lower emissions pathways. 
 
In seeking to understand phenomena such as lifestyles, decision-making and the 
relationship with consumption, theories of rationality emerged. The original conceptions 
of economic rationality are rooted in the early neoclassical economics of pioneers such 
as Edgeworth (1881). This discourse evolved to the understanding and modelling of 
social and economic behaviour as reflected in definitions such as that provided by 
Friedman (1953) where an individual maximises personal advantage by balancing costs 
and benefits. The economists’ definition tends to clash with other social enquiries of 
motives and preferences and as the studies of rationality further crossed the boundaries 
of disciplines they have become subject to much controversy. 
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 This paper also found that consumption of household durables and fuel to be price-inelastic in the 
long-term. This questions the potential efficacy of a carbon tax to lead to significant reductions in 
emissions, at least in the short term. 
 
169
 Further characteristics are a higher share of organic food, low meat consumption and fewer detached 
single family houses. The variance between high and low emitter groups are mainly determined by car 
use, airplane, shelter and electricity. Some results were found to be heterogeneous e.g. high GHG 
emitting vegetarian consumers although the preceding categories largely stand. 
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Following the critique of rationality of Sen (1977) the empirical results of behavioural 
economics began to question rational choice theory (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979). 
While contested, the differences in explaining decision-making may reflect the 
expansion of the theory to other fields such as sociology. A body of literature has 
postulated and sought to describe alternative definitions of limited or ‘bounded’ rather 
than absolute rationality such as Kahnemann (2003). The evolving alternative 
perspectives on rationality are also reflected in the discussion of chapter ten of the IPCC 
TAR (Toth et al., 2001: 638) on lifestyles and rationality, where the importance of 
social and cultural dimensions are proposed. 
 
The TAR proposed that in the context of energy and emissions, behaviours and 
consumption should not be seen in terms of economic rationality.170 The TAR cites 
Douglas et al. (1998) proposing that the majority of lifestyles are “not economically 
rational, but they are still culturally rational”, “the social and cultural dimensions of 
human needs and wants must be included in the theoretical approaches”. The TAR 
discussed this in detail (Toth, 2001). It reviewed how the modern Western cognition of 
the self as individual and independent is “peculiar” within the context of world cultures 
where the definition tends to be of “the self” as relational and interdependent. Lifestyle 
and consumption are a means of self-realisation through commodities in this Western 
individualist-consumerist cultural identity.171 “The barrier of consumption-based 
identity at the expense of others might, therefore, be overcome by contextualizing the 
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 That is where changes in lifestyles would seem to be a matter solely of changing relative prices of 
commodities by economic policy. 
 
171
 In marketing research it has been observed that since the 1960’s people have gradually passed from 
buying goods like food, clothing, or housing to basically buying personality, with hardware commodities 
being part of that. In doing so, an individual relates to him- or herself rather than to others, a process of 
self-creation or cultural project where “the self” is completed by consumption. Where consumption is 
responsible for climate change, this means that people in developed countries (and their fellow consumers 
in less-developed countries) aim for self-realisation at the expense of others (Toth et al., 2001: 638). 
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Western self in intercultural communication’’ (Toth et al., 2001: 638-640). The 
discussion continues to review the methods to achieve this cultural transition through 
such indications as environmental education, immaterial goods, collective action and 
creative democracy. 
 
5.3.7 Innovation and technological change 
Technological improvement and advances in knowledge are central to productivity 
growth. Technological advancement can facilitate further economic growth (Buckley 
and Ruane, 2006), while economic growth can increase financial resources available for 
knowledge building and technological development through investment. Social and 
institutional processes can experience inertia in responding to the potentials of 
technological change (Maddison, 1995). In realising the benefits of technological 
change, institutional innovation and flexibility in the application of information 
technology requires evolving institutional dynamics that stimulates broad diffusion 
(Watanabe et al., 2004). In development policy growth in high technology industries 
can be facilitated through effective FDI policies to attract foreign investment, or 
innovation policies to encourage indigenous industry. At the national level targeted 
science, technology and innovation policies can facilitate conducive environments for 
R&D, product ideas, production processes and marketing concepts (Shyu et al., 2001). 
 
Recent declarations have highlighted the pursuit of “green growth” and innovation as 
sources of economic growth (OECD, 2009b). This is the result of shifting market 
priorities and governance changes. It highlights the influence of institutional, 
governance and market factors on technological innovation as a source of economic 
growth.  
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Technology interacts in a complex manner with economic growth. Technical 
improvement arises through the dissemination of efficient technology while increased 
consumption arises through higher comfort, luxury standards and the rebound effect. 
This relationship with economic growth is not simple and linear but is influenced by 
complex factors. In the DA results in Chapter 4, many qualitative changes have been 
discussed. These include structural shifts in industry, technological choices 
concomitantly towards higher absolute consumption and towards increased but also 
decreased technical efficiency. This reinforces the concept that emissions can not be 
characterised by economic and technology changes alone. 
 
5.3.8 Economic productivity and energy intensity 
The securing of sustained economic growth figures high on the policy agenda of most 
nations, with few exceptions. According to Sathaye et al. (2007: 707) “economic 
growth is a key driver of CO2 emissions”. The authors reflect on the complex 
relationship that also presents within the DA results. Economic growth does not 
necessarily have a clear or linear relationship with energy CO2, but can experience both 
trend and counter-trend at once. Economic growth can increase demand for energy and 
energy intensive goods. Concomitantly economic growth can accelerate technological 
change and efficiency “and foster the development of institutions and preferences more 
conducive to environmental protection and mitigation” according to Sathaye. This 
conclusion is borne out by the accelerated intensity improvements observed during the 
1993-2001 period in the decomposition results. While the macro decomposition results 
support the conclusion that improvement has occurred in intensity, the sectoral results 
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illustrate improvement in some sectors (e.g. industry and residential) and dis-
improvement in others (e.g. private car, road public passenger). Despite intensity 
improvements aggregated results show that absolute consumption increased.  
 
The literature on the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” EKC has sought to elucidate this 
relationship. The EKC hypothesis proposes that early in development a coupled 
relationship occurs between pollution and GDP per capita. This is followed by an 
income threshold after which emissions per capita decrease. As discussed by Luzzati 
and Orsini (2009: 291) using world and national data, an energy EKC hypothesis is not 
supported. According to Dasgupta et al. (2004:19) the EKC relationship is not rigid and 
appears more related to governance. The OECD (1998) propose that high rates of 
productivity growth can accompany developments such as regulatory incentives and 
catching up or recovery. Consequently the significance for emissions is more the link 
with the related factors that describe the nature of this recovery in a development 
pathway. In general, neither an optimistic nor a pessimistic interpretation of the 
literature is yet supported (Sathaye et al., 2007: 708). The EKC does not distinguish 
between structural emissions or emissions that result from policy decisions, supporting 
a more disaggregated approach as detailed within this thesis. In advancing the 
discussion of the relationship between economic growth and GHG emissions Fisher et 
al, (2007: 177) propose that the linkage depends not just on the growth rate, but on its 
context, the nature and structure of growth. This “development pathway” is related to 
five factors; 
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i) economic structure, 
ii) technological patterns in significant sectors such as energy, 
transportation, building, waste, agriculture and forestry, 
iii) geographical distribution of activities, particularly related to the 
transportation requirements of settlements and urban structures, 
iv) consumption patterns, including housing, lifestyles and the durability of 
consumer goods, 
v) trade patterns which have implications for infrastructure investment in 
developing countries. 
 
In further describing the potential evolution of GHG emissions Fisher et al. (2007) 
propose that this will depend on “dynamic links between technology, consumption 
patterns, transportation and urban infrastructure, urban planning and rural-urban 
distribution of population”. It is within these complex relationships that the evolution of 
energy intensity is played out. As has been explored in the DA results, energy intensity 
is significant in determining emissions (see Chapter 4 Historical Decomposition 
Analysis). Energy intensity improvement in the future is linked to many factors and the 
temporal and cross-national picture is heterogeneous. In baseline scenarios to 2100 
Fisher et al. (2007: 183) documents mean annual energy intensity improvements of 1%, 
with the 90% range between 0.5% and 1.9% as “fairly consistent with the historic 
variation of this factor”. In general, it has been observed at the expert meeting on 
emission scenarios that all economies are far away from the efficiency frontier requiring 
both technological and institutional innovation (IPCC, 2005). It was also acknowledged 
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that there is a significant difference between the technologies that are deployed and 
those that could be deployed based on existing technology and knowledge.172 
 
5.3.9 Economic forecasts 
National forecasts of economic growth are fraught with uncertainty. As discussed, the 
revisions to national forecasts since the recent recession in Ireland are reflective of the 
underlying uncertainty in the national and international conditions that lead to economic 
growth. Forecasts of economic growth for both economic and energy/environment 
forecasts have consistently been revised downwards in Ireland since Fitzgerald et al. 
(2008) based on the depth of economic contraction and the timing of recovery (Bergin 
et al., 2009; IMF, 2009; OECD, 2009a; DGECFIN 2009).  
 
The official national emissions projections for national policy and compliance with EU 
reporting requirements (EPA, 2008a) are based on economic growth assumptions 
detailed in the MTR’s and revisions. The assumed economic growth rates (GDP) were 
an average of 4.2% between 2005 and 2010, 3.1% between 2010 and 2015 and 3.2% 
between 2015 and 2020. These growth rates are similar to those published by the ESRI 
in the 2008 MTR (Fitzgerald et al., 2008: 58), where the benchmark forecast projects 
GDP growth of 4.0% between 2005 and 2010, 3.6% between 2010 and 2015 and 3.3% 
between 2015 and 2020. Capros et al. (2008: 127) used baseline assumptions of 5.0% 
from 2000-2010 3.5% from 2010-2015 and 2.5 from 2015-2020 based on DGECFIN 
projections (DGECFIN, 2007) and (Carone et al., 2006). Output growth projections in 
Carone et al. (2006: 69) involved a drop from approximately 5% up to 2010 to 3% in 
2020. 
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 This phenomenon was termed the “technology frontier.” 
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Average growth rates are often favoured above forecasted years due to uncertainties and 
difficulties with accuracy. This is because turning points can’t be predicted by economic 
forecasters (Fitzgerald et al., 2005: 109). Once the recession materialised, the 
replacement of these forecasts began in late 2008. The SEI energy forecasts of 2008 
(Howley et al., 2008: 27) used downward revisions by the ESRI of GDP growth in 
terms of real GDP. The growth rates are -0.5% between 2008 and 2009, 4.7% between 
2010–2015 and 4.3% between 2015–2020. 
 
In Bergin et al. (2009) two “scenarios” of the Irish economy are provided ‘”World 
recovery scenario” and a “Prolonged recession scenario” where the world recession 
lasts until 2012 rather than 2011.173 Both scenarios assume reform of the financial 
sector. Under the world recovery scenario, GDP contracts by -8.2% in 2009, a further -
1.0% in 2010, and assumed a growth path once more from there with average annual 
growth 5.6% from 2010-2015 and 3.3% from 2015-2020. Under this scenario the 
macroeconomic stimuli and aid to the financial systems worldwide “drive a timid 
recovery in 2010 which will become well established in 2011” (Bergin et al., 2009: 36). 
The prolonged recession scenario assumes the persistence of a world recession to 2012. 
Under this scenario GDP contracts by -8.2% in 2009, by a further -1.3% in 2010 and 
reduced growth rates of 4.8% and 3.2% from 2010-2015 and 2015-2020 respectively. 
These revised forecasts warn of uncertainties:  
 
As ever, when forecasting a number of years ahead, there are significant 
uncertainties surrounding the resultant scenarios. Such uncertainties stem 
                                                 
173
 Irish output is “very sensitive” to the global recovery and high technology FDI is central to this 
(Bergin et al., 2009: 25). 
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from both the underlying assumptions about key drivers of the economy, 
such as world growth and fiscal policy, and also from the possibility of 
changes in the underlying behaviour of the economy embedded in 
whatever model is used.  
(Bergin et al., 2009: 40).  
 
Bergin et al. (2009) explain that the two scenarios don’t capture all of the uncertainties, 
but they are an advance on previous work attempting to identify and bound the 
uncertainties. This was achieved through explaining such issues as; the world economy, 
domestic fiscal policy and the banking crisis. 
 
A more pessimistic outlook about the depth of the contraction and the strength of the 
recovery is found in (IMF, 2009). GDP is projected to contract by 13.5% through 2010, 
(-8.5% in 2009 and a further -3.0% in 2010). During this period high unemployment 
and declines in wages are expected to drive consumption downwards. Property and 
financial developments have reduced potential growth and the IMF have predicted a 
modest recovery. After the economic contraction growth rates are projected as; 1.0%, 
2.3%, 2.6% and 2.6% from 2011 to 2014 respectively. The IMF executive directors are 
critical of fiscal policy failures in Ireland and note how vulnerabilities in the Irish 
economy have been “amplified by the openness of the economy to global shocks” (IMF, 
2009: 2). The OECD (2009a) are also pessimistic projecting a peak to trough 
contraction of GDP of -14% and a slow recovery beginning in 2010. DGECFIN (2009: 
63) projected a 2009 contraction of -9% in 2009 and -2.6% in 2010. Private 
consumption is expected to “fall significantly” and continue in 2010 due to reduced 
disposable income, substantial reductions in investment and an increase in 
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precautionary saving. In general, the economic outlook for Ireland is highly uncertain. 
Major challenges remain in stabilising public finances, protecting the financial system 
from collapse and avoiding a significant depression with high-unemployment rates.  
 
5.4 Energy resources and technology 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The evolution of technology both transformation and end-use, is central to questions of 
future emissions. Technological aspects such as fuel shares, renewable energy and 
historical sectoral consumption patterns have been explored in Chapter 4 Historical 
Decomposition Analysis. The following section explores energy resources and 
technology, reviews relationships between energy and end-use and supply technologies. 
Technological change, energy resources, oil peak and fuel price are also discussed. The 
section is concluded with a discussion of energy forecasts for Ireland. 
 
5.4.2 Energy and emissions in the sectors 
Energy and emissions changes are often discussed in terms of the trends in the major 
consuming sectors (Nakicenovic et al., 2000, Capros et al., 2008, Howley et al., 2008, 
Fitzgerald et al., 2008). The DA illustrated in Chapter 4 showed significant 
heterogeneity between the sectors in Ireland in terms of both the underlying effects 
leading to change and the trend in total emissions. The sectors analysed in the DA are 
similar to those explored in the scenario driving forces of the SRES in Nakicenovic et 
al. (2000: 128) with a deeper disaggregation of the transport sector. The SRES 
documents key drivers of energy use and emissions in the sectors including e.g. 
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population and vehicle stock and economic drivers such as GDP and income, energy 
and carbon intensity trends. These factors are related to consumer preferences, energy 
costs, settlement patterns and technical progress. 
 
In Ireland, both primary energy and final consumption have increased significantly from 
1990-2007 (Howley et al., 2008). Growth has occurred in all sectors while the 
aggregated transport sector stands out as both the largest sector in terms of absolute 
growth and growth rate. Energy intensity improvement, related to technical efficiency 
and behavioural aspects leads to decreases in the amount of energy required to perform 
a particular service, e.g. lighting or of delivering a unit of e.g. industrial output or 
transport activity. There is considerable heterogeneity in how energy intensity has 
evolved across the sectors in Ireland due to technical improvements and also increases 
in intensity e.g. from lifestyle factors and rebound effects. As noted in the SRES many 
studies have shown the potential (both technically and economically) for short-term 
gains in efficiency, with current technologies. This presents in historical analyses 
(Dennehy et al., 2009), the DA results of the residential sector in this thesis and in 
forecasts e.g. Capros et al. (2008). 
 
The carbon intensity of the energy source dictates the carbon emissions that result from 
energy use. Changes to carbon intensity arise from fuel substitution but can also result 
from technological improvements for example in the power generation sector (Capros et 
al., 2008: 15). Ireland has made progress in fuel-switching to gas from more carbon 
intensive fuel sources. More recently progress in increasing renewable energy has been 
made, while CCGT has also enhanced generation efficiency. 
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5.4.2.1 Economic sectors 
The driving forces of the economic sectors, behind growth in energy and carbon 
emissions include many of the economic drivers already discussed. These include global 
and national economic growth, competitiveness, economic development policy and 
consumption and trade patterns. The economic sectors also include issues such as labour 
force migration, education of the workforce and national industrial development 
policies. In industry, patterns of FDI and indigenous industry development are 
important determinants of economic growth. In this context, the development pattern is 
significant in terms of the growth and consolidation of existing industries (traditional, 
ICT and pharmaceuticals) the structural evolution of industry and decisions on 
investment in technology and fuel types. In the commercial services sector influences 
also include FDI and indigenous growth and the structural evolution of the sectors e.g. 
towards energy extensive high-value added branches. The choices in the development 
pattern influencing these outcomes include investment in technology from lighting to 
space-heating and office equipment and also the fuel types this involves.  This is also 
the case with the public services sector. The public sector depends on macroeconomic 
growth and policy support and the development pattern affecting this evolution. The 
agriculture sector is heavily influenced by EU and national agriculture policies and trade 
patterns. 
 
The most recent MTR projected weak growth across the industrial, public and 
agriculture sectors with GDP growth rates reducing to 2.0%, 2.0% and 0.8% 
respectively in 2015 (Fitzgerald et al., 2008: 64), before the current economic downturn. 
Stronger growth in the services sector levels off at 4.8% in 2015. The energy 
consumption of industry expanded from 1990-2007 with the economic growth that 
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occurred. Structural change modified this growth towards lower intensity. Howley et al. 
(2008:30) projected an annual increase in energy demand of 1.5%, 1.3% and 1.1% per 
annum from 2010 to 2020 for industry, services and agriculture respectively.174 In 
industry further improvements in energy intensity are possible but are dependent on 
further structural change and technical efficiency progress. Although this technical 
efficiency tends to slow with reduced economic growth, the domination of intensity 
improvement by structural change suggests additional potential improvement may vary 
by industrial branch. Further technical efficiencies are possible within the other 
economic sectors. Capros et al. (2008: 127) projected industry energy intensity 
improvement in Ireland of -2.4% per annum from 2010-2020 under the baseline 
scenario. The services and agriculture sectors have improvement in intensity of -2.2% 
measured as energy per value added in this projection. 
 
Over the historical period in the DA results, fuel substitution (Cffse) increased in the 
four economic sectors while renewable energy (Crepe) made a limited impact and their 
evolution would depend on investment decisions. The share of electricity expanded in 
all of the economic sectors, particularly services, as the use of office equipment 
expanded. Within this the carbon intensity of electricity supply declined. Further 
reductions in carbon intensity will depend on the evolution of the power generation 
sector.175 
 
                                                 
174
 Predicated on economic growth assumptions of the “credit crunch scenario” (Fitzgerald et al., 2008) 
and the anticipated impact of policies in place and legislatively provided for by the end of 2007. For a 
baseline forecast see Howley et al. (2008: 26). 
 
175
 The sectoral model measures change in a sectors emissions coefficient (Cemc) in the electricity 
consuming sectors, by including upstream changes in electricity supply from e.g. increased CCGT and 
wind power generation. 
 
220 
 
5.4.2.2 Transport sectors 
The transport sector is the largest consumer of energy in Ireland (Howley et al., 2008). 
High growth has been observed through increased demand for both freight and 
passenger services. Factors related to economic growth and affluence, including the 
spatial development pattern,176 acted to increase activity levels represented by passenger 
and freight movements. This increased transport energy demand. Factors in the 
development pattern affecting technological choice and infrastructure decisions that 
acted to increase energy consumption include favouring private car road transport for 
passengers and road freight transport for freight. This involved a modal shift towards 
more energy intensive transport.  
 
Factors affecting the energy intensity of transport services such as technological choice, 
consumption patterns and behaviour and logistics (e.g. larger engine sizes in private cars 
with lower passenger occupancy, road freight empty running, choice of taxi and 
hackney over bus and coach) have increased the energy intensity of transport services as 
measured by energy per p-km and t-km. The pattern of shifting towards faster, more 
individual, more energy intensive forms of transport is common worldwide. This was 
reviewed in AR4 (Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007: 330). Rail is a notable exception where 
energy intensity has improved.177 Without an improvement in intensity, given the 
dominance of fossil fuels in transport, increases in transport activity are accompanied by 
almost linear increases in CO2. Transport activity is expected to grow with increasing 
economic growth. Existing forecasts projected a 2.4% annual growth rate in transport 
final energy demand from 2010-2020 (Howley et al., 2008: 30). Kahn Ribeiro et al. 
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 Decentralisation and low density development increases demand and reduces public transport as per 
Kahn Ribeiro et al. (2007: 328). 
 
177
 Subject to the caveat on the balance of passenger transport verses freight transport (see Chapter 4 
Historical Decomposition Analysis). 
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(2007) discuss the continuing increases in transport activity and motorisation, but stress 
that this demand can be shaped by four uncertainties:  
 
1. Oil peak and replacement fuels leading to increased fuel costs,  
2. Shape and rate of economic development, 
3. Transport technology, energy efficiency and policies to avoid for 
example heavier more powerful cars,  
4. Transport infrastructure and alternatives to private cars. 
 
The issue of infrastructure and technology lock-in is important here, not just in physical 
terms but in the social and cultural terms of habit formation and its implications for 
consumption patterns. The review of Moriarty and Honnery (2008), proposes that 
transport sustainability can only be achieved by alternatives to motorisation and 
alternative transport systems. The increase in biofuels as represented by the Crepe effect 
in the historical sectoral DA results, has made little impact on the fuel mix within 
transport so far and will depend on consumption patterns, fuel price and policy 
enablement. Policies affecting the price differential between transport fuels in the 
Republic and Northern Ireland have acted to increase fuel tourism. Assuming the 
continuance of a carbon tax in the UK in the absence of one in Ireland,178 this trend 
would continue. Unspecified activities have also increased as transport demand in 
general has increased.  
 
                                                 
178
 Ireland’s recent carbon tax implemented in late 2009 is not included in the analysis as the scenarios are 
baseline. 
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5.4.2.3 Residential sector 
In the residential sector, final energy use increased by 29% from 1990-2007 (Howley et 
al., 2008: 78). Factors acting to increase energy and carbon emissions include; house 
numbers, floor area of housing and comfort factors of increasing internal temperature. 
Increased appliance use increases electricity consumption, as does increasing space-
heating from electricity.179 The significance of economic growth can also be discerned 
in the housing sector. Higher personal income facilitates further declines in occupancy. 
Depending on the consumption pattern it can also facilitate the purchase of larger 
homes, with higher comfort levels and consequently internal temperature, and increased 
appliance use (Nakicenovic et al., 2000; 131).  
 
The factors acting to change energy consumption are dependent on the overall 
development pattern with respect to driving forces such as population, governance and 
culture etc. Energy intensity improved considerably by the successive improvement of 
thermal performance of new housing. Fuel switching and technological change occurred 
away from the open-fire and away from the use of more carbon intensive fuels such as 
peat and coal, to oil and gas technologies. Overall, in the DA results these effects have 
had a negligible impact. Improvements in intensity and the emissions coefficient of 
electricity were considerable.  
 
Population growth increases house numbers and acts to increase energy consumption 
but the effect of income is important. The underlying assumptions of the residential 
energy forecast of Howley et al. (2008: 27-28) expected a 2.2% and 1.9% increase in 
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 Discussed by Tol et al. (2009) using CSO data, in 2005 7% of households used electricity for space 
heating. 
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house numbers from 2010-2015 and 2015-2020 respectively. Household energy demand 
was predicted to increase by 2.1% from 2010-2020. Embodied energy180 in building 
construction can also affect total energy consumption but is incorporated into the energy 
statistics of other sectors.  
 
Within the context of the potential for improved performance based on current 
technologies, the AR4 recognises a number of key elements in reducing energy 
consumption and CO2 in the residential sector. Some of these include; fuel substitution 
and renewables, the fuel composition of electricity generation and a range of energy 
efficiency principles from design, heating, cooling and lighting loads, occupant 
behaviour to appliance efficiency, heating system efficiency and performance 
monitoring (Levine et al., 2007). On a timescale to 2020, the attributes of new-builds, 
the ability to improve existing stock to further reduce energy consumption and occupant 
behaviour are relevant. With existing stock, a degree of infrastructural lock-in will 
already have occurred. The amelioration of this will be dependent on such factors as 
governance and social and cultural aspects of decision-making181 and also dependent on 
capital costs. 
 
5.4.3 Energy resources 
The main goal of the use of energy resources is to provide energy services that improve 
quality of life and productivity. The requirements of government and policy on the 
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 Duffy (2009) documents how embodied CO2 is highest in detached dwellings followed by semi-
detached, terraced and apartments on both a dwelling and m2 of gross floor area basis. This follows the 
expected pattern with respect to larger size and construction characteristics of detached dwellings, 
followed in sequence by the other categories described. 
 
181
 In the case of an intervention scenario, this would also include the implementation of sustainability in 
additional policy. 
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provision of energy, is for; affordability, security of supply and minimising 
environmental impacts of energy (Sims et al., 2007: 253). The challenge to deliver these 
potentially competing goals and reduce global GHG’s, is increased in complexity with 
the impending realisation of peaks in oil and natural gas reserves. The impending peak 
in oil and gas production is contested (Sims et al., 2007, OECD/ IEA, 2008, Smil, 2005, 
Campbell, 1997, Laherre, 2001). The more extreme ends of this debate range from 
optimistic positions with steadfast belief in the role of prices, human invention and 
technical fixes, that overcome physical limits to more pessimistic assessments that 
propose an approaching oil crisis and economic implosion.182 
 
Although both of these debates present with some credence the more moderate and 
sobered judgements of the IPCC and the IEA appear to present with more robust 
conclusions. Successive energy transitions have occurred in the past and will occur 
again. Successive forecasts have proven inaccurate rendering both of these extreme 
forecasts as potential ‘wildcards’ i.e. high impact and high uncertainty.183 The exact 
timing of a peak and decline in oil production is linked not only to finite reserves, but 
the complex interplay of energy substitutions, technical advances, government policies 
and environmental considerations (Smil, 2005). The IPCC AR4 concluded with “high 
agreement and much evidence” that “there are sufficient reserves of most types of 
energy resources to last at least several decades at current rates of use when using 
technologies with high energy-conversion efficient designs” (Sims et al., 2007: 253). 
The IPCC concluded that while conventional oil reserves will peak as will natural gas, 
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 For a discussion see Smil (2005: 184-213). 
 
183
 This would suggest the need for contingency planning but does not suggest an impending doom of oil 
peak to be a core component of the scenarios. 
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the timing and the nature of the transition to alternative liquid fuels184 is uncertain. Gas 
is more abundant. The evolution of coal is uncertain given the limitations of its higher 
GHG emissions and the viability of CCS technology.  
 
The implications of peaking in oil production and increased fuel prices have 
implications for the transition to alternative energy sources and technology. However on 
a timescale to 2020, the conclusions of the IPCC and the IEA appear to support the 
exclusion of oil peak as an extremity and wildcard in the study.185 Given the timeframe 
to 2020 of the scenarios, it is unlikely that oil peak is a core consideration other than the 
evolution of the price signal. The high dependency of Ireland on not only imported fuel 
sources, but on transport related oil in particular (Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007), does 
increase the salience of this issue. 
 
Nuclear energy could provide an increasing contribution to global energy requirements, 
but is subject to major barriers.186 A statutory prohibition is in place in the Republic of 
Ireland on nuclear energy (Government of Ireland, 1999). The combination of this 
legislative impediment, the historical cultural opposition in Ireland and the long lead-
time in planning, construction and commissioning187 render it highly unlikely that a 
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 Alternative liquid fuels include coal-to-liquids, gas-to-liquids, oil shales, tar sands, heavy oils, and 
biofuels. Concerns about the higher GHG coefficient than conventional oil of some of these fuels remain, 
such as with tar sands. 
 
185
 The International Energy Agency has recently forecast global output from known oilfields to drop 
after 2020 (OECD/ IEA, 2008: 249). 
 
186
 The major barriers are: long-term fuel resource constraints without recycling, economics, safety, waste 
management, security, proliferation and adverse public opinion (Sims et al., 2007: 253). 
 
187
 Lead times are estimated at 6-10 years in the US, a society familiar with the technology unlike Ireland 
see USDOE (2004). 
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nuclear power plant could be operational in Ireland until closer to 2030 at the earliest.188 
Renewable energy supply technologies provide a small contribution to global heat and 
electricity supply but are also the fastest increasing. Due to cost, social and 
environmental barriers restricting the growth of renewable technologies supportive 
government policies and measures are required (Sims et al., 2007).  
 
A trend is observed in more affluent societies to move towards using energy carriers 
with increased efficiency and convenience. This presents by moving away from solid 
fuels to liquid, gaseous fuels and electricity. An example of this trend in Ireland has 
been the transition away from the traditional open-fire combusting peat and coal to 
heating systems combusting oil and gas for residential heating. 
 
5.4.4 Energy price 
In theory, the rising demand for energy is constrained by increasing price of fossil fuels 
in particular and energy costs in general. This relationship is dictated by such factors as 
how consumers respond to final energy costs and how the cost of energy changes. 
However price is not the only determinant and cultural rationality in consumer decisions 
can be more important than economic rationality. Fossil fuel prices are governed by a 
complex set of factors and are uncertain and volatile. But the probability of future price 
increases is high (Rout et al., 2008). The response of consumers to these price increases 
depends on many factors, including the sector of use and the country in question.  
 
                                                 
188
 If it were deemed necessary and desirable (secure, sustainable and cost-effective) to produce electricity 
from nuclear energy in Ireland, the legislative, cultural, financial and engineering constraints would have 
to be overcome.   
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In general, a stimulus to economic growth is expected to outweigh the impact of higher 
energy prices, although a supply-crunch and significant price increases cannot be ruled 
out in the period to 2015 (OECD/ IEA, 2007a: 44). The reaction to the increase in oil 
prices can be inelastic as is observed with transport189. Demand is becoming insensitive 
to price and income is the primary driver of demand for energy (OECD/ IEA, 2006: 
269). In the long term, price increases can curb demand but can also transfer demand. 
This can occur to cheaper more carbon intensive fuels such as coal or alternatively to 
renewable energy sources depending on national policy circumstances (Sims et al., 
2007: 253). In Ireland, growth in energy demand has been observed despite increases in 
fuel prices and is projected to continue growing despite a projected increase in fuel price 
(Howley et al., 2008). The impact of fuel prices is not specifically included in the DA 
model used in this analysis (see also Agnolucci et al., 2009).190 Given that demand is 
projected to increase despite increases in fuel price, price is considered of reduced 
significance.191 
 
5.4.5 Fuel supply in Ireland 
 
Ireland is heavily dependent on energy imports, particularly in the case of oil. The 
energy profile of Ireland has seen oil and gas expand share between 1990 and 2007, 
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 As referred to above in general by Sims et al. (2007) demand can be shifted to other fuel types. In the 
specific context of transport the increased penetration of biofuels could have an effect on oil price in this 
sector by softening demand for fossil sources of transport fuels. 
 
190
 Agnolucci et al. (2009) explore a number of salient points with respect to price. The general level of 
prices is important in explaining growth in GDP which can increase energy consumption. Energy prices 
in particular can influence the adoption of more energy efficient technology and fuel choice based on the 
price differential between fuels and absolute consumption. Carbon taxes as a market instrument can be 
used to internalise externalities and reflect the carbon content of different fuels to influence the choice of 
fuel type. Taxation can be used as a demand-management measure and may be required in the absence of 
social and cultural changes in consumption patterns. The authors propose that social and cultural factors, 
termed as “environmental values” ultimately dictate the willingness to pay for emissions reduction. 
 
191
 The scenarios explicitly exclude wild-card events such as a supply crunch/oil crisis. Examining the 
impact of fuel price relationships on outcomes in detail is outside of the scope of this research. 
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while coal and peat have declined in share. Renewables constitute a small but growing 
contribution to overall energy supply. Ireland is dependent on oil and gas imports which 
potentially reduces security of supply. Ireland operates north-south interconnections 
within the island for electricity and gas, and east-west with the UK for gas in order to 
overcome geographical isolation. Further electricity interconnection is planned both 
north-south and east-west by 2012.192 Ireland has no major additional hydro resource to 
that already exploited and as discussed nuclear is prohibited. The two indigenous fossil 
fuel resources are gas and peat. In the absence of the development of the Corrib gas 
field, indigenous gas stocks are declining and gas is imported through the UK. The 
Corrib gas field could supply half of Irish gas demand “well into the next decade” 
(OECD/ IEA, 2007b: 18). Peat is mostly used for electricity generation and heating, but 
has declined in the share of supply (OECD/ IEA, 2007b: 12). Although peat has higher 
carbon content than other fossil fuels, and biodiversity and habitat loss occurs with its 
extraction, its maintenance in the electricity generation mix has been proposed to 
deliver fuel diversity. Ireland possesses potential to further expand its renewables 
portfolio and is subject to national and European targets to deliver on this policy 
objective (see Governance and policy). 
5.4.6 Energy supply technologies 
Ireland’s energy supply technology has evolved considerably since 1990 towards 
favouring gas. Small contributions of electricity imports have also become a consistent 
feature of the electricity profile as peat and oil have declined. The consumption of coal 
has also fallen by 10% between 1990 and 2007. The evolution of electricity supply has 
accompanied a demand increase of 4.7% p.a. over the same period. In general, Irish 
electricity supply is heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels. Indigenous peat and 
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 See <http://www.cer.ie/en/electricity-transmission-network-interconnection.aspx>. 
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renewables (particularly onshore wind) contribute a small proportion to electricity 
although renewables are growing. In the absence of additional hydro or nuclear 
generation, power generation is currently concentrated in imported gas, coal and oil. 
This has exposed Irish electricity prices to increases in fuel costs. Ireland has an 
“excellent resource potential” and very favourable economics for onshore wind (OECD/ 
IEA, 2007b: 67). 
 
While the efficiency of electricity supply has improved, energy lost in transformation 
and transmission in Ireland is “striking” representing 55% of energy inputs (Howley et 
al., 2008: 20). This has also been noted by OECD/ IEA (2007b: 97) who propose that 
achieving improved efficiency would also lower electricity prices that are amongst the 
highest in IEA Europe. The increased use of gas-fired generation, particularly due to 
new CCGT plants commissioned in 2002, 2006 and 2007, coupled with increased 
renewables and the decommissioning of old peat-fired stations, contributed to 
improving supply efficiency post 1999. The move to more efficient plant and less 
carbon-intensive fuels, including renewables, also served to improve the CO2 intensity 
of supplied electricity.193 The contribution of renewables (hydro, wind, landfill gas, 
biomass and other biogas) is small but growing, contributing 5.1% of energy inputs and 
9.4% of electricity consumption in 2007, of which wind accounts for 65% (OECD/ IEA, 
2007b). 
 
The development of generation capacity to meet demand requirements must balance 
many potentially competing concerns as outlined above, including security, cost and 
environmental considerations. Policy decisions, market preferences and investment 
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 This is represented in the sectoral DA results by the emissions coefficient effect (Cemc) where 
electricity is considered a fuel type. 
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decisions can change the plant mix considerably as has been observed in Ireland. The 
potential for infrastructural lock-in is also a relevant consideration in deciding whether 
current or planned decisions will lock the system into a high emissions path. Planned 
plant retirements present opportunities to replace older plant, or account for newer 
demand with more efficient and less carbon-intensive generation. Decommissioning 
plant can have high capital costs, particularly if it is early in the lifetime of the capital 
stock. Decommissioning can occur for other reasons such as in meeting sulphur 
regulations. These micro-level tipping-points in investment decisions are made for 
policy and market decisions that may be other than nameplate lifetimes of stock 
according to Lempert et al. (2002). The authors propose that capital has no fixed cycle. 
This suggests that investment planning and the policy framework which influences 
decisions, should integrate the management of carbon with other concerns, to encourage 
optimal decisions and the avoidance of technological lock-in.  
 
The central planning of generation capacity in Ireland was replaced in 2007 by the 
Single Electricity Market (SEM).194 This follows the liberalisation trend to move away 
from the state led market monopolies of electricity and gas by the Electricity Supply 
Board (ESB) and Bórd Gais Éireann (BGE) respectively. The independent state 
regulator the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) is overseeing market 
liberalisation and reform. It is also responsible for maintaining security of supply, but 
also compliance with the policy directions of the Department of Communication Energy 
and Natural Resources (DCENR).195 The Generation Adequacy Report forecasts the 
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 The SEM is an “All-Island market” with Northern Ireland to deliver adequate capacity and to deliver 
new plant according to market decisions. 
 
195
 The Irish government department assigned responsibility for energy in a portfolio, including 
communications and natural resources. 
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future electricity supply and demand balance only to 2014 (CER, 2008: 63). Supply is 
forecast to meet demand up to 2011. Nevertheless significant new generation capacity is 
required after this juncture.196 This is required to meet expected increased demand, 
replace plant closures and to act as reserve to the rising contribution of wind.  
 
From an engineering perspective, in preventing power outages, the generation mix must 
cope with both demand fluctuations and the need for reserve capacity. The intermittent 
nature of wind is remedied through increasing back-up of flexible conventional plant 
(CER, 2008). Alternatives to this approach are highlighted by OECD/ IEA (2007b: 78), 
including grid development in the west of Ireland,197 research on storage methods, and 
as an interim solution, the conversion of public transport in the west of Ireland to 
electricity. The “All-island grid study” (DCENR/ DETI, 2008) was implemented to 
ascertain the feasibility of connecting large additional amounts of wind generation to the 
grid. This examined the provision of up to 42% of all-island electricity demand from 
wind, and suggested the following requirements: significant transmission network 
upgrades, enhanced interconnection and increased flexible dispatch plant.198 Due to 
modelling limitations storage was not included beyond consideration of Turlough Hill 
pumped hydro storage plant, and further research was recommended.199  This could 
entail large CO2 reductions and security of supply benefits at a small additional cost. 
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 The recession reduced demand will offset the necessity for early commissioning of new plant. 
 
197
 The Irish grid is weak in the rural west and north of the country where the most suitable wind 
generation sites are located. 
 
198
 “Such plant will be dominated by non-renewable options for technical and economical reasons” 
(DCENR/ DETI, 2008: 80). 
 
199
 Energy storage is predominantly achieved through conversion to chemical, gravitational potential or 
mechanical forms, but can also be achieved through capacitors “but is rarely the cheapest way of dealing 
with variability” (OECD/ IEA, 2008: 169). This can become increasingly viable with an increasing 
carbon price. 
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According to the CER (2008) the SEM is meeting this requirement for flexible dispatch 
through increasing CCGT and OCGT on the system with plant currently under 
construction, in receipt of planning permission and in planning. A significant pipeline of 
7,300 MW of additional wind is in the connection queue against the 801MW already 
connected by 2007. Existing forecasts such as Lyons et al. (2007b) and OECD/ IEA 
(2007b:84) see the further expansion of gas and wind, the decline of coal and oil and the 
maintenance of peat-fired generation through to 2020. In looking at an “optimal 
generation portfolio” Fitzgerald et al. (2005: 36) proposed that wind is a good hedge 
against price shocks and interruptions to supply, coal reduces risk but becomes 
uneconomic with rising carbon prices while oil has limited prospects. It was also 
recommended to either close peat plant or replace with biomass. Although the 
technology exists, the use of CCS is in its infancy and is not expected to become a 
significant part of the energy mix in the EU until 2030 (CEC, 2008). Therefore it was 
excluded from the analysis. According to OECD/ IEA (2008: 74) there are four large 
scale CCS projects in operation, and twenty demonstration projects in construction or 
planned worldwide. It is assumed that CCS will become commercially available after 
2020. It is estimated that ocean energy including wind and wave could contribute up to 
66% of all-island electricity demand (OECD/ IEA, 2007b: 133). Enhanced policy 
commitment would be required to enable ocean energy to begin contributing to meeting 
electricity demand in the next decade. 
 
5.4.7 Technological change processes  
There are a wide variety of alternative energy technology strategies and it is not possible 
to pick an “optimal” strategy (Fisher et al., 2007: 224). Some modelling reported in the 
TAR, as described by Fisher et al., (2007) suggests a mitigation potential based on 
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current technologies of up to 50% by 2020 on baseline projections. In baseline 
projections in the absence of additional policy200 technological change is an evolving 
process. The technologies involved include both end-use and supply technologies. 
Between innovation and widespread diffusion, technological change can involve 
decadal to century long-time scales as described by Halsnaes et al. (2007: 147). The 
authors outline a common framework for technological change as;  
 
i) invention,  
ii) innovation,  
iii) niche markets, and, 
iv) diffusion.  
 
Each of these phases involves different actors and institutions. It is a complex dynamic 
process that can vary significantly from country to country and from sector to sector. 
Variance can depend on the infrastructural starting point, technical capacity and the 
readiness of markets to provide commercial opportunities. It is acknowledged that it is 
unlikely that there is a single “silver-bullet” technology to meet energy needs and 
emission reduction requirements.201 
 
On a longer timescale, the SRES concluded that technology was of similar importance 
to economic and population growth (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). However changes in 
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 The baseline excludes the implementation of additional energy or mitigation policy. 
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 Short to medium-term scenarios concern the diffusion of existing technologies. 
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technology do not arise autonomously, they arise through human action202 and social 
and economic systems that this underpins. Technological change is a highly uncertain 
and unpredictable process spanning a range of actors, from those that use technology to 
those that design and manufacture or create new knowledge (Halnsnaes et al., 2007: 
152). The drivers of technological change have been divided into three overlapping 
categories R&D, learning-by-doing and spillovers (Grubler, 1998). Each of these 
involves different agents, investment needs and financial institutions and is affected by 
the policy environment. As existing technology is the primary concern of scenarios to 
2020, learning-by-doing203, and spillovers204 have potentially synergistic effects.  
 
On the shorter timescale to 2020, technological diffusion is of the most significance, in 
deploying existing technology and knowledge. The OECD/ IEA (2006: 107-110) 
outline technical and economic barriers to technology uptake and the existence of other 
barriers including lack of information and education, public acceptance, planning and 
licensing, financing and structures and incentives. These can vary considerably with 
supply and demand technologies. Technology refers to both hardware and software, 
including knowledge. In transitioning to deployment, the issues of technical and 
economic feasibility become salient. Halsnaes et al. (2007: 155) propose a body of 
literature that “indicates an important relationship between environmental regulation 
and innovative activity in environmental technology”. The authors conclude that 
fundamental long-term shifts in technology to mitigate GHG’s cannot be achieved 
through emissions reductions policies alone, and cap and trade provides insufficient 
                                                 
202
 In a more broad sense, human agency over the future is a concept advanced in “futures thinking” and 
scenarios. De Jouvenel, (2000) describes the future as a realm of freedom, power and will. Although 
power may be unequal “all the actors have some individual power enabling them to act.”  
 
203Benefits arising from market deployment. 
 
204Spillovers are the transfer of knowledge and benefits from one entity to another. 
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incentives for the necessary R&D. Both technology-push and demand-pull instruments 
are required. Flexible incentive oriented policies are more likely to facilitate low-cost 
pathways than prescriptive regulatory approaches. From a more broad perspective on 
the interaction of drivers in an Irish context, the relationship of technology to economic 
growth was proposed by Bergin et al., (2009: 49). The author outlines how future 
economic growth depends on the translation of R& D expenditure into “real” innovation 
to enhance future productivity. 
 
5.4.8 Energy forecasts 
 
Energy forecasts have been formulated for Ireland based on underlying assumptions on 
economic growth, population growth and fuel price assumptions. Energy forecasts have 
been confounded by the recent economic downturn and its implications for the 
evolution of energy demand and the energy system.  
 
The 2008 MTR (Fitzgerald et al., 2008) forecast final energy consumption per fuel 
under the “benchmark scenario” with the inclusion of a carbon tax (Table 5-1). The 
projections emphasise a continued growth in energy demand at a reduced rate from the 
previous fifteen years. The ESRI Recovery Scenarios (Bergin et al., 2009) present CO2 
but not energy projections. The “baseline scenario” of Capros et al. (2008: 126) 
forecasts final energy demand per fuel to 2030 (Table 5-2). 
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Table 5-1 Final energy use by fuel, thousand (toe) and average annual growth rates 
 2005 
 
1990- 
1995 
1995- 
2000 
2000- 
2005 
2005- 
2010 
2010- 
2015 
2015- 
2020 
2020- 
2025 
Coal 435 -18 4.6 1.8 -8.9 -5.2 -4.6 -4.3 
Oil 8,196 4.4 7.5 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.7 
Gas 1,485 7.0 8.6 4.3 4.4 1.9 2.4 2.7 
Peat 274 -4.2 -13.1 -2.0 -1.3 -4.9 -4.9 -4.8 
Renewables 184 -3.1 5.1 9.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Electricity 2,094 4.6 6.4 3.7 3.9 1.4 1.4 1.1 
Total 12,668 2.0 6.2 3.2 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.6 
Source: Fitzgerald et al. (2008: 102). 
 
 
Table 5-2 Final energy demand for Ireland (ktoe), per fuel type to 2030 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Solids 1,784 933 699 704 619 561 485 417 362 
Oil 3,874 4,796 6,894 7,990 8,733 9,065 9,303 9,455 9,471 
Gas 568 796 1,201 1,337 1,632 1,775 1,867 2,008 2,130 
Electricity 1,020 1,277 1,744 2,094 2,435 2,647 2,847 2,956 3,039 
Heat205  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Other 108 102 141 221 278 441 582 660 711 
Total 7,335 7,903 10,678 12,346 13,697 14,491 15,084 15,498 15,714 
Source: Capros et al. (2008:126) 
 
Baseline forecasts of TPES included in Howley et al. (2008: 28) project average annual 
growth rates and  five year totals as detailed below in Table 5-3. Oil and gas were 
projected to grow. Renewable energy grows significantly in the short term. This is in 
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contribution to electricity and transport sectors due to the REFIT and MOTR measures 
but with no growth post 2010.  
 
Table 5-3 Baseline Total Primary Energy Supply (ktoe) by Fuel 2005-2020 
 2005 2010 2020 
Coal 1,862 2,057 1,922 
Oil 9,146 8,960 11,110 
Gas 3,477 3,871 4,795 
Peat 776 711 616 
Renewables 367 769 767 
Electricity imports 176 86 280 
Total 15,774 16,454 19,490 
Source: Howley et al. (2008: 28). 
 
Energy projections in the baseline forecast of Howley et al. (2007) were included in 
EPA baseline CO2 projections (EPA, 2008a). These projections were superseded by 
Howley et al. (2008) detailed above. 
 
5.5 Governance and policies 
 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Governance, and the government policy it includes, feed into and are influenced by such 
dynamics as population growth, economic growth, technological change and social and 
cultural processes. The evolution of these ‘drivers’ is interdependent and 
interconnected. This has particular significance for the evolution of energy CO2. The 
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scenarios developed for this research are baseline scenarios.206 However, aside from 
mitigation or energy policy the evolution of governance moves to prominence as a 
driver as it influences the quality or type of development path. This has implications for 
energy in general and CO2 in particular.  
 
The contribution of policy to the evolution of energy CO2 arises in a wide variety of 
areas. With respect to GHG’s, the SRES documented a breadth of policy areas outside 
of energy including; economic development, technology development, education, 
health, social welfare, transport, industry, agriculture and forestry (Nakicenovic et al., 
2000: 155). In general, in meeting policy objectives with respect to the plethora of 
domains and societal interests described above, a range of policy instruments are 
available. In determining what instruments to apply, it is the choice of policy that 
ultimately determines the policy’s success and resultant impact on emissions. Applying 
instruments such as; regulation, taxes and subsidies can alter the development path at 
fundamental levels. 
 
The role of policy has been alluded to in previous sections. This section aims to review 
the influence of policy through its expression in ‘governance.’ Governance has its 
impact on emissions through directing the development pathway. The concept of 
governance and the development pathway are introduced below. 
 
5.5.2 Governance and government 
In examining the effect of policies on emissions, the SRES focussed on ‘government 
policies’ as a broad development agenda. The AR4 advanced the concept of government 
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 Baseline scenarios exclude additional climate/energy policy after the end of 2006. 
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policies to “governance”. This is a more inclusive concept involving multiple scales207 
and the roles of the market and civil society in tandem with the state as multiple actors 
as discussed by Sathaye et al. (2007: 708). The authors refer to changes in the 
development pathway being contingent on these multiple scales and actors and the 
variety of intrinsic processes entailed. This wider concept of governance reflects a 
societal adaptation to address more complex problems such as climate change, and does 
not imply a reduction in the role of government as governments remain central actors. 
This evolution can be seen in the trend away from command-and-control strategies 
towards market-based instruments, voluntary initiatives and partnerships with non-
governmental organisations. Multiple scales are evident from the competencies of local 
government in the context of physical development and transport planning, to the 
opposite end of the spectrum, the international perspective of the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol. It is widely acknowledged that sustainability has become a much 
broader project than the actions of the State (Najam et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2006). 
 
At the state level the development pathway is influenced through policy choices arising 
from the political culture, regulatory policy style and public expectations of the nation. 
The institutional capacity of governments to implement policy changes is central to the 
choice of policy instruments. In general, the institutional frameworks that shape 
economic structure and its associated energy use and emissions are dependent on 
aspects such as centralisation and participation in decision-making, decision-making 
mechanisms and intervention processes (Fisher et al., 2007: 178). According to Fisher 
et al. it is social and cultural processes that ultimately shape institutions and how they 
function. It can then be postulated that in a development pathway the evolution of 
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institutions or governance towards stronger or weaker conceptions of sustainability 
would tend to entail a transition in social and cultural processes that are the impetus of 
the institutional framework and culture.  
 
In terms of the market, the role of industry in sustainability is clear not just from its 
environmental impact but from its’ social and economic footprint. Sustainability 
concerns are becoming more central to corporate strategy, including targets for GHG’s 
and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Lyon, 2003). Industry has a capacity to 
influence policy and decision-making in general, as an actor, while it also has the 
capacity to introduce sustainability into its own operations. A range of potential 
incentives can encourage industry efforts to move towards sustainability. Drivers 
towards corporate environmental sustainability include; the capacity to influence 
regulation, green-marketing, managing stakeholder relations, the demands of investors, 
the demands of insurers and other financial institutions and stakeholder initiatives. Cost-
savings are particularly salient in the context of industry sustainability. The 
development of energy and material efficiency and reducing wastes can reduce costs per 
unit of production as the concept of eco-efficiency.  
 
The sufficiency or otherwise of these actions in the context of sustainability are 
contested (Dunphy et al., 2003). Málovics et al. (2008) describe how CSR is troubled 
by two conceptual elements; firstly the paradox of the requirement to sell at low prices 
while being socially and environmentally conscious, and secondly, the necessity to 
engender sustainable consumption in society, which as an action is the domain of the 
multiple actors of governance and not just the private sector. While there has been 
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progress, industry can play a greater role in making development sustainable (Sathaye et 
al., 2007: 713). 
 
Civil society in form is blurred and broad, ranging from entities such as charities, 
NGO’s and community groups to professional associations and trade unions. In theory, 
the common role of civil society as an actor in governance and sustainability is in 
seeking to develop and implement visions of change. This is implemented through 
mechanisms such as activism, public advocacy, voter education, lobbying decision-
makers, research and public protests. Questions are frequently raised about the 
independence of civil society from state and market, and the democratic accountability 
to members (Jordan and van Tuijl, 2006). Civil society can play a vital role in shaping 
development, encouraging empowerment and participation in decision-making, creating 
and influencing policy and engendering systemic grassroots change (Moser and Dilling, 
2007). This can potentially alter orientations towards environmental sustainability in 
policy and in wider society to be inclusive of an economic balance, social equity and 
distributional considerations. In recognising the shift from government to governance, 
opportunities to cooperate and enhance policy development can arise through 
mechanisms such as partnership, deliberative democracy and the application of 
“transition theory”.208 
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 Offering another perspective on society-market-state relations and how society can be shifted to more 
sustainable paths (see Sathaye et al. 2007: 716). 
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5.5.3 Development paths, sustainability and policy 
In outlining two key areas for energy and emissions scenarios Lise (2006: 1842) 
described “development trajectories” as sectoral changes in the economy and “energy 
transitions” as investments in cleaner technologies to replace and expand capital stock. 
This concept contrasts the more broad definition of the “development path” used in 
AR4 by Sathaye et al. (2007: 696);  
 
Development paths are defined here as a complex array of technological, 
economic, social, institutional, cultural, and biophysical characteristics 
that determines the interactions between human and natural systems, 
including consumption and production patterns in all countries, over time 
at a particular scale. 
 
As described by Klein et al. (2007: 764) the driving forces of emissions are linked to the 
underlying development path. In the SRES, a spectrum of development paths are 
defined, each with associated driving forces including socio-economic conditions 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000). It is this integrated view that has also been evolving with the 
discourse on “sustainable development.” It has tended to focus on environment and 
economic dimensions (Barnett, 2001). The importance of social, political and cultural 
factors, including poverty, social equity and governance are growing in recognition 
(Banuri and Najam, 2001 and Johnson et al., 2009) and has been reflected in the 
discussion documented in this chapter.  
 
The concept of ‘”sustainable development” is ambiguous and contested and has been 
likened to meta-objectives such as “democracy” (Meadowcroft, 2000, Connelly, 2007). 
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The evolution of the discussion on sustainable development throughout the IPCC 
process since the First Assessment Report views the processes leading to GHG 
emissions and climate policy itself as a broader issue of sustainable development 
including social and economic dimensions. The treatment of sustainable development 
implemented in the TAR includes three broad classes of analyses or perspectives, 
efficiency and cost effectiveness; equity and sustainable development; and global 
sustainability and societal learning. The domain of emissions and mitigation is treated 
as an integral element of sustainable development. In this context a “development first” 
emphasis is placed on making development more sustainable, balancing the economic, 
social and environmental and recognising the potential for conflicts and trade-offs 
(Sathaye et al., 2007: 695). 
 
Using this integrated conception of both the “development pathway” and 
“sustainability”209 follows the pragmatic approach of (Halsnaes et al., 2007: 123) on the 
definition of sustainable consumption.210 The development pathway can be 
characterised by evolution towards stronger or weaker sustainability.211 For the 
purposes of this study, ‘sustainability’ is particularly related to the evolution of 
governance and society212 but also integrates the other driving forces. The definition of 
‘stronger sustainability’ is where the development path would tend to evolve towards 
immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation of development (Tapio et al., 
2007: 435-436), or the decoupling of emissions from production, and production from 
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 Sustainability is defined here as a process and not an end in itself. 
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 Rather than resolving the contested political and cultural construction of “sustainable development” or 
“sustainability,” the controversy between ecologists and economists as summarised in Arrow et al. 
(2004), was avoided by moving towards basic principles. 
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 This is not based on the weak and strong sustainability described in Halsnaes et al. (2007: 122). 
 
212
 As previously discussed as an inter-linked concept where governance is ultimately shaped by society. 
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well-being (Banuri et al., 2001). Opportunities at the sectoral level to change 
development pathways are reviewed by Sathaye et al. (2007) including, e.g. in the 
energy sector; energy poverty, energy security, energy efficiency and deploying 
renewables. In transport and urban planning, applying a spatial development pattern that 
avoids urban sprawl and supporting alternative modes of transport to road are 
suggested. Overall, the emphasis in the process of “sustainability” is placed on 
opportunities to adopt win-win-win policies evident in e.g. the reduction in urban 
pollution, notwithstanding trade-offs and conflicts may also appear.213  
 
In the context of the preceding discussion on governance, both climate and energy and 
wider ‘non-climate policy’ can influence emissions. If non-climate policy is understood 
in the context of the broad policy interests already described, these policies also can be 
encapsulated within the concept of a national “development pathway”. This would also 
include environmental policy for pollution management, outside what would be 
described as climate and energy policy.  
 
In furthering the discourse to a perspective on mitigation,214 the challenge of mitigation 
policy is synonymous with sustainable development as a normative construct. Not only 
is mitigation linked to sustainable development, but essentially the approach to 
mitigation relies on factors common to sustainable development. The significance of 
institutional and economic capacity is common to the development and implementation 
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 Although there are no definitive statements on whether the developments are actually ‘sustainable’ or 
desirable, elements commonly associated with sustainability in the literature are explored in the scenarios 
(see Chapter 6 Scenarios). 
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 This discussion has relevance to existing mitigation policy to 2007, but also potential additional 
mitigation policy that may be implemented to reduce emissions. This additional policy is beyond the 
scope of the baseline scenarios. 
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of policies across a wide variety of domains. The challenges of capacity building for 
this sustainable development “are not confined to the less industrialised countries, but 
that industrialised countries also fall short of the capacity to respond to climate 
mitigation challenges in a sustainable fashion” (Sathaye et al. 2007: 711). Climate 
change policies must be mainstreamed and routinised at all levels of development for 
full integration rather than piggybacking an existing agenda (Riordan et al., 1998). As 
concluded by Sathaye et al. (2007: 717) ultimately effective mitigation depends on good 
governance practices as the essence of sustainable development including, “whole-of-
government decision-making, synergies among economic, environment and social 
policies, coalition building, political leadership, integrated approaches and policy 
coherence”. 
 
Returning to the relevance of ‘sustainability’ in a national development path, the 
evolution of the development pathway towards lower or higher emissions trajectories is 
likely to be broadly aligned with the orientation of governance and institutions,215 with 
respect to sustainability. There is a significance of governance in general and 
sustainable development in particular in both baseline scenarios and in potential future 
energy and mitigation policy.216 It is in their capacity to alter the underlying 
development path that these driving forces become prominent. 
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 As discussed previously including the underlying social and cultural processes that lead to change in 
governance and institutions. 
 
216
 Additional energy and mitigation policy post 2006 is outside of the scope of the scenarios of this 
research. 
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5.5.4 Sustainability and ‘lock-in,’ a systems challenge 
A key question in terms of the potential for existing development patterns of emissions 
to be altered centres on the potential existence of technological and infrastructural ‘lock-
in’. The argument of engineers can tend to focus on technical potentials of emission 
reductions while that of economists may focus on economic potentials. In broadening 
the perspective of engagement in processes of change, beyond simply economic or 
engineering perspectives, a ‘systems thinking’ approach has emerged in response to the 
complexity and uncertainty of systems (Kay and Foster, 1999 and Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1994). Particularly in the context of climate change and human systems, the 
uncertainty of science involved and the complexity of the challenges have encouraged 
the adoption of a trans-disciplinary approach. 
 
In the context of the development of emissions “path dependency,” a lock-in can occur 
to alternatively high or low emissions trajectories and this “casts doubt on central 
tendency technology and emission scenarios” (Halsnaes et al., 2007:150). Issues such as 
baseline conditions, timeframe, economic and institutional capacities and culture 
materialise as part of a holistic system when considering potential alteration of the 
development path or lock-in. This has significance not just for mitigation potential but 
for the plausible evolution of baseline scenarios. As has been explored in previous 
sections Ireland has undergone significant transformation since 1990. This was 
facilitated through an economic boom period that saw considerable modification of the 
type and pattern of development, the use of infrastructure and technology and the 
consumption culture. A holistic approach views not just the physical system and its 
economic determinants but the evolution of the underlying development path through 
drivers such as governance and the institutional, social and cultural processes to which it 
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is related. These drivers can change even in the context of continuing economic growth. 
Economic growth can become an active agent of change through the use of investment 
in replacing or modifying capital stock, transport options, supply technologies etc. Tol 
(2007) discusses the apparent lock-in in the Irish car fleet and in the housing stock217 
and proposed that a carbon tax should be implemented, but as proposed by Barker et al. 
(2007: 662) and UNDP (2007: 132) pricing mechanisms are necessary, but are 
insufficient and unlikely to change behaviour or drive investment at the speed or scale 
required.  
 
In order to reduce emissions or alter lock-in, the underlying development path requires a 
profound alteration in direction through change in governance and social and cultural 
processes. In the longer term, akin to the “butterfly effect” attributed to Lorenz (1969) 
small changes of these driving forces could become magnified through interaction with 
technology and the economy. Longer term emissions reductions through mitigation or 
indeed sustainable development are contingent on short term actions the nature of which 
can change. This becomes a methodological issue involving a multidimensional system 
that can be viewed holistically and with multidiscipliniarity through scenarios. A single 
discipline approach that can arise with normal disciplinary science or economics may 
not provide the appropriate perspective.218 
 
                                                 
217
 Tol (2007: 108) discusses issues such as the young nature of the Irish car fleet and lock-in in the 
housing stock. Elements of dematerialisation and culture change may counter this assumption of lock-in. 
 
218
 Halsnaes et al. (2007: 122) discuss the emergence of ‘systems thinking’ to understand complex 
adaptive dynamic human and natural systems in response to the limitations of normal science. 
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5.5.5 Policy for baseline scenarios 
Enhancing competencies of the EU by successive treaties has increased the influence of 
the EU on policy-making in Ireland. This has had significant influence on Ireland’s 
development in general and the evolution of emissions and mitigation policy in 
particular. Supranational and regional commitments to climate change and energy 
through the UNFCCC and the EU have established Ireland’s responsibility to limit total 
GHG emissions to +13% on 1990 by 2008-2012 under the Kyoto Protocol and the EU 
Burden-Sharing agreement COM (1999)230.219 These processes established an impetus 
for the development and implementation of climate and energy policies in Ireland from 
the regional EU ETS to national mitigation policies (DOELG, 2000 and DOEHLG, 
2007).220  Wider policies and principles on sustainability were established in Ireland in 
the National Sustainable Development Strategy (DOE, 1997), but in terms of climate 
and energy, they were largely superseded by national mitigation policies in a rapidly 
evolving policy agenda.  
 
In determining policy requirements of the baseline scenarios of Chapter 6 Scenarios the 
policies included in the EPA projections (EPA, 2008a) are useful. These were based on 
the policies included in Howley et al. (2007) and include three central policies to the 
baseline forecast, agreed and legislatively provided for by the end of 2006: 
 
i) a growth in the contribution of renewables to 15% of gross electricity 
consumption by 2010 (through REFIT price support mechanism), but no 
further growth post 2010, 
                                                 
219
 Under the EU Climate and Energy Package ‘Effort sharing’ Ireland is committed to reduce GHG 
emissions -20% on 2005 by 2020 or -30% if deeper cuts are negotiated in UNFCCC process. These 
additional targets are outside of the scope of the baseline scenarios. 
 
220
 The National Climate Change Strategy (DOEHLG, 2007) is excluded from the baseline scenarios. 
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ii)  a growth in the contribution of biofuels to 2% of road transport fuels by 
2008 (through MOTR excise relief mechanism), but no further growth, 
iii)  a continuation of the ETS beyond 2012, but with no extension to 
additional sectors. 
 
Apart from the lower EU target to achieve 13.2% (2001/77/EC), achieving the higher 
national REFIT target in line with that above would require a further increase in 
renewable energy in gross electricity, as it stood at 9.4% in 2007 (Howley et al., 2008: 
24). In addition to the EU target for biofuels to achieve 2% of petrol and diesel 
consumption from renewable sources by 2005 and 5.75% by 2010 (2003/30/EC), under 
MOTR the national target is 2.0% by 2008. While biofuels have increased significantly 
in recent years (from 0.02% in 2005 to 0.5% in 2007), they are significantly below the 
2008 target (Howley et al., 2008: 48). The continuation of fuel tourism due to tax 
differentials on fuels is included as a policy concern in the absence of harmony in fuel 
prices.  
 
In terms of ETS sectors, the EPA projections (EPA, 2008a) included a growth in 
emissions of 17% for the industry and commercial services sectors by 2020 under the 
baseline scenario. The Energy Services Directive (2006/32/EC) setting a target of 1% 
improvement in energy efficiency annually to 2016 was not provided for until the 
National Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2009 and is excluded. Changes towards gas and 
electricity in heating, and away from coal and peat, were partly introduced on the basis 
of air quality considerations and have led to significant impacts on GHG emissions 
(Rolle et al., 2005: 12). Ireland’s air quality remains of a high standard and Ireland is 
expected to achieve compliance with the 2010 ceilings for SO2, NH3, VOC’s and the 
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limits for PM10’s (EPA, 2008b). However, there is considerable difficulty in reducing 
NOX and the 2010 ceiling is expected to be breached. This places an additional pressure 
on the need to reduce emissions arising predominantly from power plants and transport. 
A summary of EU legislation pertaining to air emissions is included in Appendix V.  
 
Legislation with respect to the residential sector includes the existing building 
regulations applying up to 2006 and including revisions in 2006 to include the Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive (2002/91/EC). These will continue to improve 
energy efficiency in the residential sector through standards, certification and inspection 
of heating and cooling systems. Further relevant provisions include voluntary 
agreements and incentives provided by SEI for industry and SME’s, as well as the 
enhanced deployment of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) under the Directive 
(2004/8/EC). In transport, ‘Transport 21’ contains a national programme of investment 
between 2006-2015 which is intended to upgrade both road and public transport but is 
dominated by investment in roads. The prioritisation and schedule of projects within 
this programme will change according to the evolution of public finances and 
investment decisions of the state. Although model variables do not readily permit the 
incorporation of measures such as building regulations, the ETS or transport upgrades, 
the scenarios consider the achievement of the measures above such as REFIT and 
MOTR. The legislative and policy development for EU Member States incorporated in 
Capros et al. (2008: 24), and consideration in the baseline are illustrated in Appendix V. 
 
5.5.6 Policy critique 
The rapidly evolving policy landscape has occurred in the context of two fundamental 
shifts in Ireland. Economic growth has been linked to growing energy demand and by 
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that, emissions of CO2. This is evidenced in the historical decomposition results. At the 
global, EU and at the national level the impetus for climate and energy policy to reduce 
GHG emissions has increased in tandem. The development path has not been altered 
significantly to move towards a lower emissions trajectory in the context of the growing 
economy and presents concerns of lock-in. While Rolle et al. (2005) noted a significant 
decoupling between GDP and GHG’s, the sectoral disaggregation allows for a deeper 
analysis which highlighted heterogeneous trends in energy intensity.  
 
There have been limited policy developments in Ireland while the overall picture is 
heterogeneous; the trend in energy consumption and emissions is upward. The 
implementation of successive building regulations appears to have contributed to 
limiting growth in the residential sector. Major policy commitments established in 
Ireland on the basis of DOELG (2000), including fuel switching of Moneypoint coal-
fired station and the imposition of a carbon tax were not implemented.221  
 
Climate change mitigation policy in Ireland has been criticised in recent publications 
(Coghlan, 2007; Legge and Scott, 2009; Tol, 2007). In terms of energy, the slow 
development of policy up to 2006 was criticised by OECD/ IEA (2007b: 30).222 In 
focussing on one sector in particular (Tol, 2007: 104) proposes that industry 
decarbonisation from 1990-2003 was achieved “without much of a climate policy”. In 
general, mitigation policy has been either insufficient or not implemented. While the 
course of economic growth is significant to the evolution of Ireland’s energy CO2, the 
pattern of this growth in the context of a development path is crucial. Given the pace 
                                                 
221
 A carbon tax was implemented nationally in Ireland in late 2009. 
 
222
 The OECD/ IEA (2007) noted the publication of the Green Paper; Towards a Sustainable Energy 
Future for Ireland (2006), but the measures to be put forward were not formalised until the White Paper 
Delivering a Sustainable Energy Future for Ireland (2007) and so are outside of the baseline scenarios. 
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and pattern of development since 1990 and the growth in emissions that have arisen 
since, the path-dependency of this growth is of paramount concern for mitigation policy 
in Ireland. Post-industrialist economic growth represents potential development towards 
a lower emissions trajectory. Developments in transport and in the spatial pattern in 
particular are towards lock-in to a potential higher trajectory and policy has failed to 
curb growth. The integration of sustainability throughout governance and society offers 
an approach to development on a lower emissions pathway. 
 
5.5.7 Quantification of policy impacts 
Policy effects can be difficult to quantify in modelling emissions. Model structure can 
militate against the direct inclusion of policy and policy impacts can be highly uncertain 
(Fisher et al., 2007). The price-based mechanisms have been analysed in the literature 
based on econometric and macroeconomic models which are more suited to their 
analysis. This is achieved through their explicit inclusion of inter-linkages between the 
energy sector and the rest of the economy and macroeconomic assumptions (Jeberaj and 
Iniyan, 2006). The analysis of such measures usually leads to “very large ranges in the 
magnitude of the price response” (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 157).  The physical 
structure of the modelling approach utilised in this analysis favours the inclusion of 
bottom-up structural changes in activity, fuel mix and intensity. A broad 
characterisation of policy emphasis included is offered within each scenario. The 
analysis specifically excludes climate and energy policies implemented after the end of 
2006, including the imposition of a carbon tax in 2009. The non-energy CO2 and non-
CO2 GHG emissions are also excluded to arrive at baseline energy CO2 scenarios. It is 
not the intention of the scenarios to arrive at a comprehensive assessment of the impact 
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of existing Policies and Measures (PAM’s) on the development path but to be cognisant 
of the effect of each in the scenarios. 
  
5.6 Synthesis 
As established in the historical DA, economic growth is one of the major driving forces 
of emissions. It is the type of development that is significant within the context of 
growth, and thus economic growth is linked to the other drivers of emissions. Ireland 
experienced significant growth in the economy since 1990, but has experienced a 
sudden trend break in 2008 and the ‘economic boom’ is now definitively over. 
Commentaries expect a path of economic growth to be restored in the near future, but 
the depth of contraction and the speed of recovery are uncertain. The crucial issues of 
‘how much’ and ‘what kind’ of productivity growth can be addressed only by describing 
alternative scenarios of future development (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 127).  
 
Economic growth in Ireland is intimately linked with world growth due to the openness 
of the economy. Population growth is uncertain due to its link to economic growth, and 
the effect of the economic recession on existing population projections may be 
significant. The interlinked pattern of economic and population growth led to a housing 
boom of dispersed pattern settlement that increased emissions and led to systemic 
economic risks,223 both of which arose due to light or absent regulation. In this context, 
the increase in emissions and the recession and financial instability could be viewed as 
an interlinked development issue of housing, construction and finance and the planning 
and regulation of these. Economic growth in Ireland has tended towards higher value-
added and energy extensive industrial development. In parallel, personal consumption 
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 These arose through high-risk financial and lending practices and their inadequate regulation. 
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has tended to increase in energy intensive forms such as transport. The potential for 
technological, infrastructural and cultural lock-in to a high emissions path are evident 
particularly with transport in Ireland. This has arisen not just from enhanced economic 
growth but from policy decisions or omissions on spatial pattern, infrastructure 
development and strategic planning.  
 
The concept of state government has evolved towards ‘governance’ to encapsulate the 
market and civil society in addition to the state and regulation. The state, through its 
institutions is ultimately shaped by society. This concept of change can be extended 
within a development path to encapsulate the other two aspects of governance namely 
market and civil society. In characterising governance, the concept of ‘sustainability’ 
may be applied to contextualise the pattern of a development path as a relationship of 
economy and society to energy and emissions. Using the framework of Tapio et al. 
(2007) this can be explored through immaterialisation, dematerialisation and 
decarbonisation. This can be expressed as stronger or weaker sustainability in the 
development path and further in the scenario quantification using the DA framework.  
 
Technology has evolved considerably in Ireland through decisions changing the fuel 
mix, energy supply technology and on the demand side. While progress has been made 
in technology for fuel switching and renewable energy, energy intensity has showed 
heterogeneous trends in the historical sectoral DA (see Chapter 4 Historical 
Decomposition Analysis). A survey of literature on energy resources would suggest that 
while energy prices are likely to increase, resources are adequate. Ireland has significant 
potential for the development of renewable energy resources with wind and wave, but 
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this requires appropriate policy supports which cannot be achieved through a carbon 
tax. 
 
Mitigation policy in general has not achieved much by way of emissions reductions in 
GHG emissions in Ireland. Some notable progress in individual sectors has been made. 
This is particularly the case with the improved thermal performance of the building 
stock through enhanced regulations. Industry performance is attributable to industrial 
development towards restructuring rather than climate policy. Strategically Ireland 
needs to consider the implications of the reliance on oil and other imported fuel sources, 
for security of supply, cost and competitiveness in tandem with environmental 
sustainability. 
 
While driving forces such as governance, society and culture can not be quantified, a 
qualitative exploration through the scenario driving forces discussed enhances the 
consideration of plausible alternative developments in scenarios. In the context of 
complex human systems, this is important in scientific inquiry, in strategic inquiry and 
in the communication of complexity and uncertainty. Human agency over the 
development path can be explored cognisant of potential lock-in by an exploratory 
scenario process. Point forecasts and projections tend towards BAU dynamics and often 
do not engage with issues of governance, institutions and social and cultural drivers. As 
described in the SRES (Nakicenovic et al., 2000), the task of scenario development is 
more than alternative quantitative assumptions of productivity growth, the context of 
this growth must be made explicit. Some of these factors such as governance issues 
cannot be measured, and the relationship between factors may be known only 
qualitatively.  
256 
 
 
“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can 
be counted.” 
(Albert Einstein, 1879–1955, attributed) 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The Kaya identity used to explore scenario driving forces does not suggest causality. 
The driving forces are not independent of each other but undergo complex dynamic 
interactions through their evolution. The discussion of driving forces documented above 
has drawn on literature pertaining to driving forces from the SRES and the IPCC 
assessment reports to peer-reviewed academic journals and ‘grey literature’. The 
discourse is placed in an Irish national context and allowed a broadening and deepening 
of the exploration of driving forces to compliment the DA. This aids in the process of 
considering the quantitative and qualitative evolution of the scenarios to 2020 and 
potentially gives a basis for further longer-term scenario exploration in further research.  
 
In keeping with the DA, economic growth is an important driver of energy CO2 as it 
increases activity levels in the economic sectors and through higher incomes can 
increase personal consumption and resultant emissions. Economic growth will not 
increase emissions on its own this requires a relationship with energy and emissions. It 
is the nature of growth that dictates how this relationship evolves. The unified concept 
of a ‘development path’ can be used to contextualise different economic growth rates in 
scenarios with ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ sustainability in governance and society. This can 
257 
 
also capture the evolving context of the other driving forces such as technology.224 For 
the purposes of the scenario quantification through the DA, using the framework of 
Tapio et al. (2007),225 the development path can be contextualised as a process of 
sustainability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
224
 This can be used to aid the process of assigning change in e.g. the energy intensity of each sector in the 
scenario quantification. 
 
225
 As previously discussed this includes concepts of immaterialisation, dematerialisation and 
decarbonisation. 
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CHAPTER 6: SCENARIOS 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Following from the historical decomposition analysis in Chapter 4, and the discussion 
of scenario driving forces in Chapter 5, the following chapter presents the integrated 
qualitative and quantitative scenarios of energy CO2 emissions in Ireland to 2020. Four 
scenarios are presented quantified by the LMDI model at both sectoral and macro level. 
The results are synthesised to compare the two levels of the analysis. Given the greater 
disaggregation of the sectoral model, the quantification of the macro scenarios is based 
on energy trends arising in the sectoral model. The model specification is identical to 
that applied in the historical analysis, although an addition in data is made to account for 
electricity supply.226 The scenarios detailed are not predictions but are descriptions of 
plausible alternative developments using the exploratory method of scenario analysis 
detailed in Chapter 2. 
 
6.2 Scenario axes 
In order to develop a set of four plausible alternative scenarios for the evolution of 
energy CO2 emissions, the scenario axes technique (van’t Klooster and van Asselt, 
2006) is used to select two driving forces of high uncertainty and high impact. The 
scenario axes may function as both a structuring and communication tool. However the 
                                                 
226
 This enables the conversion of TFC + Transformation Inputs into TPER for macro quantification. 
Electricity fuel consumption is based on the evolution of Transformation Inputs (see Chapter 3 
Decomposition Analysis and Appendix II). 
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conception of the driving forces is multidimensional, and a reductionist, mechanistic 
perspective on the scenario driving forces is not intended. The axes structure the 
development of plausible alternatives where driving forces are considered holistically, 
cognisant of the potential interaction of the identified axes driving forces with other 
driving forces,227 and cognisant of the historical patterns in the DA model. 
 
The impact of economic growth and technological change228 on the historical 
decomposition analysis has been illustrated as the two highest impact driving forces to 
increase and decrease emissions respectively. The scenario driving forces in Chapter 5 
expanded the discourse to look at deeper insights. It is not just the absolute growth in 
the economic output that is significant it is the nature of this growth with respect to the 
pattern and type of economic development. Similarly, ‘technology’ or ‘energy intensity’ 
do not fully capture this qualitative aspect of change. The concepts of sustainability 
described by Tapio et al. (2007) afford a deeper conception of change in a DA by 
articulating the qualitative change in the development path as “immaterialisation, 
dematerialisation and decarbonisation”. This view of sustainability characterises not 
just technology or even the nature of economic growth, but as described in Chapter 5, it 
characterises the social and cultural underpinnings of citizens as consumers of energy. It 
also characterises governance as a representation of this culture with significance for the 
development path. The beginnings of fuel substitution and renewable energy penetration 
illustrate the impact of sustainability on the development path as societal choices. 
                                                 
227
 For example the consideration of the interaction of technological change with both economic growth 
and sustainability, both of which may act to increase technological change. 
 
228
 Where technology is described by energy intensity in the DA, this included not only technical 
efficiency but also behavioural aspects. 
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Energy intensity could also be posited as a societal choice where it arises from 
immaterialisation.  
 
When conceptualised in this form, the evolution of the driving forces of the ‘economy’ 
and ‘sustainability’ are both of potential high impact and high uncertainty. In using the 
following scenario axes of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ economy and sustainability, there is no 
definitive statement on whether the economy or sustainability is strong or indeed 
weak.229 In the scenarios detailed in this chapter, no statements on the desirability of 
outcomes is included or intended as the scenarios are exploratory and not normative. 
These continuums allow thinking on the future to be structured and the process of 
change to be explored. With economic growth, it would be assumed that energy and 
CO2 emissions would increase. In the scenarios this is dependent on the evolution of 
sustainability and the other driving forces in the development path to dictate the 
relationship of the economy and society with energy and emissions. In general, it can be 
assumed that ‘strong economy’ would tend to increase emissions while ‘strong 
sustainability’ would tend to reduce emissions or curb growth. The actual development 
path is dependent on the plausible, consistent evolution of the range of driving forces 
explored. 
 
In the context of the energy intensity complex trends can also occur in the scenarios as 
documented in the SRES. Even in the context of ‘weak’ sustainability, a reduction in 
intensity can occur: “For example, scenario builders often assume that high rates of 
economic growth lead to high capital turnover. This favours more advanced and more 
                                                 
229
 Resolving the compatibility or otherwise of economic growth and sustainability is beyond the scope of 
this research. The conception of ‘sustainability’ is defined as a process and not an outcome per se as 
discussed above and in Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces. 
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efficient technologies, which result in lower energy intensities” (Nakicenovic et al., 
2000: 84).  
 
The concept of the ‘development pathway’ outlined above, prompts the consideration of 
two conclusions established by the SRES concerning the significance of ‘lock-in’ and 
the application of qualitative scenarios. Firstly, the clustering of technological and 
behaviour options can provide internally consistent stories in scenarios. These can 
represent a pattern of choices over-time that constitute a development path. Further, this 
path can involve ‘self reinforcing loops’ of positive feedback between technology, 
consumer demand and geographic distribution that can create ‘lock-in’ effects which 
can effectively foreclose technological or socio-institutional innovation towards lower 
carbon paths leading to lock-in. Lock-in would tend to be more problematic in a weak 
sustainability scenario where a high emissions trajectory becomes more likely. In the 
context of the future, this depends not only on the timescale of the analysis, but on the 
evolution of the underlying driving forces such as the governance, and societal factors 
described above. Near-term decisions can have long-term consequences. This is true for 
Ireland not only in the historical evolution but on decisions that will be made in the 
coming years. 
 
The uncertainties of economy and sustainability allow the exploration of the evolution 
of the system in the context of varying development paths. These arise from various 
combinations in the scenarios of economic growth and the orientation of the 
development path vis à vis aspects of sustainability. The rate of economic growth has 
implications for energy consumption increase and also financial resources to invest in 
capital projects to alter the development path. The implications of sustainability are 
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more subtle in influencing culture and governance but also energy intensity changes and 
the investment of financial resources. This allows the quantification process to represent 
the development path of the scenario through not only changes in energy intensity, fuel 
substitution and renewable energy but also the qualities of overall development in the 
sectors.230 
 
The explication of the scenarios in the SRES by axes describing developments as “more 
global or more regional” and “more economic or more environmental” has been 
described as flawed by Girod et al. (2009: 109). The authors propose that despite the 
potential for the interpretation of “globalisation” and “sustainability,” as not “value-
free”, the application of the concept of development as “more economic or more 
environmental” is not compatible with the definition of sustainability as a process 
(WCED, 1987). Despite the potential assumption of value judgements by scenario users 
the implication is that in the context of emission scenarios, the use of “sustainability” as 
a scenario axis is not only methodologically appropriate but potentially a necessity of 
robust analysis. 
 
In Figure 6-1, the articulation of “strong sustainability” is the development of 
governance and underlying social and cultural processes, which tends to lead to 
immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation. In contrast, “weak 
sustainability” tends not to lead to these patterns as strongly. The objective is to remain 
neutral in this exploration while cognisant of the evolving discourse on sustainability 
                                                 
230
 This includes the processes of sustainability previously discussed including immaterialisation, 
dematerialisation and also decarbonisation (Tapio et al., 2009). 
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described by Sathaye et al. (2007).231 Elements described in the scenario narratives in 
the context of issues such as culture or alternative styles of governance, are intended to 
articulate a plausible description of change using aspects associated with sustainability 
in the literature. This is not to assume that these developments are definitively 
“sustainable,”232 but given the logics of the scenarios are included to characterise a path 
of plausible change. In the case of the economy, “strong economy” is associated with 
strong economic growth rates and robust recovery from the recession whereas “weak 
economy” is less so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
231
 Sathaye et al. (2007: 697) documented emerging basic principles from the international sustainability 
discourse, as e.g. “the welfare of future generations, the maintenance of essential biophysical life support 
systems, ecosystem wellbeing, more universal participation in development processes and decision-
making, and the achievement of an acceptable standard of human wellbeing.” 
 
232
 The developments described may not be definitively “sustainable” either in the timescale described or 
in the longer term. Given that the definition of “sustainable development” is a normative construct it may 
also require a democratic process of agreement on defining what is “sustainable” before such a statement 
could be made. 
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Figure 6-1 Scenario axes  
 
 
 
The scenario axes above differentiate the four alternative scenarios explored. The 
scenario matrix of Figure 6-1 could be tentatively related to the matrix published by the 
International Institute of European Affairs (O’ Mahony, 2008) in examining the social 
and economic consequences of climate change for Ireland to 2020 (see Appendix VI).  
 
6.3 Evolution of scenario driving forces 
The following Table 6-1 when viewed in conjunction with the scenarios gives a 
summary of the evolution of some of the main features in the scenarios and the logics of 
scenario development. The illustration does not prescribe linear trends but gives an 
illustration of the direction of evolution. The drivers presented are not mutually 
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exclusive but are interconnected. Scenario logics and signals for the evolution of model 
variables can be ascertained from the table below. 
 
Table 6-1 Evolution of main features in scenario storylines to 2020 
 IE1 IE2 IE3 IE4 
Population 
 
    
Affluence 
 
    
Energy 
Consumption 
    
Equity 
 
    
Renewables  
    
Energy Intensity  
    
Technological 
Change 
    
Environmental 
Quality 
    
Effective 
governance and 
institutional 
capacity233 
    
Sustainability 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
233
 ‘Effective governance’ is defined as governance that captures synergies in policy and balances 
competing social, economic and environmental challenges. ‘Institutional capacity’ defines the ability of 
institutions to induce change. 
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6.4 The sectoral scenarios of energy CO2 to 2020 
The difficulties in accurately predicting future energy CO2 have been outlined in 
Chapter 1 Introduction and background. The following scenarios explore alternative 
plausible evolutions to 2020 and the evolution of the underlying driving forces 
identified through the research. The scenarios have been developed in keeping with the 
logics of the scenario axes illustrated in Table 6-1.  
 
The evolution of activity levels, associated energy and consequent CO2 emissions 
within each of the scenarios are documented below. As previously described, this study 
uses LMDI I decomposition analysis for scenario quantification. For each sector the 
energy consumption and activity levels in each year are calculated on the basis of 
“mean” annual change per annum as per Mander et al. (2008: 3758). There are various 
plausible emission trajectories that can arise based on the development path, and these 
can be expressed in the evolution of each compositional factor in each sector. By 
constructing scenarios this study attempts to bound the uncertainty of future changes. 
While Girod et al. (2009) suggested the naming of the scenarios is important, given the 
objectives of the research234 the scenarios have been presented with codes from IE1 to 
IE4. A summary of each of the sectoral scenarios is detailed below.  
 
Scenario IE1 is strong economic growth strong sustainability scenario. Post recession, a 
strong recovery in the economy is driven by growth in output in services while 
industrial output also expands. A modal shift in transport occurs towards public modes. 
                                                 
234
 This is primarily to generate results as alternative emission scenarios. The importance of the 
communication of results to scenario users with descriptive names or metaphors is of secondary 
importance and led to the naming of the scenarios by code. 
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The sectors tend to improve energy intensity by de-linking energy further from growth. 
Fuel shares increase in gas, electricity and renewables and decrease coal and peat.  
 
Scenario IE2 is a weaker economic growth scenario where the bounce-back in the 
economy is not as strong as IE1, but sustainability is strong. Growth is primarily driven 
by the services sector. Capital investments for technological change are less than in IE1, 
but well-being and economic output are less linked to energy consumption. Transport 
moves towards public options. Fuel shares tend to gravitate towards gas, electricity and 
renewables but at a slower rate. 
 
Scenario IE3 is a scenario of low economic growth and low sustainability in governance 
and society. Where it occurs economic growth is prioritised in industry. Weaker 
sustainability leads to losses in energy intensity, particularly in an expanding transport 
sector. Fuel shares maintain coal and peat while the consumption of oil grows. 
 
Scenario IE4 is the strongest economic growth scenario, with robust growth in industry 
and some growth in services output. Sustainability is weak in this scenario and trends in 
energy consumption and carbon emissions are upwards. The economy and society are 
dependent on increasing consumption for well-being. Energy intensity decreases in 
industry and services with robust output growth. This is attributable to capital 
investment in technology rather than immaterialisation. Transport intensity increases 
with private modes of transport favoured. Fuel shares maintain the role of coal and peat 
while the consumption of the other fuel types also grows to feed the growing economy. 
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The evolution of activity levels and energy consumption associated with the sectoral 
scenarios are outlined in Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 respectively. Data on fuel shares in 
electricity generation are also included in Table 6-4. 
 
 
Table 6-2 Sectoral activity levels in 2007 and in 2020 in the scenarios 
Sector 2007 IE1 IE2 IE3 IE4 
 
     
Economic  Total (GVA) 167,057 218,416 188,675 
 
174,856 
 
228,036 
 
Industry 56,754 61,883 
 
56,520 
 
65,559 
 
93,984 
Commercial Services 100,911 
 
141,303 
 
122,828 
 
99,959 
 
124,324 
 
Public Services 5,529 5,998 
 
5,666 
 
5,575 
 
5,746 
 
Agriculture 3,863 
 
3,862 
 
3,661 
 
3,764 
 
3,981 
 
 
     
Transport (p-km and t-km) 72,395 82,360 75,685 78,198 95,363 
Private Car 
 
41,414 44,187 
 
42,051 
 
43,063 
 
49,220 
 
Road Freight 
 
18,707 19,776 
 
18,663 21,779 30,547 
Road Public 9,791 14,732 12,212 11,049 12,978 
Rail total 2,312 2,819 
 
2,628 
 
2,180 
 
2,470 
 
Rail Passenger 2,183 2,648 
 
2,498 
 
2,115 
 
2,399 
 
Rail Freight 129 170  130 65 
 
72 
 
Domestic Aviation 170 133 131 
 
127  148 
 
Fuel tourism and unspec. NA NA NA NA NA 
 
     
Residential (House no.’s) 1,518,778 
 
1,998,778 
 
1,863,778 
 
1,828,778 
 
2,113,778 
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Table 6-3 Sectoral energy TFC in 2007 and in the scenarios in 2020 
Sector/ktoe 2007 IE1 IE2 IE3 IE4 
 
     
Industry 2,691 
 
2,212 
 
2,133 
 
2,545 
 
3,428 
 
Commercial 
Services 
1,076 
 
1,187 
 
1,061 
 
982 
 
1,083 
 
Public Services 595 
 
636 
 
607 
 
627 
 
632 
 
Agriculture 301 
 
293 
 
283 
 
306 
 
329 
 
Private Car 
 
2,183 
 
2,260 
 
2,172 
 
2,445 
 
2,912 
 
Road Freight 
 
1,284 
 
1,300 
 
1,249 
 
1,530 
 
2,157 
 
Road Public 180 
 
268 
 
219 
 
247 
 
329 
 
Rail total 48 
 
43 
 
40 
 
39 
 
43 
 
Domestic Aviation 54 
 
43 
 
42 
 
44 
 
51 
 
Fuel tourism and 
unspec. 
1,043 
 
1,209 
 
1,014 
 
1,217 
 
1,634 
 
 
 
     
Residential  2,919 
 
3,377 
 
3,192 
 
3,213 
 
3,636 
 
Total 12,372 
 
12,828 
 
12,013 
 
13,193 
 
16,233 
 
Based on Total Final Consumption of the sectors including electricity. 
 
 
 
Table 6-4 TPER of fuel shares in electricity generation (ktoe) 2007 and in the scenarios in 2020 
Fuel 2007 IE1 IE2 IE3 IE4 
 
     
Coal 1,124 
 
500 
 
730 
 
944 
 
821 
 
Oil 376 
 
66 
 
65 
 
75 
 
83 
 
Peat 438 
 
565 
 
565 
 
700 
 
622 
 
Gas 2,737 
 
4,042 
 
3,622 
 
3,092 
 
4,342 
 
Renewables 
 
237 
 
440 
 
440 
 
440 
 
440 
 
Total 4,912 
 
5,613 
 
5,422 
 
5,251 
 
6,308 
 
 
A cursory glance at the tables 6-2 and 6-3 above will show that the overall energy 
intensity of the public services sector is significantly higher than the commercial 
services sector by relating activity to TFC. Although the energy data for the commercial 
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services sector may be problematic in terms of the consumption shares of different 
branches235 it is assumed that the TFC of the aggregated sector is valid. Leaving aside 
the failure of the public services sector to improve intensity from 1990-2007 it is likely 
that the higher energy intensity of public services is largely attributable to the structure 
of these aggregated sectors. The aggregated commercial services sector includes 
economic activity from high value added, low energy intensity branches such as 
financial services and ‘rent’. These would tend to be of intrinsically lower energy 
intensity than the public services sector. For further explanation of the data aggregation 
please see chapter 4 and CSO (2008). 
 
For the full sectoral activity tables and DA results, see Appendix VII. The full sectoral 
scenarios are detailed below. 
 
6.4.1 Scenario IE1 
Scenario IE1 is a high economic growth scenario with stronger sustainability 
developing in governance and lifestyles. Post recession, economic growth increases 
robustly driven by a buoyant services sector. The bounce back in the economy softens 
from 2016-2020 and growth moderates. Ireland’s prosperity is accompanied by a 
transition towards sustainability. Quality of life, social equity and environmental quality 
are prized by society in tandem with economic growth. The economic development 
model pursues growth in the services sector as the source of economic strength. The 
stronger application of sustainability favours increases in energy efficiency and 
decarbonisation and also energy extensive economic development. Sustainability, 
coupled with increased capital for technological improvements tends to improve energy 
                                                 
235
 See section 4.4.2.3 
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intensity in all sectors. Modernisation and investment towards lower CO2 fuels and 
renewables reduces the consumption of coal and peat and increases gas in the sectors. 
 
Local government is enhanced in decision-making, and democratic participation is 
fostered through creative democracy, public dialogue and formal and informal 
education. Society seeks to address the dichotomy between citizen and consumer and 
cultural identity is less defined by consumption.236 Immaterial goods and quality of life 
are high on the public agenda which is reflected in government and institutions. The 
role of the market is perceived as delivering societal, environmental and economic 
goals. Policies are directed to influence a shift in market priorities. Poverty is reduced 
and the quality of public services is prioritised. 
 
Electricity consumption increases due to enhanced demand and modernisation. Coal and 
oil decline as fuel shares in power generation encouraged by sustainability 
considerations and the ETS, while peat is maintained as a primary fuel type for security 
of supply. Renewables in the form of wind expand to meet targets by 2012. In the 
absence of policy intervention, levels of CHP, biogas, biomass, landfill gas and hydro 
do not increase.237 Increases in demand for electricity from the consuming sectors are 
accommodated by the expansion of gas and the additional wind to replace coal and oil 
fired generation. 
 
                                                 
236
 See Toth et al. (2001: 640). 
 
237
 In the absence of additional policy supports renewables in electricity generation do not increase in 
contrast to renewables in the consuming sectors which do increase. This differentiates renewables as part 
of electricity generation e.g. landfill gas electricity generation, and renewables as a fuel type in the final 
consumption sectors e.g. biofuels in private car transport. 
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Owing to the sustainability orientation of the scenario, economic growth tends to occur 
in the office-based services sector and research and development delivering lower 
energy intensity. Growth also occurs in the industry but in the less energy intensive 
branches such as ICT as part of further economic restructuring. GVA growth is strong 
post recession in industry but is well behind historical growth rates. Industry energy 
intensity improvement lags behind historical rates with slower technical efficiency and 
slower restructuring. Fuel shares gravitate to lower carbon intensity. By 2020 industry 
sees a decline in coal and oil, while gas, renewables and electricity expand. Industry 
also proceeds to decarbonise its energy consumption with renewables. The slower pace 
of economic growth in industry and the energy intensity improvement lead to a drop in 
industry CO2. 
 
Expansion of internationally traded services in the services sector is significant in 
economic growth to 2020. Energy intensity improvement arises from capital investment 
in technology. Scale growth in services leads to a slight increase in emissions by 2020. 
Public service output experiences a shallow dip during the recession but grows slowly 
to 2020. Agriculture experiences anaemic output growth over the quantification period 
and oil and electricity consumption drop in agriculture. 
 
The transport sector in IE1 begins a process of fundamental change. In spatial planning, 
urban sprawl is discouraged, the growth in passenger and freight traffic is curbed and 
there is modal shift to public transport. The affluence of the population leads to higher 
car ownership. But the distances travelled are less and single occupancy is reduced. 
Technical efficiencies are realised as purchase behaviour favours smaller engines. 
Biofuels reach almost 5% of fuel consumption in 2010. Road freight activity dips 
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heavily during the recession and growth in freight activity is dampened due to the 
concentration of economic activity in the services sector. In the absence of policy to 
improve efficiency or to introduce biofuels, road freight emissions in 2020 are similar to 
2007. The consumption of energy in road public transport moves away from domination 
by taxis and towards bus. This sustainability scenario also sees a shift of passenger 
transport to rail. Intensity improvements are not as strong as historically in rail. Much 
infrastructure and modern locomotives were already operational early in the scenario 
and scope for further investment in technical efficiency is lower. The use of domestic 
aviation declines considerably during the recession and proves a catalyst for a trend 
break. Mobility patterns tend towards rail and bus and growth is slower than other 
modes.238 For the fuel tourism and unspecified sectors growth is modest. A weaker 
Sterling and the recession lead to less trade in fuel tourism and slow growth.  
 
The evolution of the residential sector is altered. House completions reduce 
considerably during the recession and despite population growth thereafter, new 
building projects are curbed. Housing and property reduce in cultural importance and 
household formation is affected. The design of new residential housing is in lower 
intensity forms with improved thermal performance and smaller floor areas. The fuel 
shares of residential energy see a growth in renewables, gas and electricity.  
 
The carbon emissions profile in 2020 is lower than in 2007. Although growth in energy 
consumption and emissions does occur, the drop in emissions occurring at the beginning 
of the scenario period has a sustained effect on the development pathway. The 
                                                 
238
 Empty planes running in the early years of the quantification period lead to efficiency losses. This is 
followed by improvements as the system recovers and streamlines scheduling. 
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modification of governance and society towards sustainability alters the relationship of 
economic and societal well-being with energy and emissions.  
 
Figure 6-2 Sectoral contribution to total CO2 scenario IE1 2007-2020 
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Table 6-5 Sectoral decomposition of energy CO2 scenario IE1 2007-2020 
 ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
Economic Sectors        
Industry 0.7318 1.0248 0.9153 0.7538 0.8340 1.3074 0.9492 
Commercial Services 1.0260 1.0707 0.9441 0.7581 1.1117 1.3076 0.9210 
Public Services 1.0159 1.0170 0.9964 0.9858 0.8297 1.3074 0.9375 
Agriculture 0.9120 1.0004 0.9654 0.9738 0.7648 1.3074 0.9699 
Transport Sectors ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
Private Car 0.9780 1.0000 0.9446 0.9570 0.9510 1.1376 1.0000 
Road Freight 1.0121 1.0000 1.0000 0.9574 0.9292 1.1376 1.0000 
Road Public 
Passenger 
1.4930 1.0000 1.0000 0.9923 1.3226 1.1376 1.0000 
Rail 0.9079 1.0571 1.0000 0.7262 1.1014 1.1377 0.9440 
Domestic Aviation 0.8006 1.0000 1.0000 1.0177 0.6914 1.1376 1.0000 
Fuel tourism and 
Unspecified 
1.1589 1.1589 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Residential Sector ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Chn  ∆Cemc 
Residential 1.0542 1.0010 0.9519 0.8621 1.3424 0.9561 1.0542 
Total ∆C total 
     
∆Crsd 
 
0.9679 
     
4.4409E-15 
        
6.4.2 Scenario IE2 
Scenario IE2 evolves with lower economic growth and stronger sustainability 
manifesting in governance, consumption patterns and lifestyle choices. In tandem, 
reduced prosperity leads to lower scope for technical efficiency with less investment 
capital. Economic growth is more moderate than in IE1. Economic development is also 
pursued in the services sector. Sustainability favours energy extensive economic 
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development and transport. It also favours decarbonisation of fuel consumption to lower 
CO2 fuels and renewables in the final consumption sectors. 
 
The demands of society with a weakened economy are a challenge in balancing 
government priorities. A bottom-up emphasis on change leads to strengthened 
grassroots activism, collective action and role for civil society. Good governance and 
synergies among policies are a priority of central government. This fosters socio-
institutional innovation towards a lower emissions trajectory. Environmental and 
political-education are used to counter social exclusion and change consumption 
patterns with a priority on well-being, community and lifestyle. Access to formal 
education is prioritised and public investment is directed for this purpose. Infrastructure 
and urban development are directed towards reducing transport demand and countering 
urban sprawl. Enhanced environmental regulation improves environmental quality. 
 
Electricity consumption increases at a slower rate in IE2. Coal and oil inputs decline in 
power generation, gas and renewables expand.239 Peat-fired generation is maintained for 
security of supply. The challenging economic circumstances are met with policies to 
expand the service sector. During economic recovery industry growth occurs in the less 
energy intensive branches. In the industry and commercial services sector, GVA growth 
is weak240 and significantly below historical growth rates. Industry energy intensity does 
not reduce at the same rate as in IE1, with less investment in technological change. 
Commercial services experience higher output growth than industry. Fuel shares evolve 
in a pattern similar to IE1. The effect of the recession is lasting and commercial services 
                                                 
239
 In the absence of additional policy wind and the other renewables expand in electricity generation only 
until 2012. 
 
240
 The growth rate is weaker than that described in the MTR (Fitzgerald et al., 2008). 
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emissions are lower in 2020 than in 2007. Public service output grows more slowly to 
2020, and agricultural economic activity does not recover from the recession by 2020.241 
  
A scenario of less affluence, and the effect of sustainability on governance and 
consumer trends, leads to limited increases in the demand for transport services. 
Passenger traffic growth is avoided by lifestyles and work arrangements that are 
decoupled from transport demand. Freight traffic is reduced by the economic 
development pattern favouring services and high-value industries. The lower output of 
industry leads to lower road freight activity downstream. Fleet replacement favours 
smaller engines. 
 
The influence of sustainability favours higher achievements in energy intensity but is 
also linked to wider economic health.  Transport energy intensity also improves where 
there is investment in fleet replacement to more efficient vehicles. Passenger traffic 
shifts towards public transport and away from private car, while biofuels reach 3.33% of 
fuel consumption in 2010. In a less affluent sustainability scenario, the link between 
wealth and car ownership/use is less. The cultural identity is less consumerist-
individualist and encourages diversion from consumer expenditure on transport.  
 
The consumption of energy in road public transport tends towards lower intensity with 
less growth in taxi passenger traffic. A shift of passenger transport to rail is favoured. 
Rail freight transport expands modestly in the absence of policy supports. An overall 
reduction in rail emissions occurs. The use of domestic aviation declines considerably 
during the recession and does not recover as a switch to rail and bus is favoured by 
                                                 
241
 Oil and electricity consumption reduce and renewables increase in the form of biomass. 
297 
 
passengers. For the fuel tourism and unspecified sectors growth is modest with less 
economic activity.  
 
In the residential sector, the economic downturn and slow recovery becomes evident in 
less house completions. Less population growth and prosperity requires less 
construction. This follows through in residential energy demand. Although 
sustainability encourages intensity improvements, there is less scope for capital 
investment in residential efficiency for space heating, water heating, household 
appliances and thermal performance of buildings. Residential fuel shares shift towards 
renewables, gas and electricity while oil declines. Existing heating technology is 
replaced more slowly.  
 
Energy consumption and carbon emissions increase at a slow rate in scenario IE2. 
Carbon emissions in 2020 are below IE1 due to the effect of the recession. Low activity 
growth and the manifestation of sustainability in the development path suppress 
emissions growth. 
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Figure 6-3 Sectoral contribution to total CO2 IE2 2007-2020 
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Table 6-6 Sectoral decomposition of energy CO2 scenario IE2 2007-2020 
 ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
Economic Sectors        
Industry 0.7370 1.0322 0.9378 0.7960 0.8818 1.1294 0.9604 
Commercial 
Services 0.9632 1.0739 0.9697 0.8093 1.0777 1.1296 0.9388 
Public Services 0.9898 1.0210 0.9975 0.9964 0.9072 1.1294 0.9519 
Agriculture 0.9129 1.0014 0.9922 0.9924 0.8393 1.1294 0.9768 
Transport Sectors ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
Private Car 0.9632 1.0000 0.9680 0.9800 0.9713 1.0454 1.0000 
Road Freight 0.9723 1.0000 1.0000 0.9746 0.9543 1.0454 1.0000 
Road Public 
Passenger 
1.2211 1.0000 1.0000 0.9791 1.1930 1.0454 1.0000 
Rail 0.8532 1.0549 1.0000 0.7441 1.0942 1.0455 0.9502 
Domestic Aviation 0.7841 1.0000 1.0000 1.0222 0.7337 1.0454 1.0000 
Fuel tourism and 
Unspecified 0.9717 0.9717 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Residential Sector ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Chn  ∆Cemc 
Residential 1.0298 1.0009 0.9738 0.8914 1.2271  0.9659 
Total ∆C total 
     
∆Crsd 
 
0.9317 
     
5.107E-15 
 
6.4.3 Scenario IE3 
Scenario IE3 is the weakest economic growth scenario where a robust recovery fails to 
take hold. Ireland’s open economy awaits an upturn in global growth which is 
dampened throughout the period. The evolution of governance and society is inclined to 
weaker sustainability. Consumption patterns and lifestyle choices are predisposed to 
higher energy consumption. Reduced prosperity leads to lower public and private 
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investment.242 Scarce resources increase competition and conflict. Less socially 
equitable outcomes are the dénouement. Government adopts a market driven top-down 
style. Democratic participation and community bottom-up actions are hampered. The 
three pillars of sustainable development; economy, social and environmental are 
vulnerable and subject to greater instability with rising social tensions. 
 
Social equity outcomes are downgraded in public discourse and social exclusion 
increases in this scenario. Scope for public investment is reduced, education and public 
services deteriorate, the response to economic hardship is individualist and collective 
action is weak. Governance evolves towards loosening restrictions on private enterprise 
and institutional capacity to effect social and environmental change lacks potence or 
coordination. Government intervention is shunned. A consumption based lifestyle 
favours the well-being of the affluent in an economically lean scenario. The 
development of the built environment is weakly regulated. The resulting development 
sprawls in urban and rural areas. This facilitates a closer link between increased 
mobility requirements and quality of life. 
 
Economic development seeks to maximise output growth and reduce unemployment. 
Growth is concentrated in industry regardless of energy intensity through delivering 
FDI, while growth in the services sector is low with stifled growth opportunities. Public 
services and agriculture experience low output growth and decline as a share of total 
economic activity in tandem with the services sector. Industry experiences lower 
intensity improvements with less emphasis on eco-efficiency243 or restructuring to 
                                                 
242
 This investment is directed in less socially and environmentally benign ventures delivering less energy 
intensity improvement and reduced policy synergy. 
 
243
 The technical and behavioural efficiency of industry for dematerialisation. 
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energy extensive branches. In this scenario coal expands as a cheaper fuel source in 
industry, oil declines and gas, renewables and electricity expand moderately. Despite 
the drift from sustainability, intensity improvement and weaker activity growth after the 
deep recession are sufficient to deliver a decline in industrial energy consumption and 
carbon emissions in IE3. 
 
The weaker economic activity in Ireland is characterised by the services sector. The 
effect of the recession dampens longer term growth and the resulting effects on energy 
consumption and carbon emissions have a lasting effect. Coal is maintained as a fuel 
share in this scenario, while gas, renewables and electricity grow. The recession and 
weak recovery give the commercial services sector a smaller emissions profile in 2020 
than in 2007. In the public services sector, weaker sustainability leads to an increase in 
emissions as energy intensity increases. The agriculture sector also does not improve 
energy intensity.244  
 
In IE3 power generation, fuel requirements are met by the maintenance of coal and oil 
and a slight increase in peat for security of supply.245 Weak incentives from the ETS 
provide a lower incentive to reduce carbon intensive fuels. Despite the weak economy 
the evolution of transport demand is predisposed to growth. Urban sprawl and transport 
intensive economic development results from weak regulation and reduces the 
competitiveness246 of the economy. Consumer choice, transport planning and the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
244
 The resultant emissions in 2020 are the same as in 2007 as oil and electricity increase while biomass 
experiences low growth. 
 
245
 Capros et al. (2008) explored an increase in power generation from solids i.e. coal and peat. 
 
246
 Higher energy costs can make the economy less competitive where the economy and energy 
consumption are not de-linked sufficiently. 
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preferences of the economic sectors tend towards road transport and away from public 
transport. Passenger traffic growth occurs in private cars in the world of IE3. 
Consumers favour larger engines and heavier cars while passenger occupancy falls. The 
continuing disimprovement in energy intensity leads to an increase in emissions.247  
 
A closer link between economic output and transport demands is observed. In a scenario 
of expanding industry, a growth in freight traffic occurs. Intensity does not improve as 
logistics and capacity utilisation are inefficient and emissions increase to 2020. Despite 
the restricted wealth creation in this scenario, mobility choice favours taxis over bus and 
coach. The road public passenger sector becomes more energy intensive. Rail traffic 
expands only modestly as road modes are favoured.248 A continuing increase in energy 
intensity of domestic aviation does lead to an increase in emission. Contractions in 
passenger numbers reduce the activity of this mode. Growth in the fuel tourism and the 
unspecified category are high in this scenario with increased cross-border and 
unspecified fuel sales.  
 
In the residential sector, the economic downturn and slow recovery becomes evident in 
less house completions. Lower population growth and softened consumer demand 
induce less than 21,000 house completions per annum from 2009-2020. The residential 
sector tends towards larger houses and lower thermal performance while appliance use 
increases. This is a low investment low sustainability scenario where emissions in 2020 
tend to increase. Technological change through fuel switching and renewables is lower 
and behavioural aspects are more profligate. 
 
                                                 
247
 Biofuels make limited in-roads into fuel share. 
 
248
 In the absence of additional policy supports rail declines. 
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Energy consumption and carbon emissions increase at a slow rate in this scenario. 
Although underlying conditions are ripe for a higher emissions trajectory, weak activity 
induces a dampened growth in emissions. This is a scenario of lower intensity 
improvements, lower decarbonisation and less priority on sustainability across society 
and governance.  
 
Figure 6-4 Sectoral contribution to total CO2 IE3 2007-2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
Industry Services
Public services Agriculture
Private Car Road Freight
Public Passenger Rail
Domestic aviation Fuel tourism and unspecified
Residential
kt
CO
2 
304 
 
Table 6-7 Sectoral decomposition of energy CO2 scenario IE3 2007-2020 
 
∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
Economic Sectors        
Industry 0.9429 1.0170 0.9965 0.8186 1.1036 1.0467 0.9839 
Commercial 
Services 0.9199 1.0449 0.9901 0.9207 0.9465 1.0466 0.9749 
Public Services 1.0619 1.0302 0.9984 1.0455 0.9632 1.0467 0.9795 
Agriculture 1.0083 1.0058 0.9954 1.0441 0.9309 1.0467 0.9900 
Transport Sectors ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
Private Car 1.0950 1.0000 0.9778 1.0769 0.9626 1.0802 1.0000 
Road Freight 1.1912 1.0000 1.0000 1.0232 1.0778 1.0802 1.0000 
Road Public 
Passenger 
1.3759 1.0000 1.0000 1.2193 1.0447 1.0802 1.0000 
Rail 0.8216 1.0485 1.0000 0.8418 0.8967 1.0802 0.9610 
Domestic Aviation 0.8153 1.0000 1.0000 1.0948 0.6894 1.0802 1.0000 
Fuel tourism and 
Unspecified 1.1662 1.1662 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Residential Sector ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Chn  ∆Cemc 
Residential 1.0735 1.0003 0.9889 0.9143 1.2041  0.9857 
Total ∆C total 
     
∆Crsd 
 
1.0461 
     
4.88498E-15 
 
6.4.4 Scenario IE4 
Scenario IE4 is the most robust economic scenario249. A vigorous economic recovery in 
2011 is driven primarily by industrial manufacturing. In this scenario, sustainability is 
weak across governance and society. High economic growth is paramount and social 
                                                 
249
 This scenario is economically robust in the sense of the strength and vigour of the economic growth 
unfolding. The rate of economic growth in IE4 is stronger than that of the other scenarios while it is not 
proposed as any more likely. 
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and environmental goals are given less importance. Intensity improvements are 
nonetheless facilitated by output increases and capital for investment in technology 
replacement. The reduced priority on sustainability stimulates less decarbonisation of 
fuel shares or penetration of renewable energy. Decision-making is top-down, but light 
regulation and a weakened role for government is favoured. Social exclusion and 
income inequality receive little attention and impaired social equity results. There is a 
propensity for higher consumption leading to a closer link between economic growth 
and energy. Although the high economic growth of the 1990’s is not achieved, high 
growth in energy and emissions occurs. The absence of societal or governance shifts to 
sustainability fails to dilute the energy-economy relationship. The lifestyle is 
consumerist-individualist and personal identity is expressed through the perception of 
wealth. 
 
As Ireland returns to a higher rate of development of the built environment, urban 
sprawl expands with dispersed development. Government investment prioritises road 
infrastructure. Institutional capacity is weakened by the failure of participation in 
decision-making and the role of civil society is peripheral. Policy is poorly integrated 
and synergies are not delivered. Environmental regulation is weak and environmental 
quality deteriorates with increasing pressures and higher resource use. Concerns for 
economic competitiveness grow. 
 
Output growth in this scenario is more concentrated in industry which achieves a high 
economic growth rate in the recovery period.250 In the interests of returning to a high 
growth path, the economic development model seeks to increase industrial output across 
                                                 
250
 The industry growth rate in this scenario is higher than that projected by Fitzgerald et al. (2008). 
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the board. This occurs not only in high-value added energy extensive branches but in 
more energy intensive branches also. Consumption of most fuel types increases, 
including gas, electricity and renewables but also coal and oil. The consumption of peat 
contracts through modernisation. A weaker ETS fails to discourage growth in coal and 
oil but does contribute to the reduction in peat. Energy intensity improvements do 
accompany the output growth, but total scale growth drives up industry emissions above 
the 2007 level. 
 
The service sector does not grow sufficiently to increase emissions and the 2020 level is 
approximately the same as 2007 due to the effect of the recession at the start of the 
decade. Modernisation of the sector occurs to more ‘convenient’ fuel types; gas, 
renewables and electricity grow, while coal is maintained and oil declines. Under this 
scenario, investment is made in renewables where cost effective. 
 
Growth in public services activity remains low. In the fuel shares of public services gas 
and electricity expand. The failure to improve energy intensity leads to a growth in 
emissions to 2020. Agriculture receives low priority in economic development and 
activity growth is the lowest of the scenarios. The weak sustainability leads to an 
increase in agricultural energy intensity. 
 
In electricity generation, demand is met by the maintenance of peat and oil although 
coal contracts as a primary fuel and peat is maintained for security of supply as an 
indigenous fuel. Growth in renewables stalls in 2012 in the absence of a supportive 
policy regime.  
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IE4 is a scenario of expansion in transport demand. Consumers seek enhanced mobility 
for all purposes while the economic sectors seek an expansion of freight activities in 
trade. Spatial development patterns continue to sprawl. In this scenario well-being is 
linked to increasing transport demand, while consumers favour the private car not only 
for its flexibility but as a status symbol of wealth. Car ownership continues to increase 
while the national car fleet gets heavier and engine sizes increase. Vehicle distances also 
increase for work mobility, access to services and leisure. Biofuels increase slowly in 
replacing conventional fuels. The expansion of industry output in this scenario is tightly 
linked with growth in road freight. There is no modal switch back to rail and 
inefficiencies in the road freight sector continue due to low capacity utilisation and large 
engine sizes. The lack of progress in intensity coupled with scale growth leads to a 
significant increase in road freight emissions. 
  
The enhanced consumer spending power of IE4 coupled with a predilection for private 
transport over public leads to increased use of taxis and increased energy intensity in the 
road public passenger mode.251 IE4 is a scenario of low demand for rail services as the 
countries road network are the primary transport arteries. Rail emissions drop by 2020 
with minor technical improvements decreasing energy intensity. The falls in domestic 
aviation passenger numbers over the recession recover from 2012 but by 2020 have not 
fully recovered to 2007 levels. 
 
In IE4 both the unspecified and fuel tourism categories expand. Higher demand for 
services provided by the unspecified category coincides with growth in fuel tourism due 
to a continued imbalance in fuel prices across the border with Northern Ireland.  
                                                 
251
 As discussed in Chapter 4, this mode includes bus, coach, taxi and hackney. 
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In this scenario the expression of consumer identity is evident in the development of the 
residential sector. Consumers seek larger houses, higher thermal comfort levels and 
increased use of appliances. The awareness of and concern for energy efficiency is low. 
The buoyant economy and rising population sees a return to investment in housing. 
House completions increase as construction recovers in 2012252. An improvement in 
energy intensity is recorded as investments for comfort are made. A modernisation 
towards cleaner fuels sees coal and peat decline while gas, renewables, electricity and 
oil all expand to meet increased demand in the residential sector.  
 
Scenario IE4 retains a strong link between societal well-being, economic performance 
and energy consumption. Technical efficiencies are achieved but decarbonisation of fuel 
shares and renewable energy penetration are dampened. While not increasing at the rate 
experienced historically, the effect on total emissions is an evolution of continued 
growth and lock-in to a higher emissions pathway. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
252
 This is a scenario of strong economic and population growth both of these factors would tend to 
increase house construction rates. Historically Ireland experienced relatively high rates of housing 
construction. In terms of “private households in permanent housing units” or the number of occupied 
dwellings these increased by a minimum of just under eleven thousand in the year to end of 1991 to just 
under fifty thousand in the year to end of 2007. While future numbers are highly uncertain and are 
dependent on such factors as those described above, the ESRI MTR predicted demand for housing to 
remain strong at forty eight thousand per annum from 2010-2020 (Fitzgerald et al., 2008: 57). Scenario 
IE4 explores a high rate of house construction that leads to a maximum of fifty five thousand additional 
houses per annum from 2012-2015. This is comparable to the MTR prediction with an average of just 
under forty six thousand additional houses per annum in the eleven years from 2010 to the end of 2020. 
The strong growth in this scenario is attributable to stronger economic and population growth and a close 
relationship of the development path with housing construction. It explores what appears to be the upper 
range of what may be plausible to 2020 given the advent of the recession. 
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Figure 6-5 Sectoral contribution to total CO2 IE4 2007-2020 
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Table 6-8 Sectoral decomposition of energy CO2 scenario IE4 2007-2020 
 
∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
Economic Sectors        
Industry 1.2434 1.0092 1.0033 0.7693 1.2132 1.3650 0.9638 
Commercial 
Services 1.0015 1.0757 0.9851 0.8160 0.9027 1.3644 0.9403 
Public Services 1.0478 1.0391 0.9978 1.0214 0.7613 1.3650 0.9521 
Agriculture 1.0635 1.0012 0.9953 1.0593 0.7551 1.3650 0.9774 
Transport Sectors ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
Private Car 1.3058 1.0000 0.9790 1.1223 0.9022 1.3173 1.0000 
Road Freight 1.6799 1.0000 1.0000 1.0288 1.2396 1.3173 1.0000 
Road Public 
Passenger 
1.8338 1.0000 1.0000 1.3836 1.0062 1.3173 1.0000 
Rail 0.8973 1.0394 1.0000 0.8265 0.8340 1.3173 0.9508 
Domestic Aviation 0.9446 1.0000 1.0000 1.0897 0.6580 1.3173 1.0000 
Fuel tourism and 
Unspecified 1.5667 1.5667 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Residential Sector ∆C total ∆Cffse  ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Chn  ∆Cemc 
Residential 1.1864 1.0072 0.9781 0.8951 1.3917  0.9667 
Total ∆C total 
     
∆Crsd 
 
1.2629 
     
5.10703E-15 
 
 
6.4.5 Sectoral scenario synthesis 
The sectoral scenarios illustrate a range of plausible outcomes to 2020. They are not 
intended to be viewed as predictions or forecasts. The scenarios explore divergence in 
the evolution of energy carbon emissions to 2020 and do not rely on historical patterns 
or existing projections but are cognisant of them. Viewing ‘accuracy’ or ‘prediction’ of 
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individual years is not intended by the scenarios but to discern patterns of potential 
developments and the range of outcomes resulting. The scenarios illustrate distinct 
quantitative and qualitative differences in the change occurring. This is illustrated in the 
absolute totals of activity, energy and consequent emissions, but also the pattern of the 
underlying evolution that leads to change. Both the historical DA and the scenario 
results illustrate the importance of economic growth in determining future emissions. 
Nevertheless, the nature of development e.g. from the type of economic activity to the 
description of lifestyle, illustrate the significance of other driving forces interlinked with 
economic growth to contextualise and characterise its affect on emissions. Inter-sectoral 
and intra-sectoral shifts can lower the intensity of economic development.  
 
Using the concept of plasticity (York et al., 2002), while examining the results of the 
scenarios suggests that no single effect is more important, but different effects can 
present different potentials for change and different levels of malleability by policy. 
Using the framework of the scenarios this includes the graduation to stronger 
sustainability in society and governance. Using the sustainability concept of Tapio et al. 
(2007: 436), delinking via immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation is 
relevant in terms of the range of scenario outcomes. Delinking can either be relative or 
absolute. Relative delinking in e.g. (Cint) sees improvement in energy intensity but does 
not lead to an absolute drop in energy consumption which would be absolute delinking. 
The range of outcomes observed through the scenarios document relative but not an 
absolute delinking. Once the post recession recovery occurs, emissions begin to rise 
once more in all scenarios (Figure 6-6). 
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Figure 6-6 Trajectories of sectoral scenario energy CO2 2007-2020 
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futures.253 The key to levels of progress in intensity is the manifestation of sustainability 
in the development path through the decisions of governance and society. The logics of 
the scenarios in terms of the scenario axes can be seen in the emissions totals and 
underlying effects manifesting throughout the evolution of the development path. 
Economic growth acts towards scale growth in activity and thereby emissions, while 
structural effects in the economic and transport sectors can evolve towards lower or 
higher emissions trajectories based on the change in share.254 The decarbonisation of 
energy via the (Cffse) and (Crepe) effects is predisposed to more rapid progress under the 
stronger sustainability scenarios (IE1 and IE2), and this is also relevant with the 
intensity effect (Cint). 
 
Specifically in terms of economic growth the scenarios vary according to the depth of 
the recession, the rate of recovery and the growth rate to 2020. A range of growth 
patterns is explored under the four scenarios, rather than exploring the same growth 
through the strong and weak economy scenarios, allowing a range of outcomes to be 
explored. Economic growth is weakest in IE3 though the intention is not to definitively 
state that lower economic growth evolves through lower sustainability.255 
Concomitantly, IE4 is the strongest growth scenario, but this does not preclude the same 
                                                 
253
 This effect can capture socio-economic behaviour as well as technical efficiency. From another 
perspective it can capture both immaterialisation (decoupling of material production and consumption 
from economic production) and dematerialisation (eco-efficiency) see Tapio et al. (2007). 
 
254
 These are qualitative aspects of development. 
 
255
 In some contexts lower economic growth could be associated with lower sustainability through 
interlinked drivers where e.g. environmental damage weakens the productive base of the economy. A 
more vulnerable society and environment could hamper competitiveness and growth potential. 
Concomitantly, weaker sustainability could deliver economic growth even though it could potentially be 
short-term, resource-intensive, and polluting. 
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growth rate occurring in IE1,256 the other strong economic growth scenario. The 
objective is to examine a wide emissions envelope, while remaining plausible.  
 
The underlying nature of economic growth also varies according to the sustainability 
logic of the scenario. The stronger sustainability scenarios (IE1 and IE2) tend towards 
growth in services and energy extensive branches in the economic sectors. In the weaker 
sustainability scenarios (IE3 and IE4) economic growth tends towards growth in 
industry and more energy intensive branches. Economic growth remains a key driver of 
emissions growth, but it is the underlying disposition of society to sustainability that 
dictates the emissions trajectory in response to this growth. As described by Agnolucci 
et al. (2009: 1663), “environmentally responsible behaviour” can influence all the ratios 
in a Kaya identity. In keeping with the philosophy of scenarios and DA, economic 
growth must be seen in the context of the other drivers of emissions and the various 
causalities and contexts in which it occurs. The growth rates defined do not explore 
economic stagnancy from a prolonged economic depression. For the purposes of the 
scenarios this has been judged a wildcard of low probability.  
 
Sustainability as a driver may be described as abstract, as the effect on emissions is 
vertical and horizontal,257 quantitative and qualitative. Sustainability can be tangibly 
seen in the intensity effects. More intangibly, sustainability would tend to act towards 
modifying the development path across all driving forces. This could occur through not 
only governance, technological choices and infrastructure, but also the underlying 
economic development model and the culture of society. This is represented in the 
                                                 
256
 A sustainability scenario may have higher growth potential as the human and environmental 
productive base is protected and potentially enhanced. 
 
257
 It could be described as vertical where it has an affect on absolute change in emissions, sectoral 
activity etc. but also horizontal in its qualitative affect across all driving forces. 
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scenarios in governance decision-making and style, but also in the patterns of 
consumption of society which are of critical relevance to future emissions trajectories. 
The exploration of sustainability within the scenarios is towards evolution rather than 
revolution. For plausibility, it does not involve a radical shift in society in the time 
frame to 2020, but does explore evolution in distinctly different directions. 
 
In the context of sustainability, it is not assumed that there is only one path to the 
process (Toth et al., 2001: 637). Scenarios IE1 and IE2 explore plausible visions of a 
graduation to stronger sustainability but may or may not be ‘sustainable’ in the long 
term. A definitive statement on ‘sustainability’ or otherwise of the development path is 
outside of the scope of the research. In scenario IE3 a lower emissions trajectory results 
due to a weak economy regardless of its disposition towards sustainability. It is a 
scenario of potential emissions growth on a higher trajectory, if economic growth and 
activity growth accelerates. The underlying conditions for emissions growth rather than 
reduction are further embedded as potential manifestations of lock-in. In contrast to the 
growth patterns of scenarios IE1, IE2 and IE3, which cover the lower range of 
emissions trajectories, scenario IE4 exhibits high emissions growth due to robust 
economic growth accompanied by limited progress in effects acting to reduce 
emissions.  
 
The context of IE4 yields potential insights for plausible evolutions of emissions in 
Ireland, but also methodologically for scenario analysis. Higher intensity improvement 
can be facilitated by higher output growth (Diakoulaki and Mandaraka, 2007: 646), and 
can be attributed to increased capital for investment in technology replacement. The 
diffusion of more efficient or fuel-switching technology can be contingent on this 
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capital. Ceteris paribus, the general disposition of IE4 would be towards a reduced 
improvement in Cint as a weaker sustainability scenario, than that which would occur 
with stronger sustainability to maximise Cint improvement. This apparent conflict 
illustrates the existence of potential trends and counter-trends in the scenarios (Postma 
and Liebl, 2005:169) and cautions against the rigid application of the internal 
consistency criterion of scenario analysis.258 A simple interpretation of internal 
consistency would suggest the uni-dimensional depiction of lower rates of intensity 
improvement under a lower sustainability scenario.  Alternatively, a holistic view would 
encourage the examination of other plausible outcomes based on a consideration of 
multi-dimensional drivers which may compliment, compete or feedback in effect. This 
can deliver more fully on the plausibility criterion of scenario analysis. 
 
The development of multiple driving forces is documented within the scenarios to 
enhance the depiction and exploration of the future world. For example, governance, 
social and cultural drivers are documented and contextualise sustainability from an 
abstract driving force to a more tangible manifestation. The objective is primarily to 
support exploration as scientific inquiry, but also for communication through narrative 
description. 
 
6.4.6 Energy intensity 
In varying the decomposition ratios to quantify future carbon emissions under the four 
scenarios, once scale and structural shares of activity are determined, changes in energy 
intensity primarily drive differences in the results. Due to its importance in energy and 
                                                 
258
 This existence of trend and counter-trend represents the complexity of the system and of the 
interaction of driving forces. 
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emissions scenarios and in reducing carbon emissions, energy intensity improvement is 
the subject of much debate in the literature. Hanaoka et al. (2009) proposed that it is 
particularly important in the short term, in keeping with the Fourth Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 2007). Hanaoka et al. documented an energy intensity improvement across the 
economy of around 2% per annum to 2050. This analysis is in the context of global 
stabilisation scenarios seeking to reduce carbon emissions and heterogeneous regions. It 
would also be subject to significant sectoral variations. Preceding this, the SRES 
proposed energy intensity improvement of 0.57% to 2.18% per annum to 2100 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000).  
 
The effect of the recession on energy intensity improvement interrupts the process of 
continued achievement of intensity decline in the scenarios. Using the macro scenarios 
(see below), results vary from decline of 1.53% pa in IE1, 0.97% pa in IE2 and 0.34% 
p.a. in IE4.  In IE3, there is a 1.57% (0.12% pa) increase in energy intensity to 2020. 
While the intensity increase in scenario IE3 may appear anomalous, the rapid 
technological replacement and infrastructural build of the historical period is followed 
by stagnancy up to 2020 in this scenario. Significant investment has already been made. 
Lock-in may have occurred and scope for further investment is limited. In scenario IE3 
development tends to occur in industry rather than services and in more energy 
intensive transport modes. Ireland is anomalous in its development in many respects, 
including; the rate of economic growth in the historical period, the depth of the 
recession in the economy and the pattern of recovery in various activities. It is the 
underlying intensity effects in the sectoral results which primarily elucidate the 
variance. 
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It is important to note that improvements in energy intensity can be attributed not only 
to end-use technical energy efficiency improvements (for example derived from 
technological replacement) but to savings derived from structural changes in lifestyles 
and the economy (Hanaoka et al., 2009: 99). For example, this is reflected in the 
historical results for private cars where technical efficiency was swamped by lifestyle 
factors. It can also be seen in the weak sustainability scenarios IE3 and IE4. This pattern 
underlies the scenarios. Sectoral energy intensity declines are associated with the 
stronger sustainability scenarios IE1 and IE2. 
 
In order to further document the changes in input values the following tables 6-9, 6-10, 
6-11 and 6-12 explain the variations that arise within the sectors of each scenario. As 
discussed in chapter three, the key variables in the quantitative modelling process are 
the activity and intensity variables. Initially, change in activity and fuel shares have 
been assumed within each sector under the logics of each scenario. The consumption of 
each fuel share was then iteratively amended until the TFC reached an assumed 
intensity change within each sector also consistent with the logics of the scenario. The 
change in activity, fuel shares and resulting TFC and the logic of these are documented 
within the scenario narratives and supporting tables. Seeking to explain the evolution of 
all input values and effects annually would result in a lengthy morass. In the interests of 
ease of understanding the following tables serves to explain the logics of the evolution 
of the relationship between activity and TFC by the change in the energy intensity of the 
sectors.  
 
The fuel tourism and unspecified sectors do not have intensity measures. They are 
assumed on the basis of change in TFC and are documented within the scenario 
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narrative. While all rates of change presented are in Compound Annual Growth Rate 
model inputs and results vary annually including e.g. the impact of the recession. For 
deeper analysis the narrative scenarios must be viewed in conjunction with the 
quantitative results detailed below and in Appendix VII. It is worth noting once more 
that the quantitative changes observed are intended to be consistent with the logics of 
the scenario and are not predictions. 
 
Table 6-9 Sectoral energy intensity change in scenario IE1 and discussion of input assumptions 
 
Sector Discussion  
Industry The much lower activity growth in industry than historically is associated with 
less structural change and consequently less intensity improvement. The 
average annual intensity improvement historically was -4.96% pa. Sustainability 
drives some activity growth in less energy intensive branches and also 
dematerialisation but in this scenario the significant rate of improvement reduces 
to a more tempered -2.15% pa. This is less than Capros et al, (2008) which 
projected -2.4% per annum before the recession. 
 
Commercial 
services 
Services grow strongly in this scenario particularly in energy extensive branches. 
An economically stronger scenario with sustainability influencing the 
development path leads to higher capital investment in technological 
replacement, higher dematerialisation and consequently higher intensity 
improvement. Historically commercial services intensity declined by -1.91% pa, 
in this scenario this is increased to -2.11% pa. 
 
Public 
services 
This sector was relatively static in intensity historically increasing on average by 
<0.01% pa over the period. In the absence of additional policy the influence of 
sustainability leads to a minor decrease in intensity of -0.11% pa in IE1.  
 
Agriculture Historically the intensity of the agriculture sector increased by 0.29% pa. In IE1 a 
minor decline of -0.20% pa results from dematerialisation due to the influence of 
sustainability but remains minor in the absence of additional policy. 
 
Road 
private car 
The historical change in intensity was 1.02% pa. In this scenario sustainability 
encourages smaller engine size and higher occupancy leading to a reduction in 
the energy intensity of the private car mode of -0.34% pa. In the absence of 
additional policy this is not significant but does lead to a change in the direction 
of intensity change. 
 
Road 
Freight 
The historical pattern in road freight was an increase in intensity of 0.31% pa. 
Under scenario IE1 the factors leading to this increase are somewhat offset 
although not significantly in the absence of policy. Intensity declines by -0.33% 
pa as the efficient use of fuel becomes more central to operational decisions 
reducing such factors as empty running and low load. 
 
Road public 
passenger 
The historical pattern of growth in intensity of 2.26% pa originated primarily from 
the increase in the use of SPSV’s following liberalisation and the affluence of 
consumers that coincided. In this scenario initial increases are followed by 
declines in intensity as SPSV’s reach a saturation point and modal switch 
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reverses while technical efficiency improves. Energy intensity decreases on 
average -0.06% pa over the entire period given the initial increases.  
 
Rail Rail freight and rail passenger activity expand in IE1 as a scenario associated 
with efficient public transport. This significantly densifies services to further 
improve intensity while rail logistics and operations are also improved. 
Historically intensity declined by -2.73% pa and in this scenario intensity 
declines by -2.43% pa attributable to dematerialisation rather than the structural 
change away from freight which occurred historically.  
 
Domestic 
aviation 
The historical intensity change was a growth of 1.84% pa. Intensity increases 
marginally in the absence of additional policy by 0.14% pa. Increased emphasis 
on sustainability leads to less intensity increase despite some low capacity 
utilisation occurring during the recession. 
 
Residential Historically intensity declined by -0.84% pa. In this sustainability scenario there 
is higher investment in thermal performance and technology, smaller floor areas 
of new housing and less electricity consumption from appliance use leading to 
an intensity decline of -1.14% pa. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-10 Sectoral energy intensity change in scenario IE2 and discussion of input assumptions 
 
Sector Discussion  
Industry The activity growth in industry in IE2 is lower than IE1. There is less structural 
change and consequently less intensity improvement. The average annual 
intensity improvement historically was -4.96% per annum. Sustainability 
encourages immaterialisation and dematerialisation as in IE1 but the impact of 
the recession and weak activity growth lowers capital investment in 
technological change and hampers the rate of improvement to -1.74% per 
annum. Under this scenario weak industry growth rates lead to much slower 
intensity improvements.  
 
Commercial 
services 
Services grow less strongly in this scenario although sustainability encourages 
intensity improvement. Historically, commercial services intensity declined by -
1.91% pa while in this economically weakened scenario this declines to -1.61% 
pa. 
 
Public 
services 
This sector was relatively static in intensity historically increasing on average by 
<0.01% pa over the period. The influence of sustainability leads to a minor 
decrease in intensity of -0.03% pa in IE2 but less than the economically stronger 
IE1. 
 
Agriculture Historically the intensity of the agriculture sector increased by 0.29% pa. In IE2 a 
minor decline of -0.06% pa results from dematerialisation due to the influence of 
sustainability. This is less than IE1 due to dampened technological change. 
 
Road 
private car 
The historical change in intensity was 1.02% pa. In this scenario sustainability 
encourages smaller engine size and higher occupancy leading to a reduction in 
the energy intensity of the private car mode of -0.16% pa. In contrast to IE1 
there are less new car purchases and consequently the engine size profile is 
slower to change. 
 
Road 
Freight 
The historical pattern in road freight was an increase in intensity of 0.31% pa. 
Under scenario IE2 dematerialisation takes effect but not to the same level as 
IE1. Overall activity is lower and fleet replacement does occur but is more 
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restricted by the weak economy than in IE1 leading to a decline in intensity of -
0.20% pa. 
 
Road public 
passenger 
The historical pattern of growth in intensity of 2.26% is followed by an 
improvement in IE2. This is greater than IE1 as less affluence discourages use 
of SPSV’s. In this scenario initial increases also occur followed by declines in 
intensity on average -0.16% pa over the entire period given the initial increases. 
 
Rail The outcome in scenario IE2 is similar to that in IE1 but with less intensity 
improvement. Scale effects are smaller in this scenario and are associated with 
less intensity decline despite sustainability. While investment is lower, the cost 
minimisation induced in an economically weak scenario induces efficiencies in 
rail logistics and operations. Historically intensity declined by -2.73% pa and in 
this scenario intensity declines by -2.25% pa. 
 
Domestic 
aviation 
The historical intensity change was a growth of 1.84% pa. Intensity increases 
marginally in the absence of additional policy by 0.17% pa. This is marginally 
higher than IE1 as the recession is deeper and there is less technological 
change. 
 
Residential Historically intensity declined by -0.84% pa. In this sustainability scenario there 
is less scope for investment in thermal performance and technology than IE1. 
Intensity is similar to the historical trend declining -0.88% pa through the 
sustainability orientation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-11 Sectoral energy intensity change in scenario IE3 and discussion of input assumptions 
 
Sector Discussion  
Industry The activity growth in industry in IE3 is low due to the weak economy. In tandem 
industrial production tends towards more energy intensive branches due to a 
weaker orientation to sustainability. Both of these drivers lead to reduced 
improvement in energy intensity where there is less immaterialisation and 
dematerialisation. The weakest energy intensity decline of the scenarios is 
recorded at -1.53% per annum significantly less than the historical rate of -
4.96% pa. 
 
Commercial 
services 
Services grow weakly in this scenario and weaker sustainability encourages less 
intensity improvement. Historically commercial services intensity declined by -
1.91% pa while in this economically weakened scenario this reduces to -0.63% 
pa. 
 
Public 
services 
This sector was relatively static in intensity historically increasing on average by 
<0.01% pa over the period. This is a scenario of weak economy and 
sustainability. This leads to a slight increase in intensity of 0.34% pa as energy 
intensity is of low priority. 
 
Agriculture Historically the intensity of the agriculture sector increased by 0.29% pa. In IE3 
this increases to 0.33% pa. Dematerialisation does not occur as economic 
growth and sustainability are weak. 
 
Road 
private car 
The historical change in intensity was 1.02% pa. Intensity increases under this 
scenario but not as quickly as historically. While engine efficiency improves the 
replacement of the car fleet tends to be in larger engine sizes and car 
occupancy tends to drop further.  Energy intensity increases by 0.57% pa as 
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less affluence leads to slower car replacement while mobility is prized 
individually and reduces occupancy. 
 
Road 
Freight 
The historical pattern in road freight was an increase in intensity of 0.31% pa. In 
scenario IE3 intensity continues to increase but at a slower rate as industrial 
activity is dampened providing some minor financial incentive for freight 
operators to improve. Nevertheless, empty running and logistical issues continue 
and energy intensity increases by 0.18% pa. 
 
Road public 
passenger 
The historical pattern of growth in intensity of 2.26% pa is followed by a further 
increase in IE3. The weak sustainability orientation of the scenario leads to 
further increases in the use of SPSV’s and consequent intensity increase but 
later in the period minor reductions occur as SPSV’s have reached saturation 
due to the effect of reduced affluence. Energy intensity increases by 1.54% pa. 
  
Rail This scenario is less associated with public transport and experiences low 
activity growth and consequently efficiencies are less. Weak sustainability also 
leads to less focus on operational efficiency and technological replacement is 
minimised in a weak economy. Historically, intensity declined by -2.73% pa and 
in this scenario intensity declines by -1.32% pa. 
 
Domestic 
aviation 
This weak sustainability scenario is associated with higher activity growth in 
domestic aviation. The historical intensity change was a growth of 1.84% pa. In 
this scenario intensity increases by 0.70% pa. Dropping passenger numbers 
lead to low capacity utilisation and intensity increase early in the scenario. This 
is followed by streamlining to reduce costs leading to intensity declines later in 
the scenario. 
 
Residential Historically intensity declined by -0.84% pa. In this weak sustainability scenario 
there is less investment in thermal performance and technology and any new 
housing tends towards larger floor areas and detached by design. The trend 
towards higher comfort levels and appliance use continues. Intensity 
improvement is less than the historical trend declining -0.69% pa. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-12 Sectoral energy intensity change in scenario IE4 and discussion of input assumptions 
 
Sector Discussion 
Industry The strongest activity growth in industry is recorded in this scenario. This tends 
to improve energy intensity with technological change. Higher scale growth also 
tends to be associated with higher rates of energy intensity decline. This is co-
occurrent with a weaker focus on sustainability tending to tempered 
improvement including reduced restructuring of industry. Energy intensity is 
consequently intermediate of IE1 and IE2 at -2.00% pa. 
 
Commercial 
services 
Services grow more strongly in this scenario and while weaker sustainability 
encourages less intensity improvement there is dematerialisation arising from 
technological change. Historically commercial services intensity declined by -
1.91% pa, in this scenario this reduces to -1.55% pa. This is less than Capros et 
al, (2008) 0f -2.2% albeit in an industry oriented scenario and with the impact of 
a recession, while Capros also aggregated services and agriculture. 
 
Public 
services 
This sector was relatively static in intensity historically increasing on average by 
<0.01% pa over the period. This is a scenario of weak economy and 
sustainability. This leads to a slight increase in intensity of 0.16% pa. While 
energy intensity is of low priority there is a higher rate of technological 
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replacement than IE3 due to the stronger economy leading to a smaller intensity 
increase. 
 
Agriculture Historically the intensity of the agriculture sector increased by 0.29% pa. In IE4 
this increases to 0.44% pa. Dematerialisation is weaker than IE3 as 
sustainability is weak and the energy intensity of activity is a peripheral concern. 
 
Road 
private car 
The historical change in intensity was 1.02% pa. Intensity increases under this 
scenario at a greater rate than IE3 but not as quickly as historically. Concomitant 
to engine efficiency improvement, the affluence of the scenario and the 
orientation towards sustainability leads to the replacement of the fleet with 
heavier cars with larger engines. Car occupancy also drops further as affluence 
facilitates increased individualisation of transport and energy intensity increases 
by 0.89% pa. 
 
Road 
Freight 
The historical pattern in road freight was an increase in intensity of 0.31% pa. In 
scenario IE4 intensity continues to increase more than IE3 but less than 
historically. Energy intensity of freight activities continue as peripheral concerns 
with large engine sizes and low load factors common and intensity increases by 
0.22% pa. 
Road public 
passenger 
The historical pattern of growth in intensity of 2.26% pa is followed by a further 
increase in IE4. The weak sustainability orientation of the scenario leads in 
tandem with affluence to further increases in the use of SPSV’s and larger 
engine sizes. There is also less investment in fleet replacement in the bus and 
coach category. Energy intensity increases by 2.53% pa similar to the higher 
rate of increase observed from 2001-2007. 
 
Rail This scenario is less associated with public transport and less modal switch but 
is more affluent and is associated with higher investment in technological 
change. Intensity improvement is less than the sustainability scenarios but more 
than IE3. Historically intensity declined by -2.73% pa and in this scenario 
intensity declines by -1.45% pa. 
 
Domestic 
aviation 
This weak sustainability scenario is associated with higher activity growth. 
Historical intensity change was a growth of 1.84% pa. In this scenario intensity 
increases by 0.66% pa as it is not as profligate as historically. A similar pattern 
to IE3 emerges but there is less reduction in passenger numbers in the early 
years and consequently less intensity increase.  
 
Residential Historically intensity declined by -0.84% pa. In this affluent scenario there is 
increased investment in thermal performance and technology but new housing 
tends towards larger floor areas and detached design. The trend towards higher 
comfort levels and appliance use continues. Intensity improvement is on 
average similar to the historical trend declining -0.85% pa. 
 
 
 
6.4.7 Relationship across the scenarios 
A sectoral analysis across the scenarios illustrates that the stronger sustainability 
scenarios deliver reduced scale growth and increased intensity improvements, while 
structural shifts to less energy intensive economic activity and transport mode occur. In 
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the weaker sustainability scenarios, transport increases its emissions through higher 
scale growth259 and intensity continues to increase in various sectors. In the residential 
sector, increasing house numbers are problematic as a scale effect, and significant 
intensity improvement or decarbonisation would be required to prevent emissions 
increases. 
 
Technology appears to show the evolution of both trends and counter-trends. Stronger 
economic growth scenarios would tend to have a higher efficiency improvement 
through investment in technology replacement. Stronger sustainability can also 
potentially encourage faster replacement of technology and more rapid delinking. The 
example of the private car is useful in elucidating this phenomenon in the scenarios. A 
purchase of a private car in scenario IE1 verses IE4 would tend to be smaller and have a 
smaller engine. The more buoyant economy in scenario IE4 would suggest higher 
technological replacement but in heavier, larger engine size. The pattern in IE1 is 
evidence of evolution as opposed to revolution and would be more plausible. 
 
The influence of sustainability is particularly salient with scenario IE3. Despite a lower 
economic growth rate than IE1 and IE2, emissions are higher in this scenario and 
emissions trajectories cross over (see Figure 6-6). This illustrates that potential higher 
emissions trajectories from economic growth can become lower through sustainability 
(IE1). Interdependencies and interlinkages are evident. Taking the economic example, 
economic growth can facilitate higher population growth and in concert higher scale 
growth pressures, while it can also facilitate higher improvements in energy and carbon 
intensity. Alternative evolutions of the system depend on a myriad of factors underlying 
                                                 
259
 As less immaterialisation occurs due to further urban sprawl. 
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the economy, modifying the development pathway. This is not just based on initial 
conditions but on the social and cultural philosophy that underpins lifestyles and 
governance. Economic growth does not automatically lead to rising emissions. It is the 
underlying philosophy of development that dictates its ultimate effect on emissions. 
Commonalities towards individualist consumption identities and consequently higher 
consumption emerge in the cultural identity and consumer patterns of scenarios IE3 and 
IE4. The greater prosperity of IE4 sees emissions rise at a higher rate. 
 
 
 
6.4.8 Anomalies 
Some anomalies arising in the sectoral results are discussed below. These arise from the 
selection of numerical values in the quantification process and are not anomalies of the 
model per se. 
 
1. The increase in the fossil fuel substitution effect (Cffse) in the economic 
sectors of IE1 and IE2 occur as a result of scale growth in electricity and 
gas. Despite the reduction in the emissions coefficient of electricity 
supply due to decarbonisation, scale growth in electricity is higher and 
acts to increase emissions. 
 
2. The slight variation in (Cet) for services on the other economic sectors is 
a result of energy changes in the sector. As a multiplicative identity is 
used, and as (Cet) multiplies CO2 change by economic scale change, 
results across the sectors vary.  
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3.  The variation in the (Cemc) for rail is a result of increases in electricity 
consumption and decarbonisation of electricity supply.260 
 
4. There is an increase in emissions from the road public passenger sector261 
under the stronger sustainability scenarios IE1 and IE2. The growth is 
less than in scenarios IE3 and IE4. Growth in taxi p-km is less in the 
stronger sustainability scenarios. For plausibility, a continued but 
tempered growth in the use of taxis was explored in IE1 and IE2 rather 
than a radical reversal or stasis. Equally this pattern could be altered to 
reduce taxi p-km.262 This illustrates conflict in plausibility and internal 
consistency and questions where the saturation point is for taxis/hackneys 
p-km’s.263  
 
5. The 2008 increase in energy consumption has been attributed to weather 
effects (Howley et al., 2009: 27) and consumption will be expected to 
return to background values. Nonetheless, individual years should not be 
used as forecasts. The scenario quantifications include cognisance of the 
2008 energy balance (SEI, 2009). Given the trend breaks occurring at the 
time of quantification, it was considered optimal to incorporate the 
turbulence in pattern by cognisance of the 2008 energy data. 
 
                                                 
260
 This decarbonisation occurs through increasing wind and gas-fired electricity generation. 
 
261
 This sector includes bus and coach and the more energy intensive taxi and hackney. 
 
262
 Under a strong sustainability scenario, the use of taxis may decline if a literal interpretation of 
sustainability is taken. However viewing sustainability as a process in development, cultural change 
towards an alternative path would probably take time in the absence of additional policy. However, a 
reduction of taxi p-km in this scenario is also not beyond plausibility.  
 
263
 Given that the rise in the use of taxis in Ireland has been significant since 2000. 
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6.4.9 Comparison with existing CO2 projections for Ireland 
The national scenario range to 2020 is consistent in pattern with that described in the 
global long-term analysis of Morita and Robinson (2001: 131-132). Baseline or “non-
intervention” scenarios continue to increase emissions in the absence of policy 
intervention. Growth rates are more tempered than historically as a result of the 
plateauing of economic growth,264 Ireland has caught up in terms of development. The 
rates of emissions increase in the scenarios vary considerably and the variation within 
the scenarios is contingent not only on economic growth and technology but on the 
evolution of interlinked and interdependent underlying drivers including societal 
choices and governance. Although the upward curve resumes in the economic recovery 
the impact of the recession on eventual emissions is notable.  
 
Projections of energy carbon emissions to 2020 for Ireland (Fitzgerald et al., 2008; Tol, 
2009; EPA, 2009; Capros et al., 2008) also illustrate a continuing upward curve. Two of 
the projections were produced before the impact of the recession materialised; the 
“benchmark” forecast described below as IsusMTR08 (Fitzgerald et al., 2008) and CEC 
baseline (Capros et al., 2008). The various projections for Ireland present with a number 
of fundamental differences to the scenarios produced as part of this research. These 
include; 
 
i) the modelling method and structure, 
ii) data sources, baseline emissions and base year,  
iii) the evolution of driving forces and dynamics, 
iv) economic growth rates and the impact of the recession,  
                                                 
264
 In scenarios IE1 and IE2 the tempered emissions growth rates are also a result of sustainability acting 
in the development path. 
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v) and policies and measures included in the analysis including the carbon 
tax.  
 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare these alternatives for the pattern and size of 
growth to 2020. Figure 6-7 illustrates the emissions trajectories of the scenarios with 
existing national forecasts for Ireland in the literature. 
 
Figure 6-7 Comparison of scenarios to existing national emissions projections  
 
Sources: IE1, IE2, IE3, IE4 (this research), EPA ‘with measures,’ ‘with additional 
measures,’ ‘with measures economic shock’ (EPA, 2009), Isus MTR08 (Fitzgerald et 
al., 2008), ISus v0.3 (Tol, 2009) and CEC baseline (CEC, 2008).  
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The scenario quantifications bound the upper and lower limits of existing projections. 
The “with additional measures” forecast (EPA, 2009) is below the lowest emissions 
pathway. However, the key difference in existing forecasts is the clustering of results in 
a range between IE3 and IE4 at the higher end. This appears to suggest similar 
dynamics and/or economic growth rates for existing projections and the weaker 
sustainability scenarios. The single comparable projection to the lower range of the 
emissions envelope (IE1 and IE2) is the EPA “with additional measures” (EPA, 2009). 
This includes additional climate and energy policies i.e. existing and planned Policies 
and Measures (PAM’s) to March 2009. These include measures on energy efficiency 
and renewables included in the White Paper on Energy (DCENR, 2007) and the revised 
National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (DCENR, 2009). This is the sole projection that 
is comparable to the stronger sustainability scenarios IE1 and IE2, and suggests some 
potentially interesting insight. Stronger sustainability in governance and society in these 
scenarios delivers a lower emissions trajectory similar to EPA “with additional 
measures” but in the absence of additional policy. It represents an underlying shift 
towards a lower emissions trajectory in a fundamentally altered future to that of IE3, 
IE4 and existing projections.  
 
The upper range of the scenarios embodied by IE4 is slightly above the range 
documented, but is similar to the “high growth alternative” of Fitzgerald et al. (2008: 
135), which projects emissions of circa 55MtCO2 in 2020. Based on alternative 
economic projections, the “high growth alternative” leads to a similar emissions 
trajectory to IE4. This is despite the impact of the recession in IE4 which is not 
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considered in the “high growth alternative”.265 The impact of the recession on the 
scenarios is particularly notable in comparison to “IsusMTR08” (Fitzgerald et al., 2008) 
and “CEC baseline” (Capros et al., 2008: 126). These projections were produced before 
the recession and do not include the expected reduction in emissions resulting from 
economic and activity contraction. 
 
The projections documented above are, with a single exception for enhanced policy, 
skewed towards higher growth. In contrast, the scenarios of this study explore a wider 
envelope and potential lower outcomes. These result from not just alternative economic 
projections, but fundamental changes in the relationship of society and economy to 
energy and emissions. The impact of changes in the strength of sustainability in 
governance and society leads to divergent outcomes in the scenarios even in the absence 
of additional policy. 
 
6.5 The macro scenarios of energy CO2 to 2020 
The macro scenarios are created with the same logics as the sectoral scenarios and 
operate in parallel. These illustrate change in carbon emissions in each scenario 
attributable to the effects measured in the macro DA (see Chapter 3 Decomposition 
Analysis). The changes in fuel requirement have been quantified to coincide with the 
energy trends evident in the aggregated sectoral scenarios (see also Chapter 3).  
 
Given the theoretically higher accuracy of the sectoral results due to greater 
disaggregation, the macro scenarios are predominantly for illustrative and comparative 
                                                 
265
 In scenario IE4 the post recession economic growth rates are high and in parallel sustainability is 
weak. 
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purposes. Operating in parallel, the macro scenarios do provide additional insights into 
the drivers influencing changes in emissions and help to form a more complete picture 
of change. In contrast to the sectoral decomposition model the addition of the 
population effect to the macro identity required the creation of a set of population 
scenarios in Appendix IV. Table 6-13 and 6-14 below document the activity and energy 
requirement associated with each of the scenarios as a prelude to the scenarios. The full 
time series of the macro scenario DA are detailed in Appendix VII. 
 
Table 6-13 Macro activity levels 2007 and in 2020 in the scenarios 
Activity 2007 IE1 IE2 IE3 IE4 
      
Economic  
Total (GVA) 
€ million 
167,057 
 
218,416 
 
188,675 174,856 228,036  
 
     
Population 
(inhabitants) 
4,339,000 
 
5,304,000 
 
4,944,000 
 
4,824,000 
 
5,499,000 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-14 Macro fuel shares by TPER 2007 and 2020 in the scenarios 
Fuel type (ktoe) 2007 IE1 IE2 IE3 IE4 
 
     
Coal 1,508 
 
656 
 
878 
 
1,300 
 
1,207 
 
Peat 701 
 
711 
 
701 
 
890 
 
815 
 
Oil 9,047 
 
8,340 
 
7,902 
 
9,333 
 
11,709 
 
Gas 4,293 
 
5,832 
 
5,341 
 
4,712 
 
6,261 
 
Renewables 468 
 
1,227 
 
979 
 
792 
 
895 
 
 
     
      
Total 16,017 
 
16,766 
 
15,801 
 
17,028 
 
20,887 
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6.5.1 Macro scenario IE1 
The Macro Scenario IE1 storyline explores high economic growth while stronger 
sustainability evolves in governance, consumption patterns and lifestyle choices. During 
the economic recovery a change in societal priorities develops. Energy intensity 
improves with economic growth and the influence of sustainability. This also 
accelerates technological change and the transition to ‘cleaner fuels’ favoured ahead of 
coal and peat. Fossil fuel shares and renewable energy penetration act to reduce carbon 
emissions as a result of societal choices.266 Population growth is robust during the 
economic recovery as immigration occurs to meet labour force demands. Affluence 
increases in Ireland, but consumption tends towards a lower emissions trajectory as 
economic and societal well-being immaterialise from energy and carbon emissions. 
 
 
Table 6-15 Macro scenario IE1 decomposition 2007-2020 
Ctotal Cffse Crepe Cint Cypc Cpop Cemc Crsd 
     
0.9615 
 
0.9622 
 
0.9547 
 
0.8006 
 
1.0696 
 
1.2224 
 
1.0000 
 
-1.73195E-14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
266
 As previously described these can be linked to societal choices (Morita and Robinson, 2001:132). 
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Figure 6-8 Macro scenario IE1 change in CO2 2007-2020 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Macro scenario IE2 
The Macro Scenario IE2 storyline describes low economic growth while stronger 
sustainability evolves in governance and society. Despite economic challenges, Ireland 
seeks to enhance quality of life, increasing the priority of social and environmental 
outcomes. Energy intensity improves with efficiency and technological change, 
although public and private investment is lower. Fossil fuel shares and renewable 
energy penetration act to reduce carbon emissions, consumption of coal and oil 
decrease. Population growth is moderated with a weaker economy leading to reduced 
net migration. Affluence in 2020 is less than in 2007 through long-term recessionary 
impacts. The economic reality coupled with the development pathway unfolding 
towards sustainability has the affect of reducing overall energy requirement below 2007. 
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Table 6-16 Macro scenario IE2 decomposition 2007-2020 
Ctotal Cffse Crepe Cint Cypc Cpop Cemc Crsd 
     
0.9260 
 
0.9714 
 
0.9663 
 
0.8735 
 
0.9912 
 
1.1394 
 
1.0000 
 
-2.12053E-14 
 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Macro scenario IE2 change in CO2 2007-2020 
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The Macro Scenario IE3 storyline describes anaemic economic growth while 
governance and society are inclined towards weaker sustainability. Social equity is 
harmed in this scenario and democratic participation is weakened. The challenging 
economic circumstances lead to economic priorities at the expense of social and 
environmental outcomes. Energy intensity increases due to the pattern of economic 
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continues at a lower level. Affluence is also lower and weakens energy demand. 
Nevertheless, the link between energy and economic and societal well-being remains 
and energy requirement increases. 
 
 
Table 6-17 Macro scenario IE3 decomposition 2007-2020 
Ctotal Cffse Crepe Cint Cypc Cpop Cemc Crsd 
     
1.0413 
 
0.9973 
 
0.9821 
 
1.0157 
 
0.9415 
 
 
1.1118 
 
 
1.0000 
 
 
-2.13163E-14 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-10 Macro scenario IE3 change in CO2 2007-2020  
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bottom-up collective action and cooperation. Output growth leads to minor 
improvement in the energy intensity of the economy through technological change and 
efficiencies. Progress in decarbonising fuel shares and renewable energy penetration 
occur through technological change. Population expands significantly with high net 
migration to service employment needs and high fertility rates. Increasing affluence and 
population lead to increased energy requirements. Carbon emissions increase as 
economic development and quality of life is locked in to a higher emissions trajectory. 
 
 
Table 6-18 Macro scenario IE4 decomposition 2007-2020 
Ctotal Cffse Crepe Cint Cypc Cpop Cemc Crsd 
 
    
1.2582 
 
0.9786 
 
0.9860 
 
0.9553 1.0771 1.2673 
 
 
1.0000 
 
 
-2.4647E-14 
 
 
 
Figure 6-11 Macro scenario IE4 change in CO2 2007-2020 
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6.5.5 Macro scenario synthesis 
The four scenarios portray divergent trends in emissions to 2020, based primarily on 
economic growth and the pattern of sustainability in governance and society. Due to 
tempered economic growth the dominance of the affluence effect (Cypc) to increase 
emissions is considerably reduced. Population (Cpop) has a stronger positive impact on 
emissions acting as scale growth, although population growth was linked to economic 
growth in the scenario logics. Sustainability acts to influence immaterialisation, 
dematerialisation and decarbonisation (Tapio et al., 2007) in the scenarios with stronger 
sustainability (IE1 and IE2). The qualitative impact on economic growth in these 
scenarios acts to bend the emissions trajectory from continued high growth. Through the 
depth of economic contraction and the speed of economic recovery economic growth 
remains a key driver of emissions. But it is the pattern of economic growth and societal 
development in terms of sustainability in the development path that is crucial in the 
determination of the emissions trajectory.  
 
For effects acting to limit or reduce emissions, sustainability acts towards greater 
improvements in the fossil fuel share effect (Cffse) and the renewable energy 
penetration effect (Crepe). The energy intensity effect (Cint) remains the most 
significant effect to reduce emissions. This effect is markedly reduced in lower 
sustainability scenarios (IE3 and IE4) because governance and societal choices place a 
lower priority on sustainability. In IE3 energy intensity is reversed and acts to increase 
emissions, resulting from more energy intensive economic development and low output 
growth. IE3 is also anomalous in the (Cypc) effect. Reduced affluence (wealth per 
person) acts to reduce emissions. The effects of the recession in IE3 are more long 
lasting. The reduction in the impact of the energy intensity effect occurs with a lowering 
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of economic growth across the scenarios, in comparison to historically, and a tempered 
disposition towards energy intensity improvement in IE3 and IE4. In IE4 high growth in 
emissions are attributable to robust economic recovery, the nature and structure of 
economic growth, high population growth, the absence of policy change and low 
priority on sustainability in governance and society. The energy emissions profile in 
2020 is similar or less than 2007 under scenarios IE1, IE2 and IE3 (Figure 6-12). In IE1 
and IE2, the evolution of sustainability is sufficient to deliver a lower emissions 
pathway, while in IE3 this arises due to weak output growth. The influence of 
sustainability is illustrated by the higher economic growth rates in IE1 and IE2 when 
compared to IE3, but also a lower primary energy requirement and ultimately lower 
emissions. Both scenarios IE3 and IE4 raise the issue of potential lock-in to higher 
emissions trajectories (Fisher et al., 2007: 176). 
 
 
Figure 6-12 Trajectories of the macro scenario energy CO2 2007-2020 
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6.6 Comparison of sectoral and macro results 
The differences between the macro and sectoral results are attributable to the inclusion 
of international aviation in the TPER used in the macro model and statistical differences 
in the accounting of fuel types.267 The ratio of TPER to TFC to account for these 
differences has been maintained throughout the quantifications.268 The different 
formation of the identity through the macro and sectoral scheme attributes change to 
different effects. For ease of comparison, table 6-19 of total index and CO2 change 
under both schemes is detailed below. The sectoral results are more directly comparable 
to official national projections (EPA, 2009). 
 
Table 6-19 Comparison of macro and sectoral total change 2007 and 2020 
     Sectoral      Macro   
ktCO2   2007     2020    2007    2020 
 IE1 44,178   42,759   IE1 47,327   45,507 
 IE2  41,162 IE2  43,824 
 IE3  46,213 IE3  49,281 
 IE4  55,793 IE4  59,545 
Index 
  2020   2020 
 IE1  0.9679 IE1  0.9615 
 IE2  0.9317 IE2  0.9260 
 IE3  1.0461 IE3  1.0413 
 IE4  1.2629 IE4  1.2582 
 
                                                 
267
 TPER is top down primary energy requirement and TFC is bottom-up final consumption of the sectors 
(see data in Chapter 4 Historical Decomposition Analysis). 
 
268
 For example, TPER coal in the macro scenarios compared to TFC + Transformation Inputs in the 
sectoral scenarios is 0.7% higher in 2007 and in 2020. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
The preceding chapter has presented the development of a suite of four sectoral energy 
CO2 scenarios for Ireland to 2020, followed by a suite of four supportive macro 
scenarios. The macro scenarios are based on trends arising in the sectoral quantification 
and it is the sectoral scenarios that are the primary mode of quantification. The 
scenarios are hybrids that integrate qualitative storyline and quantification through the 
LMDI I model at the two levels. The scenarios are primarily differentiated by the 
scenario axes of ‘economy’ and ‘sustainability’ and illustrate plausible divergent trends 
into the future based on the evolution of the development path. The different 
development paths, in the context of sustainability and its influence on governance, 
society and the other driving forces illustrate that it is not only economic growth but the 
qualities of economic and societal development that influence future emissions.  
 
The qualitative narratives capture the change in abstract themes such as governance and 
lifestyle, which are often ignored in emission forecasts and scenarios. This 
contextualises the development path to explore plausible change. All scenarios show a 
growth in emissions after the recession,269 while the strong sustainability scenarios IE1 
and IE2 show a reduced growth as delinking occurs. A broad range is explored in 
determining the emissions envelope to 2020, although the results are not a prediction. 
The effect of the recession sees development reach a trend-break in all scenarios 
suggesting an opportunity for change to avoid lock-in to a higher emissions trajectory. 
The sectoral scenarios show heterogeneous trends in evolution based primarily on 
change in scale and energy intensity effects in the absence of additional policy. The 
                                                 
269
 In the absence of additional energy or mitigation policy acting to reduce emissions given that these are 
baseline scenarios. This also shows the difficulty in modifying governance and cultural processes 
sufficiently to reduce absolute energy consumption and is in keeping with the concept of lock-in. 
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transport sector remains a challenge to mitigation policy but shows signs of being 
curbed in the sustainability scenarios. In the macro scenarios population growth 
becomes more important in acting to increase emissions to 2020. The sectoral and 
macro scenarios show differences in total emissions over the quantification period as 
they are based on different data sources. They also show differences in the measurement 
of effects as they are based on separate DA schemes. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
7.1 Line of inquiry 
Energy and emissions analysis, the development of policy and the reporting of progress 
require insight into the driving forces of change and potential future evolution. Energy 
and emissions are both dependent on, and influenced by, a wider development domain 
which is complex in evolution and uncertain in outcome. Qualitative and quantitative 
exploratory scenario analysis was implemented for baseline quantification of future CO2 
emissions as “scientific inquiry” rather than “strategic inquiry” (Alcamo, 2009). The 
application of decomposition analysis was implemented towards insight at macro and 
sectoral level both historically and as alternative future evolution in the scenarios. This 
can enhance knowledge of the driving forces underlying change in CO2. It is 
demonstrated by e.g. the insight into change in transport emissions which is of key 
importance in Ireland (Rolle et al., 2005).  
 
7.2 Scenario analysis and decomposition analysis 
The technique of scenario analysis of energy and emissions is increasingly applied in 
scientific inquiry on long time-scales. In exploring short-to-medium term change, 
scenarios have a utility in exploring baseline quantification. Scenarios structure thinking 
on the future and can bound uncertainty on future evolution. Probabilistic approaches 
can be applied but may imply a historical bias or determinism that does not evolve and 
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may diverge or even bifurcate from historical trends.270 Evidence from the literature on 
the accuracy of quantitative point forecasts suggests that uncertainty is endemic even on 
the shorter time scales. This is particularly obvious in the sectoral contributions to total 
energy consumption (Linderoth, 2002). Short term scenarios in the literature show that 
considerable differences can arise in energy consumption and emissions under 
alternative scenarios e.g. Steenhof et al. (2006).271 Decomposition analysis is 
increasingly applied in energy and emissions analysis to quantify the change in a set of 
predefined factors leading to change in an aggregate e.g. CO2. It can be used at macro 
level for insight into change in e.g. renewable energy penetration and energy intensity 
of the economy, or at the sectoral level for insight into change in individual sectors. 
 
The exploration of ‘softer’ issues in the development path such as those related to 
governance, institutions and values can be achieved through the scenario narrative. 
These are aspects that are frequently not detailed in forecasts or projections. The 
implicit values or determinism of modelling frameworks (Midttun and Baumgartner, 
1986) can also be made more explicit using narrative scenarios. In the application of 
scenario analysis the importance of internal consistency (Postma and Liebl, 2005) and 
the potential limitations of the scenario axes technique should be considered (Mander et 
al., 2008). The co-occurrence of trend and counter-trend is a more consistent feature of 
complex societies than consistency itself. In the scenarios this was considered implicitly 
through the process of exploring scenario driving forces and in the building of scenarios 
but was not subject to formal analysis. It is important to retain an awareness of the 
                                                 
270
 This problem can arise where there is a projection of past trends or the forecast of probable outcomes. 
OECD/ IEA (2003: 23) discuss some of the limitations of purely quantitative approaches. 
 
271
 Steenhof et al. (2006) explored a range of future greenhouse gas emissions from surface freight 
transport in Canada to 2012 of 76.24 to 84.74MtCO2 using a decomposition framework. 
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purpose of the scenarios, which in this study was fundamentally not prediction but the 
exploration of plausible alternatives. 
 
The combination of scenario analysis and decomposition analysis was used to quantify 
future change in the scenarios as recommended by Sorrell et al. (2009). This advances 
IDA to one of the key areas for further research (Ang and Zhang, 2000). Divergent 
trends in the evolution of key drivers were explored based on different assumptions of 
the development of drivers through scenario logics. This allowed the scenario DA 
quantification to arrive at a time series of annual activity, energy, effect and emissions 
totals per sector to 2020. The energy totals in the final consumption sectors were also 
used to construct ‘macro’ scenarios of future change. Combining scenario analysis and 
IDA was aided by applying the Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990) in determining the 
decomposition framework and the framework for the exploration of scenario driving 
forces. 
 
7.3 Historical decomposition analysis results 
The historical DA results provide insight into historical change and help to inform the 
building of scenarios of future change. The macro decomposition framework based on 
TPER shows the improvement in energy intensity of the economy. It also illustrates that 
energy and emissions continued to rise as only a relative delinking occurred. Absolute 
growth in economic output was high and increased energy demand and consequent 
emissions from production and consumption. This arose through the pattern of 
development that occurred over the historical period. The population effect increased 
emissions but was dwarfed by the effect of increasing output and affluence. The fuel 
substitution effect acted to reduce emissions. The renewable energy penetration effect 
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increased in later years but was minor. The total effect was an increase in total carbon 
emissions over the period from 1990-2007. 
 
The sectoral DA offers deeper insight into the changes that occurred historically. In 
particular, the improvements in energy intensity measured by the macro DA are placed 
in context by the sectoral DA results. The trends in energy intensity are heterogeneous 
through the sectors from a large decrease in industry, to increasing intensity in various 
transport sectors. 
 
The framework applied in the sectoral DA attributes change in a different form to the 
macro DA. In general, progress on fuel substitution and renewable energy penetration 
was heterogeneous and limited. Much of the change in fuel substitution and renewable 
energy penetration documented in the macro DA registers in the emissions coefficient 
of the sectoral DA through electricity. The scale growth in economic output in the 
economic sectors acted to increase emissions. Patterns of energy intensity saw a 
decrease in industry and commercial services and an increase in public services and 
agriculture.  
 
The large growth in transport emissions is attributable to both scale growth in mobility 
demand for passengers and freight and increases in intensity. While technical efficiency 
improvement would be expected to improve energy intensity in transport modes, 
preferences272 acted to increase intensity. Spatial and economic development patterns 
                                                 
272
 For example, lifestyle decisions for passenger transport and operational decisions for freight transport 
e.g. engine size purchase decisions and occupancy for private car and capacity utilisation and logistics of 
road freight. 
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and the lifestyle choices of citizens have acted to increase mobility distances in more 
energy intensive forms of transport. The data utilised for transport activity are subject to 
caveats as a full set of p-km data was not available.273 The residential sector showed 
significant improvement in energy intensity. Despite larger floor areas, more energy 
intensive dwelling types274 and increasing house numbers, technical improvements in the 
thermal performance of dwellings were achieved through enhanced building 
regulations.  
 
Historical comparisons can help in the validation of scenario quantifications and in 
understanding the past evolution but should not limit exploratory scenario analysis to a 
continuation of trends. The most valuable contribution of the historical DA possibly lies 
in the decomposition of the various transport modes (Rolle et al., 2005) for which 
energy and emissions analysis of Ireland is limited. The historical DA also establishes 
results for Irish commercial services, public services, agriculture and residential sectors 
which have not been analysed in DA studies, and extends the decomposition of industry 
of Cahill and Ó Gallachoir (2009) back to 1990.275 The macro DA gives an overall 
analysis of change in keeping with the recommendation of UNFCCC (2004).276 
                                                                                                                                               
 
273
 Data on t-km by road freight and p-km and t-km by rail is published nationally in contrast to private 
car and bus and coach p-km which is estimated by DGTREN (2009). Data on taxi/hackney p-km of the 
road public passenger mode and p-km by domestic aviation are estimations produced as part of this 
research. 
 
274
 Residential construction favoured detached and semi-detached houses dwelling types. 
 
275
 The industry DA using LMDI I of Cahill and Ó Gallachoir (2009) analysed various Irish industrial 
branches from 1995-2007. The extension in this thesis back to 1990 required the aggregation of industry 
as GVA data is not disaggregated prior to 1995. 
 
276
 UNFCCC (2004) recommended the DA approach described in the in-depth review of the third national 
communication of Germany for analysis of change in carbon emissions. For further details see Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background. 
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7.4 Scenario driving forces 
The discussion in Chapter 5 exploring the evolution and interaction of scenario driving 
forces was established similar to the SRES (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) to broaden and 
deepen the discussion of past and future driving forces of emissions to inform the 
development of scenarios. The systems and interactions involved are highly complex 
and in response the analysis is structured according to the Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990) in 
keeping with the SRES. The discussion addresses population, economic and social 
development, energy resources and technology and governance and policies.277 
 
Population growth can effect emissions in many ways from spatial development pattern 
to age demographics. Population growth through immigration278 is linked to two 
prominent factors. These are labour force demand and perceived income and equality 
disparities. These are dependent on economic growth and social development. As was 
concluded in the DA results economic growth has a significant impact on emissions. It 
is the nature of development that is critical in determining the relationship of this 
economic growth to energy and emissions. Production and consumption can be directed 
into more energy extensive or energy intensive forms. This has implications for the 
emissions trajectory and is linked to issues such as governance, culture and 
technological development. Energy resources and technology can evolve in many facets 
in determining the relationship of energy demand to emissions through the fuel mix and 
penetration of renewables. Current energy resources appear to be adequate for a number 
of decades.  
                                                 
277
 Policies for energy and mitigation relevant to ‘baseline’ scenarios implemented and legislatively 
provided for by the end of 2006. 
 
278
 The most significant and uncertain element of population growth is in the evolution of net migration. 
See Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces. 
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To explore the influence of policy and decision-making on the development path and 
the complex array of driving forces it entails governance represents a more broad 
conception than ‘government’. Ultimately, the evolution of governance is dependent on 
society. The development path arising from governance and society can involve 
stronger or weaker processes of ‘sustainability’ that encourage stronger or weaker 
processes of immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation.279 Emissions 
can evolve on higher or lower emissions trajectories based not only on the evolution of 
economic growth but on the evolution of the development path. Within the development 
path, economic growth interacts with governance and societal choices and the other 
driving forces. This can drive potential lock-in to a higher emissions trajectory. 
 
7.5 Scenarios 
7.5.1 Sectoral scenarios 
The sectoral scenarios may be differentiated in evolution by the scenario axes of 
economy and sustainability as key uncertainties of high impact. This structures the four 
scenarios combining strong or weak economy and strong or weak sustainability. The 
resultant exploratory scenarios are not predictions but are plausible descriptions of 
alternative future worlds. These involve not only technical and economic parameters but 
explicitly represent the evolution of social, political and cultural aspects in response to 
the criticism of Nielsen and Karlsson (2007).280 
                                                 
279
 Sustainability concepts reviewed by Tapio et al. (2007: 435-436). 
 
280
 Neilsen and Karlsson (2007) discussed how the difference between model-based and non-model based 
scenarios seemed to be in the degree of detail in describing technical and economic parameters verses 
social, cultural and political respectively. 
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In the sectoral scenarios emissions increase under all scenarios but the composition of 
this growth and the total growth to 2020 are divergent. The emissions trajectories in the 
four scenarios involve a reduction on 2007 levels of -3.2% and -6.8% in scenarios IE1 
and IE2, and an increase of +4.6% and +26.3% in scenarios IE3 and IE4. The recession 
varies in depth and rate of recovery in the scenarios, followed by an increase in 
emissions at different rates in the various sectors dependent on the scenario logics. In 
general, economic growth is less significant in determining future emissions as output 
growth rates are less than recorded historically. In the stronger sustainability scenarios 
IE1 and IE2, growth in the economy is dominated by services and in IE3 and IE4 
growth by industry. This is based on the influence of sustainability through governance 
and society on the economic development model. 
 
Following the scenario logics for transport, under scenarios IE1 and IE2 spatial 
development does not sprawl and mobility choices are directed towards public and more 
energy extensive modes. In scenarios IE3 and IE4 lifestyle for citizens and operational 
decisions for freight are characterised by private and more energy intensive modes, 
while spatial development increases travel distances. The evolution of transport, through 
governance and societal choices, is towards technological, infrastructural and cultural 
lock-in to higher energy demand in IE3 and IE4. In the residential sector in scenarios 
IE1 and IE2 house completion rates tend to be lower while in scenarios IE3 and IE4 
these tend to be higher. In scenarios IE3 and IE4 these tend to involve more detached 
and semi-detached dwelling types with larger floor areas.  
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In describing the impact of changes in activity levels and the nature and structure of 
these activity levels, under scenarios IE1 and IE2 energy intensity tends to be lower 
than in scenarios IE3 and IE4. The fuel mix that meets the final energy consumption 
under the scenarios tends to have higher fuel substitution and renewable energy 
penetration under scenarios IE1 and IE2. In unifying an articulation of the patterns of 
development in the scenarios, immaterialisation, dematerialisation and decarbonisation 
are higher in the stronger sustainability scenarios IE1 and IE2. 
 
The influence of sustainability through governance and society tends towards curbed 
growth in emissions regardless of economic growth rate. Following the conclusion of 
Sathaye et al. (2007: 707), lower emissions are not necessarily associated with lower 
economic growth. As the economy expands demand for the supply of energy and energy 
intensive goods increases. Concomitantly, economic growth can drive technological 
change, increased efficiency, institutional change and preferences more towards 
reducing emissions as described by Sathaye et al. The key to these alternative 
evolutions is the complex array of driving forces in the development path, which can be 
driven by governance and society. These driving forces in particular can influence the 
evolution of technological change and the development models281 applied but can also 
be represented by lifestyles and societal preferences. The development of lock-in 
through spatial pattern, infrastructure, technology and culture are crucial in determining 
the evolution of the development path. 
 
Emissions increases resume post recession in all scenarios in the absence of additional 
policies but rates vary. The scenarios describe variations in the nature of the 
                                                 
281
 Kaivo-Oja and Luukkanen (2004: 1529) concluded that the structure of economic development is the 
main determinant of the energy intensity of the society. 
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development path occurring post recession but further large bifurcations are considered 
a wildcard in the period to 2020. The influence of sustainability describes processes of 
change rather than development that is necessarily “sustainable”. 
 
In the stronger sustainability scenarios IE1 and IE2 cultural identity and lifestyles are 
less defined by consumption and social equity and environmental protection tend to be 
enhanced. In these scenarios decision-making is more bottom-up and participative. 
These scenarios tend to be less market-driven driven in approach placing a higher value 
on social well-being and environmental protection.  
 
The weaker sustainability scenarios involve the strongest and weakest economic growth 
rates for IE4 and IE3 respectively. This explores alternative outcomes due to the logics 
of the market-driven approach to; increase economic growth in IE4, and the instability 
of IE3 to depress growth. In the strong economy scenarios IE1 and IE4, capital 
investment in technological change is higher and improves energy intensity and 
decarbonisation through fuel substitution and renewables. International driving forces 
e.g. through trading partners and supranational institutions are assumed to evolve in 
keeping with the logics of the scenarios. 
 
Existing forecasts of energy CO2 are at the higher end of the range of the scenarios, and 
appear to predict not only robust economic growth but dynamics as usual in terms of 
consumption relationships, but “predictions can be self-fulfilling…the fact that 
predictions can contribute to preserving past and present trends can also make it more 
difficult to change undesirable trends” (Borjeson et al., 2006: 726). The strong 
sustainability scenarios are closer to the “with additional measures” projection of (EPA, 
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2009). In the absence of additional policy, sustainability processes curb emissions 
growth through influencing the development path in a multitude of ways. This counters 
the projection of current trends or forecasting forward of current dynamics as potentially 
erroneous. 
 
7.5.2 Macro scenarios 
The disaggregation of the sectoral scenarios is considered more accurate and the macro 
scenarios are based on the evolution of sectoral energy trends. In terms of the 
representation of change within the macro scenarios, the key insights as opposed to the 
sectoral are the evolution of energy intensity and population. Energy intensity varies 
considerably across the scenarios, although with less decrease than historically, as the 
economy grows less than historical rates and with a slight increase in intensity in IE3. 
This arises as energy intensive development, attributable to e.g. increases in transport, 
leads to higher energy intensity of the economy. The total effect of population is higher 
in IE4 to that in the historical DA and similar in IE1. This is despite the shorter time 
scale as population continues to grow. 
 
7.5.3 Methodological observations 
The divergent outcomes evident in the scenarios exemplify the range of plausible 
outcomes in the context of not only emissions totals but the contribution of individual 
sectors. They also suggest the utility of creating alternative scenarios, even on short to 
medium term time scales, in response to forecast errors discussed by Linderoth (2002). 
The objective was to explore alternative plausible outcomes given inherent uncertainties 
and the approach adopted did not assign probabilities. Using a probabilistic, or 
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particularly a point forecast approach, would focus attention on a reduced scenario set 
of one or two “likely” futures and negate the benefit of exploring alternatives. As 
discussed by Schnarrs and Ziamou (2001) the application of probabilistic approaches 
and point forecasting are usually contrary to the scenario approach. 
Even on the longer timescale there is a debate in the scenario community on the use of 
the probabilistic and storyline approaches to scenarios (Webster and Reilly, 2005: 
49).282 Nevertheless, from a methodological point of view, there is a strong argument 
for the use of storyline narrative as an approach to uncertainty rather than a probabilistic 
or point forecast approach as outlined in the Chapter 1 Introduction and Background. 
The presentation of alternative scenarios encourages the audience to consider alternative 
outcomes during policy development and monitoring. While the application of 
probabilistic or point forecast approaches also has potential utility there are pitfalls to 
these approaches. For users they can engender over-confidence283 in results and the 
results can become self-fulfilling. These approaches could also restrict the consideration 
of alternative outcomes by the practitioner to weaken supposedly robust results. The 
choice of approach would depend on the objectives of the exercise and the proposed 
audience for the results. As short to medium-term energy and emissions analysis is 
dominated by quantitative point forecasts, the utility of scenario analysis and an 
integrated qualitative/quantitative approach is increased as it offers alternate views to 
expand knowledge. 
 
                                                 
282
 Webster and Reilly presented at the expert meeting on emission scenarios of the IPCC in Washington 
D.C, held in January 2005. 
 
283
 Forecasts can lead to the illusion of certainty (OECD/ IEA, 2003: 20). 
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The integration of qualitative and quantitative elements within the scenarios allows the 
depiction of the ‘softer’ social, political and cultural drivers. Descriptions of these 
inherently more subjective phenomena could be questioned. Similarly, the implicit 
technical, economic and political underpinnings of all quantitative models used in point 
forecasts for energy and emissions analysis could also be contested. The evolution of 
the softer drivers described in the scenarios have been associated with particular 
outcomes explored in the scenario driving forces.284 In addition, the development paths 
described are plausible evolutions rather than predictions. By the explicit discussion of 
these drivers, rather than the implicit embedding285 this approach aids transparency and 
can encourage dialogue and debate.286 The argument for plural, interdisciplinary and 
varied conceptions of the future is strong both in scientific inquiry to aid analysis and in 
decision-making to aid participative democracy. Similar to the SRES, the subjective 
elements are open to interpretation and no judgement on probability or desirability is 
intended in the research (Nakicenovic et al., 2000: 46). In response to the critique of the 
SRES of (Girod et al., 2009) sustainability is included as an axis even though 
“sustainability” is complex, fuzzy, indeterminate and dependent on perspective. 
 
In Alcamo (2001: 24) a number of characteristics of a “good” scenario are detailed. This 
includes first and foremost that it fulfils the goals of the exercise. In this context the 
alternative evolutions of the sectors in the four scenarios, and the emissions totals they 
                                                 
284
 See Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces. 
 
285
 Middtun and Baumgartner (1986) discussed the embedding of technical and economic realities in 
models. Modelling results are promoted as “objective” despite the subjectivity of political assumptions in 
the model architecture. 
 
286
 Neilsen and Karlsson (2007) criticised the potential for modelling exercises to be profitable or 
preferable to vested interests. The explicit discussion of subjective elements within the scenarios of this 
thesis may lead to further debate on the political underpinnings of the scenarios in particular but also 
forecast exercises in general. 
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lead to, could be described as meeting this criterion. The scenarios should also be 
transparent and sufficiently documented, plausible287 and internally consistent. There 
are also situations in which a scenario should challenge beliefs and broaden the 
understanding of experts and policy-makers. The implication of sustainability concepts 
within the scenarios could respond to this criterion. In reviewing the more effective use 
of scenarios the European Environment Agency (2009: 11) make a number of 
recommendations. These include; i) participation of key stake holders and policy-
makers in scenario exercises, ii) policy and progress monitoring using scenarios, iii) 
addressing institutional and organisational barriers, and, iv) using scenarios to support 
decision‑making by helping to identify robust strategies.288 The value of producing 
alternative energy and CO2 scenarios as scientific inquiry could be added to this list 
given; i) the difficulties of producing accurate energy and emission forecasts, ii) the 
continual revision of forecasts in the Irish context, and, iii) the divergence in results 
documented in this research. The review noted numerous evaluative studies in the 
scenario literature and recommends the usefulness of scenarios which can “provide a 
potentially very attractive approach to addressing uncertainty and complexity” 
(European Environment Agency, 2009: 6). 
 
7.6 Limitations  
 
The Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990) may suggest direct causality and simple linear 
relationships between variables. The factors described in the identity are not directly 
                                                 
287
 Plausible scenarios are not easily dismissed by experts or policy-makers. 
 
288
 According to the European Environment Agency (2009: 11) “a robust strategy performs well 
compared to the alternatives over a wide range of plausible future scenarios”. The authors outline relevant 
sources for qualitative and quantitative approaches to the identification of robust strategies and suggest 
this process can also be used in consensus building. 
360 
 
driving forces in themselves, nor will they usually lead to linear increases in emissions. 
The exploration of driving forces in Chapter 5 aids the process of examining the 
complex evolution and interaction of driving forces. 
 
Similar to Agnolucci et al. (2009) the DA framework does not explicitly consider the 
effect of price on energy consumption. The general level of prices is also important in 
explaining growth in GDP but can not be explicitly considered in the DA. It also can not 
explore how high inflation reduces growth in output. In the meta-analysis with respect 
to road traffic of Goodwin et al. (2003), the authors suggested that income is a stronger 
determinant of fuel consumption than fuel price and consumption is price inelastic. 
Despite these limitations, in the scenarios a range of output growth rates are explored 
that allow for alternative evolutions of the economy and its relationship with energy and 
emissions. 
 
The data used in the DA has been taken from published sources and additional estimates 
have been made within the study for some transport modes. In completing the data set 
for transport, data on p-km of private car and domestic aviation are probably an 
underestimate. Bus and coach p-km is probably overestimated and taxi and hackney p-
km is difficult to validate. In general, the pre-2000 data may not be as robust as post-
2000 data due to advances in data collection and dissemination. The overall significance 
of these caveats lie primarily in the energy intensity measures of transport.289 The 
underestimates for private car and domestic aviation activity will not alter the sign of 
change with respect to energy intensity. It is very likely that intensity has increased. The 
                                                 
289
 But also this would affect the measurement of the share of total transport activity of each mode. 
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possible over-estimate of bus and coach p-km will not alter the sign of change for the 
road public passenger290 category and intensity will very likely have increased. While 
the absolute accuracy of the p-km data for transport can not be guaranteed and by that 
the measurement of effects (Ma and Stern 2008: 2524), it is proposed that this limitation 
would only be quantitative (change of magnitude) and not qualitative (change of sign). 
Further research on transport statistics would be beneficial to both policy and analysis 
as per (Rolle et al., 2005). A full sustainability model of transport would also require 
analysis of walking and cycling. Data on these modes is unavailable in Ireland.  
 
The lack of a full split of energy data for bus and coach/taxi and hackney and rail 
passenger/rail freight limited the analysis. Further research may benefit from the full 
disaggregation of the energy data for these modes in energy balance sheets. The 
decrease in intensity of rail measured in the DA merits further research. The rail DA 
used an aggregation of passenger and freight. The lack of a consistent pattern in results 
in years where the ratio of p-km to t-km remained stable suggests that factors 
influencing this result may be complex. The transport DA is aggregated as total 
transport activity just as the economic sectors are aggregated as total economic activity. 
This allows physical measurement of both total scale effects291 and the share of 
contribution of each mode in the total by change in CO2. While it can give proximate 
insights into modal change within total transport,292 a physical measure of modal switch 
                                                 
290
 This category includes taxi and hackney p-km. While taxi and hackney p-km is difficult to validate, 
the size of the increase in relative energy consumption suggests that overall road public passenger 
intensity has increased from 1990-2007. 
 
291
 Similar to the traffic density and asset utilisation measures for rail aggregating the sum of p-km and t-
km (UNECE, 2002). 
 
292
 By further comparison of relative changes among the different passenger modes and freight modes in 
the DA separately subject to the caveat of the aggregation of rail. 
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would require the disaggregation of rail energy data293 allowing separate aggregations 
of passenger modes and freight modes in the DA framework.  
 
In the quantification of the sectoral scenarios, past trends were not extrapolated into the 
future to avoid historical bias as the scenarios are exploratory. In general statistical 
relationships with energy may be time-variant.294 Nevertheless, trends from 2000-2007 
were seen as more significant in quantification given; i) the rate of change since 1990, 
ii) as it is the more contemporaneous period as per Kwon (2005: 179),295 and iii) where 
activity data is probably most robust particularly for transport.  
 
Scenario analysis is a method for structuring thinking on the future but the future is by 
its nature complex and uncertain. Known factors can evolve in unknown ways and 
unknown factors can have a substantial impact and alter outcomes. In general, the 
scenarios attempt to bound uncertainty of the known factors while unknown factors or 
wildcards have been excluded and would be the subject of strategic planning exercises. 
As described by Nakicenovic et al. (2000: 61) “scenarios and storylines […] partially 
addresses uncertainties related to known factors. Completeness uncertainties related to 
unknown factors can, of course, never be persuasively captured by any approach”.  
 
Guidance on scenario exercises frequently emphasises the importance of participation in 
scenario exercises (European Environment Agency, 2009). Time and resource 
limitations prevented the furthering of the expert workshop process within this study. 
                                                 
293
 Into separate energy and CO2 data attributed to the activity of rail passenger and rail freight modes. 
This is currently not possible in Ireland due to data limitations. 
 
294
 Due to the difficulty that arises in accurately forecasting future energy as was described by Linderoth 
(2002). See Chapter 1 Introduction and Background. 
 
295
 Kwon (2005) placed more weight on trends over the last ten years in the BAU scenario. 
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Participation is probably of greater importance in strategic inquiry or in backcasting 
exercises as these approaches concern desirable outcomes and may require institutional 
commitment through stakeholder involvement.  
 
7.7 Areas for further research 
In responding to data gaps, further research on transport activity data for Ireland would 
be beneficial to both policy and analysis. Further data research could also examine the 
disaggregation of energy data for bus and coach/taxi and hackney and rail passenger/ 
rail freight. The intensity improvement of rail measured in the DA merits further 
research given the lack of a consistent pattern and the origins of the variability. 
 
In the DA, deeper insights could be provided by expanding the decomposition in a 
number of directions. Increasing the number of factors in the framework could yield 
valuable insights. This was applied in the extended eleven factor decomposition of road 
freight by Sorrell et al. (2009). Given the importance of transport in total emissions this 
would be particularly salient with the transport modes where data permits. Further 
analysis could be completed on disaggregated branches of the economic sectors 
particularly industry and commercial services. For the residential sector, further 
disaggregation could be extended to different branches of housing by including by age 
and dwelling type or by energy service or technology type e.g. lighting, space heating 
etc. where data permits. The DA could also be modified to examine change in the 
electricity supply sector only. Extending the DA on a regional basis could also be 
considered data permitting, including an analysis of the island of Ireland to include 
Northern Ireland. Further scenario analysis of these additional DA studies could be 
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conducted. The scenario analysis detailed in this study could be temporally extended to 
2030 and 2050.  
 
Using an alternative scenario approach, the DA could also be applied in back-casting 
predefined headline targets to 2020 or 2050 similar to Agnolucci et al. 2009. DA could 
be further employed in mitigation analysis296 to establish emissions reductions through 
the given set of scenarios e.g. by meeting policy objectives on energy efficiency. The 
potential application of DA could be attempted with other GHG’s, not just related to 
combustion. An extension could be attempted to e.g. decompose the change in total 
ruminant CH4 to a number of predefined factors. 
 
Specifically related to the scenario analysis used in this research, further development of 
expert and/ or participative workshop format could be applied in scenario development 
or as a strategic policy exercise. For scenario analysis in general, further research on 
methodological aspects of scenario analysis and evaluation of the effective use of 
scenarios would be valuable.297 This could include elements such as inconsistency 
analysis (Postma and Liebl, 2005) and further research on the scenario axes technique 
and other structuring and ordering tools (van’t Klooster and van Asselt, 2006).  
 
While not necessarily the subject of direct empirical investigation in this research, a 
number of key areas could be highlighted for further research on emissions and 
mitigation. As discussed by Toth et al. (2001), lifestyle and cultural identity merits 
further research as it is not simply affluence or economic growth that dictates changes in 
                                                 
296
 This would help to inform the different political positions and debates of how best to seek CO2 
emission reduction. Especially when allied to an analysis of costs (Agnolucci et al., 2009: 1665) and 
sustainable social, economic and environmental development in Ireland. 
 
297
 As discussed in European Environment Agency (2009). 
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emissions (Girod and de Haan, 2009). Potential methods to reconcile citizen and 
consumer could also be examined. The influence of spatial development patterns and 
planning on emissions in Ireland merits analysis. Technological, infrastructural and 
cultural lock-in also merits research given both the recent evolution and potential 
emissions trajectories outlined in the scenarios. The long-term impact of transport 
infrastructure investment and alternative approaches to curb future demand is 
meritorious of further analysis. 
 
7.8 Incorporating insights 
Ireland has undergone significant change during its development since 1990. Emissions 
have increased, but the recent recession means that the rapid economic development of 
the past is over. A bifurcation has occurred, and development from here is uncertain. 
Renewed industrial economic development with patterns towards road transport, urban 
sprawl and high personal consumption will tend to lead to higher emissions growth. 
Nevertheless, it would appear from the diversity of development paths explored in the 
scenarios that there is not one single likely development path but a range of plausible 
alternative outcomes. Alternative development paths lead to different sectoral 
contributions,298 and this would be significant for the development of climate and energy 
policy in Ireland.  
 
The results illustrate that it is not just economic growth but a complex array of driving 
forces that lead to change in emissions. These driving forces manifest in domains such 
as transport development, spatial development and the economic development model. 
                                                 
298
 Linderoth (2002) also supports this conclusion in analysing forecast accuracy. 
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The influence of governance and society is substantial in dictating not just societal 
choices of fuel mix and renewables but in determining the ultimate relationship of 
economy and society to energy and further to emissions. This illustrates the importance 
of human factors, but also the potential to alter the development path even where lock-
in may already be a concern.299 Agnolucci et al. (2009: 1663), state that social, cultural 
and behavioural forces, termed as “environmentally responsible behaviour,” can 
influence all of the variables in the Kaya identity.  
 
The purpose of the scenarios is not to predict change in CO2 but to explore plausible 
alternative development paths. As per Kwon (2005: 284) the scenarios emphasise the 
importance of continuous monitoring of each of the compositional factors that 
determine emission trends. This is highlighted by the variation in the emissions 
trajectories that result from the scenarios. Similar to Kwon, by tracking the change in 
CO2 and in the compositional factors and underlying causes, it would be possible to 
establish the main factors leading to the difference between the actual emissions trends 
and the scenarios. This would enable the reiteration of the scenario model and aid the 
identification of suitable policies to achieve CO2 targets. The concept of plasticity of 
IPAT derived by York et al. (2002) could then be applied in policy development.300  
 
The scenarios could also aid in the revision and refinement of forecasts required for 
reporting to the EU and UNFCCC and the consideration of alternative developments 
                                                 
299
 de Jouvenel (2000) describes the future as a realm of freedom, power and will. 
 
300
 The malleability of factors explained by “plasticity” is the potential for effects to move in different 
directions, either in response to historical processes or in response to policy. In bridging the gap to policy, 
two issues become relevant in defining plasticity i) the variability of factors and ii) the rate at which each 
factor can vary. York et al. (2002) propose that policy should be directed at those factors showing 
variability, while policy feasibility is dictated by the speed of a factor’s change. 
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and uncertainty. Both the historical and the scenario analysis may also have important 
insights into development paths for other nations attempting to attain or currently 
experiencing rapid economic development, and the issues that can arise for CO2 
emissions. Ultimately, the development path followed and its sustainability will 
determine the emissions trajectory followed nationally.301 The actual reduction of 
emissions in Ireland will require policy interventions.302 Both the scenarios and the 
historical DA allow for appreciation of the different driving forces affecting change in 
carbon emissions.  This highlights the challenges with which society and policy must 
grapple in the future as Ireland has yet to adequately respond to emissions reduction 
imperatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
301
 Further in a global sense the impact of climate change will be driven by the global development path; 
“Climate policy alone will not solve the climate problem. Making development more sustainable by 
changing development paths can make a major contribution to climate goals” (Sathaye et al., 2007: 700). 
 
302
 Unruh (2002) argues that in escaping carbon lock-in, escape conditions are unlikely to be generated 
internally and require “exogenous forces”. This suggests that a deep societal change or rapid adoption of 
carbon-saving technology may be prevented by lock-in and requires fundamental shifts such as a climate 
crisis, the linking of specific climate events to climate change or mass public education to focus public 
consciousness. 
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Appendix I. Expert workshop 
 
 
Appendix I.1: Expert workshop methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction to expert workshops 
The expert workshop process was applied as part of preliminary investigation into the 
research question. The general format of the process for the expert scenario workshops 
follows guidance provided by Schwartz, (1996), LGA (2001), Coates, (2000), Alcamo, 
(2001), van der Heijden, (1996), Glenn and Gordon, (1999), Kelly, Sirr and Ratcliffe, 
(2004) and Postma and Liebl (2005) and is further detailed below. 
 
Combining desk-based and participatory research is a common process employed in 
scenario development (van Notten et al., 2003). Borjeson et al. (2006: 730) discussed 
the use of “generating techniques” for developing and “collecting ideas, knowledge and 
views regarding some part of the future”. The use of group-thinking through 
participatory formats can broaden the scope of exploration, promote objectivity and also 
engender ownership in stakeholders and actors in the decision-making process. This 
inclusive process can enhance the communication of strategic issues. van der Heijden 
(2000: 33) outlines how the scenario technique, employing the use of participation, 
draws on the groups “intuition” to identify factors driving the system and stretch 
exploration outside of “business as usual”. 
 
The process of drawing up of lists of key variables and building the system can be open 
to subjectivity. This can be overcome by using participatory methods; “however, to 
avoid excessive subjectivity, it is usually compiled by a pluridisciplinary working 
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committee made up of actors and experts” (de Jouvenel, 2000). This list may lead to 
further documentation, interviews with experts, and various other consultations. 
Ringland, (2002: 160) emphasises the exploratory nature of workshops “to get depth of 
understanding of a specialist area” combined with desk-study to obtain information on 
known and predicted factors. Borjeson et al. (2006: 732) suggested that the SRES 
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000) used the workshop process for both “ideas generation and 
integration” to integrate component parts into wholes in a model. Borjeson et al. (2006) 
specifically propose the use of workshops for exploratory scenarios. The authors 
suggested that Delphi methods are used where other more thorough scientific studies 
cannot be done due to e.g. time or resource constraints and workshops are frequently 
used in scenario planning. 
 
1.2 Workshop technique application  
The expert workshop technique was used in preliminary investigation in mid-2007 to 
aid the development of the scenarios of this research, but was not the key informant of 
the scenarios. The scenarios were developed by synthesising the outcomes of the 
historical DA and the scenario driving forces exploration. This preliminary investigation 
was supportive in terms of the thought processes and content, but time and resource 
constraints prevented its further employment as part of research methods. As discussed 
in Chapter 2 expert opinion can also potentially constrain analysis in certain instances. 
The expert workshop outcomes were the first building blocks and are not used directly 
as scenario narrative inputs or indeed quantification. They formed part of the holistic 
transdiciplinary process of considering relevant literature, the historical pattern in the 
system and comparative scenarios, projections and forecasts. More specifically the 
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workshop process uses collective expertise to begin a qualitative exploration of the 
future of the research question or focal issue.  
 
The preparatory phase of a workshop process can use either an informed and directed or 
an open and creative process. An informed and directed process could be defined as one 
in which participants are given information prior to the workshops (e.g. trends) that can 
begin to focus and limit the scope of exploration as opposed to a more open-ended 
process. In Kaivo-Oja et al. (2004: 109) the workshops had the primary aim of 
exploring ideas about possible development paths in the exploration of “national scale 
socio-economic and technological futures up to 2100”. The workshop process was not 
designed to legitimise scenarios or results.  
 
The objective of the workshop phase within this research was to maximise an open 
exploratory enquiring process in the absence of an excessively deterministic approach. 
Workshop participants were given an open and creative engagement in the process. 
Participants were informed only of the research question and not supplied with any 
other information on drivers or trends or otherwise restricting scope of exploration. This 
is reflective of the process used by Smith et al. (2005) and by the International Energy 
Agency (OECD/ IEA 2003: 59), where “the initial stage of the scenario process involved 
an international seminar to define factors, trends and drivers”. Given the expertise of the 
chosen participants, this permitted the workshop process the greatest freedom to explore 
plausible future system evolution by avoiding determinism. 
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1.3 Stages and process 
Following from the general scenario typologies outlined by van Notten et al. (2003) and 
Borjeson et al. (2006), the expert workshops were organised around three distinct 
phases; i) divergent, ii) emergent, and iii) a convergent phase. The divergent phase 
involves a divergence of creative collective thinking as the research question is set and 
drivers, issues and trends are identified relevant to the research question. The second 
phase, emergent, sees drivers, issues and trends ranked for impact and uncertainty as the 
space emerges within which the scenarios will materialise. The final stage, convergence, 
sees information, ideas, knowledge and views converge into an emergent order by 
ranking the drivers into significant trends, pivotal uncertainties, context shapers and 
wildcards (LGA, 2001), see Figure A-1. This generates “scenario logics” (Schwartz, 
1996) towards the construction of alternative scenarios using the “scenario axes 
technique” (van’t Klooster and van Asselt 2005).  
 
Figure A-1 Ranking of drivers towards scenario logics 
 
 
Potential 
Jokers 
Pivotal 
uncertainties 
Significant 
trends 
Context 
shapers 
High Uncertainty (5) 
Low impact (1) High Impact (5) 
Low Uncertainty (1) 
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The process was scheduled for three half day workshops on successive weeks, to allow 
thinking to crystallise in the interim among participants. Each workshop involved a 
priming phase where the process was explained and defined to participants, an 
exploration phase where breakout groups explored the question involved at each stage 
(e.g. indentify drivers, issues and trends), a presentation phase where each groups 
rapporteur presented to plenary group and a discussion phase, where the issues 
emerging were discussed in plenary. The outputs of each workshop from all break-out 
groups, were collated by the facilitator and circulated to participants by Email prior to 
the following workshop as an iterative process.  
 
The “strategic question” (Ratcliffe, 2003; Kelly, Sirr and Ratcliffe, 2004; Schwartz, 
1996: 241) or possibly more accurately termed in this instance “the research question” 
given the exploratory nature of the scenarios, was presented to the workshop 
participants, to begin framing the scope of the workshop process in its divergent phase. 
The scenarios were identified as baseline in that they include no new national or 
international policy developments post June 2006 in either energy or mitigation policy. 
The scenario process was explained in each workshop using guidance from appropriate 
literature as previously outlined. The participants were invited to ask process and 
definition questions only from the facilitator and not direct questions on the evolution of 
the research question or focal issue. 
 
The identification and analysis of drivers can use a number of different frameworks. 
The JRC-IPTS, 2008 recommends Social, Technological, Economic (Macro), 
Environmental, Political and Values or (STEEPV). Broad system exploration is 
facilitated by using such a framework. Within this research, breakout groups used the 
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“six sector approach” (Kotler, 1997; Kelly, Sirr and Ratcliffe 2004) to explore drivers, 
issues and trends at the macro (international and regional EU) and micro (national) 
levels. The six sector approach could be described as similar, but more broad than 
STEEPV, and details the following (Economy, Demography, Governance, Technology, 
Environment, Society and Culture). Each of the three smaller break-out groups was 
assigned two sectors to explore in the first workshop, and a rapporteur was appointed 
for each group to present findings in plenary. The plenary group discussed, amended 
and added to drivers, issues and trends identified by break-out groups. Breakout groups 
were used to establish a ranking of driving forces of change, issues and trends in the 
emergent phase (JRC-IPTS, 2001, LGA, 2001, Schwartz, 1996) for impact and 
uncertainty based on a scale of 1-5, according to the methodology of Kelly, Sirr and 
Ratcliffe (2004). 
 
In the emergent phase, further exploration of the ranking of driving forces, issues and 
trends, was facilitated among the breakout groups, followed by the identification of two 
pivotal uncertainties by each group (JRC-IPTS, 2008; van’t Klooster and van Asselt, 
2005), using the collated rankings of all groups. Pivotal uncertainties are defined from 
the range of driving forces identified by the groups as high impact, but uncertain 
outcome, as in Figure I-1. 
 
The workshop process involved modes of interaction and participation that sought to 
maximise engagement and inclusion through; encouraging; mixing participants, seeking 
to make people comfortable with expressing thoughts and ideas including new 
perspectives, thinking long-range, empowering participants equally and also ensuring 
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participants’ confidentiality.303 Following the workshop process, outputs were collated 
by the facilitator for consideration in the wider scenario development process.  
 
1.4 Workshop participant nomination and selection 
The following section discusses the selection of participants as acknowledged experts 
for the scenario workshops. In general, an invitation only selection was used in contrast 
to the SRES open consultative process (Nakicenovic et al., 2000), as limited expertise is 
available in Ireland. In energy and GHG analysis, modelling and in mitigation policy, 
Ireland is frequently reduced into the following activity sectors304 (ICF/ B’OC, 2006; 
Bergin et al, 2003; DOEHLG, 2000; Fitzgerald et al., 2008; DOEHLG 2007; Howley et 
al., 2007).  With some minor variations in the literature, the following sectors are 
identified;  
1. Power Generation 
2. Industry 
3. Commercial and Institutional 
4. Transport 
5. Residential 
6. Agriculture 
 
Using this ‘system map’ of activities leading to the release of energy CO2 in Ireland is a 
convenient and established method of obtaining full coverage of the system under 
analysis. This enables the scenario process to potentially link with strategic planning as 
per Ratcliffe (2003: 10). Participants were sought on this basis, with a number of 
                                                 
303
 See Glenn and Gordon, (1999), Ringland (2002: 167-175) and Schwartz, (1996: 227). 
304
 The other sectors commonly included Waste, Forestry and Process. 
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additional invitees for heterogeneity and to satisfy ethical concerns. The aim of 
participant selection is to form a group of actors, stakeholders and decision-makers that 
are acknowledged experts in the field in Ireland, as achieved by Smith et al. (2005:4). 
The (JRC-IPTS, 2008) recommended that “participants can include representatives from 
various administrations, universities, businesses, industry associations, chambers of 
commerce, trade-unions, NGO’s, the media, and the wider public”. For each particular 
exercise, the range and number of participants has to be considered carefully. In order to 
meet these requirements, prospective participants were profiled and triangulated under a 
number of key headings: 
  
(i) acknowledged experts, 
(ii) actor, stakeholder or decision-maker in a relevant activity sector, actor, 
stakeholder or decision-maker in cross-sector, 
(iii) representative of industry (private sector), civil society, business (private 
sector), government (public sector), academia or general expert, 
(iv) and level of responsibility in the organisation. 
 
A stated aim was to ensure continuity of participation through the iterative workshops, 
but in a few limited cases this was not possible. In common with guidance of JRC-IPTS 
(2008) personal contacts, co-nomination and internet searches were used to identify 
candidates.  Proposed candidates were contacted by Email and telephone prior to 
finalisation of a list of experts meeting the selection criteria. Participants were informed 
that their participation would be anonymous to the degree that outcomes would not be 
attributable, but the list of participants may be made available by the researcher. 
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Appendix I.2: Expert workshop outcomes 
 
 
The following documents the list of driving forces, their rank according to impact and 
uncertainty and the selection of pivotal uncertainties as developed in the expert 
workshop process in 2007. These were developed according to the process detailed in 
Appendix I.1 Expert Workhsop Methodology. 
 
2.1 Scenario driving forces and ranking 
Table I-1Governance driving forces 
Code Driver/ Issue Impact Uncertainty 
G1 UNFCCC (G1.1, G 1.2, G 1.3)  5 4 
G2 EU macro target (G 2.1, G 2.2)  
5 
 
2 
G3 EU RES Directive and EE 5 2 
G4 EU G 4.1 , G 4.2 (ETS) 
 EU Burden sharing G 4.3, G4.4 
3 
4 
2 
4 
*G5 Emissions trading (JI/ CDM) 4 4 
*G6 Effective Government Incentives & Structures 
(taxes etc.) 
5 3 
*G7 Enhanced civil society response 3 3 
*G8 Ability of government to effect change 4 3 
*G9 Knowledge & Info. (G 9.1, G 9.2)  
4 
 
2 
*New drivers, issues and trends discussed in Workshop 2. 
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Table I-2 Environment driving forces 
Code Driver/ Issue Impact Uncertainty 
E1 Planning/ Sprawl 5 1 
E2 Impact of climate change 3 2 
E3 Large-scale discontinuity 5 5 
E4 LULUCF 4 2 
E5 Non-climate change emissions regulation 
(Air) 
2 2 
E6 Waste management technology switch 2 2 
E7 Transport (modes/ fuel type) BAU 5 2 
*E8 REPS -Biodiversity 3 3 
*New drivers, issues and trends discussed in Workshop 2. 
 
Table I-3 Demography driving forces 
Code Driver/ Issue Impact Uncertainty 
D1 Agriculture -population 1 2.5 
D2 Residential 
D 2.1 -household size 
*D 2.2 urbanisation/ spatial distribution 
 
4 
5 
 
2 
2.5 
D3 Commercial/ Institutional 
D 3.1 Educational attainment/ skills 
*D 3.2 Spatial planning 
D 3.3 Decentralisation 
*D 3.4 percentage of GDP/ value added 
 
 4 
 4 
 -1 
 4 
 
4 
4 
4 
4.5 
D5 Industry 
Skills/ education 
 
4 
 
4 
D6 Transport 
D6 .1 Population distribution (spatial) 
*D 6.2 Travel trends (especially aviation) 
 
5 
 
 
1 
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5 4 
D7 Energy  
D7.1 Population Size 
*D 7.2 Household Size 
D 7.3 Household behaviour 
 
5 
4 
4 
 
5 
4 
5 
*New drivers, issues and trends discussed in Workshop 2. 
 
Table I-4 Technology driving forces 
Code Driver/ Issue Impact Uncertainty 
T1 Residential 
T1.1 -Energy Efficiency 
T1.2 -Renewable Energy 
*T1.3 -Waste management 
 
4/5 
3 
5 
 
2 
3 
2 
T2 Commercial/ Institutional 
T2.1 -Technology Uptake 
T2.2 -Management/ Business process 
*T2.3 -Waste management 
 
4 
2 
5 
 
2 
4 
2 
T3 Industry 
T3.1 -Process efficiency 
T3.2 -Consumer demand 
T3.3 -Globalisation 
 
4/5 
3 
5 
 
3.5 
2 
5 
T4 Transport 
T4.1 -Transport logistics/ modal design 
T4.2 -design/ materials/ fuels 
 
5 
5 
 
2 
2 
T5 Energy 
T5.1 -Energy sources/ mix 
T5.2 -Fuel prices 
 
5 
5 
 
5 
5 
T6 Agriculture 
*T6.1 -Nutrient Efficiency/ Crop technologies 
 
2 
 
4 
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*T6.2 -Consumer preference 
T6.3 -Energy services 
3 
4 
4 
3 
*New drivers, issues and trends discussed in Workshop 2. 
 
Table I-5 Economy driving forces 
Code Driver/ Issue Impact Uncertainty 
E1 US Economic slowdown 4 3 
E2 US economic readjustment 5 5 
E3 China Economic growth 4 3-4 
E4 Energy availability (disruption) 5 2 
E5 Energy  
Disruption of supply/ Security of supply/ 
Declining fossil fuels 
4 (3 over 
longer period) 
4-5 
E6 Energy price 
E 6.1 -low 
E 6.2 -high 
 
4 
4 
 
5 
2 
E7 Carbon trading 3 2 
E8 WTO 2 5 
E9 Structural change 3-4 3 
E10 Urbanisation  
E10.1 -sprawl 
E10.2 -increased density 
4 
 
4 
4 
 
2 
E11 Transport infrastructure 
E 11.1 Road 
E 11.2 Rail 
 
4 
4 
 
1 
2 
E12 Fiscal policy 4 4 
E13 Nuclear 5 1 
E14 Consumer behaviour 4 3 
*E15 R&D 4 5 
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*E16 Construction industry -decline 3 2 
*New drivers, issues and trends discussed in Workshop 2. 
 
Table I-6 Society and culture driving forces 
Code Driver/ Issue 
 
Impact Uncertaint
y 
SC 1 Westernisation 4 2 
SC 2 Radicalisation 4 4 
SC 3 Family Fragmentation 3 2 
SC 4 Individualism 4 2 
SC 5 Leisure time/ activities 3-4 4 
SC 6 Consensus politics 2 2 
SC 7 Female participation in economy 2 1-2 
SC 8 Home ownership 2 2 
*SC 9 Environmental/ energy awareness 4 2 
*SC 10 Incentives to change behaviour 4 4 
*New drivers, issues and trends discussed in Workshop 2. 
 
2.2 Pivotal Uncertainties 
Table I-7 Group 1 pivotal uncertainties 
Pivotal 
uncertainty 
Description Impacts/ Probability 
1 UNFCCC 
process for post 
2012 target and 
regime 
 
Impacts: 
Burden sharing/ Ireland’s target. Business sector 
investment and signals. Civil society. Knowledge/ 
information. Sectors. 
 
Probability: ‘scale’ 
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Assumptions: fuzzy outcomes, clear by 2010 
2 Security of supply 
in energy 
 
Impacts: 
Geopolitics. Competitiveness. Civic unrest (eg food 
security). Economic nationalism (eg rationing). 
Economic decline. Short vs medium-term impacts. 
 
Probability: ‘binary’ 
Assumptions: deep and consistent crisis, non-
negotiable 
 
 
Table I-8 Group 2 Pivotal uncertainties 
Pivotal 
uncertainty 
Description Attributes 
1 Energy price  (high/ low) 
High impact, high uncertainty 
2 Domestic  
Economic growth 
NA 
Additional Governance -regulation strength 
-target setting high/ low 
Incentives/ taxes 
Additional Environment -sprawl 
-waste 
-transport 
-environmental protection 
Additional Demography -transport/ settlement (local) 
-travel (international) 
-inward migration 
-comstruction 
-transport –air etc. 
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Additional Technology -energy technology 
-transport technology 
-investment R & D 
-D & D transport+energy 
Additional Economy 
 
-US economic readjustment 
-FDI in Ireland 
-Energy disruption 
-economic activity 
-employment 
-income 
-structural change 
Additional Social and 
Culture 
 
-Environmental and energy awareness 
-income 
-consumer behaviour 
-home ownership 
 
 
Table I-9 Group 3 pivotal uncertainties 
Pivotal 
uncertainty 
Description Impacts/ Probability 
1 E2 US economic readjustment NA 
2 E5 Energy Disruption –supply NA 
3 E5.2-E6 Energy Price NA 
4 R&D –technological development E15, T5 NA 
5 E3 Environment discontinuity 
 
NA 
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Appendix II: Sectoral electricity CO2 attribution 
 
 
The following technique attributed electricity CO2 to the consuming sectors. The 
objective was not to comprehensively model the electricity generation sector and its 
emissions, but to arrive at an estimate of total CO2 from electricity supply under each 
scenario. This was then attributed to the sectors as input data in the scenario DA. It was 
formulated for consistency with the electricity CO2 and energy data utilised in the 
historical DA. It was based on a share allocation that allows for the evolution of the 
electricity supply based on the logics of the particular scenario. This evolution occurs in 
two ways; i) in the total electricity consumption across the sectors, from the base data 
for electricity consumption used in the scenario quantifications, and ii) in the fuel shares 
in transformation inputs. 
 
The sectoral historical model is based on Total Final Consumption (TFC) of fuels. For 
completion of CO2 data, electricity CO2 must be attributed to the consuming sectors. For 
attribution, this was achieved in the same process as in the historical data set. For the 
calculation of total electricity CO2 an aggregation of the CO2 from fossil fuel types 
(coal, oil, peat and gas), is based on the 2007 emissions coefficient for each 
Transformation Input (TI) fuel used in generation. Scenario transformation inputs are 
determined by establishing the relationship between TFC electricity and transformation 
input fuels under each scenario. Electricity CO2 is then attributed to the sectors based on 
the sectors share of total electricity consumption. A number of stages are followed in 
this process to determine transformation inputs, resultant total CO2 and attribute the 
sectoral share of this CO2 and are documented below. 
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1. Electricity consumption was quantified through the sectoral scenarios as 
a fuel type and was aggregated as TFC electricity per annum. 
2. Assuming the relationship between TFC electricity and transformation 
inputs remains constant at 2007 levels the transformation inputs were 
multiplied by the growth rate in TFC electricity. This relationship 
includes conventional thermal power plants, CHP and import/export 
balance and assumed no change in the ratio of the latter two to other 
inputs. This excluded refineries and briquetting plants as per historical. 
3. An annual generation efficiency assumption of 1.46% improvement was 
subtracted from the total transformation inputs in keeping with the 
historical pattern.305 
4. Individual shares of all fuel types in transformation input to meet this 
requirement were established annually under each scenario (for coal, 
peat, oil, gas and renewables). The evolution of fuel shares evolve 
according to the logics of the scenarios. 
5. Based on the CO2 emissions coefficients applied to transformation inputs 
in 2007, the transformation inputs are calculated as CO2 per fuel type and 
aggregated as total CO2 of electricity generation. 
6. Based on the share of TFC electricity attributable to each sector annually, 
CO2 is attributed back to each of the sectors. 
7. This was completed annually for each sector, year and scenario. 
 
                                                 
305
 Calculated from 1990-2007 as 1.46% per annum improvement in energy intensity of electricity 
generation based on final consumption of electricity divided by the fuel inputs required to generate this 
electricity. This arises from improving generation efficiency and renewables, but does not include 
transmission and distribution losses. From 2006-2007 alone, there was a 3% improvement from 42% to 
45% attributed to the commissioning of two new CCGT plants (Dennehy et al., 2009: 18). 
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Appendix III: Historical decomposition analysis 
Appendix III.1: Historical sectoral activity levels 1990-2007 
 
Table III-1 Economic sector GVA 1990-2007 (million €)  
Sector 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
              
Agriculture3 3,397 3,325 3,596 3,321 3,241 3,183 3,570 3,737 3,670 
Industry4 15,308 15,609 16,627 17,040 18,797 22,117 23,927 27,828 31,658 
Public services5 4,209 4,186 4,278 4,263 4,235 4,286 4,366 4,376 4,490 
Commercial Services6 37,391 38,320 38,718 40,407 41,774 43,671 47,742 52,449 55,610 
         
Total GVA1,2 60,305 61,441 63,219 65,031 68,046 73,257 79,606 88,390 95,428 
 
Sector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  
Agriculture3 3,586 3,564 3,576 3,523 3,648 3,728 4,086 3,812 3,863 
Industry4 35,707 38,970 41,544 45,268 46,016 47,895 50,044 52,609 56,754 
Public services5 4,554 4,680 4,852 5,019 5,125 5,249 5,298 5,396 5,529 
Commercial Services6 60,144 65,624 70,915 74,427 78,480 83,403 89,167 94,356 100,911 
         
Total GVA1,2 103,991 112,838 120,887 128,237 133,269 140,274 148,596 156,173 167,057 
1Chain linked and referenced to 2006. 
2Figures for years 1990 to 1994 exclude FISIM, figures for years 1995 to 2007 include FISIM.     
3Agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
4Industry (including construction). 
5Public administration (and defence). 
6Services (including other services, distribution, transport and communications). 
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Table III-2 Transport and residential activity 1990-2007 
Sector 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Transport 
         
Road private car (million pkm) 20,870 21,363 21,855 22,346 23,328 24,798 25,775 27,747 29,225 
Road Freight (million tkm) 5,130 5,138 5,150 5,095 5,258 5,493 6,316 6,998 8,184 
Road Passenger Bus/cab     (million pkm) 4,182 4,447 4,669 4,887 5,448 5,673 5,896 6,169 6,427 
Rail passenger (million pkm) 1,226 1,290 1,226 1,274 1,260 1,291 1,295 1,387 1,421 
Rail Freight (million tkm) 589 603 633 575 569 602 570 522 466 
Rail Total (million pkm + tkm) 1,814 1,893 1,859 1,848 1,830 1,894 1,865 1,910 1,887 
Domestic aviation (million pkm) 89 83 83 73 76 87 93 98 108 
Total Transport (million pkm + tkm) 32,085 32,924 33,616 34,249 35,939 37,944 39,946 42,922 45,831 
Residential 
         
Household numbers 1,018,305 1,029,084 1,048,021 1,067,306 1,086,947 1,106,948 1,127,318 1,152,628 1,178,505 
 
Sector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Transport 
         
Road private car (million pkm) 30,684 31,673 32,610 34,071 35,038 36,028 37,506 39,483 41,414 
Road Freight (million tkm) 10,228 12,263 12,291 14,282 15,679 17,011 17,819 17,322 18,707 
Road Passenger Bus/cab     (million pkm) 6,746 6,997 7,374 7,681 7,993 8,144 8,465 8,902 9,791 
Rail passenger (million pkm) 1,458 1,389 1,515 1,628 1,601 1,623 1,917 2,033 2,183 
Rail Freight (million tkm) 526 491 516 426 398 399 303 207 129 
Rail Total (million pkm + tkm) 1,984 1,880 2,031 2,054 1,999 2,022 2,221 2,240 2,312 
Domestic aviation (million pkm) 122 131 130 121 124 121 114 154 170 
Total Transport (million pkm + tkm) 49,763 52,944 54,436 58,209 60,833 63,326 66,125 68,101 72,395 
Residential 
         
Household numbers 1,204,964 1,232,017 1,259,677 1,287,958 1,331,129 1,375,748 1,421,861 1,469,521 1,518,778 
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Appendix III.2: Sectoral Historical DA 1990-2007 
 
 
Table III-3 Industry DA 1990-2007 and cross-sectoral total 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆C industry  
total 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0283 1.0236 1.0000 1.0006 1.0066 1.0008 1.0188 0.9966 
1991-1992 0.9994 0.9898 1.0231 1.0013 0.9083 1.0352 1.0288 0.9988 
1992-1993 1.0047 1.0288 0.9937 1.0013 1.0252 0.9963 1.0287 0.9841 
1993-1994 1.0358 1.0604 0.9966 1.0013 0.9661 1.0540 1.0462 0.9976 
1994-1995 1.0245 1.0537 1.0158 1.0008 0.8772 1.0929 1.0766 1.0042 
1995-1996 1.0499 1.0128 1.0350 0.9949 0.9166 0.9956 1.0865 0.9920 
1996-1997 1.0291 1.0707 0.9958 1.0024 0.9254 1.0474 1.1103 0.9967 
1997-1998 1.0674 1.0260 1.0161 0.9915 0.9053 1.0537 1.0796 0.9889 
1998-1999 1.0487 1.0297 0.9944 1.0017 0.9213 1.0350 1.0897 0.9949 
1999-2000 1.0520 1.0801 0.9810 1.0013 1.0317 1.0058 1.0850 0.9767 
2000-2001 1.0518 1.0241 1.0097 0.9942 0.9286 0.9951 1.0713 1.0305 
2001-2002 0.9761 0.9347 1.0138 0.9983 0.8867 1.0272 1.0608 0.9559 
2002-2003 0.9972 0.9223 0.9826 1.0015 0.9675 0.9782 1.0392 0.9530 
2003-2004 1.0016 0.9827 0.9648 0.9939 1.0139 0.9889 1.0525 0.9712 
2004-2005 1.0530 1.0619 1.0232 0.9886 1.0018 0.9864 1.0593 1.0029 
2005-2006 1.0051 1.0194 1.0279 1.0009 0.9681 1.0003 1.0509 0.9736 
2006-2007 0.9873 0.9482 0.9832 1.0047 0.9281 1.0085 1.0696 0.9587 
 
        
∆C1990-2007 1.4935 1.2835 1.0552 0.9793 0.4215 1.3378 2.7678 0.7959 
∆Crsd -3.631E-07  
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Table III-4 Commercial services DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0615 1.0068 1.0000 1.0369 1.0059 1.0188 0.9921 
1991-1992 1.0541 1.0102 1.0000 1.0309 0.9820 1.0289 1.0018 
1992-1993 1.0037 0.9978 1.0000 0.9814 1.0146 1.0287 0.9822 
1993-1994 1.0662 0.9770 1.0000 1.0611 0.9880 1.0464 0.9948 
1994-1995 0.9951 1.0396 1.0000 0.9120 0.9711 1.0765 1.0040 
1995-1996 1.0636 1.0106 1.0000 0.9669 1.0060 1.0867 0.9956 
1996-1997 1.0487 1.0115 1.0000 0.9546 0.9894 1.1103 0.9886 
1997-1998 1.0325 1.0160 1.0000 0.9700 0.9821 1.0796 0.9881 
1998-1999 1.0901 1.0136 1.0000 1.0008 0.9925 1.0897 0.9936 
1999-2000 1.0385 1.0236 1.0000 0.9653 1.0056 1.0851 0.9633 
2000-2001 1.0802 1.0069 1.0000 0.9619 1.0087 1.0713 1.0322 
2001-2002 1.0326 1.0422 1.0000 1.0002 0.9894 1.0608 0.9438 
2002-2003 1.0996 1.0342 1.0000 1.0769 1.0145 1.0389 0.9368 
2003-2004 0.9388 1.0118 1.0000 0.9159 1.0097 1.0526 0.9533 
2004-2005 1.0501 0.9934 0.9997 0.9844 1.0092 1.0593 1.0048 
2005-2006 0.9244 0.9986 0.9985 0.9125 1.0067 1.0500 0.9612 
2006-2007 0.9716 1.0155 0.9965 0.9625 0.9998 1.0682 0.9341 
        
∆C1990-2007 1.6870 1.2283 0.9947 0.7203 0.9740 2.7624 0.7125 
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Table III-5 Public services DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0199 1.0117 1.0000 1.0195 0.9762 1.0188 0.9943 
1991-1992 0.9879 1.0126 1.0000 0.9550 0.9930 1.0289 0.9998 
1992-1993 0.9920 1.0000 1.0000 1.0078 0.9688 1.0287 0.9876 
1993-1994 1.0310 0.9946 1.0000 1.0484 0.9494 1.0463 0.9954 
1994-1995 0.9568 1.0324 1.0000 0.9135 0.9402 1.0765 1.0025 
1995-1996 1.0574 1.0153 1.0000 1.0252 0.9376 1.0865 0.9973 
1996-1997 1.0118 1.0192 1.0000 0.9997 0.9026 1.1103 0.9910 
1997-1998 1.0038 1.0186 1.0000 0.9693 0.9504 1.0796 0.9908 
1998-1999 1.0779 1.0133 1.0000 1.0538 0.9308 1.0897 0.9952 
1999-2000 1.0467 1.0101 1.0000 1.0382 0.9472 1.0850 0.9712 
2000-2001 1.0727 1.0041 1.0000 1.0042 0.9676 1.0713 1.0262 
2001-2002 1.0137 1.0497 1.0000 0.9786 0.9751 1.0608 0.9540 
2002-2003 1.0571 1.0467 0.9958 1.0512 0.9827 1.0392 0.9447 
2003-2004 0.9463 1.0096 0.9999 0.9516 0.9730 1.0526 0.9618 
2004-2005 1.0521 0.9931 0.9993 1.0460 0.9530 1.0593 1.0040 
2005-2006 0.9312 0.9984 0.9999 0.9468 0.9689 1.0510 0.9675 
2006-2007 0.9846 1.0077 1.0012 1.0070 0.9580 1.0697 0.9457 
        
∆C1990-2007 1.2535 1.2629 0.9961 1.0013 0.4744 2.7685 0.7578 
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Table III-6 Agriculture DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Ces ∆Cet ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0299 0.9978 1.0000 1.0593 0.9608 1.0188 0.9955 
1991-1992 1.0288 1.0082 1.0000 0.9425 1.0512 1.0289 1.0010 
1992-1993 1.0017 1.0046 1.0000 1.0914 0.8976 1.0287 0.9894 
1993-1994 1.0912 0.9781 1.0000 1.1465 0.9328 1.0464 0.9970 
1994-1995 1.1078 0.9776 1.0000 1.1513 0.9123 1.0766 1.0022 
1995-1996 0.8797 1.0556 1.0000 0.7451 1.0321 1.0866 0.9974 
1996-1997 1.0317 1.0024 1.0000 0.9902 0.9427 1.1103 0.9931 
1997-1998 1.0107 1.0151 1.0000 1.0212 0.9097 1.0796 0.9928 
1998-1999 0.9992 0.9717 1.0000 1.0565 0.8965 1.0897 0.9963 
1999-2000 1.0259 1.0056 1.0000 1.0469 0.9159 1.0851 0.9805 
2000-2001 1.0462 1.0097 1.0000 1.0158 0.9366 1.0713 1.0165 
2001-2002 0.9732 0.9992 1.0000 1.0181 0.9289 1.0608 0.9708 
2002-2003 0.9703 0.9993 1.0000 0.9690 0.9962 1.0392 0.9679 
2003-2004 0.9529 1.0077 1.0000 0.9451 0.9709 1.0526 0.9791 
2004-2005 1.0705 0.9978 1.0000 0.9766 1.0348 1.0593 1.0022 
2005-2006 0.9393 0.9993 1.0000 1.0259 0.8877 1.0510 0.9822 
2006-2007 0.9043 0.9965 0.9995 0.9230 0.9472 1.0697 0.9709 
        
∆C1990-2007 1.0328 1.0238 0.9995 1.0496 0.4105 2.7696 0.8458 
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Table III-7 Private car DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0605 1.0000 1.0000 1.0350 0.9976 1.0261 1.0009 
1991-1992 1.0316 1.0000 1.0000 1.0079 1.0020 1.0210 1.0006 
1992-1993 1.0425 1.0000 1.0000 1.0189 1.0036 1.0188 1.0006 
1993-1994 1.0573 1.0000 1.0000 1.0123 0.9949 1.0493 1.0005 
1994-1995 1.0566 1.0000 1.0000 0.9936 1.0068 1.0558 1.0004 
1995-1996 1.0690 1.0000 1.0000 1.0280 0.9873 1.0528 1.0004 
1996-1997 1.0725 1.0000 1.0000 0.9962 1.0019 1.0745 1.0001 
1997-1998 1.0542 1.0000 1.0000 1.0008 0.9864 1.0678 1.0001 
1998-1999 1.0579 1.0000 1.0000 1.0078 0.9670 1.0858 0.9998 
1999-2000 1.0362 1.0000 1.0000 1.0042 0.9702 1.0639 0.9997 
2000-2001 1.0893 1.0000 1.0000 1.0580 1.0014 1.0282 1.0000 
2001-2002 1.0067 1.0000 1.0000 0.9631 0.9771 1.0693 1.0004 
2002-2003 1.0488 1.0000 1.0000 1.0200 0.9840 1.0451 0.9999 
2003-2004 1.0401 1.0000 1.0000 1.0111 0.9878 1.0410 1.0004 
2004-2005 1.0250 1.0000 0.9994 0.9849 0.9970 1.0442 1.0002 
2005-2006 1.0602 1.0000 0.9993 1.0066 1.0222 1.0299 1.0012 
2006-2007 1.0704 1.0000 0.9914 1.0283 0.9867 1.0630 1.0009 
        
∆C1990-2007 2.3485 1.0000 0.9902 1.1879 0.8795 2.2563 1.0062 
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Table III-8 Road freight 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0444 1.0000 1.0000 1.0427 0.9760 1.0261 1.0000 
1991-1992 1.0124 1.0000 1.0000 1.0101 0.9817 1.0210 1.0000 
1992-1993 0.9830 1.0000 1.0000 0.9936 0.9710 1.0188 1.0000 
1993-1994 1.0220 1.0000 1.0000 0.9903 0.9835 1.0493 1.0000 
1994-1995 1.0461 1.0000 1.0000 1.0014 0.9895 1.0558 1.0000 
1995-1996 1.1490 1.0000 1.0000 0.9993 1.0922 1.0528 1.0000 
1996-1997 1.0776 1.0000 1.0000 0.9726 1.0312 1.0745 1.0000 
1997-1998 1.1510 1.0000 1.0000 0.9842 1.0952 1.0678 1.0000 
1998-1999 1.2360 1.0000 1.0000 0.9890 1.1510 1.0858 1.0000 
1999-2000 1.2423 1.0000 1.0000 1.0361 1.1269 1.0639 1.0000 
2000-2001 1.0148 1.0000 1.0000 1.0125 0.9748 1.0282 1.0000 
2001-2002 1.1685 1.0000 1.0000 1.0056 1.0867 1.0693 1.0000 
2002-2003 1.1154 1.0000 1.0000 1.0161 1.0504 1.0451 1.0000 
2003-2004 1.0497 1.0000 1.0000 0.9675 1.0422 1.0410 1.0000 
2004-2005 1.0793 1.0000 1.0000 1.0304 1.0032 1.0442 1.0000 
2005-2006 0.9744 1.0000 1.0000 1.0023 0.9439 1.0299 1.0000 
2006-2007 1.0823 1.0000 1.0000 1.0021 1.0159 1.0630 1.0000 
        
∆C1990-2007 3.8427 1.0000 1.0000 1.0538 1.6162 2.2563 1.0000 
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Table III-9 Road public passenger DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0966 1.0000 1.0000 1.0304 1.0363 1.0261 1.0008 
1991-1992 0.9729 1.0000 1.0000 0.9264 1.0284 1.0210 1.0001 
1992-1993 1.0500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0031 1.0273 1.0188 1.0001 
1993-1994 1.0059 1.0000 1.0000 0.9027 1.0623 1.0493 0.9997 
1994-1995 1.0964 1.0000 1.0000 1.0533 0.9863 1.0558 0.9996 
1995-1996 1.0855 1.0000 1.0000 1.0448 0.9873 1.0528 0.9996 
1996-1997 0.9740 1.0000 1.0000 0.9318 0.9737 1.0745 0.9991 
1997-1998 1.1748 1.0000 1.0000 1.1263 0.9758 1.0678 1.0010 
1998-1999 1.1349 1.0000 1.0000 1.0816 0.9666 1.0858 0.9998 
1999-2000 0.9411 1.0000 1.0000 0.9078 0.9750 1.0639 0.9994 
2000-2001 1.1265 1.0000 1.0000 1.0707 1.0250 1.0282 0.9984 
2001-2002 1.0833 1.0000 1.0000 1.0398 0.9741 1.0693 1.0002 
2002-2003 1.1531 1.0000 1.0000 1.1090 0.9957 1.0451 0.9992 
2003-2004 0.9879 1.0000 1.0000 0.9704 0.9789 1.0410 0.9990 
2004-2005 1.3308 1.0000 1.0000 1.2830 0.9954 1.0442 0.9980 
2005-2006 1.0142 1.0000 1.0000 0.9648 1.0211 1.0299 0.9996 
2006-2007 1.1058 1.0000 1.0000 1.0051 1.0347 1.0630 1.0003 
        
∆C1990-2007 3.4003 1.0000 1.0000 1.4613 1.0377 2.2563 0.9938 
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Table III-10 Rail DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 0.9788 1.0062 1.0000 0.9252 1.0259 1.0261 0.9987 
1991-1992 0.9078 1.0081 1.0000 0.9477 0.9304 1.0210 1.0003 
1992-1993 1.0899 0.9973 1.0000 1.0550 1.0200 1.0188 0.9968 
1993-1994 0.9476 1.0044 1.0000 0.9542 0.9430 1.0493 0.9991 
1994-1995 0.9373 1.0058 1.0000 0.9088 0.9704 1.0558 1.0008 
1995-1996 1.1509 0.9924 1.0000 1.1571 0.9529 1.0527 0.9991 
1996-1997 0.9894 1.0184 1.0000 0.9091 0.9968 1.0745 0.9978 
1997-1998 1.0287 1.0012 1.0000 1.0060 0.9590 1.0678 0.9975 
1998-1999 0.9711 1.0071 1.0000 0.9411 0.9450 1.0858 0.9986 
1999-2000 0.9919 1.0041 1.0000 1.0448 0.8957 1.0639 0.9922 
2000-2001 1.0852 0.9924 1.0000 0.9962 1.0609 1.0282 1.0063 
2001-2002 0.8664 1.0010 1.0000 0.8144 1.0047 1.0693 0.9893 
2002-2003 1.0795 0.9931 1.0000 1.1178 0.9410 1.0451 0.9888 
2003-2004 1.1615 1.0612 1.0000 1.0902 0.9737 1.0408 0.9906 
2004-2005 0.9454 1.0301 1.0000 0.7757 1.1315 1.0441 1.0014 
2005-2006 0.9909 0.9919 1.0000 0.9855 1.0068 1.0068 1.0000 
2006-2007 1.0439 0.9816 1.0000 0.9903 1.0101 1.0630 1.0000 
        
∆C1990-2007 1.1189 1.0980 1.0000 0.6248 0.7721 2.2051 0.9580 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
406 
 
Table III-11 Domestic aviation DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 0.9008 1.0000 1.0000 0.9687 0.9063 1.0261 0.9998 
1991-1992 0.8100 1.0000 1.0000 0.8114 0.9780 1.0210 0.9996 
1992-1993 1.4245 1.0000 1.0000 1.6214 0.8617 1.0188 1.0007 
1993-1994 0.9891 1.0000 1.0000 0.9519 0.9901 1.0493 1.0001 
1994-1995 1.0659 1.0000 1.0000 0.9287 1.0873 1.0558 0.9999 
1995-1996 0.8623 1.0000 1.0000 0.8055 1.0169 1.0528 0.9999 
1996-1997 1.2328 1.0000 1.0000 1.1667 0.9834 1.0745 1.0000 
1997-1998 1.1333 1.0000 1.0000 1.0347 1.0255 1.0678 1.0002 
1998-1999 1.0753 1.0000 1.0000 0.9501 1.0426 1.0858 0.9997 
1999-2000 1.2839 1.0000 1.0000 1.1915 1.0127 1.0639 1.0001 
2000-2001 1.0803 1.0000 1.0000 1.0943 0.9601 1.0282 1.0000 
2001-2002 0.9091 1.0000 1.0000 0.9781 0.8692 1.0693 1.0000 
2002-2003 0.9605 1.0000 1.0000 0.9339 0.9843 1.0451 0.9998 
2003-2004 1.0300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0550 0.9378 1.0410 1.0000 
2004-2005 1.2098 1.0000 1.0000 1.2838 0.9024 1.0442 1.0002 
2005-2006 1.1495 1.0000 1.0000 0.8542 1.3066 1.0299 1.0001 
2006-2007 1.0534 1.0000 1.0000 0.9505 1.0425 1.0630 1.0001 
        
∆C1990-2007 2.5936 1.0000 1.0000 1.3631 0.8430 2.2563 1.0004 
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Table III-12 Unspecified and fuel tourism DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Cts ∆Ctt ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 0.9758 0.9758 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1991-1992 1.4204 1.4212 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 
1992-1993 0.8756 0.8733 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0026 
1993-1994 1.0465 1.0444 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0021 
1994-1995 0.9055 0.9085 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9967 
1995-1996 1.5790 1.5689 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0064 
1996-1997 1.0007 1.0012 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 
1997-1998 1.5682 1.5678 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0002 
1998-1999 1.1085 1.1093 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9994 
1999-2000 1.0446 1.0453 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9993 
2000-2001 0.9838 0.9814 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0025 
2001-2002 0.9059 0.9091 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9964 
2002-2003 0.8169 0.8154 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0018 
2003-2004 1.1140 1.1124 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0014 
2004-2005 1.0904 1.0920 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9985 
2005-2006 1.1709 1.1707 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0002 
2006-2007 1.0636 1.0612 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0022 
        
∆C1990-2007 3.6342 3.6026 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0088 
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Table III-13 Residential DA 1990-2007 
Year ∆Ctotal ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint ∆Chn ∆Cemc 
1990-1991 1.0190 0.9931 1.0026 1.0149 1.0106 0.9977 
1991-1992 0.9504 1.0251 1.0021 0.9068 1.0184 1.0018 
1992-1993 0.9920 0.9951 0.9997 0.9911 1.0184 0.9878 
1993-1994 0.9972 0.9905 1.0009 0.9900 1.0184 0.9977 
1994-1995 1.0126 0.9908 1.0011 0.9989 1.0184 1.0036 
1995-1996 1.0299 0.9928 1.0018 1.0216 1.0184 0.9954 
1996-1997 0.9730 1.0068 1.0008 0.9491 1.0224 0.9952 
1997-1998 1.0548 0.9830 1.0005 1.0583 1.0224 0.9912 
1998-1999 1.0059 0.9964 1.0031 0.9898 1.0224 0.9946 
1999-2000 1.0099 1.0038 1.0005 1.0074 1.0224 0.9764 
2000-2001 1.0725 0.9929 1.0006 1.0322 1.0224 1.0228 
2001-2002 0.9485 0.9968 1.0000 0.9668 1.0224 0.9626 
2002-2003 0.9953 0.9967 1.0006 1.0063 1.0335 0.9596 
2003-2004 1.0127 0.9967 1.0004 1.0113 1.0335 0.9718 
2004-2005 1.0342 0.9990 0.9996 0.9988 1.0335 1.0033 
2005-2006 0.9992 1.0119 0.9997 0.9791 1.0335 0.9762 
2006-2007 0.9417 1.0056 0.9973 0.9445 1.0335 0.9620 
       
∆C1990-2007 1.0396 0.9767 1.0113 0.8658 1.4910 0.8153 
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Appendix IV: Population scenarios 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5 Scenario Driving Forces, the two key demographic drivers 
of population change in Ireland are natural increase and net migration. The primary 
driver of population change in Ireland has been net migration in the recent past. Net 
migration is largely dictated by economic growth, as out migration is encouraged by 
a weak economy while immigration is encouraged with a stronger economy to meet 
labour force demands. For natural increase, the fertility and mortality rates are less 
subject to the impact of economic growth. Natural increase is linked to other social 
and cultural variables. Irish fertility rates are not responding to global trends of a 
reduction in fertility with affluence, while mortality rates are less volatile and may be 
linked to social equality and access to appropriate health care. 
 
The following population scenarios explore changes in natural increase and 
migration patterns. Current population projections for Ireland do not directly 
coincide with the logics of the scenarios, given the more uni-dimensional nature of 
current national population scenarios and given the confounding factor of the 
economic recession and its impact on population projections.306 These scenarios 
have been produced to respond to difficulties with using current projections; (i) using 
the logics of the scenarios developed in this research, (ii) to incorporate the effect of 
the recession and assumed recovery on population change. 
 
                                                 
306
 Which were produced before the impact of the recession became apparent and do not explicitly 
consider factors such as the economy. 
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The population scenarios explored below are estimated cumulatively by net change 
per annum (Function 1). This is based on the exploration of the driving forces and 
the logics of the applicable scenario on natural increase and net migration. These 
were then added to the estimates for 2007 from CSO, (2009b). The results of the 
projections were consulted with a member of the CSO Expert Group on demographic 
projections Mr. Brian Hughes in 2009. Official projections of the CSO (2008a) have 
been included in the discussion of driving forces. Alternative projections noted are 
less than what appears currently plausible even given the effect of the economic 
recession. Base year population was higher than that assumed in these alternative 
projections due to rapid growth in population since 2000 which became apparent in 
the 2006 national census.  
 
The method of demographic projection used is a simple component method, as 
opposed to the more elaborate and commonly used “cohort-component method” (O’ 
Neill et al., 2001). Nevertheless, it allows a set of original population scenario 
estimates to be produced for the purposes of this research consistent with the 
scenario logics. Simple approaches can be valuable in the shorter term, while 
scenarios offer an approach to engage with uncertainty in population change as 
opposed to probabilistic techniques (O’ Neill et al., 2001). The eventual out-turn of 
the population scenarios are comparable to the results of (CSO, 2008a) but tend to be 
less than the upper range provided by CSO in 2020. As the population scenarios are 
not based on the cohort-component method, they should not be viewed as definitive. 
The process of developing these population scenarios allows further exploration of 
plausible outcomes, and internal consistency within the evolution of the overall 
scenarios. This is illustrated by the comparison of the population scenarios to 
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existing CSO projections, both in terms of pattern of evolution and absolute total. 
The CSO projections range in 2021 is from 4,686,000 in M0F2 to 5,688,000 in 
M1F1. The 2020 population scenarios detailed below range from the lowest in IE3; 
4,824,000 to the highest in IE4; 5,499,000.  
 
Pop. (x+1) = Pop. (x) + Natural Increase (x+1) + Net Migration (x+1) 
                                                                                                                                                               (1) 
In this function Pop. denotes total population, x denotes year, Natural Increase 
includes an assumption on fertility and mortality, while Net Migration is the total of 
immigration minus emigration. 
 
Population scenario IE1 
 
The 2008 and 2009 estimates are based on CSO population and migration estimates 
(CSO, 2008b; CSO, 2009a). Population growth in IE1 sees a slight increase in 
emigration and slight decrease in immigration from 2008-2010 as the slump 
dampens the economic driving force of migration. Net migration is moderated as 
emigration increases, but in this sustainability scenario the turbulence is less 
pronounced. From 2011-2015 and 2016-2020 net migration is similar to CSO M1F2 
(CSO, 2008a: 44). Sustainability is applied in migration policy to moderate the 
economic influence on immigration causing large fluctuations. Natural increase is 
similar to low fertility assumption of CSO M1F1 (CSO, 2008a: 44). Total population 
in 2020 is 5.304 million and is a similar outturn to M2F2 (CSO, 2008a) because of 
the effect of the recession. 
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Table IV-1 Population change in macro scenario IE1 (thousand inhabitants) 
 Immigration 
 
Emigration Net 
migration 
Natural 
Increase 
Total 
2008 70 55 15 45 60 
2009 55 65 -10 45 35 
2010 60 60 0 45 45 
2011-2015* 90 45 45 40 85 
2016-2020* 85 45 40 40 80 
*2011-2015 and 2016-2020 figures are the change per annum in these periods. 
 
Population scenario IE2 
 
The 2008 and 2009 estimates are based on CSO population and migration estimates 
(CSO, 2008b; CSO, 2009a). Population growth in IE2 sees slightly larger increase in 
emigration and decrease in immigration from 2008-2010 as the slump dampens the 
economic driving force of migration. Net migration is moderated as emigration 
increases, but in this sustainability scenario the turbulence is less pronounced, 
although net migration is more negative than IE1. From 2011-2015 and 2016-2020 
net migration is very weak as the dampened economy provides less incentive for 
economic migration and the result is less than  (CSO, 2008a) M2F2 and closer to 
M0. However turbulence is less pronounced and net migration is stronger than IE3. 
Natural increase is high due to current high fertility rate, but moderates and is similar 
to M2F2. Total population in 2020 is 4.944 million, which is between (CSO, 2008a) 
M2F2 and M0F1, because of dip in migration and lower fertility. 
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Table IV-2 Population change in macro scenario IE2 (thousand inhabitants) 
 Immigration Emigration Net 
migration 
Natural 
Increase 
Total 
2008 70 55 15 45 60 
2009 50 70 -20 45 25 
2010 50 75 -25 45 20 
2011-2015* 55 50 5 40 45 
2016-2020* 65 50 15 40 55 
*2011-2015 and 2016-2020 figures are the change per annum in these periods 
 
Population scenario IE3 
 
The 2008 and 2009 estimates are based on CSO population and migration estimates 
(CSO, 2008b; CSO, 2009a). Population growth in IE3 is the weakest, with net 
outflows from 2009-2010 as the weakened economy and fluid migration leads to 
emigration. Net migration is higher, as this lower sustainability scenario sees more 
turbulence occurring as unemployment rises and social equity is harmed. From 2011-
2015 and 2016-2020 net migration is weaker than IE2 as the poor economy provides 
less incentive for economic migration. Net migration is closer to that of the early 
1990’s and closer to M0. Natural increase is high, due to current high fertility rate, 
although it is similar to M2F1, while weaker economic growth weakens fertility later 
in scenario from comparable IE4 levels. Total population in 2020 is 4.824 million. 
This is less than IE2 due to weaker net migration, as a consequence of lower 
economic growth. This out-turn is between (CSO, 2008a) M0F1 and M2F2. 
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Table IV-3 Population change in macro scenario IE3 (thousand inhabitants) 
 Immigration Emigration Net 
migration 
Natural 
Increase 
Total 
2008 70 55 15 45 60 
2009 40 85 -45 45 0 
2010 40 85 -45 45 0 
2011-2015* 50 55 -5 45 40 
2016-2020* 55 55 0 45 45 
*2011-2015 and 2016-2020 figures are the change per annum in these periods 
 
Population scenario IE4 
 
The 2008 and 2009 estimates are based on CSO population and migration estimates 
(CSO, 2008b; CSO, 2009a). Population growth in IE4 is high, as economic growth is 
strongest, and migration policy and patterns continue to be dictated by economic 
concerns. A slight increase in emigration and slight decrease in immigration from 
2008-2010 does occur. Net migration is moderated, as potential economic 
opportunity sees migrant retention. From 2011-2015 and 2016-2020, net migration 
approaches previous levels of 2000’s but less pronounced than 2005-2007 (CSO, 
2008a). Post recession immigration rates are lower than historically, but there is a 
strong economic influence on immigration and net migration is higher than M1F1. 
Natural increase is high due to current high fertility rate and economic growth. The 
results in 2020 are similar to (CSO, 2008a) M1F2 due to the effect of the recession. 
Total population in 2020 is 5.499 million, slightly below (CSO, 2008a) M1F2 in 
2020 (5.510). 
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Table IV-4 Population change in macro scenario IE4 (thousand inhabitants) 
 Immigration Emigration Net 
migration 
Natural 
Increase 
Total 
2008 70 55 15 45 60 
2009 45 75 -30 45 15 
2010 70 55 15 45 60 
2011-2015* 100 40 60 50 110 
2016-2020* 90 45 45 50 95 
*2011-2015 and 2016-2020 figures are the change per annum in these periods 
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 Appendix V: 
EU  
 
In the table below the legislative and policy development for EU Member States 
incorporated in Capros 
baseline. 
 
Table V-1 Legislative and policy requirements of EU member states
 
 
419 
Legislative and policy requirements of 
et al. (2008: 24) are illustrated and their considerati
 
 
on in the 
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Appendix VI: Scenario Axes of O’ Mahony (2008) 
 
 
The scenario axes of Figure 6-1 in Chapter 6 could be related to that published by the 
International Institute of European Affairs (O’ Mahony, 2008), in examining the 
social and economic consequences of climate change to 2020. This is with the caveat 
that the scenarios were produced for a fundamentally different purpose and 
exhibiting fundamental differences. The corresponding scenarios being IE1 –
‘Greening the Tiger,’ IE2 –‘All things Frugal,’ IE3 - ‘Climate Chaos’ and IE4 – 
‘Ostrich approach’ 
  
Figure AVII-1 Scenario axes from O' Mahony, (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Ostrich Approach’ 
’Greening the Tiger’ 
Strong environmental policy 
Economic 
slowdown 
‘All Things Frugal’ 
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Strong economic 
growth 
Weak environmental policy 
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Appendix VII: Sectoral scenario activity and DA results 
 
Appendix VII.1: Sectoral scenario IE1 activity and DA results 
 
 
Table VII-1 Scenario IE1 economic sector GVA 2007-2020 (million €) 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
              
Agriculture 3,863 3,828 3,675 3,638 3,663 3,689 3,715 3,741 3,767 3,786 3,805 3,824 3,843 3,862 
Industry 56,754 55,732 49,657 49,161 50,169 51,172 52,605 54,393 56,134 57,537 58,803 60,067 60,968 61,883 
Public services 5,529 5,640 5,358 5,251 5,303 5,388 5,474 5,562 5,651 5,719 5,787 5,857 5,927 5,998 
Commercial Services 100,911 99,700 92,622 91,695 93,621 97,834 104,193 111,435 119,235 125,137 130,518 136,130 141,303 146,673 
Total GVA 167,057 164,900 151,312 149,745 152,756 158,083 165,987 175,131 184,787 192,179 198,914 205,879 212,042 218,416 
GVA growth rate -1.29 -8.24 -1.04 2.01 3.49 5.00 5.51 5.51 4.00 3.50 3.50 2.99 3.01 
Source: 2007 data (Central Statistics Office), 2008-2020 estimates for scenario analysis 
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Table VII-2 Scenario IE1 transport and residential Activity 2007-2020 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Transport 
(million pkm and tkm)307 
              
Road  
private car  
41,414 41,000 38,130 37,748 38,088 38,659 39,549 40,537 41,551 42,299 42,933 43,577 44,187 44,806 
 
Road  
Freight 
 
 
18,707 
 
18,146 
 
16,331 
 
16,005 
 
16,325 
 
16,651 
 
17,101 
 
17,631 
 
18,142 
 
18,550 
 
18,921 
 
19,290 
 
19,522 
 
19,776 
Road Passenger  
 
9,791 10,281 9,973 9,873 10,051 10,382 10,881 11,479 12,168 12,715 13,224 13,753 14,234 14,732 
Rail  
passenger  
2,183 2,118 2,033 2,013 2,033 2,074 2,146 2,232 2,321 2,403 2,482 2,564 2,648 2,736 
Rail  
Freight  
129 125 113 111 114 118 125 134 143 151 157 164 170 176 
Rail Total  2,312 2,243 2,146 2,124 2,147 2,192 2,272 2,366 2,465 2,553 2,639 2,728 2,819 2,912 
Domestic aviation  170 134 121 117 119 120 122 125 127 129 130 131 133 134 
Total  
Transport  
 
72,395 
 
71,804 
 
66,700 
 
65,867 
 
66,729 
 
68,005 
 
69,924 
 
72,138 
 
74,453 
 
76,246 
 
77,848 
 
79,480 
 
80,894 
 
82,360 
 
Residential 
              
Household no.’s 1,518,778 1,578,778 1,603,778 1,628,778 1,658,778 1,703,778 1,748,778 1,793,778 1,838,778 1,878,778 1,918,778 1,958,778 1,998,778 2,038,778 
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 Note: Road Private Car, Road Public Passenger (Bus and Cab), Rail Passenger, Domestic aviation in million p-km. Road Freight and Rail Freight in million t-km. 
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Table VII-3 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 industry and sectoral total 
Year ∆C total ∆C total 
industry 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
          
2007-2008 1.0166  0.9411 1.0026 1.0013 0.9516 0.9948 0.9871 1.0032 
2008-2009 0.9206  0.8655 1.0053 0.9960 0.9771 0.9710 0.9176 0.9929 
2009-2010 0.9775  0.9720 1.0022 0.9940 0.9960 1.0004 0.9896 0.9895 
2010-2011 0.9931  0.9798 1.0015 0.9943 0.9779 1.0004 1.0201 0.9860 
2011-2012 1.0016  0.9900 1.0018 0.9940 0.9810 0.9856 1.0349 0.9935 
2012-2013 1.0058  0.9910 1.0015 0.9936 0.9747 0.9790 1.0500 0.9939 
2013-2014 1.0087  0.9958 1.0019 0.9934 0.9717 0.9800 1.0551 0.9958 
2014-2015 1.0096  0.9965 1.0019 0.9929 0.9744 0.9781 1.0551 0.9962 
2015-2016 1.0084  0.9952 1.0016 0.9920 0.9779 0.9856 1.0400 0.9993 
2016-2017 1.0076  0.9933 1.0008 0.9912 0.9803 0.9874 1.0350 0.9994 
2017-2018 1.0080  0.9936 1.0008 0.9906 0.9818 0.9869 1.0350 0.9994 
2018-2019 1.0067  0.9931 1.0013 0.9897 0.9878 0.9855 1.0299 0.9994 
2019-2020 1.0071  0.9934 1.0013 0.9890 0.9889 0.9854 1.0301 0.9994 
 
         
2007-2020 0.9679  0.7318 1.0248 0.9153 0.7538 0.8340 1.3074 0.9492 
 
         
Rsd 4.4409E-
15 
 
 2.0095E-14       
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Table VII-4 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 commercial services 
Year ∆C total 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.0732 1.0136 0.9952 1.0713 1.0009 0.9874 1.0049 
2008-2009  0.9207 1.0117 0.9936 0.9968 1.0124 0.9176 0.9891 
2009-2010  0.9683 1.0072 0.9928 0.9943 1.0004 0.9896 0.9837 
2010-2011  0.9814 1.0039 0.9941 0.9848 1.0009 1.0201 0.9780 
2011-2012  0.9941 1.0046 0.9971 0.9596 1.0098 1.0349 0.9897 
2012-2013  1.0055 1.0041 0.9972 0.9522 1.0143 1.0500 0.9903 
2013-2014  1.0126 1.0046 0.9971 0.9516 1.0137 1.0551 0.9933 
2014-2015  1.0140 1.0043 0.9969 0.9523 1.0141 1.0551 0.9940 
2015-2016  1.0158 1.0034 0.9965 0.9691 1.0091 1.0400 0.9989 
2016-2017  1.0111 1.0032 0.9960 0.9711 1.0077 1.0350 0.9991 
2017-2018  1.0116 1.0029 0.9957 0.9721 1.0077 1.0350 0.9991 
2018-2019  1.0121 1.0027 0.9954 0.9778 1.0078 1.0299 0.9991 
2019-2020  1.0126 1.0025 0.9951 0.9789 1.0077 1.0300 0.9991 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0260 1.0707 0.9441 0.7581 1.1117 1.3076 0.9210 
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Table VII-5 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 public services 
Year ∆C total public 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.0930 0.9988 0.9992 1.0695 1.0333 0.9871 1.0040 
2008-2009  0.9525 1.0029 0.9997 1.0089 1.0353 0.9176 0.9912 
2009-2010  0.9622 0.9998 0.9997 0.9953 0.9903 0.9896 0.9870 
2010-2011  0.9827 1.0024 0.9998 0.9880 0.9901 1.0201 0.9827 
2011-2012  0.9991 1.0024 0.9998 0.9891 0.9818 1.0349 0.9920 
2012-2013  1.0001 1.0022 0.9998 0.9899 0.9676 1.0500 0.9925 
2013-2014  1.0030 1.0020 0.9998 0.9906 0.9630 1.0551 0.9948 
2014-2015  1.0040 1.0018 0.9998 0.9912 0.9629 1.0551 0.9953 
2015-2016  1.0051 1.0015 0.9998 0.9928 0.9731 1.0400 0.9991 
2016-2017  1.0045 1.0010 0.9998 0.9925 0.9777 1.0350 0.9993 
2017-2018  1.0049 1.0009 0.9998 0.9931 0.9778 1.0350 0.9993 
2018-2019  1.0054 1.0008 0.9998 0.9936 0.9826 1.0299 0.9993 
2019-2020  1.0057 1.0007 0.9998 0.9941 0.9825 1.0301 0.9993 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0159 1.0170 0.9964 0.9858 0.8297 1.3074 0.9375 
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Table VII-6 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 agriculture 
Year ∆C total 
agriculture 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9984 1.0006 0.9967 1.0082 1.0040 0.9871 1.0020 
2008-2009  0.9630 0.9987 0.9991 1.0097 1.0462 0.9176 0.9956 
2009-2010  0.9878 1.0005 0.9990 1.0047 1.0004 0.9896 0.9937 
2010-2011  0.9899 1.0001 0.9988 0.9924 0.9871 1.0201 0.9916 
2011-2012  0.9945 1.0001 0.9986 0.9926 0.9731 1.0349 0.9962 
2012-2013  0.9948 1.0001 0.9983 0.9929 0.9590 1.0500 0.9965 
2013-2014  0.9959 1.0001 0.9980 0.9932 0.9544 1.0551 0.9976 
2014-2015  0.9961 1.0001 0.9976 0.9936 0.9544 1.0551 0.9979 
2015-2016  0.9976 1.0000 0.9971 0.9959 0.9663 1.0400 0.9996 
2016-2017  0.9977 1.0000 0.9965 0.9965 0.9710 1.0350 0.9997 
2017-2018  0.9977 1.0000 0.9959 0.9972 0.9710 1.0350 0.9997 
2018-2019  0.9977 1.0000 0.9950 0.9980 0.9758 1.0299 0.9997 
2019-2020  0.9977 1.0000 0.9941 0.9989 0.9757 1.0301 0.9997 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9120  1.0004 0.9654 0.9738 0.7648 1.3074 0.9699 
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Table VII-7 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 private car 
Year ∆C total 
private car 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9830 1.0000 0.9933 0.9996 0.9981 0.9918 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9100 1.0000 0.9866 0.9918 1.0012 0.9289 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9700 1.0000 0.9841 0.9957 1.0025 0.9875 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0020 1.0000 0.9934 0.9997 0.9960 1.0131 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0070 1.0000 0.9953 0.9968 0.9960 1.0191 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0150 1.0000 0.9970 0.9952 0.9949 1.0282 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0150 1.0000 0.9986 0.9917 0.9935 1.0317 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0175 1.0000 0.9987 0.9940 0.9931 1.0321 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0140 1.0000 0.9984 0.9976 0.9941 1.0241 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0130 1.0000 0.9996 0.9985 0.9941 1.0210 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0130 1.0000 0.9996 0.9985 0.9942 1.0210 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0120 1.0000 0.9995 0.9985 0.9963 1.0178 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0120 1.0000 0.9995 0.9985 0.9960 1.0181 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9780 1.0000 0.9446 0.9570 0.9510 1.1376 1.0000 
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Table VII-8 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 road freight 
Year ∆C total road 
freight 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0103 0.9780 0.9918 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.8950 1.0000 1.0000 0.9944 0.9689 0.9289 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9750 1.0000 1.0000 0.9949 0.9924 0.9875 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0160 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 1.0068 1.0131 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0160 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 1.0009 1.0191 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0210 1.0000 1.0000 0.9942 0.9988 1.0282 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0210 1.0000 1.0000 0.9903 0.9994 1.0317 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0210 1.0000 1.0000 0.9922 0.9970 1.0321 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0190 1.0000 1.0000 0.9966 0.9985 1.0241 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9990 1.0210 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9985 0.9986 1.0210 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9943 1.0178 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9970 0.9950 1.0181 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0121 1.0000 1.0000 0.9574 0.9292 1.1376 1.0000 
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Table VII-9 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 road public passenger 
Year ∆C total road 
public 
passenger 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.2600 1.0000 1.0000 1.2000 1.0586 0.9918 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0103 1.0442 0.9289 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9900 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0025 0.9875 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0150 1.0000 1.0000 0.9971 1.0049 1.0131 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0200 1.0000 1.0000 0.9874 1.0136 1.0191 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 0.9781 1.0192 1.0282 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 0.9716 1.0226 1.0317 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 0.9670 1.0270 1.0321 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0200 1.0000 1.0000 0.9761 1.0204 1.0241 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9788 1.0186 1.0210 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9788 1.0186 1.0210 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9836 1.0169 1.0178 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9836 1.0166 1.0181 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.4930 1.0000 1.0000 0.9923 1.3226 1.1376 1.0000 
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Table VII-10 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 rail 
Year ∆C total rail ∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9334 1.0169 1.0000 0.9752 0.9780 0.9918 0.9703 
2008-2009  0.9501 1.0113 1.0000 0.9818 1.0335 0.9289 0.9967 
2009-2010  0.9700 1.0064 1.0000 0.9785 1.0025 0.9875 0.9949 
2010-2011  0.9801 1.0048 1.0000 0.9726 0.9970 1.0131 0.9930 
2011-2012  0.9840 1.0048 1.0000 0.9633 1.0009 1.0191 0.9967 
2012-2013  1.0058 1.0020 1.0000 0.9729 1.0066 1.0282 0.9969 
2013-2014  1.0126 1.0019 1.0000 0.9739 1.0081 1.0317 0.9978 
2014-2015  1.0128 1.0019 1.0000 0.9739 1.0077 1.0321 0.9981 
2015-2016  1.0145 1.0019 1.0000 0.9787 1.0107 1.0241 0.9996 
2016-2017  1.0124 1.0014 1.0000 0.9789 1.0117 1.0210 0.9997 
2017-2018  1.0109 1.0009 1.0000 0.9781 1.0118 1.0210 0.9997 
2018-2019  1.0110 1.0009 1.0000 0.9781 1.0149 1.0178 0.9997 
2019-2020  1.0110 1.0009 1.0000 0.9781 1.0146 1.0181 0.9997 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9079  1.0571 1.0000 0.7262 1.1014 1.1377 0.9440 
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Table VII-11 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 domestic aviation 
Year ∆C total 
domestic 
aviation 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.8000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0127 0.7965 0.9918 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9200 1.0000 1.0000 1.0222 0.9689 0.9289 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0103 0.9823 0.9875 1.0000 
2010-2011  0.9990 1.0000 1.0000 0.9891 0.9970 1.0131 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0070 1.0000 1.0000 0.9946 0.9935 1.0191 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9920 1.0282 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9887 1.0317 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9883 1.0321 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9862 1.0241 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9892 1.0210 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9893 1.0210 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9923 1.0178 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9920 1.0181 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.8006 1.0000 1.0000 1.0177 0.6914 1.1376 1.0000 
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Table VII-12 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 unspec. and fuel tourism 
Year ∆C total 
unspec. and 
fuel tourism 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9805 0.9805 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9163 0.9163 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9756 0.9756 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0157 1.0157 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0251 1.0251 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0325 1.0325 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0350 1.0350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0350 1.0350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0300 1.0300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0300 1.0300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0300 1.0300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0250 1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0250 1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.1589 1.1589 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table VII-13 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 residential 
Year ∆C total 
residential 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Chn ∆Cemc  
        
2007-2008  1.0806 0.9918 0.9947 1.0508 1.0395 1.0027 
2008-2009  0.9646 1.0077 0.9973 0.9505 1.0158 0.9940 
2009-2010  0.9918 1.0000 0.9975 0.9878 1.0156 0.9910 
2010-2011  0.9921 1.0000 0.9972 0.9887 1.0184 0.9879 
2011-2012  1.0001 1.0003 0.9969 0.9819 1.0271 0.9944 
2012-2013  1.0010 1.0003 0.9965 0.9836 1.0264 0.9947 
2013-2014  1.0032 1.0003 0.9960 0.9852 1.0257 0.9964 
2014-2015  1.0033 1.0002 0.9954 0.9862 1.0251 0.9967 
2015-2016  1.0029 1.0001 0.9965 0.9855 1.0218 0.9994 
2016-2017  1.0038 1.0002 0.9962 0.9870 1.0213 0.9995 
2017-2018  1.0045 1.0002 0.9959 0.9884 1.0208 0.9995 
2018-2019  1.0042 0.9999 0.9955 0.9891 1.0204 0.9995 
2019-2020  1.0048 1.0000 0.9952 0.9904 1.0200 0.9995 
 
       
2007-2020 
 
1.0542 1.0010 0.9519 0.8621 1.3424 0.9561 
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Appendix VII.2: Sectoral scenario IE2 activity and DA results 
 
 
 
Table VII-14 Scenario IE2 economic sector GVA 2007-2020 (million €) 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
              
Agriculture 3,863 3,828 3,636 3,582 3,593 3,603 3,614 3,625 3,636 3,647 3,650 3,654 3,658 3,661 
Industry 56,754 55,732 49,657 48,664 49,102 49,937 50,836 51,700 52,579 53,420 54,195 54,959 55,734 56,520 
Public services 5,529 5,640 5,302 5,196 5,232 5,284 5,337 5,390 5,444 5,488 5,532 5,576 5,621 5,666 
Commercial Services 100,911 99,700 91,425 89,597 90,582 93,028 95,865 99,221 103,090 107,111 110,967 114,951 119,054 122,828 
Total GVA 167,057 164,900 150,021 147,038 148,509 151,853 155,653 159,936 164,750 169,666 174,344 179,140 184,067 188,675 
GVA growth -1.29 -9.02 -1.99 1.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.01 2.98 2.76 2.75 2.75 2.50 
Source: 2007 data (Central Statistics Office), 2008-2020 estimates for scenario analysis 
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Table VII-15 Transport and Residential Activity IE2 2007-2020 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Transport 
(million pkm and tkm)308 
              
Road  
private car  
41,414 41,000 37,720 37,342 37,529 37,904 38,359 38,858 39,421 39,973 40,493 41,019 41,553 42,051 
 
Road  
Freight 
 
18,707 18,239 16,324 16,161 16,323 16,600 16,866 17,119 17,410 17,671 17,918 18,169 18,423 18,663 
Road Passenger  
 
9,791 10,281 9,870 9,672 9,759 9,964 10,204 10,459 10,762 11,074 11,351 11,635 11,925 12,212 
Rail  
passenger  
2,183 2,118 2,012 1,992 2,012 2,052 2,097 2,148 2,208 2,269 2,326 2,384 2,444 2,498 
Rail  
Freight  
129 125 113 111 111 113 114 116 118 121 123 125 128 131 
Rail Total  2,312 2,243 2,125 2,103 2,123 2,165 2,211 2,263 2,326 2,390 2,449 2,510 2,572 2,628 
Domestic aviation  170 134 121 117 117 119 120 122 124 125 127 128 129 131 
Total  
Transport  
72,395 71,897 66,159 65,396 65,852 66,752 67,760 68,821 70,042 71,234 72,338 73,461 74,603 75,685 
 
Residential 
              
Household no.’s 1,518,778 1,578,778 1,598,778 1,618,778 1,640,778 1,662,778 1,684,778 1,706,778 1,728,778 1,755,778 1,782,778 1,809,778 1,836,778 1,863,778 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
308
 Note: Road Private Car, Road Public Passenger (Bus and Cab), Rail Passenger, Domestic aviation in million p-km. Road Freight and Rail Freight in million t-km. 
438 
 
Table VII-16 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 industry and sectoral total 
Year ∆C total ∆C total 
industry 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
          
2007-2008 1.0166 0.9411 1.0026 1.0013 0.9516 0.9948 0.9871 1.0032 
2008-2009 0.9196 0.8681 1.0053 0.9960 0.9771 0.9794 0.9098 0.9958 
2009-2010 0.9803 0.9737 1.0022 0.9952 1.0045 0.9999 0.9801 0.9918 
2010-2011 0.9937 0.9845 1.0019 0.9955 0.9854 0.9990 1.0100 0.9929 
2011-2012 0.9957 0.9863 1.0024 0.9955 0.9815 0.9946 1.0225 0.9902 
2012-2013 1.0016 0.9928 1.0027 0.9953 0.9819 0.9931 1.0250 0.9952 
2013-2014 1.0035 0.9953 1.0024 0.9951 0.9842 0.9898 1.0275 0.9969 
2014-2015 1.0044 0.9959 1.0023 0.9949 0.9849 0.9873 1.0301 0.9971 
2015-2016 1.0034 0.9952 1.0024 0.9943 0.9834 0.9866 1.0298 0.9993 
2016-2017 1.0033 0.9945 1.0020 0.9939 0.9850 0.9873 1.0276 0.9993 
2017-2018 1.0037 0.9949 1.0020 0.9936 0.9861 0.9870 1.0275 0.9993 
2018-2019 1.0035 0.9921 1.0017 0.9929 0.9842 0.9870 1.0275 0.9994 
2019-2020 1.0038 0.9924 1.0017 0.9925 0.9849 0.9893 1.0250 0.9994 
 
        
2007-2020 0.9317 0.7370 1.0322 0.9378 0.7960 0.8818 1.1294 0.9604 
 
        
Rsd 5.107E-15 2.0095E-14           
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Table VII-17 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 commercial services 
Year ∆C total 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.0732 1.0136 0.9952 1.0713 1.0009 0.9874 1.0049 
2008-2009  0.9152 1.0118 0.9956 0.9971 1.0080 0.9098 0.9936 
2009-2010  0.9709 1.0074 0.9981 0.9980 0.9999 0.9801 0.9872 
2010-2011  0.9875 1.0051 0.9982 0.9844 1.0010 1.0100 0.9888 
2011-2012  0.9832 1.0048 0.9981 0.9696 1.0044 1.0225 0.9846 
2012-2013  0.9993 1.0040 0.9981 0.9750 1.0053 1.0250 0.9925 
2013-2014  1.0023 1.0038 0.9979 0.9714 1.0073 1.0275 0.9952 
2014-2015  1.0029 1.0036 0.9977 0.9684 1.0086 1.0301 0.9955 
2015-2016  1.0064 1.0037 0.9983 0.9678 1.0089 1.0298 0.9989 
2016-2017  1.0067 1.0036 0.9982 0.9711 1.0082 1.0276 0.9989 
2017-2018  1.0070 1.0035 0.9981 0.9716 1.0082 1.0275 0.9989 
2018-2019  1.0074 1.0034 0.9980 0.9723 1.0080 1.0275 0.9991 
2019-2020  1.0076 1.0033 0.9978 0.9766 1.0065 1.0250 0.9991 
         
2007-2020  0.9632 1.0739 0.9697 0.8093 1.0777 1.1296 0.9388 
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Table VII-18 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 public services 
Year ∆C total public 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.0930 0.9988 0.9992 1.0695 1.0333 0.9871 1.0040 
2008-2009  0.9481 1.0015 0.9997 1.0126 1.0332 0.9098 0.9948 
2009-2010  0.9650 0.9998 0.9998 0.9953 0.9999 0.9801 0.9898 
2010-2011  0.9888 1.0020 0.9999 0.9887 0.9970 1.0100 0.9912 
2011-2012  0.9905 1.0021 0.9999 0.9906 0.9878 1.0225 0.9880 
2012-2013  0.9971 1.0019 0.9999 0.9912 0.9853 1.0250 0.9942 
2013-2014  0.9997 1.0018 0.9999 0.9918 0.9829 1.0275 0.9963 
2014-2015  1.0003 1.0017 0.9999 0.9923 0.9805 1.0301 0.9965 
2015-2016  1.0019 1.0024 0.9999 0.9925 0.9788 1.0298 0.9991 
2016-2017  1.0023 1.0023 0.9999 0.9930 0.9810 1.0276 0.9992 
2017-2018  1.0027 1.0023 0.9999 0.9934 0.9810 1.0275 0.9992 
2018-2019  1.0032 1.0022 0.9999 0.9939 0.9810 1.0275 0.9993 
2019-2020  1.0035 1.0021 0.9999 0.9943 0.9834 1.0250 0.9993 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9898 1.0210 0.9975 0.9964 0.9072 1.1294 0.9519 
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Table VII-19 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 agriculture 
Year ∆C total 
agriculture 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9984 1.0006 0.9967 1.0082 1.0040 0.9871 1.0020 
2008-2009  0.9647 0.9987 0.9991 1.0203 1.0442 0.9098 0.9974 
2009-2010  0.9882 1.0005 0.9997 1.0080 1.0050 0.9801 0.9950 
2010-2011  0.9930 1.0001 0.9997 0.9944 0.9931 1.0100 0.9957 
2011-2012  0.9918 1.0002 0.9997 0.9946 0.9809 1.0225 0.9942 
2012-2013  0.9948 1.0002 0.9997 0.9946 0.9785 1.0250 0.9973 
2013-2014  0.9958 1.0002 0.9997 0.9946 0.9761 1.0275 0.9983 
2014-2015  0.9959 1.0002 0.9997 0.9947 0.9737 1.0301 0.9984 
2015-2016  0.9974 1.0001 0.9997 0.9950 0.9739 1.0298 0.9996 
2016-2017  0.9974 1.0001 0.9996 0.9970 0.9741 1.0276 0.9996 
2017-2018  0.9974 1.0001 0.9996 0.9970 0.9742 1.0275 0.9996 
2018-2019  0.9974 1.0001 0.9996 0.9971 0.9742 1.0275 0.9997 
2019-2020  0.9974 1.0001 0.9996 0.9971 0.9766 1.0250 0.9997 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9129 1.0014 0.9922 0.9924 0.8393 1.1294 0.9768 
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Table VII-20 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 private car 
Year ∆C total private 
car 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9830 1.0000 0.9933 0.9996 0.9968 0.9931 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9070 1.0000 0.9911 0.9947 0.9998 0.9202 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9800 1.0000 0.9931 0.9968 1.0016 0.9885 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0010 1.0000 0.9969 0.9992 0.9980 1.0070 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0070 1.0000 0.9978 0.9992 0.9964 1.0137 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0100 1.0000 0.9989 0.9991 0.9969 1.0151 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0110 1.0000 0.9993 0.9987 0.9974 1.0157 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0125 1.0000 0.9993 0.9987 0.9968 1.0178 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0125 1.0000 0.9993 0.9992 0.9970 1.0170 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0110 1.0000 0.9996 0.9984 0.9975 1.0155 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0110 1.0000 0.9996 0.9984 0.9975 1.0155 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0110 1.0000 0.9996 0.9984 0.9975 1.0155 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0110 1.0000 0.9996 0.9994 0.9975 1.0145 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9632 1.0000 0.9680 0.9800 0.9713 1.0454 1.0000 
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Table VII-21 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 road freight 
Year ∆C total road 
freight 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0051 0.9817 0.9931 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.8940 1.0000 1.0000 0.9989 0.9726 0.9202 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9870 1.0000 1.0000 0.9970 1.0016 0.9885 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0060 1.0000 1.0000 0.9960 1.0030 1.0070 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0130 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 1.0033 1.0137 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0130 1.0000 1.0000 0.9970 1.0009 1.0151 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0130 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9994 1.0157 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0140 1.0000 1.0000 0.9971 0.9993 1.0178 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9970 0.9980 1.0170 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9985 1.0155 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9985 1.0155 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9985 1.0155 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0110 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9985 1.0145 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9723 1.0000 1.0000 0.9746 0.9543 1.0454 1.0000 
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Table VII-22 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 road public passenger 
Year ∆C total road 
public 
passenger 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.2600 1.0000 1.0000 1.2000 1.0573 0.9931 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9650 1.0000 1.0000 1.0052 1.0433 0.9202 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9700 1.0000 1.0000 0.9898 0.9914 0.9885 1.0000 
2010-2011  0.9900 1.0000 1.0000 0.9812 1.0020 1.0070 1.0000 
2011-2012  0.9900 1.0000 1.0000 0.9696 1.0072 1.0137 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0075 1.0000 1.0000 0.9839 1.0088 1.0151 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9854 1.0092 1.0157 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9815 1.0110 1.0178 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0075 1.0000 1.0000 0.9791 1.0118 1.0170 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0050 1.0000 1.0000 0.9805 1.0094 1.0155 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0050 1.0000 1.0000 0.9805 1.0093 1.0155 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0050 1.0000 1.0000 0.9805 1.0093 1.0155 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0050 1.0000 1.0000 0.9814 1.0094 1.0145 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.2211 1.0000 1.0000 0.9791 1.1930 1.0454 1.0000 
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Table VII-23 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 rail 
Year ∆C total rail ∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9334 1.0169 1.0000 0.9752 0.9767 0.9931 0.9703 
2008-2009  0.9488 1.0111 1.0000 0.9897 1.0324 0.9202 0.9981 
2009-2010  0.9827 1.0030 1.0000 0.9936 1.0016 0.9885 0.9961 
2010-2011  0.9881 1.0033 1.0000 0.9784 1.0030 1.0070 0.9966 
2011-2012  0.9938 1.0024 1.0000 0.9767 1.0062 1.0137 0.9952 
2012-2013  0.9963 1.0024 1.0000 0.9748 1.0068 1.0151 0.9977 
2013-2014  1.0004 1.0029 1.0000 0.9756 1.0082 1.0157 0.9985 
2014-2015  1.0029 1.0026 1.0000 0.9744 1.0101 1.0178 0.9986 
2015-2016  1.0014 1.0015 1.0000 0.9730 1.0108 1.0170 0.9996 
2016-2017  0.9992 1.0019 1.0000 0.9734 1.0094 1.0155 0.9997 
2017-2018  0.9993 1.0019 1.0000 0.9734 1.0093 1.0155 0.9997 
2018-2019  0.9994 1.0019 1.0000 0.9735 1.0093 1.0155 0.9997 
2019-2020  0.9994 1.0019 1.0000 0.9764 1.0074 1.0145 0.9997 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.8532 1.0549 1.0000 0.7441 1.0942 1.0455 0.9502 
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Table VII-24 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 domestic aviation 
Year ∆C total domestic 
aviation 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.8000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0127 0.7955 0.9931 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9200 1.0000 1.0000 1.0222 0.9781 0.9202 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0103 0.9813 0.9885 1.0000 
2010-2011  0.9950 1.0000 1.0000 0.9950 0.9931 1.0070 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0050 1.0000 1.0000 0.9950 0.9964 1.0137 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9989 1.0151 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9984 1.0157 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9963 1.0178 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 0.9970 0.9980 1.0170 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9946 1.0155 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9946 1.0155 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9945 1.0155 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9956 1.0145 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.7841 1.0000 1.0000 1.0222 0.7337 1.0454 1.0000 
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Table VII-25 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 unspecified and fuel tourism 
Year ∆C total 
unspec. and 
fuel tourism 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9805 0.9805 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9112 0.9112 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9703 0.9703 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0055 1.0055 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0100 1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0113 1.0113 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0105 1.0105 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0150 1.0150 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0125 1.0125 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0125 1.0125 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0125 1.0125 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0125 1.0125 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0125 1.0125 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9717 0.9717 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table VII-26 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 residential 
Year ∆C total 
residential 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Chn ∆Cemc  
        
2007-2008  1.0806 0.9918 0.9947 1.0508 1.0395 1.0027 
2008-2009  0.9660 1.0077 0.9980 0.9519 1.0127 0.9965 
2009-2010  0.9924 1.0000 0.9984 0.9888 1.0125 0.9929 
2010-2011  0.9940 0.9999 0.9983 0.9885 1.0136 0.9939 
2011-2012  0.9949 1.0002 0.9982 0.9918 1.0134 0.9915 
2012-2013  0.9999 1.0002 0.9980 0.9928 1.0132 0.9959 
2013-2014  1.0021 1.0002 0.9978 0.9938 1.0131 0.9974 
2014-2015  1.0023 1.0002 0.9976 0.9942 1.0129 0.9975 
2015-2016  0.9986 1.0001 0.9986 0.9852 1.0156 0.9994 
2016-2017  0.9994 1.0001 0.9986 0.9862 1.0154 0.9994 
2017-2018  1.0002 1.0002 0.9985 0.9871 1.0151 0.9994 
2018-2019  1.0009 1.0002 0.9985 0.9880 1.0149 0.9995 
2019-2020  1.0016 1.0003 0.9984 0.9889 1.0147 0.9995 
 
       
2007-2020 
 
1.0298 1.0009 0.9738 0.8914 1.2271 0.9659 
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Appendix VII.3: Sectoral scenario IE3 activity and DA results 
 
 
Table VII-27 Scenario IE3 economic sector GVA 2007-2020 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
              
Agriculture 3,863 3,828 3,675 3,638 3,649 3,663 3,678 3,693 3,708 3,722 3,734 3,745 3,756 3,764 
Industry 56,754 55,817 50,515 49,757 50,474 51,498 53,218 54,984 56,799 58,440 60,135 61,885 63,699 65,559 
Public services 5,529 5,640 5,302 5,143 5,179 5,225 5,272 5,320 5,367 5,421 5,459 5,497 5,536 5,575 
Commercial Services 100,911 99,600 90,549 87,742 88,442 89,427 90,943 92,484 94,050 95,221 96,410 97,596 98,772 99,959 
Total GVA 167,057 164,885 150,040 146,279 147,743 149,814 153,111 156,481 159,924 162,805 165,738 168,723 171,762 174,856 
GVA growth -1.30 -9.00 -2.51 1.00 1.40 2.20 2.20 2.20 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 
Source: 2007 data (Central Statistics Office), 2008-2020 estimates for scenario analysis 
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Table VII-28 Scenario IE3 transport and residential activity 2007-2020 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Transport 
(million pkm and tkm)309 
              
Road  
private car  
41,414 41,000 39,360 38,966 39,200 39,474 39987 40,507 41,034 41,432 41,834 42,240 42,649 43,063 
 
Road  
Freight 
 
18,707 18,239 16,415 16,251 16,495 16,835 17,406 17,996 18,606 19,164 19,777 20,410 21,083 21,779 
Road Passenger  
 
9,791 10,281 9,870 9,672 9,750 9,857 10,005 10,155 10,307 10,452 10,598 10,746 10,897 11,049 
Rail  
passenger  
2,183 2,118 1,991 1,951 1,961 1,973 1992 2,012 2,032 2,049 2,065 2,081 2,098 2,115 
Rail  
Freight  
129 125 113 108 104 99 94 89 84 80 76 72 69 65 
Rail Total  2,312 2,243 2,103 2,059 2,065 2,071 2,086 2,101 2,117 2,129 2,141 2,154 2,167 2,180 
Domestic aviation  170 128 116 114 115 116 118 119 121 122 123 124 126 127 
Total  
Transport  
72,395 71,891 67,864 67,063 67,624 68,353 69,601 70,878 72,184 73,298 74,473 75,674 76,922 78,198 
 
Residential 
              
Household no.’s 1,518,778 1,578,778 1,598,778 1,618,778 1,638,778 1,658,778 1,678,778 1,698,778 1,718,778 1,740,778 1,762,778 1,784,778 1,806,778 1,828,778 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
309
 Note: Road Private Car, Road Public Passenger (Bus and Cab), Rail Passenger, Domestic aviation in million p-km. Road Freight and Rail Freight in million t-km. 
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Table VII-29 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 industry and sectoral total 
Year ∆C total ∆C total 
industry 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
          
2007-2008 1.0165 0.9407 1.0024 1.0012 0.9499 0.9965 0.9870 1.0032 
2008-2009 0.9411 0.9051 1.0013 1.0014 0.9961 0.9945 0.9100 1.0012 
2009-2010 0.9867 0.9857 1.0010 0.9985 1.0086 1.0103 0.9749 0.9927 
2010-2011 1.0024 1.0041 1.0012 0.9993 0.9936 1.0044 1.0100 0.9958 
2011-2012 1.0055 1.0069 1.0010 0.9996 0.9933 1.0062 1.0140 0.9930 
2012-2013 1.0119 1.0126 1.0014 0.9997 0.9814 1.0111 1.0220 0.9975 
2013-2014 1.0131 1.0143 1.0013 0.9997 0.9817 1.0110 1.0220 0.9990 
2014-2015 1.0140 1.0154 1.0013 0.9997 0.9819 1.0108 1.0220 1.0000 
2015-2016 1.0110 1.0135 1.0015 0.9995 0.9838 1.0107 1.0180 1.0003 
2016-2017 1.0109 1.0125 1.0011 0.9995 0.9831 1.0108 1.0180 1.0003 
2017-2018 1.0113 1.0126 1.0011 0.9995 0.9831 1.0109 1.0180 1.0003 
2018-2019 1.0115 1.0127 1.0011 0.9995 0.9829 1.0111 1.0180 1.0003 
2019-2020 1.0117 1.0127 1.0011 0.9995 0.9831 1.0110 1.0180 1.0003 
 
        
2007-2020 1.0461 0.9429 1.0170 0.9965 0.8186 1.1036 1.0467 0.9839 
 
    
Rsd 4.88498E-15 2.18714E-14       
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Table VII-30 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 commercial services 
Year ∆C total 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.0732 1.0136 0.9952 1.0723 1.0000 0.9873 1.0050 
2008-2009  0.9088 1.0020 0.9978 0.9979 0.9991 0.9100 1.0019 
2009-2010  0.9570 1.0011 0.9989 0.9989 0.9939 0.9749 0.9886 
2010-2011  0.9826 1.0002 0.9996 0.9814 0.9980 1.0100 0.9934 
2011-2012  0.9904 1.0030 0.9998 0.9876 0.9972 1.0140 0.9890 
2012-2013  0.9996 1.0034 0.9999 0.9836 0.9950 1.0220 0.9960 
2013-2014  1.0021 1.0034 0.9999 0.9838 0.9950 1.0220 0.9984 
2014-2015  1.0038 1.0033 0.9999 0.9840 0.9950 1.0220 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0012 1.0029 0.9998 0.9858 0.9945 1.0180 1.0004 
2016-2017  1.0014 1.0028 0.9998 0.9859 0.9946 1.0180 1.0005 
2017-2018  1.0015 1.0028 0.9998 0.9862 0.9944 1.0180 1.0005 
2018-2019  1.0016 1.0028 0.9998 0.9866 0.9941 1.0180 1.0005 
2019-2020  1.0017 1.0027 0.9998 0.9870 0.9942 1.0176 1.0005 
         
2007-2020  0.9199 1.0449 0.9901 0.9207 0.9465 1.0466 0.9749 
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Table VII-31 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 public services 
Year ∆C total public 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.0930 0.9988 0.9992 1.0695 1.0334 0.9870 1.0040 
2008-2009  0.9545 1.0015 0.9997 1.0126 1.0330 0.9100 1.0015 
2009-2010  0.9659 0.9998 0.9998 1.0055 0.9949 0.9749 0.9907 
2010-2011  0.9921 1.0004 0.9999 0.9902 0.9970 1.0100 0.9946 
2011-2012  0.9998 1.0039 1.0000 0.9961 0.9951 1.0140 0.9910 
2012-2013  1.0058 1.0038 1.0000 0.9964 0.9873 1.0220 0.9967 
2013-2014  1.0081 1.0037 1.0000 0.9967 0.9873 1.0220 0.9987 
2014-2015  1.0097 1.0037 1.0000 0.9970 0.9873 1.0220 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0069 1.0029 1.0000 0.9937 0.9921 1.0180 1.0003 
2016-2017  1.0072 1.0029 1.0000 0.9969 0.9892 1.0180 1.0004 
2017-2018  1.0074 1.0029 1.0000 0.9972 0.9892 1.0180 1.0004 
2018-2019  1.0077 1.0028 1.0000 0.9974 0.9892 1.0180 1.0004 
2019-2020  1.0079 1.0028 1.0000 0.9977 0.9892 1.0180 1.0004 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0619 1.0302 0.9984 1.0455 0.9632 1.0467 0.9795 
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Table VII-32 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 agriculture 
Year ∆C total 
agriculture 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9984 1.0006 0.9967 1.0082 1.0041 0.9870 1.0020 
2008-2009  0.9693 0.9994 0.9995 1.0101 1.0550 0.9100 1.0008 
2009-2010  0.9910 1.0002 0.9999 1.0055 1.0155 0.9749 0.9954 
2010-2011  1.0025 1.0005 0.9999 1.0017 0.9931 1.0100 0.9974 
2011-2012  1.0020 1.0006 0.9999 1.0019 0.9901 1.0140 0.9956 
2012-2013  1.0048 1.0006 0.9999 1.0019 0.9824 1.0220 0.9984 
2013-2014  1.0058 1.0006 0.9999 1.0019 0.9824 1.0220 0.9994 
2014-2015  1.0064 1.0006 0.9999 1.0019 0.9824 1.0220 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0063 1.0005 0.9999 1.0017 0.9862 1.0180 1.0002 
2016-2017  1.0056 1.0006 0.9999 1.0019 0.9853 1.0180 1.0002 
2017-2018  1.0056 1.0006 0.9999 1.0019 0.9853 1.0180 1.0002 
2018-2019  1.0056 1.0006 0.9999 1.0019 0.9853 1.0180 1.0002 
2019-2020  1.0056 1.0006 0.9999 1.0029 0.9843 1.0180 1.0002 
 
        
2007-2020 
 1.0083 1.0058 0.9954 1.0441 0.9309 1.0467 0.9900 
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Table VII-33 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 private car 
Year ∆C total private 
car 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9830 1.0000 0.9933 0.9996 0.9969 0.9930 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9800 1.0000 0.9941 1.0268 1.0170 0.9440 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9950 1.0000 0.9954 1.0097 1.0018 0.9882 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0080 1.0000 0.9976 1.0044 0.9976 1.0084 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0100 1.0000 0.9989 1.0041 0.9963 1.0108 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0170 1.0000 0.9996 1.0043 0.9948 1.0183 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0170 1.0000 0.9999 1.0040 0.9948 1.0183 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0170 1.0000 0.9999 1.0040 0.9947 1.0184 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0130 1.0000 0.9998 1.0035 0.9944 1.0154 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0130 1.0000 0.9998 1.0035 0.9938 1.0160 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0130 1.0000 0.9998 1.0035 0.9937 1.0161 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0130 1.0000 0.9998 1.0035 0.9933 1.0165 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0130 1.0000 0.9998 1.0035 0.9932 1.0166 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0950 1.0000 0.9778 1.0769 0.9626 1.0802 1.0000 
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Table VII-34 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 road freight 
Year ∆C total road 
freight 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0051 0.9818 0.9930 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9050 1.0000 1.0000 1.0056 0.9534 0.9440 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9930 1.0000 1.0000 1.0030 1.0018 0.9882 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0180 1.0000 1.0000 1.0030 1.0066 1.0084 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0208 1.0000 1.0000 1.0002 1.0097 1.0108 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0011 1.0154 1.0183 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0011 1.0153 1.0183 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0011 1.0152 1.0184 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0310 1.0000 1.0000 1.0010 1.0143 1.0154 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0310 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 1.0157 1.0160 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0330 1.0000 1.0000 1.0010 1.0156 1.0161 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0340 1.0000 1.0000 1.0010 1.0162 1.0165 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0340 1.0000 1.0000 1.0010 1.0161 1.0166 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.1912 1.0000 1.0000 1.0232 1.0778 1.0802 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
457 
 
Table VII-35 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 road public passenger 
Year ∆C total road 
public 
passenger 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  1.2600 1.0000 1.0000 1.2000 1.0574 0.9930 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0208 1.0170 0.9440 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9900 1.0000 1.0000 1.0102 0.9917 0.9882 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 1.0040 0.9996 1.0084 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 1.0010 1.0002 1.0108 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0150 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9968 1.0183 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0150 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9967 1.0183 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0150 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9966 1.0184 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 0.9986 1.0154 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 0.9980 1.0160 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 0.9979 1.0161 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 0.9975 1.0165 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9961 0.9974 1.0166 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020  1.3759 1.0000 1.0000 1.2193 1.0447 1.0802 1.0000 
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Table VII-36 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 rail 
Year ∆C total rail ∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9334 1.0169 1.0000 0.9752 0.9768 0.9930 0.9703 
2008-2009  0.9412 1.0088 1.0000 0.9920 0.9958 0.9440 1.0006 
2009-2010  0.9736 1.0043 1.0000 0.9928 0.9917 0.9882 0.9964 
2010-2011  0.9908 1.0022 1.0000 0.9858 0.9967 1.0084 0.9979 
2011-2012  0.9894 1.0022 1.0000 0.9848 0.9953 1.0108 0.9965 
2012-2013  0.9971 1.0015 1.0000 0.9870 0.9919 1.0183 0.9987 
2013-2014  0.9990 1.0020 1.0000 0.9877 0.9918 1.0183 0.9995 
2014-2015  0.9996 1.0020 1.0000 0.9878 0.9917 1.0184 1.0000 
2015-2016  0.9967 1.0015 1.0000 0.9871 0.9927 1.0154 1.0001 
2016-2017  0.9967 1.0015 1.0000 0.9871 0.9921 1.0160 1.0002 
2017-2018  0.9968 1.0016 1.0000 0.9872 0.9920 1.0161 1.0002 
2018-2019  0.9968 1.0016 1.0000 0.9872 0.9916 1.0165 1.0002 
2019-2020  0.9969 1.0016 1.0000 0.9872 0.9915 1.0166 1.0002 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.8216 1.0485 1.0000 0.8418 0.8967 1.0802 0.9610 
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Table VII-37 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 domestic aviation 
Year ∆C total 
domestic 
aviation 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.8000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0667 0.7553 0.9930 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0220 0.9640 0.9440 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9950 1.0000 1.0000 1.0153 0.9917 0.9882 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0120 1.0000 1.0000 1.0020 1.0016 1.0084 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 1.0012 1.0108 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9939 1.0183 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9938 1.0183 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0100 1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 0.9937 1.0184 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9947 1.0154 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9941 1.0160 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9940 1.0161 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9936 1.0165 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0090 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9935 1.0166 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.8153 1.0000 1.0000 1.0948 0.6894 1.0802 1.0000 
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Table VII-38 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 unspecified and fuel tourism 
Year ∆C total 
unspec. and 
fuel tourism 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
         
2007-2008  0.9805 0.9805 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9563 0.9563 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9955 0.9955 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0175 1.0175 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0250 1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0275 1.0275 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0275 1.0275 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0275 1.0275 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0200 1.0200 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0200 1.0200 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0200 1.0200 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0200 1.0200 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0200 1.0200 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020  1.1662 1.1662 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table VII-39 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 residential 
Year ∆C total 
residential 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Chn ∆Cemc  
        
2007-2008  1.0806 0.9918 0.9947 1.0508 1.0395 1.0028 
2008-2009  0.9639 1.0074 0.9986 0.9451 1.0127 1.0010 
2009-2010  0.9950 1.0004 0.9993 0.9894 1.0125 0.9936 
2010-2011  0.9993 0.9999 0.9993 0.9916 1.0124 0.9963 
2011-2012  0.9996 1.0003 0.9993 0.9942 1.0122 0.9938 
2012-2013  1.0038 1.0003 0.9998 0.9940 1.0121 0.9978 
2013-2014  1.0053 1.0003 0.9998 0.9944 1.0119 0.9991 
2014-2015  1.0064 1.0003 0.9998 0.9947 1.0118 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0037 0.9999 0.9997 0.9912 1.0128 1.0002 
2016-2017  1.0040 0.9999 0.9997 0.9916 1.0126 1.0003 
2017-2018  1.0042 0.9999 0.9997 0.9919 1.0125 1.0003 
2018-2019  1.0044 1.0000 0.9997 0.9922 1.0123 1.0003 
2019-2020  1.0046 1.0000 0.9997 0.9925 1.0122 1.0003 
 
 
      
2007-2020 
 
1.0735 1.0003 0.9889 0.9143 1.2041 0.9857 
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Appendix VII.4: Sectoral scenario IE4 activity and DA results 
 
 
Table VII-40 Scenario IE4 economic sector GVA 2007-2020 (million €) 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
              
Agriculture 3,863 3,828 3,713 3,713 3,743 3,773 3,803 3,833 3,864 3,887 3,910 3,934 3,957 3,981 
Industry 56,754 55,732 51,887 51,212 53,747 57,230 61,219 66,484 72,035 76,213 80,557 85,149 89,466 93,984 
Public services 5,529 5,640 5,358 5,197 5,223 5,275 5,328 5,408 5,489 5,544 5,594 5,644 5,695 5,746 
Commercial Services 100,911 99,700 90,329 88,883 91,505 94,891 98,877 103,623 107,850 111,194 114,641 118,137 121,209 124,324 
Total GVA 167,057 164,900 151,286 149,006 154,218 161,169 169,226 179,348 189,239 196,838 204,703 212,865 220,328 228,036 
GVA growth -1.29 -8.26 -1.51 3.50 4.50 5.00 5.98 5.52 4.02 4.00 3.99 3.51 3.50 
Source: 2007 data (Central Statistics Office), 2008-2020 estimates for scenario analysis 
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Table VII-41 Scenario IE4 transport and residential activity 2007-2020 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Transport 
(million pkm and tkm)310 
              
Road  
private car  
41,414 41,000 38,950 38,755 39,530 40,439 41,491 42,777 44,103 45,117 46,155 47,217 48,208 49,220 
 
Road  
Freight 
 
18,707 18,333 16,683 16,516 17,342 18,469 19,780 21,501 23,307 24,706 26,163 27,707 29,093 30,547 
Road Passenger  
 
9,791 10,281 9,973 9,873 10,051 10,352 10,714 11,143 11,589 11,849 12,116 12,389 12,680 12,978 
Rail  
passenger  
2,183 2,118 2,012 1,972 1,992 2,031 2,082 2,138 2,196 2,238 2,280 2,324 2,361 2,399 
Rail  
Freight  
129 125 113 108 104 100 96 92 88 85 81 78 75 72 
Rail Total  2,312 2,243 2,125 2,080 2,095 2,131 2,178 2,230 2,284 2,322 2,361 2,402 2,436 2,470 
Domestic aviation  170 128 119 118 120 122 125 129 133 136 139 142 145 148 
Total  
Transport  
72,395 71,984 67,848 67,341 69,137 71,514 74,288 77,780 81,416 84,131 86,935 89,856 92,561 95,363 
 
Residential 
              
Household no.’s 1,518,778 1,578,778 1,608,778 1,638,778 1,668,778 1,723,778 1,778,778 1,833,778 1,888,778 1,933,778 1,978,778 2,023,778 2,068,778 2,113,778 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
310
 Note: Road Private Car, Road Public Passenger (Bus and Cab), Rail Passenger, Domestic aviation in million p-km. Road Freight and Rail Freight in million t-km. 
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Table VII-42 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 industry and sectoral total 
Year ∆C total ∆C total 
industry 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
 
         
2007-2008 1.0165 0.9407 1.0024 1.0012 0.9514 0.9948 0.9871 1.0032 
2008-2009 0.9474 0.9104 1.0011 1.0017 0.9736 1.0148 0.9174 1.0015 
2009-2010 0.9926 0.9805 1.0007 0.9987 1.0007 1.0021 0.9849 0.9934 
2010-2011 1.0168 1.0247 1.0005 0.9997 0.9866 1.0140 1.0350 0.9894 
2011-2012 1.0268 1.0377 1.0002 1.0001 0.9784 1.0189 1.0451 0.9957 
2012-2013 1.0305 1.0429 1.0012 1.0003 0.9776 1.0188 1.0500 0.9957 
2013-2014 1.0355 1.0470 1.0005 1.0005 0.9658 1.0247 1.0598 0.9973 
2014-2015 1.0362 1.0471 1.0005 1.0005 0.9680 1.0269 1.0551 0.9974 
2015-2016 1.0280 1.0428 1.0005 1.0002 0.9872 1.0172 1.0402 0.9977 
2016-2017 1.0285 1.0429 1.0005 1.0002 0.9881 1.0164 1.0400 0.9978 
2017-2018 1.0279 1.0384 1.0005 1.0000 0.9839 1.0165 1.0399 0.9980 
2018-2019 1.0260 1.0385 1.0005 1.0000 0.9899 1.0151 1.0351 0.9981 
2019-2020 1.0264 1.0386 1.0005 1.0000 0.9901 1.0150 1.0350 0.9981 
         
2007-2020 1.2629 1.2434 1.0092 1.0033 0.7693 1.2132 1.3650 0.9638 
 
    
Rsd 5.10703E-15 2.62013E-
14 
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Table VII-43 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 commercial services 
Year ∆C total 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  1.0732 1.0136 0.9952 1.0713 1.0009 0.9874 1.0050 
2008-2009  0.9236 1.0125 0.9979 1.0066 0.9875 0.9174 1.0023 
2009-2010  0.9758 1.0075 0.9991 0.9956 0.9991 0.9849 0.9895 
2010-2011  0.9850 1.0045 0.9993 0.9697 0.9947 1.0350 0.9829 
2011-2012  1.0030 1.0055 0.9994 0.9693 0.9923 1.0451 0.9930 
2012-2013  1.0032 1.0053 0.9993 0.9651 0.9924 1.0500 0.9929 
2013-2014  1.0077 1.0043 0.9994 0.9625 0.9889 1.0598 0.9954 
2014-2015  1.0080 1.0042 0.9993 0.9694 0.9864 1.0551 0.9955 
2015-2016  1.0051 1.0033 0.9993 0.9761 0.9912 1.0402 0.9961 
2016-2017  1.0053 1.0032 0.9992 0.9764 0.9914 1.0400 0.9963 
2017-2018  1.0057 1.0031 0.9992 0.9771 0.9910 1.0399 0.9965 
2018-2019  1.0059 1.0031 0.9992 0.9816 0.9912 1.0351 0.9966 
2019-2020  1.0062 1.0031 0.9992 0.9825 0.9912 1.0343 0.9967 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0015 1.0757 0.9851 0.8160 0.9027 1.3644 0.9403 
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Table VII-44 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 public services 
Year ∆C total public 
services 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  1.0930 0.9988 0.9992 1.0695 1.0333 0.9871 1.0040 
2008-2009  0.9528 1.0030 0.9996 0.9984 1.0355 0.9174 1.0019 
2009-2010  0.9687 1.0046 0.9998 1.0028 0.9848 0.9849 0.9916 
2010-2011  0.9889 1.0027 0.9999 0.9951 0.9710 1.0350 0.9863 
2011-2012  1.0050 1.0043 0.9999 0.9965 0.9664 1.0451 0.9944 
2012-2013  1.0052 1.0042 0.9999 0.9968 0.9619 1.0500 0.9944 
2013-2014  1.0074 1.0041 0.9999 0.9921 0.9577 1.0598 0.9963 
2014-2015  1.0077 1.0041 0.9999 0.9924 0.9619 1.0551 0.9964 
2015-2016  1.0042 1.0026 0.9999 0.9948 0.9710 1.0402 0.9969 
2016-2017  1.0045 1.0026 0.9999 0.9960 0.9702 1.0400 0.9970 
2017-2018  1.0048 1.0026 0.9999 0.9962 0.9703 1.0399 0.9972 
2018-2019  1.0051 1.0025 0.9999 0.9964 0.9748 1.0351 0.9973 
2019-2020  1.0053 1.0025 0.9999 0.9966 0.9749 1.0350 0.9974 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0478 1.0391 0.9978 1.0214 0.7613 1.3650 0.9521 
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Table VII-45 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 agriculture 
Year ∆C total 
agriculture 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Ces  ∆Cet ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  0.9984 1.0006 0.9967 1.0082 1.0040 0.9871 1.0020 
2008-2009  0.9845 0.9994 0.9992 1.0155 1.0573 0.9174 1.0009 
2009-2010  1.0087 1.0004 1.0000 1.0125 1.0153 0.9849 0.9959 
2010-2011  1.0021 0.9999 0.9999 1.0009 0.9739 1.0350 0.9934 
2011-2012  1.0066 1.0001 0.9999 1.0012 0.9645 1.0451 0.9973 
2012-2013  1.0066 1.0001 0.9999 1.0012 0.9600 1.0500 0.9973 
2013-2014  1.0076 1.0001 0.9999 1.0012 0.9511 1.0598 0.9983 
2014-2015  1.0076 1.0001 0.9999 1.0012 0.9553 1.0551 0.9984 
2015-2016  1.0079 1.0001 0.9999 1.0032 0.9672 1.0402 0.9986 
2016-2017  1.0079 1.0001 0.9999 1.0032 0.9674 1.0400 0.9987 
2017-2018  1.0080 1.0001 0.9999 1.0032 0.9674 1.0399 0.9987 
2018-2019  1.0081 1.0001 0.9999 1.0032 0.9719 1.0351 0.9988 
2019-2020  1.0081 1.0001 0.9999 1.0032 0.9720 1.0350 0.9988 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.0635 1.0012 0.9953 1.0593 0.7551 1.3650 0.9774 
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Table VII-46 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 private car 
Year ∆C total private 
car 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  0.9830 1.0000 0.9933 0.9996 0.9956 0.9943 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9600 1.0000 0.9933 1.0173 1.0079 0.9425 1.0000 
2009-2010  1.0070 1.0000 0.9933 1.0188 1.0025 0.9925 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0300 1.0000 0.9966 1.0133 0.9935 1.0267 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0330 1.0000 0.9995 1.0103 0.9890 1.0344 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0360 1.0000 1.0002 1.0096 0.9877 1.0388 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0400 1.0000 1.0006 1.0081 0.9847 1.0470 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0400 1.0000 1.0006 1.0081 0.9850 1.0467 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0300 1.0000 1.0003 1.0065 0.9900 1.0333 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0300 1.0000 1.0003 1.0065 0.9900 1.0333 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0300 1.0000 1.0003 1.0065 0.9897 1.0336 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0270 1.0000 1.0002 1.0057 0.9912 1.0301 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0270 1.0000 1.0002 1.0057 0.9910 1.0303 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.3058 1.0000 0.9790 1.1223 0.9022 1.3173 1.0000 
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Table VII-47 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 road freight 
Year ∆C total road 
freight 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  0.9800 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9856 0.9943 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9150 1.0000 1.0000 1.0055 0.9655 0.9425 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9950 1.0000 1.0000 1.0051 0.9975 0.9925 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0540 1.0000 1.0000 1.0038 1.0227 1.0267 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0620 1.0000 1.0000 0.9972 1.0296 1.0344 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0730 1.0000 1.0000 1.0019 1.0310 1.0388 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0890 1.0000 1.0000 1.0018 1.0382 1.0470 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0870 1.0000 1.0000 1.0028 1.0356 1.0467 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0610 1.0000 1.0000 1.0009 1.0258 1.0333 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0620 1.0000 1.0000 1.0028 1.0248 1.0333 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0620 1.0000 1.0000 1.0028 1.0246 1.0336 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0520 1.0000 1.0000 1.0019 1.0193 1.0301 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0520 1.0000 1.0000 1.0019 1.0191 1.0303 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.6799 1.0000 1.0000 1.0288 1.2396 1.3173 1.0000 
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Table VII-48 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 road public passenger 
Year ∆C total road 
public 
passenger 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  1.2600 1.0000 1.0000 1.2000 1.0560 0.9943 1.0000 
2008-2009  1.0300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0619 1.0291 0.9425 1.0000 
2009-2010  1.0220 1.0000 1.0000 1.0323 0.9975 0.9925 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0118 0.9916 1.0267 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0320 1.0000 1.0000 1.0019 0.9958 1.0344 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9963 1.0388 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0425 1.0000 1.0000 1.0024 0.9933 1.0470 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0450 1.0000 1.0000 1.0048 0.9936 1.0467 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0400 1.0000 1.0000 1.0171 0.9895 1.0333 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0073 0.9895 1.0333 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 1.0024 0.9893 1.0336 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 1.0015 0.9936 1.0301 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0250 1.0000 1.0000 1.0015 0.9934 1.0303 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.8338 1.0000 1.0000 1.3836 1.0062 1.3173 1.0000 
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Table VII-49 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 rail 
Year ∆C total rail ∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  0.9334 1.0169 1.0000 0.9752 0.9755 0.9943 0.9703 
2008-2009  0.9435 1.0078 1.0000 0.9848 1.0079 0.9426 1.0007 
2009-2010  0.9677 1.0051 1.0000 0.9856 0.9874 0.9925 0.9968 
2010-2011  0.9830 1.0028 1.0000 0.9757 0.9838 1.0267 0.9947 
2011-2012  1.0026 1.0016 1.0000 0.9835 0.9861 1.0344 0.9978 
2012-2013  1.0042 1.0014 1.0000 0.9804 0.9867 1.0388 0.9978 
2013-2014  1.0096 1.0009 1.0000 0.9836 0.9809 1.0470 0.9986 
2014-2015  1.0085 1.0004 1.0000 0.9830 0.9811 1.0467 0.9986 
2015-2016  1.0087 1.0004 1.0000 0.9907 0.9861 1.0333 0.9988 
2016-2017  1.0088 1.0004 1.0000 0.9907 0.9861 1.0333 0.9989 
2017-2018  1.0088 1.0004 1.0000 0.9907 0.9859 1.0336 0.9990 
2018-2019  1.0089 1.0004 1.0000 0.9936 0.9863 1.0301 0.9990 
2019-2020  1.0089 1.0004 1.0000 0.9936 0.9861 1.0303 0.9990 
 
        
2007-2020  0.8973 1.0394 1.0000 0.8265 0.8340 1.3173 0.9508 
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Table VII-50 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 domestic aviation 
Year ∆C total domestic 
aviation 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  0.8000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0667 0.7543 0.9943 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0215 0.9867 0.9425 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9950 1.0000 1.0000 1.0051 0.9975 0.9925 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0160 1.0000 1.0000 0.9985 0.9911 1.0267 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0220 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 0.9885 1.0344 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0240 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9867 1.0388 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0320 1.0000 1.0000 1.0019 0.9838 1.0470 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0270 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 0.9816 1.0467 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0220 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 0.9895 1.0333 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0220 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 0.9895 1.0333 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0220 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 0.9893 1.0336 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0190 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9902 1.0301 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0190 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 0.9900 1.0303 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
0.9446 1.0000 1.0000 1.0897 0.6580 1.3173 1.0000 
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Table VII-51 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 unspecified and fuel tourism 
Year ∆C total unspec. 
and fuel tourism 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Cts  ∆Ctt ∆Cemc  
 
        
2007-2008  0.9805 0.9805 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2008-2009  0.9612 0.9612 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2009-2010  0.9924 0.9924 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2010-2011  1.0400 1.0400 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2011-2012  1.0550 1.0550 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2012-2013  1.0650 1.0650 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2013-2014  1.0700 1.0700 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2014-2015  1.0700 1.0700 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2015-2016  1.0500 1.0500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2016-2017  1.0500 1.0500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2017-2018  1.0500 1.0500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2018-2019  1.0400 1.0400 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2019-2020  1.0400 1.0400 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
        
2007-2020 
 
1.5667 1.5667 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table VII-52 Sectoral decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 residential 
Year ∆C total 
residential 
∆Cffse ∆Crepe  ∆Cint ∆Chn ∆Cemc  
 
       
2007-2008  1.0806 0.9918 0.9947 1.0508 1.0395 1.0028 
2008-2009  0.9781 1.0068 0.9981 0.9539 1.0190 1.0013 
2009-2010  1.0024 1.0007 0.9986 0.9905 1.0186 0.9942 
2010-2011  1.0069 1.0007 0.9986 0.9989 1.0183 0.9906 
2011-2012  1.0128 1.0007 0.9985 0.9851 1.0330 0.9961 
2012-2013  1.0131 1.0007 0.9983 0.9866 1.0319 0.9961 
2013-2014  1.0148 1.0007 0.9982 0.9880 1.0309 0.9975 
2014-2015  1.0152 1.0007 0.9981 0.9893 1.0300 0.9975 
2015-2016  1.0094 1.0009 0.9990 0.9881 1.0238 0.9979 
2016-2017  1.0098 1.0009 0.9990 0.9890 1.0233 0.9979 
2017-2018  1.0102 1.0009 0.9990 0.9898 1.0227 0.9980 
2018-2019  1.0106 1.0009 0.9989 0.9906 1.0222 0.9981 
2019-2020  1.0110 1.0010 0.9989 0.9914 1.0218 0.9981 
 
       
2007-2020 
 
1.1864 1.0072 0.9781 0.8951 1.3917 0.9667 
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Appendix VII.5: Macro scenario activity  
 
 
Table VII-53 Macro scenario IE1 activity 2007-2020 
 
  2007    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
               
GVA € 
million* 167,057 164,900 151,312 149,745 152,756 158,083 165,987 175,131 184,787 192,179 198,914 205,879 212,042 218,416 
(% change)  -1.29 -8.24 -1.04 2.01 3.49 5.00 5.51 5.51 4.00 3.50 3.50 2.99 3.01 
 
             
Population 4,339,000 4,399,000 4,434,000 4,479,000 4,564,000 4,649,000 4,734,000 4,819,000 4,904,000 4,984,000 5,064,000 5,144,000 5,224,000 5,304,000 
(net change)  60,000 35,000 45,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 
 
              
 
 
 
Table VII-54 Macro scenario IE2 activity 2007-2020 
 
  2007    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
               
GVA € 
million* 
167,057 164,900 150,021 147,038 148,509 151,853 155,653 159,936 164,750 169,666 174,344 179,140 184,067 188,675 
(% change)  -1.29 -9.02 -1.99 1.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.01 2.98 2.76 2.75 2.75 2.50 
 
             
Population 4,339,000 4,399,000 4,424,000 4,444,000 4,489,000 4,534,000 4,579,000 4,624,000 4,669,000 4,724,000 4,779,000 4,834,000 4,889,000 4,944,000 
(net change)  60,000 25,000 20,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 55,000 55,000 55,000 55,000 55,000 
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Table VII-55 Macro scenario IE3 activity 2007-2020 
 
  2007    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
               
GVA € 
million* 
167,057 164,885 150,040 146,279 147,743 149,814 153,111 156,481 159,924 162,805 165,738 168,723 171,762 174,856 
(% change)  -1.30 -9.00 -2.51 1.00 1.40 2.20 2.20 2.20 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 
 
             
Population 4,339,000 4,399,000 4,399,000 4,399,000 4,439,000 4,479,000 4,519,000 4,559,000 4,599,000 4,644,000 4,689,000 4,734,000 4,779,000 4,824,000 
(net change)  60,000 0 0 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 45,000 
               
 
 
  
Table VII-56 Macro scenario IE4 activity 2007-2020 
 
  2007    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
               
GVA € 
million* 167,057 164,900 151,286 149,006 154,218 161,169 169,226 179,348 189,239 196,838 204,703 212,865 220,328 228,036 
(% change)  
-1.29 -8.26 -1.51 3.50 4.50 5.00 5.98 5.52 4.02 4.00 3.99 3.51 3.50 
 
             
Population 4,339,000 4,399,000 4,414,000 4,474,000 4,584,000 4,694,000 4,804,000 4,914,000 5,024,000 5,119,000 5,214,000 5,309,000 5,404,000 5,499,000 
(net change)  60,000 15,000 60,000 110,000 110,000 110,000 110,000 110,000 95,000 95,000 95,000 95,000 95,000 
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Appendix VII.6: Macro Scenario DA results 
 
 
Table VII-57 Macro decomposition scenario IE1 2007-2020 
Year ∆C total ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint  ∆Cypc Cpop ∆Cemc  ∆Crsd 
          
2007-2008 1.0114 1.0016 0.9942 1.0289 0.9736 1.0138 1.0000 0.0000 
2008-2009 0.9203 1.0005 0.9910 1.0116 0.9104 1.0080 1.0000 0.0000 
2009-2010 0.9770 0.9960 0.9925 0.9986 0.9797 1.0101 1.0000 0.0000 
2010-2011 0.9921 0.9920 0.9959 0.9844 1.0011 1.0190 1.0000 0.0000 
2011-2012 1.0016 0.9949 0.9966 0.9762 1.0159 1.0186 1.0000 0.0000 
2012-2013 1.0059 0.9954 0.9981 0.9643 1.0311 1.0183 1.0000 0.0000 
2013-2014 1.0087 0.9953 0.9983 0.9622 1.0365 1.0180 1.0000 0.0000 
2014-2015 1.0096 0.9956 0.9981 0.9629 1.0368 1.0176 1.0000 0.0000 
2015-2016 1.0085 0.9977 0.9981 0.9738 1.0233 1.0163 1.0000 0.0000 
2016-2017 1.0077 0.9980 0.9981 0.9774 1.0187 1.0161 1.0000 0.0000 
2017-2018 1.0081 0.9981 0.9979 0.9780 1.0189 1.0158 1.0000 0.0000 
2018-2019 1.0068 0.9982 0.9976 0.9817 1.0142 1.0156 1.0000 0.0000 
2019-2020 1.0071 0.9982 0.9974 0.9820 1.0145 1.0153 1.0000 0.0000 
 
         
2007-2020 0.9615 0.9622 0.9547 0.8006 1.0696 1.2224 1.0000 -1.73195E-14 
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Table VII-58 Macro decomposition scenario IE2 2007-2020 
Year ∆C total ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint  ∆Cypc ∆Cpop ∆Cemc  ∆Crsd 
          
2007-2008 1.0114 1.0016 0.9942 1.0289 0.9736 1.0138 1.0000 0.0000 
2008-2009 0.9192 1.0025 0.9918 1.0162 0.9046 1.0057 1.0000 0.0000 
2009-2010 0.9800 0.9975 0.9946 1.0078 0.9757 1.0045 1.0000 0.0000 
2010-2011 0.9936 0.9964 0.9970 0.9904 0.9999 1.0101 1.0000 0.0000 
2011-2012 0.9948 0.9933 0.9972 0.9822 1.0124 1.0100 1.0000 0.0000 
2012-2013 1.0017 0.9964 0.9988 0.9819 1.0149 1.0099 1.0000 0.0000 
2013-2014 1.0034 0.9962 0.9989 0.9813 1.0175 1.0098 1.0000 0.0000 
2014-2015 1.0044 0.9964 0.9988 0.9797 1.0202 1.0097 1.0000 0.0000 
2015-2016 1.0034 0.9979 0.9990 0.9774 1.0179 1.0118 1.0000 0.0000 
2016-2017 1.0033 0.9980 0.9989 0.9794 1.0157 1.0116 1.0000 0.0000 
2017-2018 1.0037 0.9980 0.9989 0.9798 1.0158 1.0115 1.0000 0.0000 
2018-2019 1.0035 0.9982 0.9988 0.9795 1.0159 1.0114 1.0000 0.0000 
2019-2020 1.0046 0.9986 0.9988 0.9826 1.0136 1.0112 1.0000 0.0000 
          
2007-2020 0.9260 0.9714 0.9663 0.8735 0.9912 1.1394 1.0000 -2.12053E-14 
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Table VII-59 Macro decomposition scenario IE3 2007-2020 
Year ∆C total ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint  ∆Cypc ∆Cpop ∆Cemc  ∆Crsd 
          
2007-2008 1.0113 1.0016 0.9942 1.0289 0.9735 1.0138 1.0000 0.0000 
2008-2009 0.9414 1.0065 0.9936 1.0345 0.9100 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
2009-2010 0.9868 0.9992 0.9957 1.0172 0.9749 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
2010-2011 1.0026 0.9994 0.9981 0.9952 1.0009 1.0091 1.0000 0.0000 
2011-2012 1.0047 0.9962 0.9985 0.9961 1.0050 1.0090 1.0000 0.0000 
2012-2013 1.0121 0.9987 1.0002 0.9913 1.0130 1.0089 1.0000 0.0000 
2013-2014 1.0133 0.9985 1.0003 0.9926 1.0130 1.0089 1.0000 0.0000 
2014-2015 1.0141 0.9992 1.0004 0.9928 1.0131 1.0088 1.0000 0.0000 
2015-2016 1.0110 0.9995 1.0002 0.9934 1.0081 1.0098 1.0000 0.0000 
2016-2017 1.0110 0.9996 1.0002 0.9933 1.0082 1.0097 1.0000 0.0000 
2017-2018 1.0113 0.9996 1.0002 0.9937 1.0083 1.0096 1.0000 0.0000 
2018-2019 1.0116 0.9996 1.0002 0.9939 1.0084 1.0095 1.0000 0.0000 
2019-2020 1.0118 0.9997 1.0002 0.9940 1.0085 1.0094 1.0000 0.0000 
          
2007-2020 1.0413 0.9973 0.9821 1.0157 0.9415 1.1118 1.0000 -2.13163E-14 
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Table VII-60 Macro decomposition scenario IE4 2007-2020 
Year ∆C total ∆Cffse ∆Crepe ∆Cint  ∆Cypc ∆Cpop ∆Cemc  ∆Crsd 
          
2007-2008 1.0113 1.0016 0.9942 1.0288 0.9736 1.0138 1.0000 0.0000 
2008-2009 0.9472 1.0064 0.9936 1.0324 0.9143 1.0034 1.0000 0.0000  
2009-2010 0.9927 0.9993 0.9956 1.0130 0.9717 1.0136 1.0000 0.0000  
2010-2011 1.0161 0.9947 0.9983 0.9886 1.0101 1.0246 1.0000 0.0000  
2011-2012 1.0270 0.9970 0.9991 0.9865 1.0206 1.0240 1.0000 0.0000  
2012-2013 1.0309 0.9969 1.0006 0.9842 1.0259 1.0234 1.0000 0.0000  
2013-2014 1.0360 0.9969 1.0009 0.9797 1.0361 1.0229 1.0000 0.0000  
2014-2015 1.0366 0.9970 1.0008 0.9845 1.0320 1.0224 1.0000 0.0000  
2015-2016 1.0282 0.9974 1.0006 0.9905 1.0209 1.0189 1.0000 0.0000  
2016-2017 1.0286 0.9975 1.0006 0.9910 1.0210 1.0186 1.0000 0.0000  
2017-2018 1.0282 0.9978 1.0006 0.9904 1.0213 1.0182 1.0000 0.0000  
2018-2019 1.0261 0.9978 1.0004 0.9930 1.0169 1.0179 1.0000 0.0000  
2019-2020 1.0265 0.9979 1.0004 0.9934 1.0171 1.0176 1.0000 0.0000  
          
2007-2020 1.2582 0.9786 0.9860 0.9553 1.0771 1.2673 1.0000 -2.4647E-14  
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